FAST CAPITALISM

An Interdisciplinary Journal

Volume 1 • Issue 2

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Fast Capitalism is an academic journal with a political intent. We publish reviewed scholarship and essays about the impact of rapid information and communication technologies on self, society and culture in the 21st century. We do not pretend an absolute objectivity; the work we publish is written from the vantages of viewpoint. Our authors examine how heretofore distinct social institutions, such as work and family, education and entertainment, have blurred to the point of near identity in an accelerated, post-Fordist stage of capitalism. This makes it difficult for people to shield themselves from subordination and surveillance. The working day has expanded; there is little down time anymore. People can 'office' anywhere, using laptops and cells to stay in touch. But these invasive technologies that tether us to capital and control can also help us resist these tendencies. People use the Internet as a public sphere in which they express and enlighten themselves and organize others; women, especially, manage their families and nurture children from the job site and on the road, perhaps even 'familizing' traditionally patriarchal and bureaucratic work relations; information technologies afford connection, mitigate isolation, and even make way for social movements. We are convinced that the best way to study an accelerated media culture and its various political economies and existential meanings is dialectically, with nuance, avoiding sheer condemnation and ebullient celebration. We seek to shape these new technologies and social structures in democratic ways.

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* We invite contributions on these and related issues. Some papers will stick close to the ground of daily life and politics; others will ascend the heights of theory in order to get the big picture. The work we publish is both disciplinary and interdisciplinary, bridging the social sciences and humanities. Culture and capital are keywords. We are also interested in cities, the built environment and nature, and we encourage people who theorize space to submit their work.

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Where in the World Are We? Elections, the Color Line, the Decline of Empire and Fireflies

Bernardine Dohrn

My middle son, Malik, was five-years old when my life partner/his father Bill got his doctorate. All four of us waited outside during Bill's dissertation defense with balloons and flowers. When Bill came out, Malik raced over to him, jumped up into his arms and then said, "Poppy, you're a doctor, right? But you're not the kind of doctor who can help anyone." [1]

That, of course, remains the dilemma for all graduates. You graduates are, we anticipate, the kind who can help.

Where in the world are we?

The graduating classes of Summer 2005 entered college or high school just at the turn of the millennium in the long-ago autumn of 2001, looking forward with the promise and privileges of stepping forth from the richest, most powerful, globally-dominant nation in human history. You have—as young adults today—almost no memory of the cold war, let alone a time of American isolationism or economic depression. You were awash in abundance relative to the rest of the world, even those of you who worked and sacrificed to graduate. You were raised in, soaked in, and shaped by an era of American triumphalism, empire, privilege, and apparent peace.

Yet you have graduated, just four years later, with that myopic worldview in ashes. Just as you began your student years, the brutal, criminal attacks of September 11, 2001 tore open the illusions; the shredded economy and loss of jobs, the consequences of deregulation and devolution that bankrupted state and local governments, the relentless punishment and imprisoning of over two million of your fellow citizens in America, flagrant corporate plunder and criminality, rolling blackouts, the apparently permanent war on terrorism, the shock and awe occupation of Iraq, systematic and degrading detention without trial, torture, and extrajudicial assassinations, and the establishment of a crescent of new U.S. military bases across the Middle East and South Asia—all have transformed whatever blissful myths were harbored as you prepared to enter college or high school.

Yet you graduates were not sound asleep. Many, during your past four years, have been struggling to come awake to a world in flames. Although your school years were characterized by the colossal new world ordering of war and occupation, you also came to connect with the ripples of insurgent resistance to power, the so-called "globalization from below"—manifest in the world social forums in Puerto Allegre and Mumbai, the international movement to abolish violence against women, the global effort for a safe environment, the surprisingly fierce partnerships for human rights, insurgent public health efforts to address the HIV-AIDs epidemic, the U.N. Durban Conference on Racism and Xenophobia, the campaign to abolish child soldiers, the popular peasant struggles against being charged for water in Bolivia, the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela, and the monumental global opposition to war on February 15, 2003. These are the incipient and activist communities with global reach who simultaneously represent the humanist alternative, the emancipatory.

The inability to stop the war in Iraq flowed into popular efforts to defeat Bush's '04 re-election.

This year, hundreds of thousands of young people had their first experiences with organizing, with talking politics to strangers, with knocking on doors in neighborhoods, with working a campaign in the buildup to the 2004

Presidential election. We had Barack Obama, swing weekends, and United for Peace and Justice, the RNC convened under siege in New York City, Move On, Code Pink, and Michael Moore. That is the good news. The bad news is that this monumental effort, media savvy, and creative hope did not go into building an independent radical movement—the only force that results in substantial change. The work was wiser than previously, the sectarian squabbles diminished and the tactical divides bridged—but the organizing did not (at least in the short run) feed into a stronger, more robust and effective radical movement. We know that real change comes from below. Lincoln did not free the slaves, Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not legalize unions, forge a social security net or end the depression, and LBJ did not support civil rights—without massive, independent and radical social movements insistent on justice, none of these presidents would have made those meanings in those particular moments of crisis and choice. So we have a choice: we can ride the waves of despair and powerlessness after November elections, or we can work to rebuild and recreate an independent, radical, participatory democratic movement.

Just thirty years ago, in the village of Ban Me Thuot at the Southern end of the Central Highlands, the South Vietnamese army broke and ran, tearing off their uniforms and returning to their homes as quickly as possible. The North Vietnamese and NLF (National Liberation Front) forces raced toward Than Son Hut airbase and Saigon where four days later they took the Presidential Palace and seized the former U.S. embassy where U.S. authorities frantically shredded documents and dollars, beat back their South Vietnamese allies and employees, and climbed from the roof onto the final evacuating helicopter. It was to be, despite the relentless predictions of a communist bloodbath, a relatively peaceful end to the U.S.'s longest war.

In the subsequent long War to Explain the War since that traumatic, final rout, the massive U.S. military/political defeat in Vietnam after twelve years (and five different presidents) of invasion, occupation, pillage and Vietnamization, is still in contention here in the "belly of the beast." This year, the media barely ran the footage of the U.S. final days in Vietnam on TV news or blogs, or the front pages, or the endless talk shows. It would be too eerie for the 150,000 U.S. troops today occupying Iraq with an analogous inability to "win." It would reilluminate the palpable vulnerabilities of overwhelming technical, military power. So our memory of that U.S. defeat more than a quarter of a century ago must be smudged, erased, recast, and revised. That defeat, it is claimed, was caused by the Failure to Stay the Course; it was that The Military Was Shackled; it was the Treason Within, not the contradictions of empire and resistance. So the tale is retold, and the veterans who returned to tell the truth—as today—are ridiculed and dismissed for their most heroic moments.

The wonder is that we (the broad "we") as a people assumed responsibility for what was being done in our name—for the role of our government in Vietnam, South Africa, Nicaragua, and Haiti and built an authentic, aroused and engaged opposition that grew and was sustained. Today, that is a memory which must be buried, rendered invisible, or criminalized and discredited. For all its limitations and although we were unable to stop the Vietnam War even when a large majority of the American people opposed it, that resistance remains an example of popular democratic activity which toppled two presidents and left behind a legacy which survives—even post 9/11[2]. Then as now, the administration failed to win hearts and minds, either in the country of occupation, or at home.

And then, as now, election cycles interrupted the anti-war and Black Freedom Movements, seduced young people to become active for the Least Worst Alternative, and led to crushing defeats for more "moderate" or anti-war candidates. The elections did not change the outcome of war or white supremacy: both were always bipartisan projects. They did not change the enormous unpopularity of the war—people massively opposed the war and were confident that the government was lying to them both before and after the election. Racism and the haunting legacy of slavery was to characterize much of the election discourse then and again today. Of course, we now talk race in a coded manner, rather than the crudities of the 1964 and 1968 Democratic and Republican National Conventions. But the understanding is universal: crime talk is race talk; fear talk is race talk; immigrant talk is race talk; and anti-gay talk is hate talk.

Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., at his most radical the year before his death, said: "The greatest purveyor of violence on this earth is my own country." That was 38 years ago. His words are as true in the twenty-first century. Today, with a revived empire and permanent war as the shape of U.S. triumphalism and barbarism, the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and a massive U.S. geopolitical unilateralism are spreading military outposts across Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Subcontinent, the Middle East, and the Pacific Rim. The goals include domination of oil and natural resource reserves by assuring supply and access, markets, labor, and investment; policing "unfriendly" or terrorist regimes and rebellious or independent nations; protecting U.S.-friendly regimes;

and containing and weakening China and India. It includes political and financial intervention in the democratic Bolivarian revolution of Venezuela, the militarization of Colombia, and the isolation of Chiapas. It involves a deadly quest for cultural and political hegemony.

Your parents and I, the so-called Sixties generation, were absolutely certain that we would leave you and our grandchildren a legacy of a better, more just, world. So much for certainty. You entered school on a privileged wave, but you step forth into a greater challenge—a more treacherous, unequal, divided, and inflamed global moment than the one we faced forty years ago.

So you will embrace your own time. You will live and have your breathing in the eye of this whirlwind.

And this is a breathtaking moment in American life. In large part, we North Americans don't know who we are and we don't know where we are.

Since 9/11, it is irrefutably apparent that we are a geographically challenged people. We are famous throughout the world for having trouble locating ourselves in time and space. I ask my students to locate Afghanistan on a map. Consternation. I challenge myself and them to draw a free-hand sketch of the six countries bordering Iraq. Pandemonium.[3]

National Geographic did a survey of 18-25 year old Americans and discovered that 85% could not locate Iraq. But 29% could not locate the Pacific Ocean, and even 11% of young Americans could not point to the United States on a map of the world. Michael Moore says that there ought to be an international law that says no one can bomb a country they can't find on a map. Such a law would lead to a precipitous drop in violence around the world.

I was in Rwanda with fifteen law students, my life partner Bill, and my son Chesa during the tenth anniversary of the genocide. In that sorrowfully beautiful country, a million people were killed in 100 days while the United States and world powers refused to use the "g" word [genocide] and failed to take the most simple, nonviolent steps to stop the slaughter.

In Rwanda, Chesa organized a visit to a dusty refugee camp on a barren hillside of 15,000 stateless people in Rwanda, half of them—like all refugees—children. There, a youngster in a mud floor classroom reached into his desk and pulled out a freehand map he had drawn of the world. On his map, this fourteen-year old pointed out Chicago. Chicago and North America are important to him. He needs urgently to know both where he is and where we are.

Who in the world are we? I ask my students: Is this a historic moment?? To a person, they think it is not. History is Nelson Mandela, Ella Baker, and Rosa Parks, or generals, inventors and presidents. It is the opposition to slavery and lynching, or to the gulags of Hitler and Stalin.

When Muhammad Ali refused to be inducted into the U.S. army and told the world, "no Vietcong ever called me nigger," he took the loneliest of decisions. No focus group approved, no foundation funded, no friends, family members, religious leaders or entourage supported him. And he did not know how it would turn out—that he would be recognized as a hero across Africa and around the world, and eventually recast here, decades later, as a great, cuddly lion.

So you act and take a stand, without knowing the outcome. You keep in play both the sense of opposition to systems of power, and your sense of engaged participation. Act with confidence yet simultaneously with the irreconcilable tension of the certainty that you will not be entirely right.

But this moment, your moment, is historic and pregnant with possibility. There is nothing inevitable about the final outcome of the occupation of Iraq, the acceleration of global warming, or the perpetuation of the world's richest 1% receiving as much income as the poorest 57%. These are human constructions and they can be transformed by human beings, acting both ethically and in concert.

One obstacle to your seizing this historic moment is the mythmaking about the Sixties.

Our son Malik once called out from the back seat of the car, "Pops, tell us the story about when you burned your credit card." "Whoa," said Bill, "I wasn't that radical! I burned my draft card but I need my credit card."

In too many ways, lore and legend about the Sixties can be a bludgeon, a barrier, and an obstacle for your generation. This is no time for nostalgia, and I surely am not urging you to do as we did. Your parents, your schools, your capable faculty have given you their best. Most of what you now need, we never knew or forgot to tell you.

When my son Zayd came back for Thanksgiving after his first two months away at college, he turned to me at our crowded, family holiday meal—and as the room seemingly fell silent he said, somewhat accusingly, "Mom, why didn't you tell me about Kierkegaard?" Touche. I read him all of Dickens, took him to every Shakespeare play, and at the last minute I even remembered to teach him how to iron, but Kierkegaard...

We are all works in progress, unfinished, and still learning. If every moment is historical, you are not a passive object of history but a subject in history. You too are makers of history.

Who in the world are we?

At the turn of the last century, W.E.B. DuBois famously wrote that the issue of the twentieth century would be the issue of the color line.

51 years ago, an extraordinary and unpredictable development resulting from decades of human initiative occurred. On May 17, 1954, the justices of the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision that shattered the cultural assumption of white supremacy and black inferiority. Its import cannot be overestimated. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned its own shameful history. It acknowledged 250 years of slavery and 100 years of Jim Crow. The decision in Brown v. Board of Education—actually five cases—imagined a nation of equal justice under the law.

That promise—and the triumph of a heroic group of parents, students and civil rights attorneys who toiled over two decades to breech that wall, to open up doors through which they could not travel—was immediately undercut by Brown II. "All deliberate speed," it turns out, came to mean "slowly." Brown II was a green light to subvert the equality ideal—and 50 years of hostile undermining of Brown followed: closing public schools, angry mobs confronting children, busing crises, reverse discrimination arguments, new forms of racial heirarchy, and schools now more highly segregated than ever. So today, we together face an incomplete revolution by the Black Freedom Movement—nine times as many African-Americans in prison today as in 1954—an equivocal reality that spills over into your century.

So what will be the issue of the twenty-first century? That critical question—how you will judge yourself and how history will judge you—is yours alone to identify and to seize. To fail to do so, to act as though we are at the end of history, is to submit to power, to perpetuate the silence of inequality and pain at home and abroad.

One great challenge of the twenty-first century will be to face the prospect of a declining American empire, the end of U.S. hegemony, the emergence of a multipolar world, and to face it with imagination and hope. It is likely that a half century from now the United States will not be a sole hyperpower, alone dominating the globe not only militarily but economically and culturally. Can we imagine such a future as an extension of human potential, an innovation, an opportunity, rather than an embattled, bitter decline?

Today the U.S. population is some 4.9% of the world's people but controls some 60% of the world's wealth, a certain formula for instability and crisis.

Can we anticipate a United States as one nation among nations, as a complexity of peoples and traditions, religions and narratives who have great inventions and unique strengths to offer the world community (we can start with jazz, baseball and the Bill of Rights)? Could your creativity in the sciences, philosophy, and international law prepare us for the possibility of participation without the unchecked imperative to dominate and subjugate? That will require, I caution, radical imagination. The answer is critical since the revival of civil society and human survival hang in the balance.

Yet, sober as the stakes are, don't forget the necessity of laughter. Humor stimulates the imagination and humor is generous. At the monumental women's march in June 2004, the Radical Cheerleaders wore pink panties over their clothing and on the panties was written: "weapons of mass seduction." We need the Onion, Aaron McGruder, and the Daily Show to give shape and voice to the contest between powerful systems of interests and the less powerful. A recent Onion headline read: "Massachusetts ups the ante: you can only marry people of the same sex." It carried a picture of two glum, anxious-looking guys, one saying, "I wanted to marry my girlfriend but I live in Massachusetts; I have to marry this guy."

The spoken word, theater, the arts, and the web can seize back the now-appropriated language of human rights, democracy and freedom, and reconnect them to complex and yeasty realities. Your imagination is as critical to resistance as are demonstrations, meetings, and leaflets. We have the stranglehold of consolidated corporate media and imbedded reporters, yet the insurgent and transgressive truth-telling of digital cameras and web videos breaks free from censorship and constraint. The connective tissue of what Jonathan Swift called "oratorical machines" now give us immediate access to Arundati Roy, Susan Sontag, Wole Soyinka, Rashid Khalidi, and Samir Amin—that imagined but actual, incipient community of independent intellectuals who yoke themselves to the sorrow and suffering of ordinary people.

Our biggest obstacle to forging an alternative tidal wave is the relentless drumbeat that tells us that what we do won't make a difference. Our own sense of despair or worse, cynicism, is a monumental, invisible barrier to social justice. President Bush, like Nixon before him, came out from the White House to announce to the press that he did

not notice the tens of millions in the streets across the world demanding peace and justice just before the invasion of Iraq, or the half million people in New York at the RNC. The press conference to say that it didn't matter. I think he noticed.

We are meant to feel marginalized and diminished, to retreat to privatized silence and slumber. We are encouraged and enticed not to act as if every human life is equally valuable: lives in Srebrenica, in Haiti, in the Sudan, Guatemala, South Central L.A., Palestine and Israel, and Oklahoma. We are intimidated into not acknowledging the humanity of the "enemy" or the "other."

But in my lifetime, young people have changed the world. They changed the world in Little Rock, Arkansas, in Selma, Alabama, and in Soweto. No one of us ever thought we would see a free and democratic South Africa in our lifetime. Yet, the young people of Soweto could not wait; against the wishes of their parents and teachers, without leadership from the African National Congress, with only their own urgent reading of their moment, they catapulted forward the end of apartheid. Young people changed the world at Tien An Mien and perhaps in Seattle. Young women, veterans, gays and lesbians, immigrants, and disabled activists too numerous to mention have transformed our landscape and shaped a world we readily take for granted.

Young people move us toward justice.

You can, each of you, open your eyes, go out to talk to people, learn from them and teach. I urge you to go outside your comfort zone, put yourself regularly—even just once or twice a week—with the dispossessed. Share food, listen hard, see how you can be changed and what you have to offer.

I wish for you just this: the courage to speak truth to power, the grit to become a witness to persecution and suffering, the audacity to be a dissenting voice in all conflicts with authority. And being a Midwest gal from the generation that wants it all, I also—we also—desperately want for you the sweet promises of fireflies in the summer, wondrous adventures, abundant love, and the pleasures of solitude.

The Irish poet Seamus Heaney wrote:

> History says, don't hope
> On this side of the grave
>
> But then, once in a lifetime
> The longed-for tidal wave
> Of justice can rise up
> And hope and history rhyme.

May we all experience that longed-for moment, where hope and history rhyme.

Endnotes

1. This article is adapted from a commencement address given by the author at Pitzer College.

2. The civil rights/anti-war legacy includes: serving as the cradle for multiple and radical movements (the women's movement, gay and lesbian movement, environmental movement, disability rights movement, the Puerto Rican independence movement, new labor organizing, and immigrant rights), the abolition of the draft, the Watergate "impeachment" of Nixon, exposure of the massive, secret, illegal FBI and CIA counterintelligence operation [COINTELPRO] that included assassination of Black Panther Party members, trumped-up charges, and dirty tricks (Deep Throat, Mark Felt himself, was convicted of these crimes and later pardoned by President Reagan), the War Powers Act and international law as constraints, and the failure to make movements illegal, despite some ten major conspiracy indictments, a Justice Department grand jury strategy, COINTELPRO assassinations and convictions, and the continued jailing of political prisoners.

3. The answer: Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria and Lebanon.

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Killing the Field of Dreams: George W. Bush, Empire and the Politics of Misrecogtion

Jeremy Varon

Robin Palmer and his crew of neophyte Weathermen were set for action. The plan was to firebomb after-hours six locations in New York City—a bank and two police stations among them—on December 1, 1970, a year to the day that Chicago police and the FBI murdered Black Panther leader Fred Hampton as he lay in his bed. The anniversary assault would both avenge Hampton's killing, which had catalyzed Weatherman's move underground, and amplify the budding "armed struggle" of white American radicals.

There was, however, the matter of Steve Weiner. Palmer had some experience with infiltrators. Sam Melville, the leader of an independent New York City bombing collective and Palmer's best friend, had been busted months earlier when he recruited undercover FBI agent George Demerle, known in radical circles for his brash talk of violence, to help him blow up military trucks. The sting landed Melville a fourteen-year prison sentence, cut short when he was fatally shot by a New York State trooper in the 1971 Attica uprising, and took down several others, but had narrowly missed Palmer.

Weiner lacked the crazed swagger of the provocateur Demerle, but still left Palmer uncomfortable. To assuage his doubt, Palmer got Weiner stoned and conducted a halfhearted interrogation—a technique Palmer later deemed "superficial by Weatherman standards." [1] Just shy of reassured, Palmer nonetheless apologized to Weiner for the embarrassing ritual. The last shudders of caution were stilled when Weiner suggested that the two patch things up by taking in a Mets game. "No Mets fan," Palmer comforted himself, "would be so unsportsmanlike as to infiltrate a group."

Palmer was captured en flagrant with petrol bombs destined for the First National Bank. He soon entered Attica prison where he joined Melville, who would die in his arms. Weiner had been sent straight from the FBI academy into undercover operations against radicals.

Weiner's offer of a Mets game stuck with Palmer for decades and stuck with me through my years of research in the 1990s on the Weather Underground. Immersed as I was through endless reading and interviews in the shocks of the late 1960s, it was comforting to know that there was still room—in between the Vietnam war and the war to end it, the assassinations, the rallies, riots, busts, and all the shouting and tears and blood and worry—for something so familiar, permanent, and seemingly incorruptible as baseball. It was the Mets no less, the lovable losers turned "Amazin's" on their World Series run in the summer of '69—a fairy-tale drama on the side of hope and togetherness, like the lunar landing or even Woodstock.

Baseball had substantial pedigree as a palliative for hard and scary times. The late, muckraking journalist Jack Newfield confessed that he might have gone crazy in the 1960s and early 1970s if not for his enduring belief in the existence of two Americas. One was the ugly America of the Vietnam War and Watergate, of bigotry and deceit. But there was another, truer, better America, epitomized for him by roots music like black gospel and by baseball. Baseball had never been fully pure, as Newfield, witness to Jackie Robinson's struggle, knew so well. But it had managed to stay just ahead of the times on issues like race, to rise above periodic division and strife, and to dig below the pocked

surfaces of cynicism and doubt to some deep American spring of faith in the power of possibility, renewal, and fair play. In light of these associations, familiar to anyone in baseball's grand church, Palmer's reassurance at the offer of a ballgame made perfect sense to me, as did his sense of betrayal. A "Mets' fan". . . the scoundrel!

More than thirty years later, baseball again did valuable service to the cause of healing and hope. The Mets, by reputation still the gritty, blue-collar alternative to their perennially dominant cross-town rival, paid ceaseless tribute to fallen firemen and police officers. The Yankees, for all the soulless preppie power of their arch-capitalist owner, put a wounded city on their backs, nearly carrying it with late-inning heroics in the fall of 2001 to the fleeting heaven of champions. The pain of the game seven World Series loss seemed drowned in fans' gratitude for the wild ride; a stadium sign played tricks on time and memory in its sweet plea to relish the moment: "These are the good old days." The ominous quality of the Series' metaphor—that superior wealth and firepower do not guarantee victory, that even the mighty Yankee empire has its limits—had not yet kicked in.

Two years following, with the "liberation" of Afghanistan and Iraq complete and signs of quagmire only just emerging, the Yankees' improbable victory over the Red Sox seemed an affirmation of the order of things: the eternity of New York, empire, and myth (the Curse!), but also the impossibility, within a primordial Calvinist cosmology, of the expiation of sin. The Red Sox's unfathomable victory over the Yankees and World Series title a year later blew open all doors of certainty: reality can overcome myth, nothing—including empires—lasts forever, and anything, indeed, is possible. Whether baseball, in a new era of war and worry, was now more compelling for its distracting drama or its richly ambivalent allegories (and how to choose between "the Evil Empire" and "the Idiots" anyhow?) seemed a matter of taste. All the while, another black man threatened to surpass Babe Ruth's home run total, but this time without the demeanor of a cautious upstart or such intense white backlash. Call it progress.

There was, however, the matter of steroids. For all the epic storylines and shattered records, this has been no golden age for baseball. Rather, it has been the great era of moral rot, caused by the systematic violation for at least two decades of the game's literal and metaphorical essence: fair play. Robin Palmer's story of betrayal, however poignant for its own day, simply could not work any longer, as no one in his or her right mind would now equate baseball with sportsmanship, let alone innocence. Even the recent "good old days" weren't.

Having squandered its status as refuge, baseball has itself become, in part, more refuse—both a symbol and instance of American ugliness. The tenor of our troubled times can be easily read off this tarnished sign. Consider the March 17, 2005 congressional hearings on steroid use. Before a television audience and a crush of media, ghoulish counsels for the Commissioner's Office and Players' Union alike made solemn allusions to a grave problem, but took no responsibility whatsoever for it. Home-run hero Mark McGwire, looking more like a sallow, middle-aged father than Paul Bunyan, insisted that he was "not here to talk about the past" and repeatedly invoked his lawyer's advice that he keep mum about what he might have seen and done. [2] Curt Schilling, invited as the loud-mouthed whistle-blower, scrambled on his wrecked ankle back across the thin white line protecting obscenely wealthy cheats and crooks. Grandstanding politicians, claiming no mandate to do anything in particular, balanced maudlin admonitions with fawning praise of the people they were meant to interrogate.

Even the most myopic sports fan could not help but sense that he had seen this all before. He of course had, whether in the fleeting Enron and WorldCom hearings, the grueling 9-11 Commission inquiry, the hearings on pre- and post-9-11 intelligence failures, or those on torture at Abu Ghraib prison, partially reprised by the confirmation process of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. Wherever one looked, the tropes of corruption and cowardice were more or less the same. Plausible deniability, blame shifting, and the exculpatory insistence on the value of "moving forward" serve as universal alibis. In the face of tragic messes, caused in part by awful decisions and staggering negligence, the past is somehow not the issue. (Bush had initially resisted the formation of a 9-11 Commission; Condoleezza Rice, who at first refused to testify, thought it best not to dwell on such things as an August 6, 2001 memo titled, "Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside United States.") No one—or everyone, and hence, no one, as per the claim that all credible sources thought Iraq had WMD—is to blame. Indeed, everyone, in the protective cant of high officialdom, serves "honorably" (excepting zealous truth-tellers like former U.N. inspector Scott Ritter), no matter how disgraceful the actual conduct. And scarcely anyone has to lose his or her job or go to prison, save at the bottom of a mystified chain of command or lucrative pyramid. [3] The "price" for the grandest failures, as in the case of former CIA Director George Tenet, is the award of the Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian honor. Hence, an American era of crime not only without punishment, but with ritual reward and a career ladder that at its lofty rungs allows one to "fail upward." (Consider Rice's promotion to Secretary of State, Paul Wolfowitz's

appointment as the head of the World Bank, or the ascendance of Gonzales, who as White House counsel advocated that the United States disregard Geneva Convention restrictions on torture.)

The weave between the fractured worlds of baseball, politics, and high finance grows more disturbing as one speculates about the origins of the steroids scandal. How and why, beyond the timeless lure of competitive advantage, did steroid use grow so rampant in the mid-1990s? In the wake of the 1994 strike, attendance was sharply down and fans in near-mutiny. So baseball, according to one hypothesis, bio-fueled its revival by having super-sized players launch bombs to cheering crowds. Bigger muscles and smaller ballparks made for more home runs, enhanced drama, heightened demand, fatter contracts, pricier tickets, and bigger revenues. Far from honest dupes, the owners, according to one critic, all but encouraged "the jettisoning of the game's subtlety" in favor of "home-run madness," no matter how achieved. (Bissinger 2005:A35) Within this power and profit-driven logic, baseball has a blacker eye, but also its surest alibi. The fans, getting and paying for what just what they wanted, became complicit in their own deception; they never demanded, after all, that laws and tradition be honored in the giving and found a way to rationalize cartoonishly brawny bodies and garish statistical anomalies. The sports media, itself a cause and beneficiary of baseball's highlight-friendly resurrection, failed to ask the tough questions with sufficient stamina and bite.

Toggle back to politics, and a similar sense of collective shame emerges. After 9-11, much of America demanded of its government only that it be kept safe, imposing neither moral restrictions on how it should be done, nor a rational standard for what makes the country truly safer. What should have sounded great ethical alarms—civilian casualties in Afghanistan equaling the nearly 3,000 lost on 9-11; [4] reports years ago of the "extraordinary rendition" to foreign countries of terror suspects and their likely torture in the CIA's secret, global gulag; [5] the putatively indefinite internment in Guantanamo Bay of many ordinary men, landed there by bribes and vendettas—caused barely a peep. Without the public either explicitly asking for it or, certainly, disavowing it, terror and human rights abuse became standard means for fighting alleged terrorists and human rights abusers.

The story of broad complicity in the Iraq saga is equally sorry. Media belief in the Bush administration's hype of Iraqi WMD was near universal. [6] Even the New York Times, savaged by the right for its anti-Bush posture, admitted to having failed its own journalistic standards and role as watchdog in its faulty reporting on WMD and passive acceptance of administration claims. [7]At its tragic-comic worst, a dumbfounding percentage of the public held onto its belief in a great lie—that of Iraqi involvement in the September 11 attacks—that even the Bush administration was forced to renounce. [8] This life-and-death drama of shared, willful delusion was presaged by the accounting scandals of Enron, Arthur Anderson, et. al. In the "go-go '90s," with stock ownership expanding and profits soaring, corporate America heard thunderous public cries for gleaming annual reports and giddy share values. They heard less often and loudly, perhaps—the demand that it all be done above board. Far from a few bad apples, orchards of the unscrupulous thus conjured virtual profits to adorn all but phony companies. Outrage and subpoenas followed only when key institutions and people-investment banks and legions of pensioners among them-began losing vats of money.

By having its players juiced, baseball irrevocably cooked its books, such that its vaunted records and the hallowed past they represent no longer make sense. Unlike the criminal forgeries at Enron, the cost is not measured in ruined portfolios, but in the loss of its most precious, if abstract, possession: its integrity. With the loss, baseball takes its place alongside politics and corporate capitalism in forming an era of permanent scandal, never-ending investigation, and inexpugnable asterisks. And who has presided over this recent rotting of the American kingdom? A failed corporate executive, rewarded with ownership of the Texas Rangers' baseball franchise (whose new stadium was first named Enron Field), turned master of lies and delusions. . . of course!.

Baseball provides here a summertime metaphor for a political and cultural condition that could be described by more direct means. The core issues disclosed in the metaphor, however, seem necessary predicates for broaching the broad assignment of this essay: assessing what light Sixties'-era radicalism may shed on popular resistance today. By my judgment, the aching distance between then and now, notwithstanding resurgent activism and the similarities between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, is most apparent; the withered salience of Robin Palmer's invocation of baseball underscores, above all, that distance.

We currently live in an era of the open secret in which mechanisms for stopping political crimes and holding the offenders to account seem to have broken down beyond reckoning or repair. While the 1960s and early 1970s were rife with outrages, this one—defined by the absence of remotely effective outrage at outrageous governmental

conduct—seems new, certainly in degree and likely in kind; its hold on American public life obviates any simple effort to mine from the past a sense of what is to be done today. The first task is to take closer stock of the affliction, and though limited reference to the past is helpful with this, any grander comparison of then and now will have to wait until outrage again has some consequence.

To indict the Bush administration's roguish conduct and obsession with secrecy, the repentant Nixon aide John Dean (2004) wrote a book titled Worse than Watergate. Indeed, lying one's way into a war by "fixing" intelligence around predetermined agendas dwarfs the Nixon administration's use of dirty tricks against political opponents and attempts to cover it up. [9] Even worse, however, has been the conspicuous immunity with which the Bush presidency has savaged the truth and the public's trust. The offenses comprising Watergate, one may argue, were hardly the worst of the Nixon administration (consider, by comparison, the 1972 mining of North Vietnamese harbors or the U.S.-aided coup in Chile in 1973). Even so, Watergate brought deep shame on Nixon and functioned as at least a partial vindication of the antiwar movement and even the counterculture. (Disgust with Nixon was so pervasive that I recall, as a young boy in 1975, finding it hard to find any adult who would admit to having voted for him in 1972.) Watergate served, moreover, as the watershed for an era in public life, albeit brief and inadequate, of atonement and reconciliation, of institutional reform and the imposition of meaningful checks on state power. [10]

However much an object of half-blind devotion, Bush never enjoyed consensus support for his policies. Just after 9-11, some Americans, and New Yorkers especially, protested that their "grief is not a cry for war" and greeted core aspects of the "war on terror" with the slogan "Not in My Name." Many more were vocal in their view that the administration sought to frighten America into war in Iraq and bully the international community into signing off on it. Every suspicion of administration critics has been confirmed, and then some: that there were no Iraqi weapons of mass destructions; that the administration set up the U.N. inspections to fail in order to enhance its causus belli; that Colin Powell's portentous "case" before the United Nations of Iraqi WMD had no basis in fact; that the White House overrode intelligence doubting the existence of an active Iraqi nuclear weapons program, while Cheney fatuously put the fear of Armageddon into middle America; [11] and that the war's main boosters egregiously miscalculated its human and financial cost.

Former counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke appeared to seal the damning case by reporting that the Bush administration was shamefully slow-footed in dealing with the demonstrable threat Al Qaeda posed and zealously determined to see some phantom Iraq-9-11 connection as a prelude to a U.S. attack. His response to Secretary Rumsfeld's talk on September 12, 2001, of "getting Iraq"—that it would be akin to "our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor"—captured with epic gumption the administration's ludicrous resolve to have its coveted invasion. (Clark 2004:31-32). And then followed the cruelest cut, the release in April 2002 of the Abu Ghraib prison photos and accompanying revelation that the mistreatment of Iraqi detainees had been both extensive and grotesque. A prison complex notorious during Hussein's regime as a place of torture had become notorious, under the U.S. occupation, as a place of torture. With this hard fact, the moral case for Iraq's "liberation" and America's claim of world-saving benevolence had been ruthlessly undercut. [12]

Each revelation brought to Bush's foes a sense of vindication (if vastly more bitter than sweet) and the reasonable expectation that some vital line had at last been crossed: that resignations, dismissals, indictments, or even impeachment proceedings would soon follow, wrapped in a grave sense of constitutional and moral crisis. One could plausibly imagine at the moments of greatest shock that American wrath would turn inward, bringing down its false prophets of security and restored glory in a torrent of public recrimination, and that the country would soon emerge on a vastly different track. Short of that, surely the American people, by all rights indignant at being fooled once, would vote Bush out of office. For those in the anti-Bush camp, continued faith in the basic rationality of the political universe seemed to depend on the playing out of this primitive correlation between truth and consequences. Just to be sure that the equation still held, millions of Americans threw themselves into the campaign for Bush's electoral defeat as if it were a transcendent calling to save the nation's honor and soul. As if by agreement, liberals, leftists, and radicals withheld building robust social movements on the causes that mattered to them, whether the environment or even opposition to the war. Instead, all energy fed a single, over-arching goal: beating Bush.

The perfect storm of anti-Bush resolve and resources seemed to gather. Unprecedented millions flowed into the coffers of an uncommonly united Democratic Party. A flood of acrimony, from the left especially, quickly drowned Ralph Nader's spoiler candidacy into statistical irrelevance. Progressives at last cracked the mainstream punditocracy and even got their own talk-radio station. A cottage industry of books of the "George Bush is a Dirty, Rotten, Semi-literate Idiot" variety sprang up to document his every lie and malapropism. Michael Moore stuffed his blockbuster

documentary with unsparing derision and, in the image of a bereaved soldier's mother literally cursing the White House, heart-rending denunciation of the president. Hip-hop mogul Russell Simmons registered young minority voters in droves, while Bruce Springsteen led a star-studded tour of anti-Bush rockers through the swing states. Grass-roots groups like the satirical Billionaires for Bush used media-friendly wit and glamour to energize the anti-Bush faithful and educate the undecided about Republican class warfare. [13] The GOP unwisely chose New York City-claimed by Bush as the symbolic center of his "war on terror," but in truth the quintessence of multicultural, blue-state hostility-as the site of its nominating convention. (Bush would lose the five boroughs by a staggering two million votes.) And a small army of volunteers descended on Florida, Pennsylvania, and Ohio to make sure that "irregularities" not tilt this time a Democratic victory into a Republican upset. Finally, Senator John Kerry, whatever his patrician air and fickle voting record, brought to the fight great dignity, debating skill, and, as a decorated combat veteran and Harley Davidson rider, a conspicuously manly pedigree.

George Bush of course won, this time taking the popular vote by more than two million. His victory, in spite of the glaring wreckage of his presidency, is the defining fact and riddle of our political era. To be sure, the administration's misdeeds elicited obligatory hand-wringing, tepid apologies for the worst treatment of Iraqis, all manner of investigations, recommendations, and revised protocols, a few decent Supreme Court decisions limiting executive power, moments of Congressional indignation (notably, Senator Robert Byrd's jeremiads), and a groundswell of popular opposition. But when given the easy chance to at last reject Bush's tragic folly, some critical mass of "the people"—the vaunted sovereign and where the buck presumably stops—refused, as if they did not know, or did not care, or could not accept that they had been so grossly mislead, disrespected, and endangered.

The other half of the voting public was left crushed and shaken in its civic faith. Bitterness and sanctimony aside, one could not help but feel that Bush had held on to American hearts and minds by some means other than a conscientious, rational appeal. The case for his administration, prima facie, seemed neither credible nor persuasive. How could people not know or not care what it had done? Explanations for the outcome quickly piled up: that is what the four million evangelicals Republican strategist Karl Rove allegedly brought out this time to the polls; the surprise choice of so many voters to put "moral values" first in choosing their president; more cynically, the diversionary, eleventh-hour focus in key states on "culture war" issues like gay marriage; the rigid ideological demographics of a "divided America" tilting slightly in Bush's favor; or, correcting for all this, that a majority of voters simply felt safer with Bush in office ("It was 9-11, stupid!"). But each of these, if valuable as partial accounts, seemed incapable of solving a puzzle that seemed to stretch beyond the realm of certainty and the explanatory power of social science. Perhaps the intermittent campaign charge that Bush was "out of touch with reality" now held the vital clue. By this speculative drift, Bush had, above all, invited his supporters to participate in an alluring fantasy. In the world it imagined, all the comforting platitudes of his campaign held, no matter the mountain of highly public evidence to the contrary: that America is blessed with special virtue and divine favor; that its global enemies simply resent and envy its freedom; that the nation and the world are safer for Hussein's removal, and by that alone the war is just; that America only promotes, and never violates, human rights; that Iraq is fast on the road to democracy, and that the war is going well; that no important mistakes were made, and indeed that nothing could have or should have been done otherwise. Bush's victory, if rooted in this stubborn delusion, represents nothing less than the victory over—or ingenious (mis)construction of—reality. Long live the American myth of innocence!

Frustration on the left with the apparent blindness of the electorate or even "the people" is nothing new. It was certainly felt in the 1960s, when leftists had to contend with the enduring support of much of America for a war vastly more destructive than that in Iraq. And Nixon, in spite of the war's mounting toll and the sturm und drang of domestic protest, won in 1972 by a landslide. Nonetheless, there prevailed in most dissident quarters a basic faith in the judgment and capacity for initiative of the American people. One observer described that faith with respect to the war: "We assume that most Americans don't 'really' will the Vietnam war but are morally asleep and brainwashed . . . that there has been a usurpation by a hidden government which makes policy, and that an awakened populace can throw it off." [14] Hence, the effort over years to awaken the populace through education and protest, and, when power still proved deaf to antiwar appeals, to disrupt directly the war machine. But what to do, as now seems the case, when the theft occurs in plain view and is widely ignored in a seeming state of waking sleep? A more radical inquiry in the late 1960s into the will of the people asked how close America was to revolution, why "the masses" did not yet want some apocalyptic, social transformation, whether the "objective interests" of working-class whites lay on the side of empire or the world's oppressed, and so on. Somewhat fanciful even in its own time, such talk is light years from being relevant today. At issue is a far less ambitious awakening: merely having a fraction more than

fifty percent of voters unseat a new, amply exposed usurper in favor of a candidate who in truth offered only modest alternatives on contentious issues like the war in Iraq or U.S. trade policy. If America can't do even that, the madness is not the president's, but ours.

To credit Bush's victory, in part, to a pervasive misrecognition of reality is to pose multiple analytic challenges and to invite diverse objections or even offense. The thesis plainly asserts that Bush's supporters possess a false picture of both his administration and the world. They are victims, therefore, of "ideology" as that mechanism which forces, by a standard definition, the "divergence between so-called social reality and [a] distorted representation, [a] false consciousness of it." [15]Whether an essentially naïve and manipulated consciousness holds this false picture remains an open question. The model of willful delusion sketched above suggests that something else is going on today—something akin to the subjects of the naked king in the famous fable insisting that he is clothed when they can clearly see that he is not. In this instance, the naiveté, paradoxically, is a choice. Whatever the case, there seems in the inscrutability and even shock of the election result new cause for ideology critique, less as the unmasking of false pictures than as an effort to understand the complex means by which ideology now works. The condescension implied by the endeavor—that Bush backers have reality wrong—is unavoidable, even if partisan bullying is not the point.

Skepticism may come from a rather different camp. The notion of misrecognition invokes a premise long contested by the postmodern habit of mind: that there exists a stable reality "out there" than can be represented in ways more or less truthful. Reality and truth, decades of postmodern theory counseled, are contingent social constructions, all but obviating the category of raw cognitive error and the forms of ideology critique that draw on it. Moreover, postmodern thinking has doubted the existence of an epistemological ground from which judgments of truth and error could even be made. The main goals, of course, were to destabilize dominant constructions of reality by knocking out their metaphysical supports; to valorize the claims of dissident and marginalized groups; and to argue the benefits of liberation from "the truth"—as a prime weapon of the powerful—altogether. That said, a portion of postmodern animus was always directed at the Marxist hermeneutic of truth and error, the stipulation—with its hoary vanguardism—of "false consciousness," and the historic implication of these in systems of domination. With whatever irony, political conservatism and theoretical experimentalism may share hostility to self-professed bearers of truth.

Neither camp, however, need feel so scandalized. A dialectics of truth and error has a venerable place in the metaphysical heritage of "the West" or the "Judeo-Christian" world. Its root is the Platonic insistence that things are not as they conventionally appear—indeed, that reality comes to us in distorted form. The deepest knowledge entails piercing the fleeting realm of appearances to apprehend things as they essentially are. Centuries of Christian theology sustained this duality of appearance and essence by positing that the true nature of divinity is largely concealed, whether by the intricacies of the divine text, the distraction of heresies, or the mystifying otherness of God himself. Union with the divine, never made easy, requires special qualities of insight, piety, or faith. In more modern and experiential terms, the evangelical notion of being "awakened" or "born again" posits that one may long dwell in sinful ignorance of God's love, only to be brought into the saving light of faith by which one then "sees" the reality of God's immanence. A social application of this principle, moreover, is endemic to modern, American religious conservatism. Abortion foes, for example, commonly claim that a "baby Holocaust" is daily taking place; the urgent task is to get Americans to see the truth of this moral horror behind the ideological haze of a supposed right to privacy and, once awakened, purge the sinful conduct from the nation. If one can accept these kinds of individual and collective passage from darkness to light, why not also the possibility that a false prophet on the political right can condemn his voting flock to a dangerous blindness?

Conversely, a postmodernist on the left may find it hard to do without at least soft versions of "the truth" and "reality." How else does one make either the straightforward charge that, for instance, the "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" falsified Kerry's record in Vietnam, or more ambitiously, that Bush has promulgated fraudulent narratives about the motives for and course of the Iraq war? Somewhat tendentiously, as Ed Rothstein argued in 2001 in the New York Times just after 9-11 that postmodern relativism, taken to its extreme, leaves one powerless to condemn evil such as the Al Qaeda attacks. The logic of Rothstein's admonition, turned against its intent, also limits the power to denounce the wrongfulness, if not outright evil, of the Bush administration. A postmodernist may want to squander neither capacity, even if it means tempering skepticism and analytic acrobatics.

This may be the time, moreover, for ardent postmodernists to keep open minds regarding concepts like "truth,"

"reality," and "narrative" that have long been the objects of their critical gaze. 9-11 has scrambled the meaning and agency of these terms. Merely reflecting on whether the attacks and their complex aftermath have repudiated or confirmed the postmodern condition induces a kind of interpretive vertigo. Did 9-11 not represent, according to the eminent theorist-provocateur Slavoj Zizek, the crashing in of the Real, with its very literal load of death, on a culture long protected in the bubble of its projections and virtual realities? That tragic day thus forced America's rediscovery of "the world"—both as a vast space of suffering beyond its privileged borders, and as the realm of reference as such beneath the scrim of the hyper-real. [16] And yet, in 9-11's wake, hasn't the world been banished from America once again, its sufferings-including American war deaths—kept mostly out of sight and out of mind? And hasn't "reality" seemed as fungible as ever-the plaything not only of dreary television shows, but of partisans and propagandists, the coveted prize in newly raging discourse wars tethered to an election of global importance? The indeterminacy of our current moment demands permitting the existence of multiple and even contradictory logics, such that "reality" and "truth" both do and do not have substance, that our age may be both supremely ideological and post-ideological all at once.

Ideology as "false consciousness," a concept known to any college sophomore, comes of course from Marx. It describes the state of ignorance of the wage-working masses regarding the nature of their oppression and the path to their liberation. Marx sought, however, to explain and not merely decry this ignorance and its benefit to capitalists. In the mature theory of Capital, the root of false consciousness lies in the reification or fetishism inherent in commodity exchange, whereby social relations among people are mistaken for economic relations between things. Far from a simple failure of vision, this mystification is the condition of possibility for the operation of capitalism itself. To cast it off is to enter the road of freedom, but also to imperil the context for one's social existence, however much already compromised or degraded. This awakening is therefore neither easily done nor even embraced. Workers may have had nothing to lose but their chains, but Marx could understand their odd comfort in remaining bound.

Italy's Antonio Gramsci greatly enriched Marx's critique of ideology in ways especially fruitful for future theory and resonant in our time. According to Gramsci, ideology is not a more or less static effect of a mystifying structure. Rather, it is dynamic and often unstable, sustained by processes of hegemony in which the ruling class makes its values and ambitions those of the people it exploits. The misrecognition on the part of the exploited thus occurs as a debilitating identification with classes, points of view, and sensibilities antithetical to their true identity and interests. And because ideology functions mostly through discourse, not repression, this illusory sense of affinity is overwhelmingly voluntary; hence, the vital questions for political actors of who controls the means of ideological production, how those means are used, and which discourses-whether those of the media, the state, or the education system-most powerfully condition popular belief and practice. Finally, hegemony can be at least partially undone by commandeering discursive power. Class conflict, within this model, largely takes the form of discourse wars over the interpretation or representation of social reality.

Herbert Marcuse, the arch-theorist for 1960s radicals worldwide, substantially separated ideology from class oppression as such. Advanced capitalism, he asserted in the early 1960s, had neither a single locus of power nor class of victims; its destructive capacities, such as ecological devastation and existential impoverishment, imperiled everybody. But Marcuse retained the charge that "the system"—still predicated on logics of domination benefiting a corporate-political elite-sustains itself by inducing pervasive loyalty to it. The means for this were forms of "one-dimensional" thought and culture ranging from instrumental rationality, to a vapid media, to the ethos of conspicuous consumption. Their effect was to dramatically inhibit critical or "negative" thinking by reinforcing the illusion that the existing world is the best, and indeed only possible, world. The limited dissent that did exist was quickly neutralized by being absorbed into the political and cultural mainstream or, as in the case of the rage of poor urban blacks, pushed to the distant margins of public concern. In the face of this, Marcuse encouraged anyone so inclined to participate in "the Great Refusal" of the system in its totality.[17]How heartened he was, then, to see so many takers for his audacious plea, who would help make "the Sixties" happen.

However intermittently influential for the American left, ideology critique of the sorts outlined above fell into almost total disfavor from the mid-1970s on. The decline partly reflected a broad shift among progressives from a politics of class to one of identity. Left-wing intellectuals developed a new appreciation of the complexities of power and a new humility regarding the ability to demarcate "reality" with any great certainty or script how people "should" think and act. And with the right seizing the mantle of populism from at least the days of Ronald Reagan, anything from the mouth of candidates suggesting cynicism as to the thoughtfulness and good judgment of "the people"

smacked of an intolerable elitism that only strengthened the conservative hand.

What a surprise, then, to see in this last election cycle the evocation of the spirit (though not the letter) of decades of accumulated, broadly Marxist wisdom. Loosen from Gramsci's model its focus on class and its normative commitments, and it anticipates today's recognition of the central importance of language in political struggle. The province of neither the left or right, this awareness can everywhere be seen: in the obsessive charge of each that its rival controls the media and drenches it with bias; in the consensus crediting of the right's success to its ability to define the terms of debate by disciplining its ranks in the use of specific words and "talking points"; in the desperate attempt of the Democrats to reframe debates, whether by stealing from the Republican playbook or taking the more targeted instruction of the progressive socio-linguist George Lakoff; and in pundits' assessments of how the Republican Party presented the more compelling "narrative" of the country's destiny and how its candidate would take it there. Among the mainstream media, it is more and more assumed that American politics is a contest not over who has the truer or better picture of the world according to some normative criterion (such as what might be most beneficial for the country), but rather over whose picture is more effective in garnering publicity, financial contributions, and votes. [18]

More surprising still has been the return with such great vengeance of an unapologetically class-based and militantly partisan version of ideology critique-one that, at bottom, accuses the Republican Party of mass deception and the American people of mass stupidity. I refer here to Thomas Frank's (2004) brilliant preelection study What's the Matter with Kansas?, a book that almost functions as a metonym for a growing species of defiant, progressive critique of political conservatism. Too easily appreciated (or dismissed) simply as an entertaining polemic, Frank's landmark study of American political consciousness warrants close scrutiny.

In the question posed by his title, Frank really asks what's the matter with America. His answer can be easily summarized: working- and middle-class Americans should be livid with the corporate-political class, represented most purely by the Republican Party. It uses trade agreements, tax cuts for the wealthy, corporate welfare, and all manner of deregulation to outsource their jobs, destroy their family farms, bankrupt their cities and towns, crush their unions, make health care unaffordable, and mortgage their children's future. (The devastation is especially acute in Frank's native Kansas, which he describes with intimate sorrow.) But instead of shunning their structural adversary, legions of suffering Americans dutifully vote Republican and effectively support the policies that bring them ruin. He laments, "people getting their fundamental interests wrong is what American political life is all about. This species of derangement is the bedrock of our civic order" (2004:7). Without once uttering the word "Marx," he argues that America is awash in plainly false consciousness.

Frank's ingenuity comes in his revelation of how the derangement is essentially a ruse. Americans, and red state dwellers especially, feel plenty of rage against elites. But rather than directing it at their economic overlords, they aim for an alleged cultural elite that is stereotypically liberal, secular, educated, urban, politically correct, well-connected, and "effete." This "elite," in the phantasmatic construction of cultural conservatives, is destroying their values with its decadence, their pride with its condescension, and the certainties of their faith with its relativizing intellectualism. At once instigators and opportunists of misplaced anger, Republican leaders essentially buy the loyalty of voters-and therefore support for their corporate agenda—with largely rhetorical patronage in perpetually raging culture wars. In these, they play the down-home heroes of their humble countrymen, while castigating the opposition as inauthentic, out-of-touch, and un-American.

For the conservative rank-and-file, the seeming bargain is less a fair trade than a raw deal, as the point of its true beneficiaries is not actually to win the culture wars, and the tangible gains are indeed few. Rather, the point is to keep large swaths of the public endlessly fulminating at an illusory foe and squarely within the Republican camp. (Hence, Frank's observation that indignation, as bellows from any conservative talk radio station, is the quintessential pose of the cultural warrior.) Furthermore, Frank describes what he bluntly calls "the trick": "Vote to stop abortion; receive a rollback in capital gains taxes. . . Vote to get government off our backs; receive conglomeration and monopoly everywhere from media to meatpacking," and so on (p.7). Instead of the Great Refusal, in sum, Americans have opted for "the Great Backlash," defined by a tragic contradiction: "it is a working-class movement that has done incalculable, historic harm to working-class people."(2004:6)

Frank's study is not without its tensions and flaws. By his read, culture wars are for their master-architects essentially diversionary, such that losses are eminently acceptable. One may observe that popular entertainment is choked with gratuitous sex and violence, despite conservatives' vocal offense at this; that Will and Grace is a beloved sitcom, despite right wing disgust at the purported imposition of "the gay agenda" on good Americans. By a

thousand measures, conservatives are losing on issues where their passion seems strongest, and Frank helps explain why. Frank, however, overlooks that some cultural warriors are dead set on actually winning and minimizing their very real victories-from functionally eliminating abortion services in much of rural America, to constitutionally blocking same-sex marriage at the state level, to stacking the federal judiciary with conservatives. In structural terms, Frank asserts the primacy of the economic so forcefully that culture becomes little more than a repository for misplaced economic grievances. Like so much Marxism, he thus denies culture its limited autonomy and the legitimate stake of activists, whether of the right or the left, in morality as such.

In addition, Frank leaves rather murky just how this grand ruse is orchestrated. Who was so ingenious as to first figure out and then coordinate it, year after year, election after election? At times, Frank implies the existence of a plutocratic Republican minority that shrewdly calls the shots. At other times, the ruse seems less the doing of a literal conspiracy of rich guys and their strategists than a mechanism built into the operation of corporate capitalism itself, whose players become incidental functionaries of a structural logic. In this model, something as abstract as "capital" becomes the preeminent agent of American politics and culture. Specifying the precise means by which ideology functions is admittedly difficult, but doing so may be crucial for its sabotage. Moreover, the New Democrat Bill Clinton, with NAFTA and welfare "reform," himself advanced a free market agenda largely without summoning for cover the tropes of the culture wars (his upbraid of Sister Soulja and obvious Bubba-appeal are modest exceptions). This begs the question of how much the rich really need the culture wars to get what they most want.

These limitations, however, hardly compromise the polemical and even analytical power of Frank's study. Frank articulates with an appropriate sense of horror the virtual psychosis afflicting America: "The country seems like a panorama of madness and delusion worthy of Hieronymus Bosch: of sturdy blue-collar patriots reciting the pledge while they strangle their own life chances; of proud farmers proudly voting themselves off the land; of devoted family men carefully seeing to it that their children will never be able to afford college or proper health care" (p. 10). In such rhetoric, penned before the election, Frank enunciates the same basic stupefaction in which I wrapped my account of Bush's victory, the same anguished bewilderment at Americans' apparent choice to be, in his phrase, "happy captives." [19] He has, in short, the problem right.

Frank's anguish derives almost exclusively from an analysis of domestic politics, and mine from Bush's foreign policy. Yet, Frank provides material for linking in new ways domestic and foreign concerns, culture wars with the "war on terror." With these linkages, a kind of master diagnosis emerges of a multi-symptom disease in the American body politic, in the American mind.

In describing the deep psychological appeal of "the backlash," especially among white men, Frank asserts that it "is a theory of how the world works, but it also provides a ready-made way in which the glamour of authenticity, combined with the narcissism of victimhood, is available to almost anyone. . . You're the salt of the earth, the beating heart of America, the backlash tells [you] . . .But now [you], too, can enjoy the instant righteousness that is flaunted by every other aggrieved group" (p.157). In this cast, soldiering in the culture wars provides a subjective, if largely illusory, sense of empowerment as a response to a subjective sense of injury or wounded pride, ultimately rooted in economic malaise.

On September 11, 2001, the United States was of course attacked, imposing on its people a victim status that was very real and which made the country, for a time, an uncharacteristic object of global sympathy. Clearly, the strikes left a massive psychic and even spiritual wound in Americans. A bumper sticker appearing after 9-11 asserted the sacred cast of American nationalism, while hinting at the depth of the wound and, perhaps, the wrath to come: "America is My Holy Land."

Both fascinating and scary has been the United States' reaction—one so severe and so zealous that is seems to transcend good military and political sense and draw on reserves of traumatized rage emanating directly from the wound. That is, so much of the "war on terror" exceeds, prima facie, the conscientious pursuit of greater security: from the wanton incarceration of so many harmless foreign "enemies"; to the flouting of international human rights standards America once championed; to the abusive detention and mass deportation of immigrants (albeit often illegal) posing no security threat; to absurd degrees of domestic surveillance that compromise the very freedoms in whose name we are fighting; to the costly invasion of a country posing no military threat; to a professed crusade to bring democracy to the world at the barrel of a gun. If of doubtful security value, all this may nonetheless accomplish something very important with respect to 9-11: to make Americans feel again proud, tough, invulnerable, virtuous, and superior, with all means for doing so metaphysically justified by the apocalyptic injury the country endured and its newly proclaimed (if widely contested) identity as global arch-victim. In this role, the "war on terror" reproduces

the basic formula of the culture war: misdirected anger as dubious, if not downright self-injurious, compensation for a perceived loss of pride, prestige, power, and security.

One can see with reference to the international arena a striking reflection of the archetypes and tropes of the domestic culture wars. To the red state patriot, the native liberal is now the sanctimonious, over-cultured, and patently wimpy Frenchman. The indigenous "blame America first" crowd becomes the international community tout court, which can neither recognize, let alone appreciate, America's benevolence. The nativist suspicion of multiculturalism endemic to the culture wars becomes hostility to a whole globe of America-bashing others. The peculiar blend of resentment at and envy of domestic groups claiming victim status-minorities, women, gays-is now felt toward entire geographies (the "Third World" or "global south") and "civilizations" (Islam, by a crude construction). If they can have their holy wars, their jihads, why can't we? Is our God, are our values, any less worthy of defense? Finally, Bush's pursuit of global democracy amplifies the virtue of his earnest backers: they are the beating heart of America, and America is the beating heart of the world. By these mediations, the backlash goes global.

In arguing the globalization of the backlash one asserts a kind of primacy of culture that challenges Frank's hierarchy in which economy is the dominant, if often covert, cause of politics. Consider the Iraq war, perhaps the purest case of displaced rage within the "war on terror." Tenuously or not, leftists have denounced it as a war for oil profits masquerading as one of preemption, and, more recently, liberation. But one can see it in different terms altogether: as a war "really" fought to restore wounded pride or, perhaps, exact a vengeance not satisfied by the easy conquest of feeble Afghanistan. National security is sacrificed not to economic interest but to psychological and cultural need.

There is a sense, however, in which Frank's analytic emphases may hold, giving him the last sad laugh. A plausible case can be made that before Bush even entered the White House, a clique of neoconservatives sought a U.S. invasion of Iraq in order to establish a beachhead for, above all, the political and economic pacification of the oil-rich Middle East. 9-11 provided the occasion to execute this audacious, essentially imperialist plan. (Neil Smith's Endgame of Globalization [2005] offers a compelling version of this controversial charge. Smith does not weaken his argument by dismissing Bush's rhetoric of spreading democracy as a smoke screen. Rather, he shows how such rhetoric has always accompanied American imperial ambition, tingeing greed with idealism, and vice versa. Whether or not the dismally expensive conflict has as yet been remotely worth it from an imperialist standpoint is another matter.) To a security-crazed citizenry, manufactured fear of Iraqi WMD provided the war's rationale; the aching desire to strike back, to lash out—even if against the wrong "enemy"—provided its necessary public passion. America stands fooled again by the same Frankian logic, as a corporate-political elite manipulates mass emotion for economic gain.

The raw deal can be described, iconically, as the "Halliburton effect": the American taxpayer now holds an open-ended bill for an abjectly unnecessary and possibly unwinnable war that is nonetheless sure to earn the vice-president's corporate friends untold billions in reconstruction contracts. Yet, the rip-off is worse still when considering its ultimate cost and who pays it. The demographics of the volunteer military notoriously fall towards the bottom of the economic ladder. Geographically, servicemen and women are drawn disproportionately from America's vast pockets of economic decline or blight, notably those in the Midwest, Appalachia, the Rust Belt, and the rural and small town South. In other words, our wars are fought by refugees from the dead-end jobs, dreary monoculture, and dismal life prospects of red state America. (Archetypically, the young volunteer to earn money, get an education, and see the world; saying so is not to doubt the strength or sincerity of their patriotism.) It is, then, precisely the shabby economy of the vaunted heartland and its coastal tributaries—no matter how many Wal-Mart jobs they may have, no matter the sublime authenticity of their culture—that generates a standing army large enough to carry out the imperial strikes of the rich and powerful. In this, the "trick" on the culture war die-hard takes its most obscene and tragic form: Vote for a straight-shooting, tough-talking Texan who will keep America safe and strong; receive a deceitful war that will explode the deficit, stoke hatred of America, and which may kill your son or daughter.

The final virtue of Frank's study is the powerful simplicity with which he explains, and not just poses, what's wrong with America. To the "how could they?" quality of Americans' misdirection, he answers in essence, "It's ideology, stupid!"—and of a rather primitive sort. That is, people still can and do possess fundamentally erroneous understandings of reality that are manipulated by a more or less coherent ruling class.

What saves the book from either unbearable arrogance or pessimism is Frank's implicit faith that it is still possible to use facts and reason to appeal to people's truly enlightened self-interest. What saves it from self-trivializing

idealism is that the awakening Frank seeks is nothing so grandiose as a "revolutionary class consciousness" desiring "socialism"; rather, he seems to favor the common-sense pursuit of economic policies, like uniformly living wages, universal health care, and greater market regulation, which threaten only to give capitalism a more human, egalitarian face. The implications for progressives, whether Democrats or not, are clear: in terms of message, to return to economic populism, like the Kansas Populists of the nineteenth century and generations of rather successful Democrats in the twentieth century. [20] In terms of strategy, to practice a relentless politics of truth that educates people about the source of their anger and directs it in the right place-at the right. This means fighting discourse wars with new focus and rigor, mobilizing every available species of media, cultivating a winning arsenal of key words, images, and narratives, and being vigilant in not offering up easy fodder-like photo-ops of the Democratic candidate windsurfing near his fourth home-for the reinforcement of "liberal elite" stereotypes. [21]

Crucial to all this is unsettling the affinity between the Republican powerful and their dutiful followers, but with a twist on what Gramsci's notion of hegemony might recommend. The counter trick is not so much to break people's spurious identification upward with the rich; rather, it is to show the opportunism and falsity with which plutocrats identify downward with the masses by appearing to share their moral anger, lead their crusades, and even echo their average-guyness. (Could Bush's victory in the "Who would you rather have a beer with?" sweepstakes alone explain his reelection?). With whatever impact on the electorate, the Billionaires for Bush performed this complex semiotic operation with great skill as they visited Bush rallies and shopping malls in swing states. Wearing top hats and tiaras, speaking in condescending tones about "the little people," and ritually thanking Americans for paying their taxes and fighting their wars, their message was this: the Republicans are your false friends; they do not ultimately think like you, look like you, or care about you. But they ring up, year after year, your vote. [22] In using hyperbole to cast away the spell of misidentification, the cunning logic of the culture wars stood exposed.

A more partisan optimism issues, finally, from the Frankian meditation. However deep America's current madness, the cure outlined above is not so exotic after all. Doses of it were already applied during the campaign. In the most daring protest at the Republican National Convention, activists dropped a banner over four stories of New York's Plaza Hotel. On it was an arrow bearing the word "truth"; below, and pointing in the opposite direction, was another with the word "Bush." The whole sign points, from a strategic perspective, in the right direction. Redoubled commitment to a politics of truth, moreover, is just what so many in the anti-Bush ranks prescribed for themselves in the literal and figurative mornings after the election. As the postmortems evolved, nobody has been saying that the cure will come quickly or easily. It will take, by consensus, time, money, courage, and will. And with any luck, some cosmic twin of Bill Clinton's, more genuinely liberal but with the same poor white roots, "aw shucks" charm, and ability to make Americans feel that he feels their pain, will emerge in 2008 to spike the saving potion.

With the resurgent diagnosis of false consciousness, the Gordian knot of American politics, tied like a tumor in the American mind (with complications for the heart), seems already to loosen. The prognoses in progressive circles might be genuinely good were there greater actual faith in the cure. At one level, progressives harbor troubling doubts that they can win at the politics of truth. The lament is familiar: that it's clear which side media conglomeration favors; that the right's bromides and simple pieties reduce well to sound bites, while the nuanced views of liberals and leftists do not; that conservatives' pockets are deeper, their institutional base and reserve of "social capital" in the evangelical churches far richer than anything on the left; that it's hard to keep Americans from rallying around the flag and their president (or his party) in times of war; and that the Bush administration has shrewdly constructed this war and its accompanying state of near-emergency as permanent. Yet there is the even deeper and more dispiriting worry that under current conditions a politics of truth can't work, and here the problem is not one of resources or stamina, but of structure. Hinting at the problem, Senator Hilary Clinton recently fulminated at the right, "I know it's frustrating. . . Why can't the Democrats do more to stop them?. . . It's very hard to stop people who have no shame about what they're doing. . . It is very hard to stop people who have never been acquainted with the truth." [23]

Intense partisanship and ideological polarization always entail deep chasms between the worldviews of political rivals—intense disagreements about "reality" and "truth." There seems in recent years, however, a qualitative mutation in the field of discourse itself, such that no viable context exists any longer for the mediation of competing truth claims, little or no terrain even for an honest battle over hearts and minds. Sensing this, an exacerbated editorialist asked: "Is it possible in America today to convince anyone of anything he doesn't already believe? If so, are there enough places where this mingling of the minds exists to sustain democracy?" (Miller 2005:A15) The problem, he intuited, was not simply the stubbornness of strong belief.

Americans today seem to live in alternate semiotic universes, whereby ideological divisions reflect different profiles of media consumption. Thus, the "NPR liberal" and "Fox News conservative" become antipodes in a near-ontological stand-off of quintessentially discursive identities, with neither allowing its corruption by the stories, spin, and ethos of the other's media culture. In plainer language, each "side" seems to have its own passionately held and rigidly inoculated "truth."

At a more disconcerting extreme, and within the universe of the right, that inoculation may ward off the challenge of anything approaching "reality" altogether: certain vital facts, in the dark corners of ideologically-induced information fog, either do not appear or do not minimally register. This can lead to essentially hallucinatory—yet politically powerful—misperceptions, in which the derangement of American consciousness again rages. Perhaps the most disturbing political data of recent times have been polls showing that garish percentages of Americans believe, without a shred of evidence, that Hussein was involved in the 9-11 attacks and that a number of the hijackers were Iraqi. In September of 2003, a Washington Post poll had 69% holding the former belief. [24] Bush, sensitive to charges that his administration had deliberately fostered this untruth, quickly clarified, "We have no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the September 11 attacks." But he then added, dubiously, "There's no question that Saddam Hussein had Al Qaeda ties." [25] The myth of Iraqi involvement in 9-11 persisted through the election and endures to this day. (A Harris poll of February 2005 showed that "47 percent believe that Saddam Hussein helped plan [the attack] and support the hijackers," while 44 percent believe that several of the hijackers were Iraqis.) [26] The myth's strength, in the face of countless refutations, has led critics to suspect that the Bush administration knows that insinuation is enough to throw many Americans off the trail of reality—that all on their own, "the people" will morph innuendo and small misstatements of fact into Great Lies, bleating from the administration any obvious culpability.

From this instance of derangement, it is tempting to conclude that what America most needs—prior to any partisan reawakening—is a massive re-education in basic political literacy and civic competence. Only then would a national conversation about controversial issues be minimally rational and therefore democratic in the elevated description of democracy's original Anglo-American champions. (In the meantime, progressives may have to write off a certain numbskull constituency among the public, and hope that it doesn't vote in large numbers.) However salutary, making such civic competence the priority would be, I think, to misunderstand the depth of the pathology when popular beliefs, and the discourse wars within which they are shaped, are so little tethered to or regulated by credible reference to "reality." That is, broader public agreement on a larger body of facts goes only so far in addressing how the realms not only of "fact," but of "value" as well, are under assault.

Engaging briefly the issue of the persistence or eclipse of the postmodern condition helps to define that assault. In his seminal work of 1979, the French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard defined postmodernity in terms of the decline of the West's master narratives like "emancipation" or "equality" and the exhaustion of utopian energies for their fulfillment. (Lyotard 1979) Yet we patently seem in a new era of the grand narrative, insofar as both the "war on terror" and the extremist war on America have a manifestly epic cast. With messianic ambition and militarized zeal, Bush trumpets his fight against terrorism as one for the Enlightenment's core ideals: democracy, liberty, secular government, religious pluralism, political equality among groups, and human rights. From the other side, radical Islamists seek to use spectacular violence to cleanse the world of the moral corruptions—from the desecration of tradition to libertine indulgence—of a great infidel empire. [27] In an apparent rebuke of Lyotard, the perceived stakes of conflict seem to be getting bigger and more idealistic, not smaller and less so.

At the same time, Lyotard prophesied that political conflict would increasingly take the shape of discourse wars among newly proliferate, and often highly local, narratives. Lyotard seems to have the quality of the struggle right, but its number and scale off. Indeed, America's current polarization and much of the global debate over U.S. power can be described as a battle of two, epically contrasting narratives-themselves large in scope and import—over whether Bush is truly advancing or irreparably harming the Enlightenment narrative and its constitutive ideals. This conflict has raged in the recent war of words between Amnesty International, the London-based custodian of international "human rights," and the Bush administration. In a well-publicized report, Amnesty charged that features of the "war on terror" have made the United States one of the world's conspicuous human rights abusers and likened its network of detention facilities to a global "gulag"—a word evoking the negation of liberty by America's historic, totalitarian foe. Bush himself dismissed the charges as "absurd," insisted that America is the world's leading human rights defender, and, in a perfect gesture of the global backlash, denounced the report as the product of people who "hate America." [28]However one scores the debate, it pulses with concern over values and the nation's moral destiny.

Lyotard made a final prediction, with chilling implications to the extent that it may be coming true: that the power, salience, and truth of narratives would depend less and less on their correspondence to "reality" or normative integrity, and more and more, within an ascendant commercial-operational logic, on their efficacy in achieving instrumental ends. Bluntly stated, it matters not which narrative is truer, only which is more effective, evacuating moral concern from what he calls the "legitimation" of knowledge.

Lyotard's prediction begs the question of what criteria determine efficacy. Lyotard's own eye was mostly on technology; the kind of question implicit in his inquiry was, for example, whether moral misgivings would have any power to arrest the development of cloning technology, with its tremendous intellectual momentum, social application, and commercial potential. Shift to contemporary politics, and worrisome possibilities appear. One pertains to politics in the relatively superficial, but nonetheless potent, sense of the horse race, of the American obsession with winning and losing. By its metric, partisan advantage is what most counts in crafting and assessing political discourse. Consider Bush's quip that the Amnesty authors "hate America." The slight-red meat for the Bush faithful-permits Bush to avoid, in Amnesty's apt words, "dealing with the details or the facts," while turning the report's evaluation into a referendum on how one feels about the United States. Making defiance of the international community the measure of true patriotism is of course a standard weapon in the right's rhetorical arsenal-one used to great effect in Bush's repeated, fallacious charge prior to the election that Kerry would require that the United States "ask foreign capitals" for permission before defending itself. What this example suggests, amplified by the myth of an Iraq-9-11 connection, is that if some mass of the public believes in a given narrative or image of reality, and this belief helps one win, then the story or picture is as good as true, and the facts don't matter. Hence, Karl Rove, the master of rhetorical sleight of hand, is widely praised as a brilliant strategist, when he could just as easily be condemned as a craven propagandist.

This circumstance is laden with irony. For their assaults on "truth," postmodernists have been castigated as the great at relativisms; yet postmodern theory, in the manner above, helps disclose in contemporary political discourse a kind of relative logic-one so powerful that the return to grand, morally rich narratives and disagreements over them has not arrested the instrumentalization of political life and the functional decline of moral concern. In a second irony, conservatives are widely credited with asserting in the last election the importance in public life of moral values. Part of their dislike of Kerry was for his alleged "inauthenticity"-the perception (hard at times for Democrats to refute) that he would do anything, say anything, and appear to be anything in order to be liked and to win. Bush purportedly "stood for something." Yet it has been much more the right, with its distortions of reality and propagation of myth in the name of political gain, that has permeated political debate with the inauthenticity of image-craft and a win-at-all-costs attitude.

There is, however, winning in a grander sense, generating another cold standard for assessing narratives' efficacy: the degree to which they enable the United States to fulfill its imperialist prerogatives. Within Neil Smith's argument, representing here a whole genre of new critiques of empire, the endgame of the Iraq invasion is the extension of U.S. economic power. Thus, it can succeed even if its current, touted goal of bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq bogs down or fails altogether. Lest one think this unduly cynical, Smith invites the reader to contrast two things: on the one hand, the alacrity with which the United States, under Paul Bremer's early leadership, lowered Iraq's tax rate, liberalized its foreign investment laws, reduced its import duties, developed corporate stakes in Iraq's oil industry, and secured mammoth reconstruction contracts for U.S. firms; on the other, the great difficulty and even sloth with which the United States has restored basic services to Iraqis, helped to rebuild the everyday economy, provided security, and cultivated democratic institutions. (Smith 2005:176-191) By Smith's tally, what the occupation has mostly achieved so far is a kind of structural adjustment by invasion, earning Bremer also a Medal of Freedom. (In this light, Wolfowitz's new tenure at the World Bank makes perfect sense.) Returning to the fate of "reality," the narrative of Iraq's democratization is functionally true not to the extent that Iraq actually becomes democratic, but to the extent to which it provides a context and rationale for the achievement of the United States' economic goals. Imperial might, when applied successfully, makes its own alibi right.

Should one think this formula too simple or cynical, consider the fall 2004 comment by an unnamed senior White House adviser to a New York Times Magazine reporter:

> The aide said that guys like me (i.e. reporters and commentators) were "in what we call the reality-based community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. . . We're history's actors.

. . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do" (Danner 2005).

At first glance, this seems a triumphal, almost caustic, expression of the Bush administration's view of itself, in Hegelian fashion, as "world-historical." The administration makes history, dammit, while timid naysayers and equivocating scholars stand on the sidelines of destiny merely to watch. And America's destiny is to be an empire, not just of power but of virtue, advancing the grand story of freedom's march.

This may be, however, crediting the quote with an idealism it does not have, for nowhere does it mention freedom or any other virtue. One commentator, despairing at the encroaching irrelevance of facts in American politics, sees in it the frightening boast that "power . . . can shape truth [and] determine reality, or at least the reality of what most people believe-a critical point, for the administration has been singularly effective in its recognition that what is most politically important is not what the New York Times believes, but what most Americans are willing to believe" (Danner 2005). This despair, while echoing my own, evokes also the concern of the Times' Frank Rich for the fate of his profession. Mortified by the White House allowing into its exclusive press conferences the "fake" journalist "Jeff Gannon" to pose "fake" questions, Rich (2004) leveled the charge: "Conservatives, who supposedly deplore post-modernism, are now welcoming in a brave new world in which it's a given that there can be no empirical reality in news, only the reality you want to hear (or that they want you to hear)" [29] (p.20). This small transgression of the boundary between the real and the fake points to a much larger one: the waging of a very real war based on a faked cause.

To the celebrated journalist Seymour Hersh, the Bush administration's simultaneous disregard for and manipulation of reality spurred an even greater revulsion. After recounting Bush's preposterously rosy assessments of the war in Iraq and America's moral record in the "war on terror," Hersh (2004) offered, "There are many who believe that George Bush is a liar [who] knowingly and deliberately twists facts for political gain. But lying would indicate an understanding of what is desired, what is possible, and how best to get there. A more plausible explanation is that words have no meaning for the President beyond the immediate moment, and so he believes that his mere utterance of the phrases makes them real" (p. 367).

In the hands of the new, covert postmodernists, empire seems to have taken the "linguistic turn," giving the quote of the White House aid a final, chilling salience. Attaching to empire no higher purpose or even instrumental end, its author defines power, in its purest form, as the ability to assert one's will as such. One does so not through the control of territory and resources, not in the allegiance of the minds and hearts of variously pacified or grateful subjects, but-by the ultimate discursive conquest-in lordship over "reality" itself. Yet this brave new world, in the ironic march of history backward, turns out to be rather like the old one. When sketching the postmodern condition, Lyotard (1979) largely celebrated the dissolution of master narratives and their utopian impetus; these, he felt, may have spurred progress, but they also lay at the heart of modern totalitarianism, which he defined as a "dangerous fantasy to seize reality" (p. 112).

In this dystopian image, an analytic null point has ostensibly been reached, such that it is time to take final stock of the proposed remedies for America's derangement and choose among them. Frank counsels that we turn false consciousness true by unmasking both the reality behind the veil of ideology and the devious means by which it is covered over. A second therapy deepens civic competence to restore an appreciation of facts and the means for making politics accountable to them. The most systemic approach demands greater public stewardship over the very idea of reality. But alas, the pathology is complex and substantially new; each remedy is necessarily experimental and likely, in itself, inadequate. Therefore, a holistic treatment combining the strength of each seems best. By a military metaphor, we need a coalition army in the discourse wars-networks of citizens' militias of every possible political persuasion, group identity, intellectual bent, and skill set to fight at once for facts, truth, reality, reason, and justice.

This call to arms avoids, however, the nagging problem implied by the early image of subjects making the naked emperor clothed. That is, it places ultimate faith in the power of revelation-the premise that if you expose the trick and publicize its cost, the captive audience will abandon the illusion and even turn on the illusionist. One may protest: aren't there already enough damning facts out there, and in plain enough view? Shouldn't some tipping point of disgust with Bush have been reached long ago, no matter the vagaries of ideology? This protest suggests that there already is enough of the medicine in the system, such that the diagnosis may still be off. Exploring this possibility requires that we cast our net one last time into the waters of social theory.

In the late 1980s, Slavoj Zizek invoked the idea of "cynical reason," first developed by Germany's Peter Sloterdijk,

in assessing the status of ideology in the modern West. Sloterdijk saw the decline of the "naive consciousness" victimized by traditional ideology and the rise, in Zizek's phrasing, of a new "cynical subject . . . quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but who nonetheless insists on wearing the mask." Possessed of an "enlightened false consciousness," this subjectivity is defined by contradiction: "One knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest behind the ideological universality, but one still does not renounce it" (Zizek 1989:29). Against the Marxian formula of ideology as mystification—"they do not know what they are doing, yet they are doing it"—cynical reason holds: "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they do it." (Zizek 1989:29)

The idea of cynical reason provides new perspective on the mysteries of American politics. Above all, it dispenses with the assumption that people are fooled. Following from this, many Americans may well know that they were tricked into war, yet still support it as if it were no trick at all; know that the culture wars are a ruse, but still fight them. In cases, the reasons for this self-falsification may not be so hard to understand. A maimed soldier may "know," but still formally deny, that lies brought him to Iraq, lest the sense of betrayal crush him. If one had few life chances, commitment to "values" might be especially important, functionally vanishing one's knowledge of their manipulation for others' gain. But the incentive for wearing the mask does not ultimately matter in Sloterdijk's model. The point is that the mask is chosen, for whatever reason, and cynical reason may not be rational from the standpoint of its subjects. (At an extreme of dissonance, the "knowing" subject might himself fabricate the mask, as in the fallacy of an Iraq-9-11 link.) Cynical reason appears a more perfect form of power because perfectly immunized against charges of deception. Ideology critique becomes futile when there is no hidden truth to reveal. Additionally, power itself becomes more deeply cynical when it no longer requires that we accept its lies, even if it keeps presenting them. (Absent any official rationale, there would be no ideology, and power would be fully cynical.) What opponent of the Iraq war could not relate to the paralysis or even terror of the following, far from unimaginable, scenario: making the case to a Bush defender that the war was never about preemption or liberation, that it's goal all along was to demonstrate American power, and him responding simply, "Of course. So?"

However compelling, "cynical reason" does not wash as a comprehensive account of American derangement, as it assumes a situation of total transparency. Clearly, there remain instances of genuine ignorance and deception worthy of a political response. The concept's utility is as a kind of thought experiment pointing to new possibilities: in this case, that many Bush supporters may, in effect, already see through him, such that we are dealing with a new strain of ideology resistant even to a fortified politics of persuasion. It has additional value in generating, as Zizek's foil, a final model of ideology.

Sloterdijk contends that in the West we are now, in essence, "post-ideological" societies, and that this is ultimately liberating. If power is absolved of duplicity, so too is the public—wise to the ideological ploy—free from deception. The freedom is experienced in a cynical distance from the manipulative message. This can be readily seen in the now familiar relationship between consumer and advertiser, in which both parties know that the ad is a kind of fantasy or false promise; that it offers only a soft drink, or cell phone, or athletic shoe, and that these things cannot provide in themselves the joy or love or courage being shown. (A whole genre of advertising as parody lays bare its own alluring codes.) This mutual, often playful understanding of the rules of the ideological game very much defines "postmodern irony"-a sensibility that became in the 1980s the dominant cultural trope, suffusing advertising, entertainment, and the media. It could characterize as well a new cynicism about politics: the pervasive sense that of course politicians lie, that there's naturally a difference between their image and their true selves, their stated and their real motives. [30] From the other side, the skill of politics lies in fabricating a compelling image of authenticity, even if the public knows it's just an image. The "liberation" comes in peoples' odd sense of empowerment, despite their cynicism, in not being fooled. I recall a man telling me during the 1991 Gulf War, with palpable satisfaction at his insight, that the real reason for the conflict was that "Our boys in the military wanted to try out all their new toys," like Patriot Missiles and "smart" bombs. Acknowledging the deception, he nonetheless supported the war.

Against Sloterdijk, Zizek declares this ostensibly post-ideological liberation false by asserting that ideology lies not on the side of knowing, but of doing. To explain, he rehearses how Marx extracted, without quite realizing it, the idea of constitutive misrecognition from his analysis of the commodity form. According to Marx, the commodity system is predicated on an illusion, as incommensurable qualities (use-values) are exchanged as quantitative equivalences (exchange-values). The system is organized around money as a pure form of exchange value bearing no intrinsic worth (especially when in paper form). Whatever insights participants in commodity exchange might make into this abstraction, they sustain the illusion of equivalence in practice, in the act of commodity exchange itself.

For Zizek, ideology refers to the whole mechanism whereby the role of illusion in constituting social "reality" itself is obscured:

> "Ideological" is not the "false consciousness" of a (social) being but this being itself insofar as it is supported by "false consciousness," . . . not [an] illusion masking the real state of things, but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself. And at this level, we are of course far from being a post-ideological society. Cynical distance is just one way . . . to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them. (Zizek 1989:21, 33)

Most obviously, this dense quote suggests we do not overcome ideology simply by seeing through the illusion. With respect to advertising, it does not matter whether we buy the fantasy, only that we buy the product; when we do, the illusion will have retroactively worked, even if we never quite fell under its spell. Similarly, we gain nothing by seeing through politicians if we nonetheless reward them with our support or simply admire their image-craft. Far from outsmarting the system, "ironic distance" offers the palliating illusion of no longer being tricked, while occluding the persistence of mystification; we thus fall victim to a higher form of illusion, a crueler joke.

Zizek's more complex point about the source of misrecognition warrants explication, for which returning to Baseball's steroids scandal is helpful. Baseball functions as a competitive sport only if one accepts the premise that its players are not cheating, beyond the mild, catch-me-if-you-can transgressions of scuffed balls and stolen signs. That premise is in fact the one essential article of faith; withdraw it, and there is no game. Holding on to that faith, when one knows it is being violated, amounts to a constitutive illusion, as it permits the thing itself to be. This approximates the absurdity of the last two decades, when fans could fairly well see that players were using steroids, but still avidly followed the game. [31] To extend Zizek's model, the "moment" of blinding faith does not lie in any formal renunciation of the charge of steroid use or equivocation about it (no perfect proof yet exists, perhaps it's only a few players, etc.). Rather, it occurs when actively participating in baseball as a fan: plunking down money for a game, but even just thrilling to the drama of a pennant race. Only through these acts, predicated on an illusion fans may even not hold, does baseball reproduce itself. And in the case of baseball, uniquely concerned among sports with tradition and history, removing the problem would not expel the illusion. For even if the game were now totally clean, the achievements of steroids-era players can be enshrined in the statistical-historical record only through acts of forgetting.

Having made Zizek's analytical matrix more vivid, it is now time to apply it to American politics. What might be the United States' "social being" and the "fantasy" or "illusion" constituting it? What are the implications of the answers we provide? Before providing them, a small caution: highly abstract concepts such as these may map imperfectly onto our topics; we therefore aim only for a rough, mutually illuminating correspondence between theory and its objects.

My contention here is that America's "social being," defined as its dominant or fundamental identity, is today "empire." I make as yet no judgment as to the morality of empire, only recognize that America projects its power on vast scale. The sustaining illusion of its people-the essential ideology of empire-is that America deserves to be one. That is, the country's status as preeminent world power results from America having some special talent, resourcefulness, store of virtue, or divine mandate that rightly sets it apart from and above other nations. A circularity defines the whole thought: we are an empire because we are supposed to be.

While perhaps not universal, this belief is, I think, absolutely pervasive among Americans. It is certainly held by conservatives like Bush, whose framing of America's global profile oozes with reference to the country's special moral destiny. To be fair, Bush does not claim that the United States has unique possession of the core virtue of liberty. With perfect Lockean idealism, he insists that liberty is the universal gift of "the Almighty," but that America has a special power and duty to bring it to the world. The ideological claim becomes "false" or an "illusion" when the conduct of empire plainly contradicts the virtue being claimed. This has been the case, above all, in the torture at Abu Ghraib, which savagely deprives the tortured of freedom over his own body (the essential "natural right," according to Locke). The stubbornness of the illusion was evident as Bush thundered on the campaign trail that "torture is un-American!" and that the world will see how true this is when we punish the small handful of culprits. The whole affair seemed for him less an occasion for shame and an exhaustive inquiry into a likely systemic problem than an opportunity to assert, in near jingoistic tones, the depth of American virtue. (Needless to say, the punishments so far have been sparse and slight.) Likewise, the administration's offense at the Amnesty report was not over the U.S.

conduct the report questioned, but instead that Amnesty International had denied America its desired moral status-rhetorically stripped the naked emperor of his imaginary clothes.

Liberals may wish that America assert its power more circumspectly, but do not typically deny it a special status. Some liberal thinkers, notably Michael Ignatieff, asked if America should proudly claim the title of empire and brazenly use its might to liberate the world. [32] Even leftists loudly condemning the gap between American rhetoric and conduct may yet assume the basic legitimacy of America's elevated global status. And whether or not he would have led us into war in Iraq in the first place, Kerry promised-with an irony his supporters downplayed—to basically stay the course of Bush's policies. (A modest revision was greater involvement of Europe in post-invasion Iraq; to tempt the erstwhile imperialists in, he proposed appealing to their geo-strategic stake in regional stability and economic interest in reconstruction profits). Moreover, Kerry failed to do with respect to the Iraq war-lest Americans disdain the message and the messenger-what he courageously did with respect to the Vietnam War: speak out against the atrocities committed in the name of virtue and the profound moral contradictions they create.

But whatever the strength and breadth of the illusion, empire ultimately is as empire does. This simple phrase, which combines Zizek's mind-bending theorems with the homespun wisdom of Forrest Gump's mother, has important consequences. (When Forrest complained that the world regarded him as a half-wit, she would reply lovingly "Stupid is as stupid does," such that what matters in not the perception but the conduct.) From Zizek's perspective first: it is not so much that America's special virtue produces its imperial power; rather, the power itself presupposes the ideology of American virtue. Further, by the very reality of this power, the ideological fantasy holds, even if the virtue is violated and even if Americans, recognizing this, were to formally renounce belief in it. There seems, in other words, no point at which you may simply "know too much" about power for it to survive, because the fantasy follows from the social reality it at the same time creates. [33] (By way of analogy, the collective, simultaneous realization that money is only worthless paper would not, in itself, dissolve the commodity system. The collapse would occur only if people actually stopped trading goods and services for what are, after all, worthless pieces of paper.)

What this suggests is that it does not matter so much how we feel about being an empire, whether we think we live up to our ideals, and so on, but only that we are an empire. In a nearly violent oscillation, the emphasis regarding ideology thus shifts from discourse back to practice, from thought to action, and from the derangement of the right to the weak and often misplaced activism of the left. What America needs is to stop being an empire, and this requires less a new lens to correct reality's distortion or an attitude adjustment than, as a nation, massive behavior modification. The obverse of the iconic Nike slogan, "Just Don't Do It," becomes a plausible Zizekian credo with respect to empire, summoning the spirit of Marcuse's Great Refusal, even if the goals may be less ambitious.

For inspiration and practical guidance, enter Forrest Gump's mother, whose revised maxim might counsel that if we no longer want to be an empire, we have to stop the practices of empire. Common sense dictates that one start where the offense is greatest, the symbolism the richest, and one's case the strongest. For four years now, the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay-widely condemned as a "legal black hole," where uncharged prisoners can scarcely plead their innocence to prevent lifetimes of detention-has represented the existential negation of bedrock principles, like the rule of law and basic respect for human liberty, in whose name the "war on terror" is purportedly waged. With the recently reported desecration of Korans in the prison, freedom of worship is also assaulted. Editorials and legal briefs have accomplished little in diminishing the shame of Guantanamo. It may therefore be time to heed the recent call of Senator Robert Byrd and others and build a broad public campaign to at last shut the prison down. [34]

Empire also has its structural predicates, and here the task may be oddly easier. Whether or not primarily motivated by the desire for oil, the Iraq invasion and broader Middle East morass are clearly connected to the dependence of "our way of life" on fossil fuels. ("We wouldn't attack Iraq if all Kuwait had was broccoli," protesters would say of the first Gulf War; the same logic today holds.) [35] Hence, changing our way of life by curing the SUV addiction, shifting to renewable energy sources, expanding public transit, and disciplining our use of electricity become vital. Pursuing these goals, which save money and the environment both, represent strikes against empire that do not so directly challenge patriotic passion or pick at the still-throbbing wound of September 11. As added appeal, they represent ways of beating Bush, so to speak, without beating Bush.

The list of desired, practical changes could be endless, and accomplishing any of them of course requires convincing people of the value of doing so. Engaging the battle for hearts and minds, no matter the slings and arrows of outrageous quiescence and ideological distortion, is therefore unavoidable; it remains, moreover, the

crucial requirement for democratic action. Finally, part of the healing requires that the America, like a psychotic deluded by false grandeur, relinquish the conceit of its own uncorrupted virtue. The United States, like all nations, should be more moral, and achieving this is best done without the fantastical sense-no matter genocide, slavery, Hiroshima, and torture-that we already are the most moral nation, now or ever. Protestations of moral purity, as in Bush's smugly righteous response to Abu Ghraib, serve too often as cover for or even impetus to moral blight. Even so, when addressing one's fellow citizens, it may not be possible to escape entirely this fantasy (and it would be anyhow absurd to hold that America is only an empire, its store of virtue nearly drained). All forms of ideology, for that matter, have stubborn lives. And when the work seems too difficult, the minds too far gone and the hearts too hard, it may be time for the solace of some earthy, American pleasure that gives again a sense of hope, like a blues concert or an afternoon of baseball.

The Yankees are in big trouble this season, but the Mets are fun to watch. Want to go see a game?

Endnotes

1. Robin Palmer, interview with author, November 11, 1994.

2. "McGwire mum on steroids in hearing," March 17, 2005, at http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/03/17/steroids.baseball/

3. As of May 17, 2005, only two people, both hands-on torturers, have been convicted of crimes at Abu Ghraib, and six codefendants have entered into plea agreements. "Soldier is Found Guilty in Abu Ghraib Abuse," New York Times, May 17, 2005, p. A9. On the precedent for and extent of abuse at the prison, see Greenberg, Karen J. and Joshua L. Dratel, eds. 2005. The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. New York: Cambridge University Press. To date, baseball's modestly revamped steroids policy has netted only a handful of marginal, mostly Latin-American players. The recent corporate scandals have resulted in some high-profile convictions, but none yet among Enron executives.

4. The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001. Professor Marc Herold, drawing on NGO, newspaper, and wire service reports, estimated that by December as many as 2,970 Afghan civilians had been killed by U.S. bombs; by July 2002, he put the figure as high as 3,620. "Attempts to Hide the Number of Afghan Civilians Killed By U.S. Bombs Are an Affront to Justice," The Guardian, August 8, 2002.

5. "U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects," Washington Post, March 11, 2002, A1.

6. This characterization is supported by the detailed study of University of Maryland professor Susan D. Moeller, "Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, March 9, 2004, found at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june04/nytimes_05-26.html.

7. The Times detailed and offered explanation for many of its errors in its May 26, 2004 issue.

8. This misperception will be discussed below and referenced in a subsequent footnote.

9. The language of deliberately "fixing" intelligence comes from a hitherto secret British memo, published by The London Times on May 1, 2005, reporting on a meeting of high-ranking American and British officials eight months before the U.S. attack. The memo, whose revelation played a role in the Labor Party's poor showing in the May 2005 elections, added additional support for a thesis regarding the manipulation of intelligence long held by American critics: Danner, Mark. 2005. "Secret Way to War: The British Smoking-Gun Memo." The New York Review of Books, June 9, also at http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=2486.

10. In the wake of the revelation that "Deep Throat" was the FBI's Mark Felt, editorialist Bob Herbert called on Congress, the press, and the American people to hold George Bush to account, as they finally did with Nixon. See Herbert, Bob. 2005. "Truth and Deceit." New York Times, June 2.

11. Barstow, David,William J. Broad, and Jeff Girth. 2004. "How White House Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence." New York Times, October 3.

12. Bob Herbert appropriately asked in early 2005, "As a nation, does the United States have a conscience? Or is anything and everything OK in post-9/11 America? If torture and the denial of due process are OK, why not murder? When the government can make people just vanish-which it can and which it does-where is the

line that we, as a nation, dare not cross?" "It's Called Torture," New York Times, February 28, 2005, p. A19.

13. On the Billionaires for Bush, see Haugerud, Angelique. 2004. "The Art of Protest." Anthropology News, November, vol. 45(7) and "'Leave No Billionaire Behind': Political Dissent as Performance Parody," Princeton Report on Knowledge, vol. 1(1), 2005, at http://www.princeton.edu/~prok/inventions.hmtl.

14. The quote is from counterculture author Paul Goodman in 1967, found in my Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004:137. Generalizing about the antiwar movement is of course difficult. Some radicals, notably the Weathermen, had periods of doubt as to the will of the American people regarding the war, leading them to ask whether they were ultimately fighting on behalf of, or against, the American masses. For a discussion of this tension, and the larger question of the public's attitude toward the war, see the chapter "'Hearts and Minds': The Antiwar Movement, Violence, and the Critical Mass."

15. This is Slavoj Zizek's characterization of the classic view of ideology, contained in "How Did Marx Invent the Symptom?" The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso, 1989:28.

16. This was the broad thesis of Zizek's short essay "Welcome to the Desert of the Real," written on September 15, 2001, and which flew around the internet. A version is at http://web.mit.edu/cms/reconstructions/interpretations/desertreal.html. Zizek expanded and substantially modified the thesis in Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates. New York: Verso, 2002.

17. Marcuse developed this analysis most clearly in Herbert Marcuse. 1964. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press, where he introduced the concept of the Great Refusal.

18. This assumption is shared less by highly partisan media like Fox News, which routinely editorializes as it reports, and by figures like CNN's Lou Dobbs, who uses his nightly program as a platform for relentless criticism of U.S. immigration and trade policy.

19. "Happy Captives" is the title of the book's eighth chapter.

20. Rick Perlstein, whose blurb calls Frank's book "the true story of how conservatives punk'd a nation," has laid out a detailed argument as to how and why the Democrats could succeed with a platform of economic populism in future elections. "How the Can the Democrats Win," Boston Review at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.3/perlstein.html.

21. Identifying lapses in the Democrats' image-craft is the near-exclusive focus of Frank's recent essay "What's the Matter with Liberals?" New York Review of Books, May 12, 2005.

22. For an ingenious theorization of the Billionaires for Bush and other forms of cultural activism, see Andrew Boyd and Stephen Duncombe, "Manufacturing Dissent: What the Left Can Learn from Las Vegas," Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, volume 1, #3, 2004. Boyd and Duncombe address many of the themes of this essay-chiefly the apparent paralysis of resistance politics when "truth" no longer seems to matter-with an exhilaratingly fresh perspective. Rather than mourn the abuse of reality, they counsel that progressives themselves fabricate compelling versions of it by creating their own myths and spectacles.

23. "Senator Clinton Assails G.O.P. at Fundraiser," New York Times, June 7, 2001, pp. B1, B4.

24. "Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds," Washington Post, September 6, 2003, p. A1.

25. "Bush: No Link Between Iraq, Sept. 11 Attacks," Fox News, September 17, 2003, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,97527,00.html.

26. The Harris Poll® #14, February 18, 2005 at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=544.

27. I make no claim here as to the accuracy of these frames. Zizek introduces his post-9-11 essays by asserting that the least democratic aspect of the "war on terror" is the coercive and reductive assumption that the only two possibilities are democracy of the American sort and "fundamentalism" of the radical Islamist sort. Welcome to the Desert of the Real, 1-3. The Islamist challenge seems to me illiberal and antimodern in deeply pejorative senses.

28. "Rights Group Defends Chastising of U.S.", New York Times, June 4, 2005, p. A5.

29. The gentleman's real name is Jeff Guckert, and his only credentials were as a self-described journalist working for a brazenly partisan website.

30. Whether this is more a legacy of "Tricky Dick" or "Slick Willy," the lies of Vietnam and Watergate or of the Clinton-Lewinsky-Starr affair, is a matter of political taste. For the argument that Nixon was the great pioneer of image-craft in American politics, see Greenberg, David. 2003. Nixon's Shadow: The History of an Image. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

31. The chase of Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa, both suspected steroid users, of Roger Marris's home run record is widely credited with reviving baseball after the 1994 strike.

32. See especially, Ignatieff, Michael. 2004. "Lesser

Evils: What Will it Cost Us to Succeed in the War on Terror." The New York Times Magazine, May 2.

33. Here I think the spirit of Zizek's text defies its letter. Zizek holds that ideology broadly "works" insofar as its determinate logic evades our recognition, and that we can therefore "know too much." But by his own logic, merely understanding how "non-knowledge" or "misrecognition" constitutes a system does not, in itself, disrupt the system's operation.

34. Senator Byrd introduced in April 2005 an amendment to stop funding, and hence shut down, U.S. detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay. The amendment was to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, and would have eliminated $36 million for construction of a permanent military prison there. The more influential but less courageous Senator Joseph Biden recently echoed Byrd's call to close the prison, though primarily to deny our enemy its "greatest propaganda tool." "Biden Says Prison at Guantanamo Bay Should be Shut Down," Washington Post, June 6, 2005, p. A02.

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From Participatory Democracy to Digital Democracy

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Tom Hayden posted on his website, http://www.tomhayden.com, an article he coauthored with Dick Flacks to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Port Huron Statement. The two SDS founders concluded, "Perhaps the most important legacy of the Port Huron Statement is the fact that it introduced the concept of participatory democracy to popular discourse and practice." The concept of participatory democracy encompassed values such as equality, decentralization, and consensus decision-making. It provided direction for "all those trying to create a world where each person has a voice in the decisions affecting his or her life." [1] In this article, I suggest that Port Huron's concept of participatory democracy included some ideas that were potentially antithetical to democracy and that potential, unfortunately, is being fulfilled in contemporary theories of digital democracy.

The Port Huron Statement Revisited

The Port Huron Statement contained two underlying themes that potentially subverted democratic equality. One was the notion that the American people were fundamentally flawed, most apparently, by their apathy. The other was that the best means to eliminate this flaw was to follow the lead of rational, deliberative activists. Both themes could be (and would be) used to justify political inequalities.

Port Huron's student-authors expressed a dim view of American citizens. The American people had closed minds. They exhibited a foolish confidence that the nation could muddle through its problems. They harbored a false sense of contentment, "a glaze above deeply felt anxieties," arising out of loneliness, isolation, and estrangement. They also suffered from materialism, meaningless work, and an intellectual numbness born of powerlessness. Overall, the students portrayed Americans as a people more prone to ignorance, silence, and obedience to their leaders than to equal participation in the decisions that affect their lives. [2]

The good news was that Americans could be redeemed. They had a capacity for self-cultivation, self-understanding, and creativity. They could become engaged in a community founded on love, thoughtfulness, and creativity. Importantly, students in universities ("overlooked seats of influence") could lead the way. College students who developed "real intellectual skill" and committed themselves to reason, reflection, and deliberation were the basis for a New Left that would impart information, enhance motivation, and encourage participation.

To a degree, then, the student-authors assumed that Americans suffered false consciousness. The students were not clear on whether they expected people to overcome false consciousness before they became actively involved in politics or whether people would become enlightened by way of their active involvement in politics. Nor did the authors gauge "how false" American consciousness was or how false it was in comparison to common political practices and hegemonic ideas disseminated by dominant elites. The omission was significant. It sidestepped the question of whether the American people—as they thought and acted at the time—could be trusted to participate in the politics of self-government.

One can infer from the Port Huron Statement an indirect answer to the question of trust. On the one hand,

the SDS writers suggested that, alas, the American people could be trusted to participate in politics in ways that supported dominant elites. They essentially portrayed the United States as a plebiscitary democracy in which a combination of citizen apathy and periodic elections legitimized government by the few. On the other hand, the Port Huron Statement implied that American people could not yet be trusted to exhibit the love or deliberation essential to a robust, participatory democracy. Certainly, later SDS activists did not endorse Richard Nixon's racist, xenophobic "silent majority" when it became more vocal and more involved in political discussion and decision-making. A strong temptation for New Left activists was to proclaim themselves the arbiters of what counted as love and deliberation as a basis for determining who could be trusted to participate in public life.

Overall, I believe that the Port Huron Statement was based on an optimism that a majority of Americans eventually would participate in politics in ways that enhanced liberty, equality, community, the common good, and world peace. Nevertheless, its dim assessment of American public consciousness, along with its emphasis on deliberation as the proper foundation for participation, fueled the arguments of later activists who declared themselves a political vanguard. Nearing the end of the 1960s, pessimism about the American people and optimism about activists' insight produced significant antidemocratic tendencies within the New Left.

Michael Walzer concluded the decade with a marvelous essay about participation in progressive politics. He made several key points. First, a citizen's choice not to participate does not constitute false consciousness. There are many legitimate reasons for citizens to disengage themselves from politics. Equally important, these nonparticipants play an important role in democracy. They serve as audiences and critics of participants. Furthermore, they are citizens who have rights and interests that need to be represented. Walzer wrote, "Participatory democracy needs to be paralleled by representative democracy." Second, participatory democracy has a tendency to become "the rule of men with the most evenings to spare." Activists often turn participation into an onerous "duty" that entails constant meetings, discussions, deliberations, and decision-making. That duty may become so burdensome that most citizens cannot conceivably do it and many activists burn out trying. The "participatory" element in participatory democracy may disappear when the few activists who are willing to give 110 percent to the cause monopolize among themselves political initiative, strategy, and authority. Walzer warned that the most committed participants are the ones who need the strongest reminder that they are only part of the citizenry. [3]

Participatory Democracy in Practice

In 1977, Tom Hayden founded the Campaign for Economic Democracy (CED), which he dedicated to giving the public "a real voice" in economic and political decisions." [4] Hayden lived in Santa Monica, California, where the local CED chapter joined a municipal coalition (Santa Monicans for Renters' Rights-SMRR) to win a major rent control referendum in 1979 and then control of city hall in 1981. Progressive activists and public officials hoped to bring participatory democracy to the city. I have told their story in Middle Class Radicalism in Santa Monica (1986). Here I focus on three tensions that emerged when progressives sought to implement participatory democracy in an affluent, ocean side city. [5]

First, activists and politicians had a tough time adhering to the concept of participatory democracy. For example, the SMRR coalition championed the participation of residents living in the low-income, minority section of town, but the coalition's white, middle-class activist leaders did not especially trust those residents or their neighborhood association to adhere to SMRR's agenda. The residents were outsiders. Their priorities and interests differed from those of the rent-control crowd. Activists also supported broad citizen participation on city commissions. However, they opened commissions to diverse participation only after they appointed trusted allies who could secure a majority and control decision-making outcomes. The result was that more low-income minorities participated in local politics and were served by city government but they did not necessarily win greater influence over public policy. Clearly, activists' rhetoric outran their success in putting participatory democracy into practice.

Second, political activists and politicians became increasingly dependent on professionals and experts to administer rent control, guide public policy, and insure electoral majorities. After 1979, a rent control board with its own legal staff administered rent control and adjudicated landlord-tenant disputes. The city attorney and the city manager defended progressive victories but they also resisted a number of progressive policies. Periodic elections prompted activist politicians to appeal to their renter base and downplay other progressive issues as potentially divisive. The elections also prompted SMRR candidates to hire professional consultants to devise and manage their

electoral campaigns. To a large extent, the democratic goal of citizen participation did not stand in the way of structural forces that were conducive to amateur demobilization, issue depoliticization, and the reign of professional expertise.

Third, SMRR leaders and politicians made extraordinary demands on the time, energy, and resources of the activist community. For example, the mayor remained voluntarily unemployed, turning what had been a part-time job into an overtime commitment. Leaders put tremendous pressure on activists to attend endless meetings-night after night and on weekends. Why? Egalitarian, decentralized, inclusive, consensus decision-making takes an enormous amount of time. City council meetings, municipal commission and board meetings, neighborhood organization meetings, CED meetings, Democratic Club meetings, SMRR meetings, and so on, were ongoing and unending. Moreover, because progressive leaders tended to distrust those outside their own ranks, they took on more and more tasks themselves and they demanded more and more time from the activist rank and file. Those who put in the time were likely to become part of the activist core; those who "failed" in their duty were apt to end up on the periphery. The tendency here was for the "last activists standing" to practice participatory democracy among themselves-while everyone else went to bed.

To their credit, Santa Monica activists did not make a virtue out of necessity. They did not declare their moral or intellectual superiority over those whom they governed; they did not justify the rule of deliberative experts at the expense of citizen amateurs; and they did not try to force on the unwilling a sacred duty to participate. Indeed, many student activists of the 1960s and backyard democrats of the 1980s recognized the tension between participatory ideals and structural obstacles. Santa Monica activists did want lower-class minorities to organize, participate, and share in governance; they did want to give preference to political mobilization and progressive policies while taking advantage of the advice of experts; and they did want to build a culture in which participation was inclusive and fulfilling rather than onerous and burdensome. In contrast, today's "digital democrats" often resolve these tensions in ways that systematically undervalue and substantially undermine democratic participation.

Participation in Cyberspace

The recent development and deployment of the Internet invited participatory democrats to adapt their theories to twenty-first century technology. Tom Hayden was near the head of the line. He developed his own interactive website which includes, among other features, "Tom's Blog" as well as a "Discussion Forum" advertised as "the place to ask Tom a question." [6]

The Internet seems to be ideally suited to participatory democracy in the United States. It is a decentralized technology devoid of gatekeepers and subversive of hierarchy. It provides millions of citizens with relatively cheap and easy access to massive amounts of social and political information as well as to unmediated, interactive communication with other citizens and leaders. It can host virtual town hall meetings, close the distance between voters and decision-makers, and serve as a medium for mounting protests against social injustice and political corruption. Amitai Etzioni writes, "It would be much easier online than offline for millions not merely to gain information and to vote, but also to participate in deliberations and in instructing their chosen representatives." [7] Welcome to the age of digital democracy.

Note that even the most enthusiastic digital democrats recognize obstacles to online participation. The Internet is a commercialized medium, more suited to the desires of consumers and producers than to the needs of citizens and decision-makers. The Internet generates a "digital divide" that reproduces many of the inequalities that exist in society, with the "haves" making more effective use of cyberspace than the "have nots." Furthermore, the Internet tends to isolate individuals from each other, promote fragmented and parochial publics, and give preference to information dissemination, polling, and voting rather than democratic discussion, deliberation, and decision-making. Digital democrats exhibit different degrees of confidence about the possibilities for overcoming these obstacles but they still believe that the Internet can be a positive, potent force for promoting democratic participation. [8] Is their confidence justified?

Much of the discourse on digital democracy is based on a low opinion of the American people's capacity for self-government. Theorists rarely refer back to Thomas Paine's belief in the people's "common sense" or even to Thomas Jefferson's faith that average citizens can govern themselves in local communities. Instead, digital democrats' useable past focuses on James Madison, whose writings emphasized people's inordinate passions, selfish interests,

frequent factionalism, and tendency toward tyrannical majorities. [9] In one sense, digital democrats' resurrection of Madison is surprising. A major thrust of Madison's contributions to the Federalist was opposition to democratic experiments in the states in favor of centralized power in a national government that would be governed by "the better sort." In another sense, Madison's popularity among digital democrats is almost predictable. Many cyberdemocrats fear that the Internet will be used primarily as an instrument for instant polling, instant referenda, instant elections—that is, for instant democracy. Like Madison, these digital democrats fear plebiscitary democracy, which Benjamin Barber defines as "a democracy that embodies majority opinions assembled from the unconsidered prejudices of private persons voting private interests." Digital democrats have little faith in the common sense, good will, or civic virtue of the American majority; indeed, they dwell on the people's impulsive, prejudicial opinions and worry about "unchecked majoritarianism." [10]

This lack of faith in the American public seems to have two sources. One source, as old as Madison, is a belief that Americans' fickle combination of apathy, passion, selfishness, consumerism, and parochialism—when unmediated by built-in delays and buffers, countervailing forces, and governing elites—tends to produce social disorder, bad public policy, and majority tyranny. The other source is digital democrats' conviction that populist measures such as citizen referenda and popular plebiscites regularly produce conservative victories. Especially since the Reagan Revolution, progressive democrats fear that America's "unthinking" majority supports illiberal, undemocratic values founded on a combination of religious fundamentalism and laissez-faire capitalism. They worry that populist appeals produce California-style initiatives that serve the cause of moral regulation and social inequality, and invite public support for popular demagogues (reminiscent of Hitler and Mussolini). Unfortunately, digital democrats conclude, if the Internet facilitates plebicitary democracy and makes "push-button democracy" pervasive, the result will be to empower conservative policies and demagogues strongly opposed to equality. Lloyd Morrissett concludes that the choice today is "demagoguery or democracy." [11]

To avoid the demagoguery born of "mass prejudice" and "the tyranny of opinion" and instead to achieve "strong democracy," Barber argues that the Internet should become a forum for a "multiple-phase" process of public deliberation that includes "information, adversarial debate, and the direct engagement of citizens within their local communities, and among the communities and the experts." The Internet should be reconceived and reengineered as a Civic Net rather than a Commercial Net. It should serve as a source not so much of information as knowledge, the latter requiring time for discussion, debate, and deliberation. Meanwhile, "netizens" ought to be taught the skills necessary for expressing and defending their views in public forums and for listening and responding to other people's views, even to views they would prefer to ignore. Ideally, digital democrats tell us, we should move toward "a discursive democratic polity" in which the voice of the people is heeded in decision-making not because it is the voice of the people but because it conveys a thoughtful message. [12]

Let us assume the plebiscitary democracy will result in policies and laws consistent with right wing populism. Is the problem that the American people suffer from false consciousness because they are more interested in pornography than politics or because they tolerate or support dominant elites? [13] Is it that they lack proper motivation to participate or proper information and sufficient deliberation? Not necessarily. It may be that many Americans agree with libertarian norms founded on a distrust of politics or conservative values aimed at enforcing fundamentalist morality. And it may be that many Americans believe that an impassioned citizenry needs to be governed because it is incapable of governing itself in an orderly fashion. The problem may not be plebiscitary democracy; the problem may be the assumptions, values, and preferences that many Americans bring to politics. Perhaps digital democrats should be less concerned with push-button technology and their own role as the arbiters of deliberative outcomes; they should be more concerned with winning the hearts and minds of the American people.

Alternatively, let us assume that plebiscitary democracy invites impulsive decisions that tend to produce varying degrees of social disorder, bad public policy, and majority tyranny. Consider Richard K. Moore's description of West Coast populism:

> In California, there has long been an initiative and referendum process, and it is much used. This particular system was set up in a fairly reasonable way, and in many cases decent results have been obtained. On the other hand, there have been cases where corporate interests have used the initiative process (with the help of intensive advertising campaigns) to get measures approved that were blatantly unsound.[14]

Moore sets himself up as the arbiter of what counts as "decent results" and "blatantly unsound" measures without either justifying his authority to arbitrate or making a case for his substantive position. His implicit message is, "Trust

me rather than California voters or the corporate interests that manipulate them." Conceivably, the majority of California voters who supported corporate interests and their pet policies were actually making thoughtful decisions that were consistent with their own values and preferences.

Even if one grants the argument that the American people tend to use plebiscitary democracy to make impulsive decisions that produce varying degrees of social disorder, bad public policy, and majority tyranny, one must compare those likely results with the actual results produced by the current system of representative government. Today, American citizenship combines public inaction and periodic voting to produce conservative Republican domination in all three branches of the federal government, ongoing social inequalities, public policies destructive of people's civil rights and economic opportunities, and what some consider a rising rightwing tyranny (symbolized by the Patriot Act). In contrast, a plebiscitary democracy, with all of its flaws, might be preferable to this right wing domination. Indeed, online participation in a plebiscitary democracy may even constitute a significant step toward building more participatory mobilizations and progressive organizations.

The most progressive digital democrats generally argue that the solution to the public's shortcomings involves devising a way for citizens to deliberate on public issues. According to Barber, the transition from ill-informed public opinion to deliberative public knowledge is likely to require "intervention, education, facilitation, and mediation-all anathema of devotees of an anarchic and wholly user-controlled net whose whole point is to circumvent facilitation, editing, and other 'top-down' forms of intervention." [15] Barber believes that citizen deliberation is so crucial to fostering participatory democracy that efforts to facilitate it may require the imposition of government regulation of the Internet.

If we grant the importance of deliberation for democracy, it may still be the case that deliberation is not a sufficiently weighty value to justify government regulation of the Internet. Deliberation does not rule out deceit, but it may promote manipulation. Deliberation does not eliminate inequalities in people's motivation, education, resources, and bargaining power. Deliberation does not guarantee fair treatment, good will, or consensus decision-making. Nor does deliberation ensure that a majority will not be as tyrannical as, if not more tyrannical than, an impulsive citizenry. What deliberation does ensure is a degree of hierarchy in which those who participate in public forums are likely to claim superior political credentials to nonparticipants. Are we prepared to exclude nondeliberative citizens from political participation? Are we to assume nondeliberative citizens will be virtually represented by deliberative netizens? [16]

Even if we were to agree that deliberation is sufficiently important to justify top-down governance of the Internet, we must ask who is appropriately qualified and trustworthy to design and administer top-down governance. Digital democrats cannot depend on the American people; after all, they are the ones in need of guidance. Nor can digital democrats count on dominant elites, who benefit from the absence of deliberative, participatory democracy. According to Bruce Bimber, the complexity of the Internet and modern governance systematically undermines the public's capacity "to participate in the formation of political agendas, engage in the policy process, and monitor and ultimately control democratic institutions." Instead, this complexity provides "experts" a technical and political advantage over the public, making democracy "vulnerable to drift toward a state of Platonic guardianship." For Bimber, the question is whether a sufficiently savvy subset of informed and engaged citizens (net activists?) can counterbalance the inevitable power of experts. [17] Here, participatory democracy is less a political ideal than a stopgap measure to energize an activist vanguard to check and balance technocratic domination.

Digital democrats do not seem to be particularly concerned with attracting or building a social base that might participate in a mobilization or movement aimed at promoting digital democracy. On the one hand, the theorists seem more comfortable confronting technical obstacles to digital democracy than engaging in a social and political analysis of the forces that might benefit from it, support it, and lead the way to it. For example, in considering how to insure that "e-democracy [does] not turn demagogic," Etzioni explains how to transform chat rooms into deliberative forums by installing "delay loops." Missing is an analysis of the social forces that may advocate or participate in these deliberative forums. [18] On the other hand, digital democrats are happy to provide examples of progressive groups-locally, nationally, and internationally-that have used the Web to promote grassroots organizing, coordinate coalitions and protests, and identify and publicize political corruption. Of course, conservatives and fascists have also used the Web, perhaps more aggressively, to promote their own visions, values, and causes.

An important difference distinguishing the Port Huron students and Santa Monica activists from today's digital democrats is proximity to a social base. SDS was part of a student movement and the Port Huron Statement was a catalyst for the growth of that movement. Santa Monica's progressives led a renters' revolt in a city where some

80% of residents were tenants and where a struggle for control over one's housing was seen as a launching pad for a broader movement to win democratic control of the community. A major problem facing digital democrats is that they have not identified a social base. As far as I can tell, the main audiences for their theories, ideas, and recommendations are other professionals and experts: academics, politicians, bureaucrats, and industry practitioners. [19]

A Politics for Digital Democracy?

In a fascinating think piece, John Ferejohn argues that Americans live in a participatory democracy but do not realize it. While public interest and participation in conventional political institutions is quite low, civic engagement in associational life (including the workplace) is relatively robust. This form of participation fortifies individuals' principled belief in social equality and cooperation and it fuels periodic "participatory eruptions" that shatter people's everyday complacency and draws them into populist surges focused on a variety of public issues. [20]

Ferejohn emphasizes political principles and participatory eruptions, which are also important to Dick Flacks and Tom Hayden when they reflect on the legacy of the sixties and evaluate the prospects for the future. Flacks and coauthor Jack Whalen conclude a study of the evolving ideals of the sixties generation as its activists matured into adulthood by writing:

> The lives we have looked at in this inquiry . . . have been deeply affected by their intertwining with social movement. The flow and ebb of collective action is the primary context within which lives committed to principle are lived. It is not that in ebb times principles are abandoned, for what we have found is different. But it is the case that personal conviction is insufficient to make commitment fully meaningful. The spirit of the sixties did not die as its bearers got older, nor did they betray that spirit. Perhaps the spirit waits for a new opportunity that will permit the tide of collective action once more to rise. [21]

This focus on enduring principles and changing contexts, it seems to me, is crucial for understanding opportunities for promoting participatory democracy. The struggle for participatory democracy is still a fight for principles, particularly for the enduring value of equality and self-government. Deliberation is an important principle but not necessarily a primary one. The Internet can be an important medium for fostering both involvement and deliberation but the medium is neither the message nor a substitute for it. The struggle for the hearts and minds of citizens is an ongoing one—regardless of changes in information and communication technologies.

Principles do not exist in a social vacuum. In a 2003 speech posted on http://alternet.org, Tom Hayden offers evidence of the rise of "a new movement in the world." One of its strands is "the global justice movement." Another main strand is global opposition to America's war in Iraq, which is emblematic of our elites' imperial designs. The main manifestation of this new movement is periodic participatory eruptions such as the Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization or the rapid rise of http://www.MoveOn.org as a factor in domestic politics. In both instances, the Internet proved to be an effective instrument for mobilizing participants and giving visibility to collective action. [22]

The cause of participatory democracy is not necessarily furthered by academic and practitioner emphases on online dissemination of information, online plebiscites, online deliberative forums, and online modes of decision-making. Rather, promoting participatory democracy is still a matter of advocating democratic values and applying them to salient issues—using traditional means as well new media. However, as Roger Hurwitz suggests, an important function of cyberspace for democracy becomes visible during moments when there is "great dissatisfaction with a current state of affairs" and when that dissatisfaction finds expression in "ad hoc protest movements." These are moments when citizens do not need much information or forums for deliberation; rather, they need a focal point for "collective demand." During these participatory eruptions, the Internet can serve as a crucial medium for alerting citizens to the crisis and directing them to opportunities to engage in collective action.

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9. Cass Sunstein, republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 38-39; Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Information Technology and Democratic Governance," in Kamarck and Nye, 11-13; Arthur Isak Applbaum, "Failure in the Cybermarketplace of Ideas," in ibid., 27; Anthony G. Wilhelm, "Civic Participation and Technology Inequality: The 'Killer Application' is Education," in Anderson and Cornfield, 118-19. A major exception is Benjamin Barber, who attaches Jefferson's name to a model of "strong democracy" but, as we shall see, whose concern with popular participation is qualified by his prioritization of deliberation. See Barber, Benjamin. Winter 1998-1999. "Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong Democracy." Political Science Quarterly 113, 4:573-589.

10. Anna Malina, "Perspectives on Citizen Democratization and Alienation in the Virtual Public Sphere," in Hague and Loader, 33; Barber, "Three Scenarios," 585.

11. Stephen Coleman, "Cutting Out the Middle Man: From Virtual Representation to Direct Deliberation," in Hague and Loader, 200, 210; Richard K. Moore, "Democracy and Cyberspace," in ibid., 57; Anthony G. Wilhelm, "Virtual Sounding Boards: How Deliberative is Online Political Discussion?" in ibid., 175; Lloyd Morrisett, "Technologies of Freedom," in Jenkins and Thorburn, 27, 31.

12. Barber, "Three Scenarios," 583-84; Benjamin R, Barber, "Which Technology and Which Democracy?" in Jenkins and Thorburn, 43, 46; Wilhelm, "Virtual Sounding Boards," in Hague and Loader, 155, 157-60, 175; see also Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

13. See Ellen Hume, "Resource Journalism: A Model for New Media," in Jenkins and Thorburn, 332-33, 336.

14. Richard K. Moore, "Democracy and Cyberspace," 56 (emphasis added).

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16. See Applbaum, "Failure in the Cybermarketplace of Ideas," 23-28.

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Two Wars, Two Movements: Iraq in Light of Vietnam

Tom Wells

It started with a bang. In October 2002, five months before the Iraq War had even begun, and on two separate days, tens of thousands of people demonstrated against the likely war in cities around the United States. Well over 100,000 (perhaps twice that many) protested in Washington in what was probably the largest antiwar demonstration held there since the Vietnam War; many were first-timers. "I've never in my life done anything like this before," one 31-year-old woman told a reporter. Over 50,000 protested in San Francisco in perhaps the largest antiwar demonstration there since Vietnam too. Earlier that month more than 1.5 million protested in cities in Italy, a strong U.S. ally in Europe, including some 200,000 in Rome, almost matching the size of an antiwar demonstration in London late the previous month. Activists descended on Congress and organized a deluge of e-mails and phone calls to legislators, urging them to oppose resolutions authorizing President George Bush to wage war. When Congress overwhelmingly passed such a resolution, it sparked civil disobedience in San Francisco and other cities.[1]

There was an upsurge in student opposition to the war; dissent on college campuses was "growing exponentially," according to an organizer with the Institute for Policy Studies. Campus teach-ins and protests were "so common that prominent academics cannot meet the demand for their presence," the New York Times observed. Some activists spoke of being astounded and overwhelmed by the number of people who wanted to get involved. [2]

On January 18, 2003, despite temperatures in the mid-twenties, several hundred thousand demonstrated in Washington, surpassing the size of the October protest; at the Washington Naval Yard an "inspections team" demanded access to U.S. weapons of mass destruction. In San Francisco at least 150,000 demonstrated this time. In Pittsburgh, several thousand marched in the largest antiwar protest in that city since Vietnam; numerous small protests were held in the rural Midwest, despite particularly strong support for the war in rural America and the greater social and economic risks of speaking out there. "It was a little scary to take ourselves off-campus in this town," said a professor in Emporia, Kansas. Many who joined these demonstrations were also novices at protest. Republican business executives who had supported the Bush administration's attack on Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks published a full-page letter in the Wall Street Journal declaring that "Iraq does not pass the test." Antiwar sentiment was increasing in the labor movement. Many Christian religious leaders were also speaking out: both the National Council of Churches and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops passed resolutions opposing military action. By February 6 at least sixty-four cities had passed antiwar resolutions as well; fueled by anger at congressional complicity with the Bush administration on Iraq, that number would more than double the following month in an extraordinary grassroots movement. "It's like wildfire," one of its organizers remarked. [3]

On February 15, in an unmatched day of global protest under the slogan "The World Says No to War," over 400,000 people demonstrated in New York in freezing temperatures. Hundreds of protests were held around the world involving close to ten million people. Over a million demonstrated in London in the largest antiwar demonstration ever there; at least as many demonstrated in Rome, 250,000 in Sydney—the largest antiwar protest ever in Australia—and 200,000 in Berlin. Many organizers were stunned by the size of the protests. "We were just as surprised as everyone else," one said. "But you're seeing a new sense of confidence among organizations." The political tide appeared to be turning. The demonstrations and their political repercussions around the world "have

radically altered the calculus of possibilities," Jonathan Schell wrote in The Nation. "Before the 15th, the war seemed unstoppable—inevitable. Now, for the first time, it is conceivable that if enough people place enough specific, concrete pressure on their governments, the war can be prevented." In a "virtual march on Washington," peace activists flooded members of Congress with phone calls and faxes. [4]

It was an unprecedented outpouring. These were the biggest antiwar demonstrations to ever take place before a war had actually begun, due in no small part to the power of the internet. "We could communicate very quickly," notes Joseph Gerson, a veteran activist with the American Friends Service Committee and one of many political veterans involved in organizing the prewar protests. The international infrastructure of the antiglobalization movement aided organization of the protests significantly. February 15 "built on a whole series of global days of action that had been organized around WTO and other trade issues going back to 1998," Leslie Kauffman, a staff organizer with the United for Peace and Justice coalition, remembers. The demonstrators included a broad spectrum of people: ordinary citizens with their families, religious activists, antiglobalization protesters, members of traditional peace groups, seniors, businesspeople, environmentalists, civil rights and feminist activists, union members, college students, and teenagers. And the movement was genuinely international. "We have created the largest, most broadly based peace movement in history," David Cortright, a cofounder of the antiwar coalition Win Without War, wrote. [5] In antiwar circles, enthusiasm and hope were soaring.

Protest against the Vietnam War had taken a far different path. Before that war had begun in earnest in the spring of 1965, protests against it had been small and politically isolated, although over 20,000 U.S. "advisers" were in Vietnam by the end of 1964, over 400 Americans had already died by then, and the United States was undertaking an extensive program of clandestine military attacks against North Vietnam and other military operations. But Americans were not facing a well-publicized and dramatic prospect of an all-out, imminent military assault at that time—the advantages of all-out assaults became more apparent in Washington after Vietnam—and the anticommunist rationale for intervening in Vietnam still resonated widely in the country. Fewer questioned their government's case for war strongly enough to protest it. With Iraq, more citizens deemed war completely unnecessary. Of course, the memory of Vietnam and government lying about it fed participation in the Iraq protests.

The contrast in numbers is stark. The first national demonstration against the Vietnam War, held in April 1965 in Washington after the sustained U.S. bombing of North Vietnam (dubbed Operation Rolling Thunder) had begun, totaled only 20,000 people, mainly students. The first national coordinating committee to end the Vietnam War, shaky and transitory as it was, was not formed until five or six months after Operation Rolling Thunder had begun and when nearly 100,000 U.S. troops were already in Vietnam (and 175,000 in all were ticketed for there); yet several national coalitions and other national antiwar organizations were on the move before the Iraq War had even started. During Vietnam, it took two more years—when U.S. troop levels had reached well over 400,000 amid gradually intensified U.S. bombing, and around 10,000 Americans had died there—before a peace demonstration attracted several hundred thousand people. And it was not until two and a half years after that, in the fall of 1969—after U.S. troop levels had peaked at about 549,000—that over 500,000 people would turn out for a demonstration in the United States. [6]

The contrast in social composition is also marked. Mainstream religious organizations joined the antiwar movement much sooner during Iraq than they did during Vietnam (at least in terms of public statements). Pope John Paul II was an early and consistent critic of U.S. policy. Segments of organized labor, which was hawkish for years during Vietnam—some unionists even attacked protesters—and which largely supported the U.S. war in Afghanistan, also joined the antiwar movement sooner during Iraq than during Vietnam. So did military families, war veterans, and civil rights groups like the NAACP. There was also more criticism of U.S. policy in the media over Iraq (though it was accompanied by the standard cheerleading when the war began). And while student protest was central to dissent on Vietnam, students have played a secondary role on Iraq, despite joining that movement in large numbers, especially before the war began—greater than in any other recent movement—and largely without the generational self-definitions of the 1960s. A counterculture "is much more difficult to find now," Bill Dobbs, a United for Peace and Justice activist, says. [7]

In early March 2003, more than 400 colleges and high schools in the United States participated in national, though mainly small, protests against the Iraq War, including school walkouts. It was one of the largest student actions in years. "People felt really empowered," Jessie Marshall, an organizer with the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition, recalls. Three days later, thousands of women with pink accessories ("Bush says Code Red, we say Code Pink," they chanted, mocking the government's color-coded terror-alert system) marched in Washington. A

week later, in "a prelude of civil disobedience to come," as a reporter for the Washington Post wrote, protesters in San Francisco engaged in civil disobedience aimed at shutting down the Pacific Stock Exchange; arrestees included 60-year-old Warren Langley, a recent former president of the Exchange who had joined his first antiwar protest in January and then marched again in February. "This war seems very wrong for the entire world," Langley commented. On March 15 some 50,000 demonstrated in Washington. The next day a wave of candlelight vigils across the globe involved about a million participants. [8]

Protests erupted around the world after the U.S. bombing of Iraq commenced in full force on March 19. Some 200,000 turned out in Athens, Greece. Protesters engaged in civil disobedience in numerous cities, including New York, where they staged a "die-in" on Fifth Avenue; over 2,000 were arrested in San Francisco. On March 22, more than 300,000 marched in another huge demonstration in New York.[9]

Antiwar protest continued worldwide in the months ahead—marches, rallies, civil disobedience, vigils, teach-ins, congressional lobbying, student strikes, antiwar ads, you name it. Meanwhile the peace movement was doing a lot of strategizing. Unlike during the Gulf War in 1991, when "once the missiles started flying the movement essentially evaporated," Joseph Gerson observes, "this time the movement stuck." But the prewar eruption was the zenith of the movement (at least as of 2005), which lost momentum. "Since the war started we've had a pretty lackluster response from the grass roots," David Cortright acknowledged. "Our movement is going to get smaller before it gets bigger," conceded Bob Edgar, another Win Without War co-chairman. The immediate crisis—trying to prevent a massive deadly assault—was over, and it appeared likely to many activists and other Americans that the war would soon be over too. After all, many voices in the media were predicting a U.S. cakewalk. "It could last six days, six weeks. I doubt six months," U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had predicted the month before the U.S. attack began. The fall of Baghdad the second week of April was the end to many people. The war was over, the New York Times, the Associated Press, and other members of the media declared. (To some extent the history of the Iraq War is a history of purported turning points: the fall of Baghdad, Bush's "mission accomplished" claim, Hussein's capture, the formal transfer of sovereignty, the assault on Fallujah, the elections, and so on.)[10]

Many protesters were feeling disoriented. Why are you still out there? some were asked. Although 15,000 demonstrated in Oakland, California, on April 5, a march in San Francisco under rain on April 12 drew only several thousand people; other demonstrations worldwide that day also attracted reduced numbers. Maybe 30,000 protested in Washington, 25,000 in London. Win Without War debated whether to continue and, if so, whether to pursue a broader agenda (it decided to soldier on). United for Peace and Justice, the nation's largest antiwar coalition, considered focusing more on smaller regional events than on huge national ones. "We're not 100 percent sure how to navigate this," Leslie Cagan, cochairwoman of that group, said. "…This is very much a period of figuring out our next steps." A sense that the war would end sooner rather than later would hamper the movement for weeks.[11]

Many protesters were discouraged that they hadn't prevented the war, unprecedented as that would have been, and that Bush had apparently ignored them. "They're not listening, and it's getting harder to stay optimistic," said a United for Peace and Justice coordinator. "It was a real hit to people," young and old alike, Jessie Marshall recalls. Demoralization was widespread. There was "a tremendous letdown," David Cortright remembers. "In the first few weeks it looked like Bush was having his way." They'd mounted the largest day of antiwar protest ever on February 15, to no avail. Massive demonstrations hadn't had the effect that many people had hoped they would. Perceptions of political weakness, even impotence, would plague the movement for some time, as they did the anti-Vietnam War movement. Lack of media coverage of antiwar events (which led some groups to purchase television and newspaper ads, and which too would remain a source of frustration later) and slanted coverage were also dispiriting. Overwhelming public support for Bush—his approval rating after the fall of Baghdad was 73 percent, and about 70 percent supported the war when it began—was deflating too. Morale in the movement was slipping. And many organizers were exhausted. They'd put together mobilizations at an extraordinarily rapid pace. They needed a breather. Some people had simply tired of demonstrating. "People have been in the street for seven months," a French antiwar leader pointed out. [12]

Many activists turned their attention to related issues: publicizing false U.S. claims about Iraq's weapons capabilities before the war and pushing for an independent investigation of them; organizing to prevent other U.S. interventions overseas and to shape a new U.S. foreign policy; opposing the continued U.S. occupation of Iraq and promoting the reconstruction of the country; unseating Bush in 2004; publicizing the bloated U.S. military budget and its cost in domestic programs; fighting the erosion of civil liberties; and working for global economic justice (appropriately enough since many antiwar protesters came out of the antiglobalization movement). [13] MoveOn.

org, that huge online network of activists, would ultimately move on to focus on domestic issues like social security and Supreme Court nominees.

Meanwhile, however, United for Peace and Justice was growing enormously. Countless local antiwar groups sought it out, wanting to be part of something bigger. More groups joined the coalition between the start of the war and that summer than did during the prewar period. And there was "lots of unglamorous, less newsworthy movement building taking place," Leslie Kauffman recalls. [14]

Soon a guerrilla movement made its presence known in Iraq, one that exhibited a surprising level of organization and sophistication and whose attacks on U.S. forces and boldness increased almost daily. And then came the inevitable comparisons to Vietnam. "Iraq could be even worse," a Newsweek article argued in July 2003. In Iraq, "the United States has to do just about everything, but it looks as if it didn't prepare for anything." Among other blunders, the White House failed to foresee the strength, size, and sophistication of the resistance in Iraq, and badly misjudged the response it would get there. "This is way beyond the scope of anything anybody who was talking about [an upsurge in violence] expected," said a retired Defense Intelligence Agency officer the following April. Bush himself had confidently told Pat Robertson before the war began, "We're not going to have any casualties," and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz had told a congressional committee, "I am reasonably certain that they will greet us as liberators." The original war plan had thus forecast a series of quick U.S. troop reductions in 2003, perhaps down to 50,000 by the end of the year. The administration's intelligence failure was gargantuan. Even many hawks and military officers began forecasting failure in Iraq without a major change in policy. The Bush administration and the military were forced to junk plans for months of relatively peaceful occupation and prepare for the possibility of years of conflict. [15]

By September 2003, only 50 percent of Americans believed the situation in Iraq was worth going to war over. And whereas 41 percent had felt that "for all intents and purposes" the war was over shortly after Bush declared an end to "major combat" on May 1, now only 10 percent did. There was "a gnawing unease about the course of this mission and a realization that the conflict will be deadlier, more expensive and longer-lasting than Mr. Bush signaled" on May 1, the New York Times noted. Bush's request for another $87 billion from Congress to finance the war fed that unease. In early November, for the first time, a slim majority of Americans disapproved of Bush's actions in Iraq. Though opinion on the war would rise and fall with events, the public was turning against the conflict quicker than it did during Vietnam. Not until over two years into that war did a slim majority disapprove of President Lyndon Johnson's policies in Vietnam. [16]

Of course, the scales of the two wars were different, and that helps explain the drop in protest over Iraq after the crisis had passed. That September there were around 130,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, around the same number as were in Vietnam when the anti-Vietnam War movement was still getting off the ground in 1965. Around 300 Americans had died in Iraq, which was comparable to 1964—before the antiwar movement even really got going—during Vietnam. And while more than 10,000 Iraqi civilians would be dead by February 2004, over two million Vietnamese eventually died in Vietnam. [17] In other words, after the initial "shock and awe" (to use that repulsive term) in Iraq, the size of the war there resembled the early going in Vietnam.

In late September, some 25,000 demonstrated in London. A month later, perhaps 100,000 turned out in Washington, 20,000 in San Francisco. Up to 200,000 protested in London during a visit by Bush in November. The movement was still alive; organizers spoke of a revival and increased cooperation between antiwar coalitions. An untold number of smaller protests continued around the United States; some forty weekly peace vigils were still being held in the Los Angeles area alone, despite a decline since around April. Opposition among military families and veterans was increasing, if still largely beneath the surface. "Bush lies and who dies? My son, Jesus Suarez del Solar Navarro," Jesus's father would say during a March 2004 protest organized by Military Families Speak Out and Veterans for Peace. As it did during Vietnam, the FBI undertook a systematic nationwide effort to collect intelligence on protesters. [18]

On March 20, 2004, the first anniversary of the U.S. attack on Iraq, over 300 protests were held in the United States and some 400 elsewhere around the world. At least a million turned out in Rome. The numbers were much lower in other places, however, and (as one might expect) far lower than the turnouts after the start of the war. Somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 demonstrated in New York. In London around 25,000 protested; in Athens only around 10,000 did, and several thousand demonstrated in Sydney. [19]

The antiwar movement during Vietnam had also ebbed and flowed. Measured by turnouts at national demonstrations, which of course are merely one barometer of an antiwar movement's size and health (albeit the

easiest to get a handle on—it's much harder to tabulate the myriad of smaller and less prominent expressions of opposition including local organizing), it did not simply grow in a linear fashion as is often remembered. After the first national demonstration in April 1965, some 25,000 protested in New York that fall, slightly more in Washington. In March 1966, about 50,000 demonstrated in New York, but attendance at protests in many other cities that day was disappointing. Eight months later, locally determined protests around the country also disappointed organizers, and only 15,000 marched in New York (when over 300,000 U.S. troops were in Vietnam). Then came the extraordinarily successful mobilizations of over 300,000 in New York and 60,000 in San Francisco in April 1967. But in the famous "confrontation" at the Pentagon that October, the numbers dropped to around 100,000 at a preconfrontation rally and to 35,000 at the Pentagon itself (where 683 people were arrested). [20]

Following a successful, national student strike and a 150,000-strong demonstration in New York the next spring, protests at the Democratic convention in Chicago in late August of 1968 drew only about 10,000 people. The movement then went into a protracted slump; the turnout for a counterinaugural protest in January 1969 in Washington was low, and the national antiwar coalition fell ill and suspended activity. But that April some 100,000 marched in a GI-Civilian demonstration in New York. Then came the massive Moratorium of October 1969, when over two million Americans expressed their opposition to the war. The Moratorium was followed by a gigantic demonstration of over 500,000 in Washington and one of 150,000 in San Francisco the next month. But then the national antiwar coalition again found itself on the brink of death and the movement suffered another slump. The U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State shootings of student demonstrators by National Guardsmen in the spring of 1970 revived the movement, however, inciting the greatest outpouring of campus dissent in U.S. history and other protests in cities all over the country, including a demonstration in Washington of over 100,000 organized in only a week's time by a horribly divided coalition. Then came yet another slump and a fracturing of the antiwar coalition (the two largest antiwar student groups—the Student Mobilization Committee and Students for a Democratic Society—had already self-destructed). The sectarianism in the movement was by then quite stark. Protests that fall were small and campuses were relatively quiet. A new coalition was formed, only to be disbanded in early 1971 and replaced by another coalition.

But in the spring of 1971 the movement rebounded with a well-publicized offensive that included protests by Vietnam Veterans against the War in Washington, a demonstration of 500,000 there and one of 200,000 in San Francisco, and massive May Day civil disobedience in Washington. Protests that fall were mainly small, however, and with U.S. ground involvement in Vietnam continuing to wind down the peace movement did too, though it mounted escalations in response to intensified U.S. bombing and waged a focused congressional lobbying campaign.

Meanwhile the moods and energies of antiwar activists had also gone up and down, and local organizing had suffered its own ebbs and flows. It was never easy, and feelings of great frustration, distress, and even hopelessness were common.

In 2004 United for Peace and Justice continued to grow, comprising over 800 groups by June. The antiwar movement "has not died away at all," Leslie Cagan told a reporter, who wrote of new recruits, including war veterans and military families, and "an increasingly energized peace movement." With no "weapons of mass destruction" found in Iraq and over 600 Americans dead by April, numerous military wives were asking, Why did we go into Iraq? "The war has been based on lies from the start," said one Iraq veteran who protested outside the Texas state capitol. The mother of a soldier killed in Iraq protested the government's ban on photographing returning coffins on military bases by inviting the media to take pictures of her son's coffin as it arrived at the Sacramento, California, airport and encouraging them to publish and distribute the images. Many opponents of the war were engaged in less visible antiwar activities than joining large demonstrations, and in less predictable places than Washington, New York, or San Francisco. The movement's reach was growing. Meanwhile public support for the war continued to erode: In June, for the first time, a majority of Americans (54 percent) said the United States had made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq. (By contrast, not until August 1968—over three years into the major fighting in Vietnam—did a majority of Americans say it had been a mistake to send U.S. troops there.) [21]

As it did in Vietnam, disillusionment was growing among U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which was becoming by far the deadliest U.S. intervention since Vietnam for American troops. "I'm tired of every time we go out the gate, someone tries to kill me," one sergeant complained in July. Said another, "A lot of times, I look at this place and wonder what have we really done.... When we first got here, we all wanted to change it and make it better, but now I don't give a shit. What the hell am I here for?" [22]

In late August, protesters descended on the Republican National Convention in New York amid tight security

in sweltering heat. The day before the convention opened, up to 500,000 marched against the war. It was the largest protest ever at a U.S. political convention, tremendously heartening for the movement, and an enormous success by any measure. Compare it to the paltry turnout for the 1968 Democratic convention protests in Chicago, where many peace activists feared violence and tainted Democratic hopefuls (among other things), and the similarly low turnout at the Republican national convention in 1972. The march in New York was "a very mainstream, family-oriented event," one marcher said. Many youth also participated. Civil disobedience during the convention resulted in over 1,800 arrests. [23]

The huge convention demonstration was one of the first public appearances of Iraq Veterans against the War, which had been formed weeks earlier. Though there were only about forty people in the group at the time, it found itself in the media spotlight. Vietnam Veterans against the War (VVAW), on the other hand, was not formed until over two years into the Vietnam War and did not take the national stage until four years after that with the spring 1971 protests. Another antiwar veterans group, Veterans against the Iraq War, had been formed before the Iraq War had even started. The Vietnam experience provided impetus. Veterans against the Iraq War included several leaders of VVAW, and Iraq Veterans against the War considered VVAW their model. [24]

That fall many peace activists, including younger ones, organized to defeat Bush in the presidential election, taking considerable energy from the movement. But antiwar activities continued. Some 500 national-security specialists signed an open letter stating that Iraq had been the most misguided policy since Vietnam. "We're advising the administration, which is already in a deep hole, to stop digging," one signatory remarked. In October perhaps 50,000 demonstrated in London. In Washington protesters set up more than 1,100 flag-draped mock coffins in front of the Lincoln Memorial to symbolize the number of Americans killed in Iraq. A platoon of army reservists in Iraq defied orders to deliver fuel because their vehicles were judged unsafe and because they lacked military support—mirroring other instances of U.S. troops being sent on missions without adequate equipment. Iraq Veterans against the War went on speaking tours as more soldiers sought conscientious objector status or even asylum in Canada; some pursued more creative escapes from the war, such as by failing drug or medical tests or injuring themselves. "One by one, a trickle of soldiers and marines—some just back from duty in Iraq, others facing a trip there soon—are seeking ways out," the New York Times observed the following March. Many war veterans were resisting the "backdoor draft" of extended tours of duty. Spurred by the horrific U.S. destruction of Fallujah, activists (including parents of dead U.S. soldiers) delivered humanitarian aid to refugees in Iraq. [25]

In the winter of 2005, following a lull after Bush's reelection, many peace activists worked to broaden their base and build new alliances. National demonstrations marking important benchmarks would continue, they decided, but grassroots organizing would take priority. Some groups were planning lobbying campaigns to pressure Congress to stop funding the war and bring U.S. troops home. Others were building bridges to new allies by highlighting the war's costs in domestic programs and organizing state campaigns to stop the use of the National Guard in Iraq. There was also talk of increasing nonviolent resistance to the war (talk of resistance picked up at about the two-year mark of the Vietnam War too). At President Bush's inauguration in Washington on January 20, over 10,000 demonstrators gathered in the cold. "Protesters often seemed more prevalent than Bush supporters," the Los Angeles Times noted. "They appeared to have achieved their goal of making their presence known both to the president…and to the American public." Protesters also joined numerous other antiwar actions around the country that day. Cindy Sheehan, the mother of a U.S. soldier killed in Iraq and a co-founder of Gold Star Families for Peace, comprised of family members of slain U.S. soldiers, and other parents were then giving heart-wrenching talks around the nation; Sheehan had also appeared on a number of national television shows, including Good Morning America. By now only 39 percent of Americans felt the situation in Iraq was worth going to war over. Comparisons to Vietnam were "bubbling to the top" of mainstream political discussion, the New York Times pointed out. Major similarities in the two wars were political: the difficulties of creating a popular, legitimate government and effective armed forces in both Iraq and Vietnam, and of sustaining domestic support for the wars in the United States. [26]

On the weekend of March 19-20, the second anniversary of the start of the war, protests were held in over 750 cities and towns in all fifty states in the United States. They were mainly small, and attendance was uneven, but organizers had emphasized local action over large demonstrations in major cities, and their geographical breadth and number were nothing to sneeze at: more than twice as many protests took place than on the one-year anniversary of the start of the war. The movement's reach was continuing to expand, including in conservative areas. In many communities, the protests were larger than the year before. The weekend was "extraordinarily encouraging," Leslie Kauffman of United for Peace and Justice remembers. "It shows a maturity and sophistication in the movement, that

people are really putting down roots and doing local organizing, reaching out to people who don't agree with them, talking to their neighbors, really building a movement at the grass roots, and digging in for the long haul, rather than just mobilizing people who agree with you for big splashy demonstrations." Such organizing "is what is really needed to build the kind of political power we need to end the war," she says. Typically, media downplayed the protests: they were "nowhere near as big" as the prewar demonstrations, the New York Times said. But who would have reasonably expected them to be? Still, less than 15,000 protested in New York, far fewer than a year earlier. "I think Bush's reelection took the steam out of the antiwar movement," one activist commented. [27]

Outside Fort Bragg in North Carolina, however, several thousand, including veterans of assorted stripes and members of soldiers' families, assembled for the largest demonstration there since the Vietnam War. It reflected a new peace movement strategy: to raise the public profile of antiwar veterans and members of military families, to encourage dissent within their ranks, and to zero in on the military's recruitment problems. "There's a consensus nationally that one of the biggest vulnerabilities of the Bush administration is a matter of troops, and that organizing work by military families and veterans and counter-recruitment are strategically key to derailing this war," Kauffman says. Iraq Veterans against the War now had nearly 200 members and Military Families Speak Out ten times that many. Over 1,500 U.S. soldiers had by now died in the war, which 70 percent of Americans felt was an unacceptable price. The weekend also saw the formal launching of Clergy and Laity Concerned about Iraq, which echoed the earlier Vietnam-era group Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam. In London, at least 50,000 demonstrated in the weekend's largest protest. [28]

On March 24, the 40th anniversary of the first teach-in against the Vietnam War at the University of Michigan, teach-ins on the Iraq War were held in Washington, D.C, Ann Arbor, and the San Francisco Bay Area. The Ann Arbor teach-in on Vietnam had inspired a wave of teach-ins on college campuses, and organizers were now hoping to build a similar educational campaign. [29]

Meanwhile young people's involvement in the movement, which had tended to rise and fall in waves like much of the rest of the movement, had been growing, if slowly and not always sustained. They'd learned more about the war's realities; it was apparent it wasn't going away; Bush's agenda seemed to threaten their futures; older antiwar leaders were encouraging their participation; and there was increasing concern about a draft. At the well-attended second national assembly of the United for Peace and Justice coalition in February, up to a fifth of the participants were under twenty-five (and 17 percent of the coalition's new steering committee were youth), which marked a change from the group's first national assembly. "A new wave of young people is beginning to assert leadership," Joseph Gerson says. Many youth, including high school students, were participating in the expanding movement against military recruitment. Some were doing educational work on the costs and realities of the war for youth in both the United States and Iraq. Many were steeling themselves for a longer haul with an awareness that "you can't end the war with one demonstration," the student organizer Jessie Marshall says. Meanwhile other activists, mainly older ones, were in the early stages of what could be a long and hard battle to cut off the war's funding (nobody in the Senate has yet been willing to propose an amendment that talks about U.S. withdrawal, and the Democratic Party for the most part doesn't want to discuss it). Another campaign to highlight the war's human cost and raise funds for reconstruction in Iraq was also being waged, and plans were forming for another mass protest in September. [30]

As of this writing in early April of 2005, the antiwar movement was alive and growing, if struggling over ways to best nurture and surface antiwar sentiment among the public, still recovering from Bush's reelection, frustrated by media slights, and suffering predictable political disagreements (most recently over when and how the United States should withdraw from Iraq, though the movement's divisions in general are not nearly as destructive as those that destroyed antiwar organizations during the 1960s). It was also wrestling as usual with the questions of what to do next and how to exert maximum pressure on Washington. But it had built a broader base than the anti-Vietnam War movement did two years into that war, even though the size of the war in Iraq was lower in U.S. troop deployments, U.S. bombing, and both U.S. and "enemy" deaths (though one study by Johns Hopkins public health researchers released the previous fall found conservatively that the war had already cost the lives of 100,000 Iraqis, mainly due to violence). [31] It would be unrealistic to expect several hundred thousand people to attend national demonstrations every year. Movements fluctuate, they gain and lose momentum, they fight uphill battles, divisions are virtually always a problem, and people drop in and out of them. But it is likely that this one will continue to show its staying power, as did the movement against the Vietnam War, and in ways that will not always be recorded in one's morning newspaper.

Still, the differences in student involvement in the Iraq and Vietnam antiwar movements remain significant. Certainly, the current absence of a draft—"that potent fuel for an antiwar movement," as Alexander Cockburn has

written—is a major reason. War becomes far more immediate, personally relevant, and threatening for youths who face the prospect of fighting in it; a draft can also affect their parents. While U.S. officials might exaggerate the role that self-interest plays in fanning antiwar activity (they certainly did during Vietnam, and some of their theories were pretty wacky), it's not inconsequential. Many students during the Vietnam War worried about losing their student deferments and receiving a one-way plane ticket to Vietnam. Hence, President Lyndon Johnson rejected advice to abolish student deferments, a step he felt would further inflame students, and the Nixon administration eventually went to a draft lottery that limited liability to one year. "This will take care of a lot of the draft dodgers," Nixon remarked. And consider all the forms of protest over the Vietnam draft that are absent from today's antiwar movement: the formation of "We Won't Go" groups on college campuses and of the Resistance national antidraft organization; protests against class ranking by the Selective Service System; actions ranging from leafletting to sit-ins to mobile civil disobedience at draft boards and draft induction centers; outright resistance to the draft in the forms of public noncooperation, draft card burnings, and induction refusals; draft counseling; the destruction of draft records; the flooding of the system with applications for conscientious objector status; public adult support for draft resistance—the list could go on. Draft protest was a conspicuous part of that movement. [32]

Which is one reason the Bush administration is so reluctant to reinstitute the draft, despite the army's and marines' recruitment problems. But, attune to the possibility, some peace activists launched a campaign under the slogan "No draft, no way" that included plans for blockades of military recruitment offices and student walkouts. It's not easy to organize around fear of a draft without the real thing, however.

Of course, during the 1960s many students had been involved in civil rights, campus, antibomb, and other protests before the Vietnam War took off, which fostered participation in the antiwar movement. To an extent, the movement against the Vietnam War grew out of the civil rights movement and the early New Left. Students today have had less previous experience with protest, the antiglobalization movement aside. And there are other roots of student activism in the 1960s that are not operative today, such as the baby boom, the long post-World War II economic boom (students now face a tougher job market), the growth of universities, the oppositional subcultures of the 1950s, and so on.

What has the movement against the Iraq War accomplished? The fall 2002 protests in the United States and overseas probably fed into the Bush administration's decision to seek congressional and United Nations support for war, which delayed the attack on Iraq (small consolation as that might be to people enraged and depressed when the war began). "If they were going to launch it, they had to at least go through the motions of consulting with the United Nations," Joseph Gerson argues. Opposition overseas was also probably a factor in the administration's failure to secure a UN Security Council resolution authorizing war, which undermined the credibility of U.S. policy, and in the weakness and eventual unraveling of Bush's war coalition. The movement may have also influenced administration efforts to limit casualties on both sides, grossly insufficient as those efforts have been; the Vietnam experience played a larger role in U.S. war planning. Primarily for domestic political reasons, the Bush administration has been determined to limit the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. The movement has surely exerted some effect on public opinion on the war, unquantifiable as that effect is, although the war's doubtful prospects, its mounting cost in American lives, and majority Iraqi opposition to the U.S. presence have probably had greater influence. Without the massive prewar protests, that 70 percent that supported the war when it began would probably have been even greater. The demonstrations "opened the national debate up in quite a profound way," Gerson maintains, and "laid the groundwork for the war becoming the issue it was in the last election." "Obviously the war has gone so badly that it was doomed to not be hugely popular," Leslie Kauffman asserts. "But given what we've been up against in terms of a very powerful propaganda machine, we've been enormously effective in consistently increasing the unpopularity of the war." The movement's generally mainstream tenor helped (I'm not aware of any polls showing the degree of public dislike of protesters that was evident during Vietnam). The movement may have also emboldened some members of Congress to speak out, including in calls in the House for U.S. withdrawal. [33]

As the fighting continues in Iraq, it seems likely that broad opposition in the United States combined with perceptions in Washington that Iraq's a loser will eventually force the administration to depart (while of course claiming success). And then, as Lawrence Freedman has observed, when other U.S. interventions are weighed in the future, people will seek assurances that they will not be "another Iraq," and officials will worry about how to overcome "the Iraq syndrome." [34]

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Information Technology and Participatory Democracy: Some Considerations

Dick Flacks

Please read the following in light of the following biographical context: I was one of the several dozen students who met together at Port Huron, Michigan in June 1962 to found the Students for a Democratic Society and draft the Port Huron Statement. That experience marked me for life. For me, the phrase 'participatory democracy', despite its awkwardness, encapsulates what's essential for defining the good society and for criticizing established institutions and practices, and for formulating a political agenda. And my goal as a teacher for these 43 years has been to inspire students with that vision and help empower them to fulfill it as social actors. What follows is a set of reflections (not fully developed) on the prospects for democracy in a society in which members acquire and produce knowledge and culture through the new information media.

I

For the last few years I've been helping direct an online survey of the student body of the University of California, looking, among other things, at the ways they use their time as one measure of their degree of engagement in the various domains of undergraduate experience. Our most recent survey results come from the spring of 2004, when more than 40,000 students on the eight UC campuses responded.

Among many matters covered on this survey was the question of whether and how students followed the news. That students have been increasingly unlikely to read a daily newspaper has been noticed for some years now; still, I was taken aback to find that no more than 7% of students at the University of California said they read a newspaper daily. Indeed, only about a fifth of UC students read a newspaper with any frequency at all and something like two/thirds never or rarely do. I find these numbers startling, although I don't have any ready at hand way to compare them with the past, I assume that the newspaper habit was substantially more widespread among students in the past.

I should add that the numbers of students getting their news from TV or radio, or from newsmagazines, aren't much greater. Indeed, I estimate that 40% of University of California students are not really following the news at all. But the finding that I want to foreground here is that about 60% of students say they do use the internet at least several times a week to get the news (and nearly a third are doing this daily).

We asked those who use the Internet to list the websites they typically go to for news. The great majority listed sites that offer quick headline scanning: Yahoo, AOL, CNN and other TV network and local newspaper sites. About 15%, however, indicated that they go to web places that provide more sophisticated and in-depth possibilities: BBC, NY Times, various British newspaper sites, and the like. So, most students who follow the news rely on these sorts of websites with only fitful glances at traditional news media. There is, I should point out, a small but maybe significant group, whose daily online use of sophisticated sites was associated with daily newspaper reading.

That finding illustrates the primary point I want to make here: the Internet's effects on democratic participation are fundamentally ambiguous and contradictory. We have, on the one hand, the mass abandonment of established journalistic institutions by the American student body. My so far sketchy findings about how students are using

the web to replace newspaper and TV news tell us little about the consequences of this abandonment; my strong impression, based on surveys of and discussion with students in my classes on political sociology, is that there has been a steady erosion of basic information and awareness of the news. The great majority of students even in an upper-division class focused on the political—can't identify many of the key players, nor articulate the key issues, that now define public policy.

Yet, on the other hand, there is that much smaller group for whom the web provides ready access to information and even insight that's richer and more varied than what might be gained by daily absorption in the NY Times, NPR, and the other traditional news sources aimed at the attentive public.

But we know almost nothing about the consequences, for both individual political understanding and shared public awareness, of the abandonment of the newspaper as the primary medium for defining and following the news. There's a lot of data about how people read a newspaper and how newspapers shape publics. How does googling the news differ from reading the morning paper? What does it mean that at any moment of the day one can use Google to get news distilled from 4,500 different international news sources? Does the web's inherent capacity to provide a range of seemingly diverse sources expand or narrow the individual's focus of attention and breadth of information?

Reading a newspaper with the morning coffee, or watching network news after dinner, seems to epitomize the image of one-way, top-down, centralized, information consumption. The online news consumer appears to be more active, autonomous, and self-directed. But. I argue with my students that there are serious caveats. First, the passive reader/viewer is receiving stories that she might not, voluntarily, pay attention to. This in contrast to the likelihood that online one pursues the topics one already is interested in. The very opportunity to make one's own selection of newsworthiness (thereby weakening the power of media to define what is news) has the likely effect of reducing awareness of issues and perspectives not already one's own.

Second, the consumer of traditional newspaper and network news is participating in a widely shared, collective experience—in contrast to the ease with which the online consumer can pursue a highly individualized, idiosyncratic, and self-oriented trajectory. How can already attenuated public discourse be sustained if members each are able to create their own, very separate worlds?

The individuation offered by the Internet is one of the many things that makes being online so attractive. We feel freer online because we can make our own way through the information ocean. We feel better informed, more autonomous in our understanding, because we can instantly compare divergent news sources and find ones that are marginalized in the mainstream. We can put the NY Times up against Al Jazeera, The Guardian and Le Monde. But is there a cost to this capacity for such individual selectivity? Does our ability to focus attention on the information and perspectives of immediate interest to us lead to less awareness of the issues, ideas, and understandings of those publics who aren't on our particular wavelengths? And does such a loss threaten to harden cleavages of culture and consciousness and intensify already evident incomprehension across such cleavages?

These are questions that pertain to the strata who are attentive to public affairs. Beyond those are, of course. masses of people, including most college students today, for whom the web's potentials for consciousness expansion are largely out of reach or unused. Checking in to Yahoo occasionally is actually more than quite a few students are doing to keep up.

Many students say that they don't follow the news because they can't trust the media, justifying their disengagement as a kind of resistance. Jon Stewart's popularity—the fact that his 'fake news' is listed by numbers of students as their primary news source—is a piece of such claimed resistance. We need to know a lot more than we do about the causes and consequences of such 'willed cluelessness'. Are the students who claim to be resisting 'biased media' by tuning out asserting a refreshingly libertarian, anarchistic readiness to oppose authoritarian politics; or, are they making themselves passive sheep readying for slaughter? Or both?

II

Classic social criticism focused a great deal on potentials for mass society. Mass media were thought to facilitate and encourage the homogenization of belief and attitude by replacing face-to-face community and local knowledge with centralized one-way communication sources. Concentration of control of media by corporate monopoly or state agencies would produce political uniformity and enhance the manipulability of atomized masses.

Although media studies diluted this scenario by showing that people at the base were not so manipulable, nor

face-to-face ties as fragile as mass society critics had assumed, massification continues to be rightly seen as a primary cause of the erosion of democratic publics and the diminution of social capital.

The Internet and other computer based technologies for acquiring and storing information and cultural expression offer many ways to sustain personal autonomy and participatory democracy:

Web access to an enormous and global range of established media allows citizens unprecedented access to diverse sources of news, information, and opinion.

The fact that much of this material is archived online allows for fact checking and social memory that undermines the capacity of central authority to control the definition of public reality.

The ease of access to web sites, and the relatively nonhierarchical inventorying of sites by independent search engines, allows any group or motivated individual to enter the 'marketplace of ideas' and have some chance to be heard.

In a short time social inventions like Internet groups, listservs, filesharing, and blogs have provided structures that seem to undermine established top-down media controls.

Web and satellite radio enormously expand the number of audio channels available, and allow each listener to select highly individualized and idiosyncratic programming

IPod and similar technologies for storing materials further enhance such individuation. With these, the audio consumer need not plug in at all to programming produced by anyone other than himself and can be immersed in a sound collage that appears to be entirely of her own choosing.

Computer technologies allow the consumer to fundamentally remake already produced material, further expanding the power of the individual to shape his own experience of cultural products and transmit this to others.

Cultural producers need not be dependent on established corporate frameworks for disseminating their work; direct distribution through file sharing, or through online self-marketing represents a readily available alternative to the 'cultural apparatus'.

If most of the population remains dependent on packaged information and entertainment distributed by the media oligopoly, the above inventory suggests that the trends are away from what we have understood to be mass society. These technological supports for autonomy are not the province of an avant-garde. They are all mass-marketed; their wide availability has already eroded the foundations of the mass cultural apparatus, as theater receipts, network ratings, newspaper readership, and CD sales figures seem to suggest.

Another way to say this is that IT and its continuous proliferation provides a new material foundation for liberty—that is, for individuals to experience the world according to their own personal preferences, and therefore to be relatively free from many of the controls historically available to dominant organizations and elites.

Walk around campus on any given afternoon and you can get a snapshot of how this plays out in mundane behavior: every third person is interacting with a cell phone; those who aren't are typically wearing headsets as they stroll, bike, and skateboard. It's at a moment like this, that I at least have Luddite thoughts (feeling a certain resentment that these folks are somewhere other than here, feeling a vague anxiety that taken for granted reality is somehow dissolving).

These feelings, I think, stem from fear that a great deal of what we have assumed to be social connectedness is dissolving. The cultural choice and autonomy made possible by new technology means that those using it need not experience themselves as members of a collectivity that is hearing the same news, or seeing the same shows, or sharing the same objects of attention. Yet, if these simultaneous and shared cultural experiences constitute much of the common coin of sociability and serve as foundations for collective identity and perception, then the new liberties I'm referring to are jeopardizing much of social fabric that enables collective action and destroying the bases for whatever is left of publics. Or perhaps new social fabric is being woven . . .

III

One day in September 2002, I received an email signed by a couple of friends in town declaring that the buildup to a war in Iraq was obvious and so we ought to start protesting that. They proposed that those interested gather across the street from the Saturday Farmers' Market at 11 A.M. and march down Santa Barbara's main street with whatever signs anyone cared to bring. On that Saturday about 100 people showed up, and marched and somehow understood that we would be coming back each week, same time, same place. The numbers doubled and tripled and

a couple of months later there were at least 10,000 on the march. Some of that happened by word of mouth, but most of the mobilization seemed to have been carried by emails, sent and resent by those already involved. Out of these, a small number took some special responsibility to get police permits when needed and eventually to organize occasional rallies with PA equipment and guest speakers and singers and the like. A group of veterans of past wars formed a Vets for Peace, spinning off a number of other creative forms of protest. A group of women spun off a 'women in white' vigil. On one occasion an email was disseminated asking that those marchers who wanted to head toward the headquarters of congresswoman Lois Capps do so on next Saturday (which hundreds did). And so, for six months or more (until shock and awe fell on Baghdad) tens of thousands of people in Santa Barbara turned out to march on Saturday, and many of these got actively involved in a range of other protest oriented antiwar activities. These happenings were very effective locally: Congresswoman Capps voted against the war; the conservative newspaper praised her and editorialized frequently against the war; the city council passed an antiwar resolution.

All of the above was almost entirely mobilized through email communication rather than by planned organizing efforts of established organizations or organizers. Santa Barbara, we learn from this experience, is rather richly endowed with social capital—numerous and diverse networks (mostly NOT based on political affiliation) could be instantly activated by online communiqués; each week's assembly amounted to a coming together of many circles of affiliation and circuits of shared interest. Showing up on Saturday was 'voluntary' (that is, not a response to structured expectations); the assertions of necessary leadership fulfilled anarchist visions about the potential for semi-spontaneous organization; small groups of participants creatively expanded protest repertoires. In this instance (repeated I am sure in hundreds of places across the planet), the Internet became a remarkable tool for collective action, for social capitalization, for new social formation.

I suggested earlier that the new technology endangers collective action, but the same technology makes for new possibilities for grassroots democracy as the above story illustrates. Here are some of the ways this is happening:

The astonishing network structures that constitute what Brecher, et al call 'globalization from below' have been made possible by the Internet. It's the web that enables the mass mobilizations on the Seattle model to come together and at the same time to allow for ramifying advocacy networks made up of local activists, NGO's, academically based researchers, and so forth to formulate policy perspectives and strategies. I take it that the World Social Forums could not happen on their current scale were it not for web-based processes of communication and online modes of registration. The Internet is the material foundation for twenty-first century corporate globalization—and for the resistance to it.

MoveOn.org is to me a rather astonishing instance of a new kind of mobilized political organization. Although its structure is 'top-down' in that a small band of full-time leaders decide what and how to target and creates the language and the framing for these, each 'member' is completely free to act or not in response to the proposals emanating from the 'top'. So in a sense MoveOn is a kind of action clearinghouse, providing a regular menu of opportunities for people to participate in a constantly unfolding series of campaigns. But there is more participation being facilitated than just signing a petition or sending some money: hundreds of thousands 'voted' before the Democratic primaries in MoveOn's own election, and thereby created Howard Dean. Thousands made and submitted campaign commercials, and hundreds of thousands judged and selected which ones to actually use. MoveOn has convened hundreds of house parties, no doubt helping to foster a number of new face-to-face encounters of the like-minded in many American towns. And it has enabled the dissemination of important video documentaries, financed a variety of political campaigns, placed potent newspaper ads and encouraged much writing of letters to politicians and newspapers.

MoveOn has demonstrated that email and web can foster not only on-line action, but that it can get people into old-fashioned face-to-face gatherings. This potential was pushed further by the Dean campaigns use of 'meetup' websites to create an astonishing network of grassroots Dean campaign operations. Deaniacs may have included some veteran liberal activists , but for the most part participants in the meetups were new to politics or had been politically passive for a long time. Dean flamed-out before the campaign potential of this mobilization was fully tested, but quite a few of the local Dean groups continued to function after the campaign and have become new centers of grassroots political action.

Deaniacs are part of the emerging grassroots base of the Democratic Party. What the roots share in the way of program, vision or expectation isn't clear, but they are certainly being watered by the dozens of blogs emerging from and aimed at them. It's the web that has been fostering the potential for the democratization of the Democratic Party.

Like so much of web-based social action I'm enumerating, this formation is decentered, fluid, and voluntaristic.

These examples are but a sampling of the social movement/collective action potentialities now being fostered through web based means. These potentialities are reasons to hope for a future for participatory democracy.

IV

Let's go back to the student scene we started with. If the students I've been surveying or teaching are any guide, only a small number are now connected to the democratic possibilities of IT. Many more are, of course, prime consumers of its libertarian potentialities. But one may wonder how much effective use they make of those resources. Our survey data suggest that about 5% of University of California students currently use 'alternative' websites for getting the news (I mean places like indymedia, Alternet, Buzzflash, and the like). Almost none referred to any blogs. The individuation provided by downloading is offset by the persistence of youth subcultural identities structured by commodified musical genres of which hip-hop and 'hardcore' are the primary campus nodes. My perhaps limited observation is that some kids do go deeply into these, but few deliberately try to break out of them to explore cultural expression from other places and times. Many students acknowledge they live within 'bubbles' which feel safe and which provide identity. Strikingly unlike their counterparts of the 1960s and 1970s, upper-middle-class students these days would rather be comfortable than challenged. The new technology fosters such a stance, even if it offers access to alternatives.

Whatever the reasons for this difference in student generations (and an effort to figure these out seems essential), I do think that the post-9/11 student body (the first members of which have just graduated) may well be the most politically oblivious we've seen in several decades. I know there's evidence of political engagement among today's youth. Conservative kids have never been so organized—no doubt in part because of resources made available by new technology. Progressive activism is certainly evident, and the youth vote was historically, relatively high in 2004. That vote was more 'blue' than other age groups, and this reflected a generational consensus opposed to right-wing cultural traditionalism.

Nevertheless, political disaffiliation and willed cluelessness seem to me to characterize the dominant campus mood. That mood is fostered, I think, by the way that new technologies enable the relatively affluent to construct and maintain their cultural bubbles. There are, I want to stress, thousands of University of California students whose life experience is quite different. More than half of UC students have parents who emigrated to the United States (and sizable number of students are themselves immigrants). At least a third of UC students come from low income, or working-class backgrounds. Its these ranks that provide much of today's campus leadership, community service, and political activism.

It's the relatively rich kids (who are likely to be the most technologically plugged in) who worry me. After all, it was that class of young people who fueled the new left and counterculture of the sixties. Their relative cluelessness today is not easy to explain. We need to foster a conversation about how to create pedagogy that can help students break out of their bubbles and become serious, social actors. The democratic potentials of new technology can be a resource for such a project.

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My Radical Dad

Thai Jones

The hardest thing for me is to picture my dad as he was in the late 1960s. In those days, Jeff Jones was a leader of the radical and violent Weathermen. He wore blue jeans and a leather jacket. His neck-length blond hair was slicked back in a greaser's ducktail. He was notorious, intimidating. I've seen news footage of him striking tough poses behind a podium, glaring at the audience, cursing into microphones, screaming at huge crowds to "fight it out," and "knock the motherfuckers who control this thing right on their ass!"

That man bears no resemblance to the Jeff I know, who absolutely never shows anger or impatience, who wears a tie to work every day, and is so mellow, so . . . parental.

My father's own parents had been Southern-California Quakers. His father, Al, was a conscientious objector who spent World War II in an isolated work camp in the mountains. Jeff was a blond, sunny kid; the recognizable precursor to the adult I know now. He was a go-getter—Boy of the Year—a committed participant in numerous organizations. He hiked and camped throughout Southern California. He left for Antioch College in 1965, just as the war in Vietnam was becoming national news. His whole upbringing had prepared him to oppose the violence of the conflict, and within six weeks he had joined the local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society—at a time when the national organization had just a few thousand members.

War and antiwar escalated together. During his sophomore year, Jeff dropped out to take a full-time organizing job as regional director for SDS in New York City. The next year he sat-in at the Pentagon with 60,000 others. By 1968, there were half a million U.S. troops in Vietnam, and SDS reckoned on roughly the same number of student supporters back home. Tactics had changed. In the early demonstrations, marchers had allowed themselves to be arrested, going limp when the police arrived. It was a measure of how far things had degenerated that, at the Democratic Convention in Chicago, protesters and police engaged in running street fights for an entire week.

By 1969, Jeff had spent four years working against the war. He had been arrested a dozen times for protesting, but what had he accomplished? The conflict was expanding into other South-East Asian countries. Though his Quaker lineage had earned him conscientious-objector status, he had long since abandoned his father's teachings. Jeff believed that the Vietnamese had a right to defend themselves with violence, so he wrote to Selective Service and asked to be removed from the ranks of pacifists.

Here is where the picture starts to change. Jeff aligned himself with Weatherman, one of several factions bidding for power at the SDS summer convention, and was elected to a top leadership position. He immediately began organizing for a new kind of demonstration where, instead of avoiding conflict, the protesters would set out to fight the police. Scheduled for October, the riot would come to be known as the Days of Rage.

This was the period—the months building up to October—when my father really becomes unrecognizable to me. Preparing for the confrontation, he and the others went a little mad. In control of the SDS printing press, they transformed the newsletter from New Left Notes into Fire! and ran off a few issues before losing interest. SDS had been the framework for all Jeff's political activities since 1965, but it was defunct within a few months of his taking over. He didn't mourn. He was in training, practicing karate, critiquing others' commitment.

He believed the world was in a phase of revolution and he was willing to sacrifice to be a part of it. Weatherman's goal was to show solidarity with third-world people by forming a white fighting-force inside the imperialist mother country. They wanted ten thousand furious rioters to come to the Days of Rage, but it was soon clear they'd get nothing like so many. Jeff drove to Madison, Wisconsin, and crashed a meeting at the University. While his cohorts

struck karate poses behind him, Jeff pushed the speaker away, grabbed the mic, and yelled, "You don't see any motherfucking students at any motherfucking college up here on this stage. All of us up here are stone communist revolutionaries." Every person in the room—in unison—turned their chairs around to face the other direction. After that, Jeff pushed harder, turning on the students who were his base, castigating them, humiliating them for faltering. Nothing but total dedication was acceptable. My father made more enemies in these few months than in all the other seasons of his life.

On October 8, 1969, a few hundred protesters gathered around a bonfire in Chicago's Lincoln Park. Jeff, his hair dyed brown, led them on a rampage through the city's downtown shopping district. For a few unbelievable minutes they were in charge, smashing store windows and destroying cars. Then the police regrouped, formed a line, and waited. Jeff charged ahead, ducked a punch and slipped through the barricade, but a block later he was cornered by half a dozen plainclothes cops. They kicked him, maced him, chucked him in a paddy wagon.

By Sunday, it was finished. Some glass had been broken. Dozens of demonstrators had been arrested, eight had been shot by police. A few cops had gone to the hospital with minor injuries. One lawman had been paralyzed while attempting to throw a football tackle at a protester. All the leaders of Weatherman had been arrested and were facing federal and state charges. The FBI and police tailed them constantly. Almost nobody in the New Left had supported the misadventure. The alternative press dedicated full pages to critiquing the Weatherman strategy. Even Fred Hampton, leader of the Black Panthers in Chicago, had denounced the action, saying, "It's Custeristic in that its leaders take people into situations where the people can be massacred, and they call that revolution. That's nothing but child's play. It's folly."

The Days of Rage—a frontal assault against a superior force—had been a tactical disaster. Seeking an alternative strategy, Jeff and the others went to the opposite extreme: clandestinity, secrecy, sustainability. They started constructing the underground. At first, they resented those who had stayed away from Chicago. But, after the Townhouse Explosion—when three close friends were killed—Jeff and the others dropped the anger and fashioned a more compassionate guerrilla army.

Jeff started to become his recognizable self again. The communiqués from the underground lost their macho edge. In the New Morning statement of autumn 1970, they criticized their earlier steeliness, and celebrated the softer side of the hippie culture: "free wild children," and "organic food." Clearly, Jeff had returned to the things I know him for: communing with birds, taking nature hikes. Wherever he was—it would take the FBI eleven more years to find him—it was the countryside, and he belonged there.

So, if the teenage Jeff was clearly the Jeff I know, and the underground Jeff was too, then who was that man whose picture I've seen—the Jeff Jones of 1969 and 1970? The Vietnam War and his immersion in the fight against it had transformed him into someone else. He had determined that violent protest was not just valid, but that it was the only tactic, and since he was committed to the antiwar movement he would have to use it himself. The result—for him and the others—was an out-of-body experience.

The antiwar demonstrators—even the Weathermen—were always the least violent factor in the equation. Their street fights and tiny explosives were a joke compared to the clubbings of the police, the carpet-bombings of the military, and the warfare of the Vietnamese. These people were pacifistic by nature. They had no history of violence. They turned themselves inside-out, found the will to fight the police. Got their asses kicked. Earned the scorn of their former comrades.

Yet, they did it.

And because they did, the Days of Rage protest is in the history books. Had it never happened, what proof would there be that even middle-class white Americans, faced with sufficient provocation, will take to the street with pipes and clubs and transform themselves, for a weekend at least, into stone communist revolutionaries?

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Teaching the Sixties

Margot Fortunato Galt

In 1964, when Fran Galt found his draft card in his University of Minnesota mailbox, the Vietnam war had been heating up for about two years. Soon Americans would be exposed to this war in a new way: on their televisions. Two years later, in 1966, eating dinner in an Atlanta apartment I watched, spellbound and horrified, as U.S. troops napalmed Vietnamese villages into swirling clouds of dust and smoke. The war had marched into my rather complacent life and gripped me by the throat. It struck me immediately that we Americans had no real reason for killing families in Vietnamese rice paddies; whatever their government was doing (and those politics were hazy with U.S. government smokescreens), the Vietnamese people in no way threatened me. Fran had agreed two years before: after holding his draft card for a few moments, he sent it back to the draft board. His revulsion against this war or any war was so strong that he knew he could not take up arms. Over the next few years, his act of resistance would bring him before his Iowa draft board, would place him behind two armed U.S. marshals in a car heading to Missouri, and would land him for seventeen months in the U.S. penitentiary in Springfield, Missouri, where he would meet bank robbers, Jehovah's Witnesses, (and other conscientious objectors), along with a few murderers. The incarceration derailed his 20-year-old life, led to eventual divorce from the woman whom he had married just before entering prison, and put him "underground" while the rest of his peers sang the songs of the Beatles' "Seargent Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band." What was unusual about Fran's experience was not that he went to prison—though he was one of the earliest, a number of other young men protesting the war would soon find themselves in the same boat. But Fran landed there not strictly on religious grounds: He protested not just Vietnam; he declared himself a pacifist, opposed to all war, all violence, except in extreme cases of self-defense. The Beatles' album contained the songs that would eventually mark the 1960s counterculture hippiedom: "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" being code for LSD.

When I wrote Stop This War: American Protest of the Conflict in Vietnam (Lerner 2000), I used Fran's story as a narrative thread, bringing home the many marches, sit-ins, and lock-outs which protested the war. Now when I think about teaching the 1960s, I return to two things: nonviolence as a passionate response against the disgust and fear young people felt about being forced to participate in an unreasonable war, and what could be called its twin sister: The "Make Love, Not War" motto of 1960s counterculture. Fran and I have grown-up children; the students in schools and colleges today are almost of an age to be our grandchildren. Over two generations, a lot has been lost by way of activism among young people, and love has become something not to do. Our lives have become famously global—but that began with the televised news of Vietnam. Our lives have become faster—in the 1960s my parents had one car; my 1960s husband and I had (not surprisingly) a VW Beetle. The U.S. freeway system, put in place during President Eisenhower's administration in the 1950s, had begun to change the face of American travel, and many cities had lost neighborhoods to speed. But the United States was still, in 1966, a country of defined regional politics. As my husband and I traveled west from Atlanta with New York license plates on our Beetle (we had both been graduate students in New York), we found a South wary of Northerners. The Civil Rights Movement was in full swing in 1966; the Birmingham March only a few years past. The nonviolent activism which many liberal Northern students learned on the streets and by-ways of the South would fuel their resistance to Vietnam—this seems to me a crucial connection. Nonviolence, Civil Rights, northern "infiltration" into the South began to dissolve regional divisions, not with guns or invading armies, not with commercial slogans or corporate skyscrapers, but with songs, marches, door-to-door canvassing and voter-education projects, with white students from the North bringing national television attention to the poverty and oppression of black people in the South.

Among the many faces of the 1960s, I emphasize nonviolence because I believe the nonviolent message and method sparked fire within the hearts of young people all over the United States, from educated Eastern elite to rural Minnesota Catholic novitiates, from black college students to pillars of the black community who were galvanized within their churches to stand strong and resist through boycotts, newly formed political parties, and, yes eventually, through voting their own leaders into office for the first time since Reconstruction. I know the 1960s spawned noteworthy exceptions to this credo of nonviolence—both Civil Rights and war protest turned famously violent, preaching black power and black separatism, the Weatherman bombing of U.S. arsenals and the Symbionese Liberation Army. Given the decades since, these violent methods look dangerously prophetic: We have become, more than ever, a nation glorifying violence, fascinated by benighted mental states (the seeds of which were surely planted in the 1960s drug use), and the acts of disaffected loners. In an Ojibway Reservation School, Red Lake, Minnesota, a high school student recently (March 2005) shot family, friends, and staff before taking his own life. Schools deal with such deadly violence because, in part, we have not taken the original 1960s message of nonviolence across regions, races and creeds to heart.

When I teach the 1960s to young people today, I want them to understand the power of acting together to change the world, the protection which group action can give against the fear of government brutality. I urge them to use their religious convictions to enlarge opportunities and expand tolerance. I want them to plumb the realities of taking a radical nonviolent stand, even if it means going to prison. I want to rouse them from attachment to material comforts and set them on the road, not afraid to sleep in buses, face police dogs and sheriffs' nightsticks, lose sleep, delay college a year, make love in the very best sense of the word, not violence, not war.

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Why Were There So Many Jews in SDS? Or, The Ordeal of Civility

Mark Rudd

I've been thinking about this subject for a long time, almost forty years. I first spoke publicly about the question in 1988 at the twentieth anniversary celebration of the Columbia strike. In a rambling 45 minute monologue I touched on a lot of subjects, but the only one people seemed to respond to was my recognition of our Jewish backgrounds as relevant to our opposition to the war and racism. That was during a mini-revival of Judaism and Jewish culture which took place among the not so new New Leftists in the 80's. With the death of the socialist dream we were all searching for direction at the time. Unfortunately, I haven't pursued the subject until now, but I do believe that the revolt of Jewish youth in the New Left of the sixties and seventies deserves to be studied and honored as an important chapter in the history of American Jews. [1]

Before beginning to write, I checked out the subject on the internet. Googling the words "Jews and SDS," the number two site that popped up was a page from "Jew Watch," which monitors the ZOG, that is the Zionist Occupation Government of the United States. The piece was called, "How the Jews Controlled the New Left of the 1960's." Reading down, I found some decent scholarly references concerning the numerical preponderance of Jewish leaders and rank-and-file members of the New Left and SDS, at least until the late 1960's. But at one point, with no warning, the anonymous author suddenly flips into analysis mode with this paragraph:

> Radical Jewish students tended to come from liberal if not radical homes. While their parents might express some opposition, often on tactical grounds, they were generally quite supportive. Indeed, many Jewish parents spoke with pride of their "revolutionary" children. During the 1968 Columbia upheavals, Mark Rudd's mother commented: "My revolutionary helped me plant these tulips last November, my rebel." Rudd, in turn, according to the same New York Times story, speaks of his parents with respect and affection, and they maintain that they are "100 percent behind him," even though they don't agree with all his views. On Mother's Day (during the riotous period at Columbia) his parents went to the Columbia campus and bought a veal parmigiana dinner, which the family ate in their parked car on Amsterdam Avenue. [New York Times, May 19, 1968, p. 1.]

I'm not sure whether the author is jealous of the close, accepting Jewish family, or more likely, merely Jewish humor-impaired, not recognizing my mother's obvious sarcasm.

Originally I was astounded that a quote from my dear mother, Bertha F. Rudd—now age 93 and still healthy and sharp-as-a-tack, living in the Lester Senior Housing Independent Living Apartments of the Jewish Community Housing Agency at the Metrowest Jewish Community Center, in Whippany, N.J. —would appear on a rabidly anti-semitic website. But then I remembered that Bertha had served as the model for Woody Allen's mother in the 1989 movie "New York Stories, Oedipus Wrecks" in which his mother appears in the sky over Manhattan to tell the whole city about his shortcomings.

Anonymous anti-semites aside, the numbers on Jews in SDS are clear. The author Paul Berman, himself a Jewish veteran of Columbia SDS, in his excellent book, "A Tale of Two Utopias," gives the following data from reliable sources: two-thirds of the white Freedom Riders who traveled to Mississippi were Jewish; a majority of the steering committee of the 1964 Berkeley Free Speech Movement were Jewish; the SDS chapters at Columbia and the University of Michigan were more than half Jewish; at Kent State in Ohio, where only 5 percent of the student body

was Jewish, Jews constituted 19 percent of the chapter. I might add a strange statistic which I became aware of in the course of two trips to Kent State to commemorate the events of May, 1970: three of the four students shot by the National Guard at Kent State were Jewish. This, of course, defies all odds.

There are at least two good ways to pursue the question of why there were so many Jews in SDS. The first would be a sociological research study in which a large representative sample of the Jewish veterans of SDS and the New Left are asked about the relationship between their being Jewish and their activism. The responses would be classified and quantified. I hope somebody does this, if it hasn't already been done. The second approach, ethnographic case study, is the one I propose to pursue. And, surprise, the case study will be myself, as representative of the cohort. So here goes:

My father, Jacob S. Rudd, born Jacov Shmuel Rudnitsky in Stanislower, Poland, immigrated to the United States in 1917, when he was nine years old. My mother, Bertha Rudd, was born Bertha Bass, in Elizabeth, New Jersey, in 1912, the year after her parents immigrated from Lithuania, the only child of the family born in this country. My family was part of the great wave of Eastern European Jewish immigration which lasted from 1880 to about 1920.

Both my parents were raised in Elizabeth, N.J., speaking Yiddish at home and English outside the house. My mother graduated high school, and my father went to Rutgers, the State University, on a scholarship. Though he graduated as an electrical engineer in 1932, he couldn't find work in the depths of the depression so he went into the Army as a reserve officer and ran CCC camps. For three years my parents were stationed in Blanding, Utah, a world away from Elizabeth, N.J. Stories I heard and photos I saw as a child generated in me a fascination with the Southwest, which might have been an important factor in my transplanting myself here years later.

My father served as an officer during World War II, both at home and in the Philippines. After the war he continued in the reserves, eventually rising to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, which he was very proud of. Someone had told him that a Rudnitsky could never rise above the rank of Captain, so in 1954 he shortened his name—and mine—which seemed to do the trick.

I was raised in the town of Maplewood, N.J., a near-by suburb of Newark. My grandmother on my mother's side ran a "candy store," what we would probably now call a convenience store, in a mixed-Irish-Italian-Jewish-black neighborhood of Newark, a very old industrial city. From 1945 to 1967, an entire flourishing community of about 100,000 Jews packed up and left Newark for the suburbs to the west. The story of the Newark Jews, including the flight to the suburbs, has been brilliantly chronicled by Philip Roth, starting with "Goodbye Columbus" in 1959, up to today, with "The Plot Against America," published in 2004. Roth is about 15 years older than I am; the world he describes is precisely one-half generation earlier than the one I grew up in. It's no surprise that he has always been one of my favorite authors, though my mother can't stand him since Maxine Grofsky's mother used to sit next to her in shul. Mrs. Grofsky had nothing good to say about Philip. Maxine was the girl that Philip was going with right before he wrote "Goodbye Columbus." The story skewered rich suburban Jews and also there was something about a diaphragm, you might recall. The incident was very difficult for the Grofsky's and for my mother. Bertha never liked Roth after that.

I invoke Roth to let you in on the insularity of the world I grew up in. My family carried the Jewish ghettos of Newark and Elizabeth with them to the suburbs. We may have lived in integrated neighborhoods, that is integrated with goyim (there were only a few blacks in the town) and we may have gone to integrated schools, (of course there were no blacks in my elementary school) but we were far from assimilated, if that means replacing a Jewish identity with an American one. At about the age of nine or ten I remember eating lunch at the house of a non-Jewish friend and reporting back that the hamburgers had onion and parsley in them. "Oh, that's goyish hamburger," my mother said. I lived a Philip Roth existence in which the distinction between Jews and gentiles was present in all things: having dogs and cats was goyish, for example, as was a church-sponsored hay-ride which I was invited to by the cute red-haired girl who sat in front of me in my seventh grade home-room. My parents didn't allow me to go, and, since repression breeds resistance, that was probably a signal event in my career of fascination with shiksas and things goyish, a career which paralleled that of young Alexander Portnoy in "Portnoy's Complaint."

The center of my parents' social world was Congregation Beth El in South Orange, N.J. After my father achieved a certain level of success in the real estate business he was asked to join the Congregation Board. That was well after I had left for college. In his retirement years he took charge of the upkeep of the building and grounds. My mother was active in the local chapter of the National Council of Jewish Women and ran the temple's gift shop, selling candy and bagels to the Hebrew school kids. Neither being particularly religious, we were minimally observant. I attended Hebrew School quite dutifully, though, and services, too, at least until the year after my bar mitzvah. I even became

President of the Junior Congregation, conducting services on Saturday mornings for the kids. I was a perfect little Jewish boy in my suit and tie, tallis, and, occasionally, tefillim.

However, it was on or about my bar mitzvah that it occurred to me, like happens to so many other Jewish kids, that God probably doesn't exist, that He's a social construct, just like all other gods. In retrospect I realize that I never had the faith very deeply. God wasn't a very active member of Congregation Beth El. I think He had missed the move out of Newark. There, my grandmother was still maintaining the old orthodox faith, observing the Sabbath and keeping kosher. Years after her death I realized for the first time that she had never once eaten a meal at our house in Maplewood, since we were not kosher. That was the price my mother paid for having rejected her mother's old religion as just so much superstition.

As a teenager, Congregation Beth El seemed to me just another aspect of the suburban scene: materialist and hypocritical. This was the time of the civil rights movement, but the lily-white suburbs existed in order to escape the "schvartzes." Jews in my parents' and grandparents' milieu used this derogatory term in exactly the same way southerners used "nigger." "The schvartze is coming to clean the house." "The schvartzes robbed my hardware store in Newark." "I had to sell the apartments on Clinton Avenue because schvartzes moved next door." There was no phony liberalism about the race war in Newark and Maplewood, at least not that I could see. Oh, yes, there was the local branch of the Ethical Culture Society, which consisted of Jews so removed from their roots that they couldn't even remember they had once been Jews. They were the town liberals, and it was only later that I got to know them.

In the early sixties I was mostly influenced by the beats in poetry and by the folk-song movement. Pete Seeger wasn't very Jewish, his ancestors having come over on the Mayflower, I think, though many of the communists around him were. Israeli folk-songs of the time had a whiff of socialism about them, but labor anthems rang in my head. I learned the songs of the Spanish Civil War, Bertold Brecht, the Wobblies, the union movement, blues via Leadbelly and Sonny Terry and Brownie Magee. The Harlan County miners' "Which Side Are You On?" was not the music of the Jewish suburbs. I wanted out.

I got to Columbia University as a freshman, age 18, in September, 1965, a few months after the United States attacked Vietnam with main force troops. There I found a small but vibrant anti-war movement. In my first semester I was recruited by David Gilbert, a senior who had written a pamphlet on imperialism for national SDS, Students for a Democratic Society. David was one of the founders of the Columbia SDS chapter, along with John Fuerst, the chapter Chairman. Both were Jewish, of course, as were my mentors and friends, Michael Josefowicz, Harvey Blume, Michael Neumann, and John Jacobs. Ted Kaptchuk and Ted Gold were Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Columbia SDS the year before I was elected Chairman, along with my Vice-Chairman, Nick Freudenberg. All of us were Jewish. It's hard to remember the names of non-Jewish Columbia SDS'ers; it was as much a Jewish fraternity as Sammie. There were probably a greater proportion of gentile women than guys in SDS, and of course I got to know them.

Out of all the uncountable hours of discussion in SDS meetings, at the West End Bar over beer, and in our dorm rooms and apartments over joints, I don't remember one single conversation in which we discussed the fact that so many of us were Jewish. This glaring lack alone might serve as a clue to what we were up to: by being radicals we thought we could escape our Jewishness. Left-wing radicalism was internationalist, not narrow nationalist; it favored the oppressed and the workers, not the privileged and elites, which our families were striving toward. Moreover, we were New Leftists, having rejected the sectarianism and cant of the Old Left, which, of course was dominated by Jews.

My friends in SDS taught me, quite correctly, that the world was in revolt against U.S. domination. That was why the Vietnamese were fighting so hard. I learned to admire the Vietnamese and the Cubans and the Chinese and the Russian peasants who had stood up to make a new society. Identifying with the oppressed seemed to me at Columbia and since a natural Jewish value, though one we never spoke of as being Jewish. We were socialists and internationalists first. I myself joined the cult of Che Guevara, putting posters of him on my apartment wall and aching to be a revolutionary hero like him. He wasn't very Jewish, incidentally.

But World War II and the holocaust were our fixed reference points. This was only twenty years after the end of the war. We often talked about the moral imperative to not be Good Germans. Many of my older comrades had mobilized for the civil rights movement; we were all anti-racists. We saw American racism as akin to German racism toward the Jews. As we learned more about the war, we discovered that killing Vietnamese en masse was of no moral consequence to American war planners. So we started describing the war as racist genocide, reflecting the genocide of the holocaust. American imperialist goals around the world were to us little different from the Nazi goal of global

conquest. If you really didn't like somebody—and we loathed President Lyndon B. Johnson—you might call him a fascist.

Columbia SDS adopted an intelligent strategy of protesting the war by opposing the university's involvement with it. Over a three year period we exposed the University's claims of being "value-neutral" by pointing to Columbia's Naval ROTC program, its allowing Marine and CIA and Dow Chemical recruiting, and, finally, the defense-oriented research work of the Institute for Defense Analysis consortium, of which Columbia was a leading—and secret—member. Support for the anti-war position among students and faculty gradually grew as the war escalated and as the SDS chapter engaged in continual educational activities and confrontations. The conflict with the university over the war and racism came to a head in the massive rebellion and strike of April-May, 1968.

What outraged me and my comrades so much about Columbia, along with its hypocrisy, was the air of genteel civility. Or should I say gentile?

Despite the presence of so many Jews in the faculty and among the students—geographical distribution in the admissions process had not been effective at filtering us out, our SAT's and class-rank being so high—the place was dripping with goyishness. When I got there freshmen still wore blue blazers and ties and drank sherry at afternoon socials with the deans. I had a classmate named Billy Schwartz who played rock guitar. He was the nephew of the most famous of all Columbia English professors, Lionel Trilling. Turns out Professor Trilling had once been Leon Schwartz, but had changed his name in order to advance up the academic ladder, not unlike my father in the U.S. Army. At the top of the Columbia heap sat President Grayson Kirk and Vice-President David Truman, two consummate liberal WASP's who privately claimed to oppose the war but maintained the institution's support of it.

In an infamous rabble-rousing speech I made in the course of one the confrontations on campus, I referred to President Grayson Kirk as "that shithead." Certainly I reveled in my role of head barbarian within the gates. But also I wanted to de-throne the President of Columbia University in the minds of my fellow students. It worked.

More than twenty years ago I read a book called, "The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle With Modernity." The author, an Irish-American sociologist named John Murray Cuddihy, advances a fascinating theory on the origins of Marxism and Freudianism. Jews were newly emancipated, that is, given legal and political rights, in Western Europe in the mid to late nineteenth century. But even bourgeois Jews were still excluded from civil society by customs and especially by manners. As Jewish (or formerly Jewish) outsiders ostensibly allowed in, but not really, Marx and Freud brought critical eyes to European bourgeois society. Marx said, in effect, "You think you've got yourself a fine little democracy here, well let me tell you about the class exploitation and misery that's underlying it." Similarly, Freud exposed the seamy, sexuality-driven motives, the up-raised penises controlling the unconscious minds of civilized, well-mannered bourgeois society.

We Jews at Columbia—and I would guess at colleges throughout the country—brought the same outsider view to the campuses we had been allowed into. We were peasant children right out of the shtetls of New Jersey and Queens screaming, "You want to know the truth about Columbia University, they're a bunch of liberal imperialists! They claim to be value-neutral but when we asked them to stop their research for the Vietnam War and their racist expansion into the Harlem community, they not only ignored us, but they called out the cops to beat us up and arrest us. Up against the wall, motherfucker, this is a stickup!" Morally and emotionally we could not fit into the civilized world of the racist, defense-oriented modern university. Such was our ordeal of civility.

Only a few of us came to Columbia from red-diaper backgrounds, children of communists. We were good Jewish kids, the cream of the crop, who had accepted the myths of America—democracy, opportunity for all, good intentions toward the world—and of the university—free and open inquiry toward the truth. We were betrayed by our country and the university when we learned, in a relative instant, that the reality wasn't even close to these myths. We third generation American Jews suddenly woke up and realized this country may have been a blessing for us, but not for so many others who couldn't pass for white. I should add that non-Jewish friends and comrades in the New Left experienced very similar feelings of betrayal and outrage, though coming from different backgrounds.

In the midst of the Columbia strike, a downtown theater company came to the campus to perform for us a revival of an old Yiddish play, "The Gymnasium." About 1,000 students packed the auditorium of the student center to see it. It's a classic story of the struggle of a Jewish family in Poland to get their son into the city's high school, the gymnasium. First the boy is rejected because he's Jewish, then the family is told he can attend the gymnasium if they sponsor a gentile also. So they go out and find a gentile boy, get him through the entrance tests, pay for him, and the two boys are admitted. It's a saga. In the last scene, the boys come home early from school. The mother is in the kitchen. She asks what's wrong. The son replies, "Mother, it's wonderful, the gymnasium is closed. We're on strike

against the quota system!" The mother collapses, and as she does so, all of us in the audience jump up, screaming at the top of our lungs, "Strike! Strike! Strike!," raising our hands in the V sign, tears streaming down all our faces.

Perhaps our anger was derived in some unconscious way from the famed prophetic tradition in Judaism, but I had never experienced any of it. Our rabbi at Congregation Beth El, Dr. Theodore Friedman, never to my knowledge preached about the legal discrimination against Negroes in the South, even as the civil rights movement raged on for more than a decade. Nor did I ever hear mention in shul of any relationship between those of us in the all-white suburbs to our black neighbors in adjacent Newark, N.J., other than thankfulness that we had gotten the hell out of there.

This is not to say that there weren't decent rabbis and Jewish leaders who were active in civil rights. Years later I became aware of Rabbi Joachim Prinz of Temple B'nai Abraham in Newark, and Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York, both side-kicks of Dr. Martin Luther King. They are said to have been very influential, though I didn't know about them at the time.

From my own experience I'm forced to disagree with the theory that there's something special and inherent in our religion which leads us to social activism, altruism, and the left. My former rabbi, Lynn Gottlieb, was fond of telling us that the Torah enjoins us to "honor the stranger because we were strangers in Egypt" forty-six or one hundred and seventeen times. Whatever the number, it was probably one of those laws that needed to be reiterated continually because nobody was observing it.

Dr. Israel Shahak, recently deceased, was a Hebrew University Chemistry Professor, President of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, and a holocaust survivor. For many years he occupied a place in Israeli politics roughly the same as Noam Chomsky in this country. In a book entitled, "Jewish History, Jewish Religion: The Weight of Three Thousand Years," he argues that as a reaction to being the victims of racism throughout the centuries, we developed a religion which itself enshrined racism toward the other. This is especially true of the rabbinical commentaries developed in Eastern Europe over the almost one thousand years in which we occupied a middle position between the landlords, whom we served, and the peasants who despised us and whom we in turn despised. How could it have been otherwise? In my family, if you wanted to say somebody was stupid you said they had a "goyishe kup," a goyish head.

My intention here is not to single out Judaism as being worse than other religions. It is just to say that we are no better. As a kid in Maplewood I never heard of tikkun olam, the now well-known commandment to repair the world. For all I know, Michael Lerner—whose parents, incidentally sat near my parents in shul at Beth El—made the whole thing up.

I am so obviously Jewish that no matter how much carne adovada or fry bread I eat, I'm instantly recognizable as a Jew. I proudly acknowledge the drive for education in Jewish culture which made me want to read about the world and to understand it and to become a teacher. I also recognize that in my social activism I am one of thousands working in the grand tradition of Jewish leftists, the Trotskys and the Emma Goldmans and the Goodmans and Schwerners of the twentieth century. I honor this lineage. As Jews our advantage in the past, though, was that we were outsiders critically looking in; today Jews sit at the right hand of the goy in the White House advising him whom to bomb next in order to advance the Empire.

To be outsiders in a nation or an empire is not such a terrible thing. Keeping critical and alert has allowed the Jewish people to survive all sorts of imperial disasters over the millennia—the Greeks, the Romans, Islam in Spain (which went from Golden Age to Inquisition in a few centuries), the Crusades, Reformation Europe, the Russian Czars, Nazism. This particular empire is neither the first nor the last to attempt to seduce us to join up. But we'd better not: it's our job to be critical outsiders, both for our own survival and for that of the planet.

As a child I never fell for the seduction of patriotism. It seemed so arbitrary, who's an American and who's not. If my relatives hadn't emigrated, who would I be? Since I was also at core an idealist and a utopian—another Jewish tradition?—I wanted to skip all that obviously stupid and dangerous stuff that gave rise to wars and racism. In 1965 I began to identify myself as a socialist and an internationalist. I still am an internationalist since old religions die hard.

That brings me to the toughest problem of all, Israel. If we look closely and critically at Israel today it's possible to see the downside of nationalism, whether religious or secular. There is a well-documented continuity over the last almost forty years between the Labor Party and Likud in their policies toward the Palestinians and settlement in the Occupied Territories. I am heartbroken over the moral and spiritual costs of the Jewish State to the Jewish People. I challenge anyone who thinks of me as a traitor to my people or a self-hating Jew, both of which I've been called, to visit Palestinians in the West Bank or East Jerusalem for as little as one-half day. Every Jew needs to see the misery

and humiliation which our Jewish nationalism and racism have wrought. These are not Jewish values, or at least my Jewish values.

Nor does the Jewish state guarantee Jewish safety and survival. My father was a military man and as such was always pessimistic about the long-term survival of Israel. He easily perceived Israel's strategic weaknesses in both geography and demographics. The only way Israel has survived so far has been to ally with the sole remaining imperial power in the world. But all empires fall, as Jewish history so clearly tells us. Maybe they should have allied with China.

This year I visited Israel with my family for the first time. I learned that far from being culturally retro, which is the way I used to think of it—a small, socialist, anti-materialist nation—Israel is really an avatar, way ahead even of California. Israel is America's future: militarized, racist, religio-nationalist, corporate, riven with so many internal splits and hatreds that only the existence of a perpetual enemy keeps the nation from exploding. If we don't organize to stop the current direction in this country, thirty years from now we will be Israel.

"Genug!, enough!," as my father would say if he were here, "You've made your point!"

Ok, Jake, you're probably right. To show what a good Jewish boy I am I'll give Bertha the last word. After all, she started this piece.

In 2003 a documentary called The Weather Underground was released. It was made by two young men, Sam Green and Bill Siegel, both Jewish, and was well received by audiences and reviewers. It was even nominated for an Oscar.

My brother David, who's eight years older than I, had never been comfortable with anything about the Weathermen. At the time I treated him contemptuously because he wasn't "revolutionary," and on top of that he had to live with the misery which my parents endured for the seven years I was a fugitive. Over the years our way of dealing with the issue was to not talk about it. But after he saw the movie, David became so smitten with The Weather Underground that he set up two showings, one in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, where he lives part-time, and the other at a Jewish film festival in suburban Essex County, New Jersey, where our family is from.

About four hundred people attended the showing at the Jewish Community Center in West Orange. The average age of the audience was probably around 65. My mother was sitting in the second row. After the movie I was answering questions from the audience when my mother waved her hand, interrupting. "I have a question! I have a question!" she shouted. "What's your question, Mom?" I asked.

She paused just long enough for the audience to wonder what she was going to say. "I've waited thirty years to ask you: How could you do this to me?"

Endnotes

1. Talk given at the New Mexico Jewish Historical Society Conference, "Jews in War and Peace," held in Albuquerque, NM, on Nov. 12, 2005.

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Who Controls Digital Culture?

Mark Poster

"Sharing data is the beginning of humanity."

— SkipGates, TV ad for Linux

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 is most often approached from the point of view of the contending agents: the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), peer-to-peer file sharing program developers and users, lawyers on both sides of the question. Each of these social agents perceives the DMCA from the limits of its situated position and each party has some validity to the arguments it makes from that perspective. For many of these agents the question of copyright law is about the fate of the culture industries, those corporations that control the production, reproduction and distribution of texts, sounds and images. I shall introduce what I regard as a broader viewpoint: that of the citizen concerned about the general relation of new technologies and democracy, about the question of transculture in an age of globalization, and more broadly still about the long-term relation of human beings to information machines. As a media studies theorist and historian, I view the question of copyright also in terms of the changing nature of the producer and the consumer, about the character of our culture, and about the scope of democracy or the basic freedoms of the citizen. Ultimately the question that must be raised in connection with the DMCA is that of who controls cultural objects—one that goes to the heart of contemporary societies since they increasingly depend on information in a planetary context.[1]

Popular culture compulsively returns to the theme of the future direction of technology. Film after film depicts machines and humans in various conditions of struggle, cooperation, and symbiosis. Robots of course are a staple of Hollywood, especially since Blade Runner (1982). The recent and highly popular Matrix Trilogy problematizes not only machines but in particular the complex of information machines that constitute the Internet. A dialogue in the second film in the series, Matrix Reloaded (2003) broaches the question of humans and machines in a particularly exigent manner. The scene occurs at a moment in the film when the machines are about to attack the humans. Neo, the hero of the film played by Keanu Reeves, and Councilor Hamann, played by Anthony Zerba, emerge from an elevator that has descended into the engine room level of the humans' stronghold. The Councilor marvels at the complexity of the machines before them.

> Councilor: Almost no one comes down here unless of course there's a problem. That's how it is with people: nobody cares how it works, as long as it works. I like it down here. I like to be reminded that the city survives because of these machines. These machines are keeping us alive while other machines are coming to kill us. Interesting isn't it? The power to give life and the power to end it.
>
> Neo: Don't we have same power?
>
> Councilor: I suppose we do. Sometimes down here I keep thinking about all those people still plugged into the matrix. And when I look at these machines, I can't help thinking that in a way we have plugged into them.
>
> Neo: But we control these machines. They don't control us.
>
> Councilor: Of course not. How could they? The idea is pure nonsense but it does make one wonder just, what is controlling?

Neo: If we wanted, we could shut these machines down.

Councilor: Of course. That's it. You hit it. That's control isn't it? If we wanted we could smash them to bits. Although if we did we would have to consider what would happen to our lights, our heat, our air.

Neo: So we need machines and they need us. Is that your point, Councilor?

Councilor: No. No point. Old men like me don't bother with making points. There is no point.

Neo: Is that why there are no young men on the council?

Councilor: Good point.

Neo: Why don't you tell me what's on your mind councilor?

[Music begins suggesting the importance of the words that follow.]

Councilor: There is so much in this world that I do not understand. See that machine? It has something to do with recycling our water supply. I have absolutely no idea how it works. But I do understand the reason for it to work. I have absolutely no idea how you are able to do some of the things you do. But I believe there's a reason for that as well. I only hope we understand that reason before it's too late.

Today one might say we are in the same position as these humans of the future. We can turn off the machines off only at the risk of catastrophe, a condition that compels a rethinking of our relation to machines as one of agent to tool. In addition, many of the older generation—the Councilor Hamanns - have no idea what has become of the younger generation in its interactions with information machines, the virtual realities proliferating on the Internet. Yet there are clearly alternative approaches to this emerging digital culture and the direction we take in relation to it most likely will greatly affect the human condition for the next decades. The question then may be put as follows: Who controls digital culture?; Who ought to control digital culture?; and additionally, is control a good term to use in relation to digital culture?

Controlling Information and its Hazards

The case of the Soviet Union is instructive in this regard. This bureaucratic state abhorred the free flow of information and attempted to restrict technologies that promoted it such as photocopy machines, computers, and video cassette recorders (VCRs) for example. When the Soviet Union began to manufacture VCRs they excluded the capability of recording, limiting VCRs to playback machines, thereby imagining the government could control the reproduction and distribution of moving images. In their effort to control information, to keep information in the hands of the bureaucrats at designated levels of the hierarchy of the state apparatus, the Soviet political machine wrestled hopelessly with the increasing spread of machines throughout society that were capable of reproducing and disseminating texts, images, and sounds. As machine after machine was introduced as a consumer item, the Soviets attempted to control culture in the manner it was controlled by the Tsarist regime before the Revolution of 1917, at the beginning of socialist society. While the West especially after World War II increasingly integrated information machines at all levels of society and in all corners of everyday life—raising productivity with automation, empowering consumers against giant corporations like AT&T with inexpensive telephones, promoting youth cultures with cheap radios, assisting in the proliferation of women's subcultures, ethnic communities, and groups with marginalized sexual orientations with electronic devices that preserve images and sounds—the Soviets resisted, fending off communications from the West as well as the information machines that promote the creation and distribution of culture beyond the control of the government. Some observers go so far as to attribute the collapse of the Soviet Union exactly to its defensive and futile policy of information control (Castells 1998).

The music industry (Recording Industry Association of America until 2003 represented by Hilary Rosen) and the film industry (with Jack Valenti as President of Motion Picture Association of America) reacted to the rapid spread of peer-to-peer file-sharing of music and films much in the manner of the Soviet bureaucracy, and, as far as one can tell at this point, with much the same effect. The culture industries attempted to destroy the new information

machines. They lobbied hard for the passage of the DMCA. And they would have us believe the DMCA is about the author's rights: the compensation of creative people for their innovations. In their suit of September 2003 the RIAA has acted as if downloading music files is the same thing as taking a music CD from a retail store without paying for it. This claim of equivalence is a political move that ignores the specificity and differences of each media—CDs and digital files (Hull 2003). But if this were so, then the 12 year-old girl who was subpoenaed by the RIAA and settled the threatened suit out of court was capable of performing the same social functions as the music industry (i.e., copying and distributing music). And in that case, clearly, the music industry is superfluous and redundant, far less efficient than the girl who accomplishes the tasks at almost no cost.

If the case of the Soviet Union's effort to control information technocultures is instructive, so is the case of the copyists' assault on the print guilds in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The resort to political institutions like the legislature and the judiciary by industries threatened by technical progress is not at all new. As Jacques Attali reports in Noise, one hundred fifty years after the origin of the printing press in Europe, copyists in France requested aid from the Parlement de Paris and received the right to destroy printing presses (Attali 1985)! The copyists had good arguments. They produced beautiful, illuminated manuscripts and codices. Their works compared very favorably in comparison to the fledgling print industry. During the period of the production of incunabula in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, few of the later conventions of page composition were in practice. Margins, word and line spacing, paragraph demarcations, the use of periods and commas - all of these commonplaces of the printed page that make it so readable were not yet in use. Early products of the print industry are ugly and difficult to scan. True enough the copyists made many errors and their work was unreliable because of this. But the early print industry, contrary to modern expectations about the consistency of the printing press in comparison with the scriptoria, also habitually made errors (Newman 1985). Authors had no assurance that their manuscripts would be faithfully reproduced by the Stationers' guilds. Hierarchies of status within the print guilds did not give pride of place to authors, who had not yet been elevated to the place of genius they would later enjoy. Instead masters and journeymen ruled the place of production. If journeyman compositors wished they simply altered the text to suit their sense of quality, the modern conception of the inviolability of the author's work, as well as the concomitant cultural fetish for a uniform text, were not yet inscribed in the practice of book-making (Johns 1998). When the French copyists received the go-ahead to destroy printing presses they easily identified themselves as the aggrieved parties with rectitude (and no doubt God) on their side just as the contemporary music industry ascribes to itself the defense of the artists and the rights of private property.

But there is an important distinction in the two cases: the feudal copyists' confrontation with the printing press was based on the preservation and authority of tradition; capitalism's confrontation with peer-to-peer networks is justified by its commitment to technical progress. If the music industry wins its case against internet technology, capitalism loses its legitimacy as the bearer of progress. The copyists did not have to defend themselves against the charge of holding back progress since no such ideological prescription prevailed. The music industry, on the contrary, must somehow show that progress is promoted by destroying an innovative and very promising information technology. They face an uphill battle, to put it mildly. In their defense, the music industry points to the fact that more music is available to consumers today than ever before. Their conclusion is that the current system works just fine and that peer-to-peer networks will diminish the amount of music in circulation. The argument from complacency echoes the copyists' plaint too closely. If the status quo ante prevailed in the fifteenth century and the printing presses were somehow destroyed, one cannot imagine the loss. The printers' argument that their machines were more efficient, would produce more books at a cheaper cost, and would be of benefit to more individuals, could not be proven in 1470. The same is true today: peer-to-peer file sharers cannot prove that a society without the RIAA will be better served than the current arrangement. These are counter-factual arguments that do not hold much water. Yet it is plain that a printing press works better than the human hand and that peer-to-peer networks are superior means of reproduction and distribution than Time-Warner and EMI corporate facilities[2]. And to take the argument beyond economic calculation to political effects, one might also say that printing democratized books by enabling individuals of modest means to purchase them, that it made universal education possible for the same reason and that, finally, it was a condition of possibility for the democratic citizen since reading is a prerequisite for independent political judgment. Similarly, one can argue that peer-to-peer networks will loosen the stranglehold of the music industry on the circulation of music allowing far more musicians to be heard than presently is the case, that it will foster a greater proliferation of music as a result. In addition, peer-to-peer networks, as we shall see promote the transformation and recirculation of music by the consumer, effectively laying the groundwork for the elevation of consumption into

creativity, ending the bifurcation of production and consumption.

The Politics of Control, or Politics as Control

The Oxford English Dictionary provides several instructive definitions of control. As a noun, the primary definition of control is: "The fact of controlling, or of checking and directing action; the function or power of directing and regulating; domination, command, sway." As a verb, the definition is: "To check or verify, and hence to regulate." The OED has also updates to definition of the noun, control, as follows: "control freak orig. U.S., a person who demonstrates a need to exercise tight control over his or her surroundings, behavior, or appearance, especially. by assuming command of any situation or exerting authority over others." The OED does not, of course, explore the question of the subject of control (What kind of agent has or seeks control?), nor that of the culture of control (To what extent is control by agents important to a culture? and, more significantly, What is the nature of the subjects and objects in the culture that do the controlling or are regulated by such agents?) These questions animate my analysis of the music industry's relation to the innovation of digital technology. The numerous studies that raise the question of control in relation to digital media tend to assume that individual or collective agents are in positions of control or lack of control. They define the question as one of who ought to control the technology, never asking the more basic question "Is control by agents the best way critically to understand the general relation of digital technoculture to control? Do digital media support enhance or undermine practices of control?"[3]

In the case of the DMCA, the music industry attempts to maintain control over their product in the face of the new technology of digital reproduction. I argue that the main issue in the enactment of the DMCA is the control of cultural objects. Digitalization has radically altered the conditions of culture. In response, the RIAA has exerted enormous influence on politicians to pass laws, including the DMCA, to extend copyright to cover digital products. In this way the RIAA hopes to maintain control over cultural objects. It is often argued that the introduction of new technologies is accompanied by disruptions to the existing order of control, eliciting great expectations that democracy, peace and freedom will thereby be enhanced (Marvin 1988). Most historians of technology, however, contend that as the new technology is disseminated throughout society and is assimilated into it, controlling agents that preexisted the innovation soon regain their dominance (McCourt and Burkart 2003). This view, I argue, is blind to the manner in which information technologies alter both culture and society. Even if dominant institutions are not directly overthrown by new technologies, fundamental aspects of culture are indeed transformed by them. This argument cannot be developed here although it has been posited by many leading media theorists and historians (McLuhan 1964; Adorno 1972; Heidegger 1977; Kittler 1986; Baudrillard 1994; Manovich 2001; Poster 2001). What I do want to avoid, however, is the premature conclusion that peer-to-peer file sharing will quickly be either eliminated or adapted by the RIAA.

Two observations about the introduction of new technologies are pertinent at this point. First, the relation of a technology to social practice is a complex, changing phenomenon that is not reducible to the goals of its developer. The inventors of audio recording (Edison's phonograph), for instance, intended the device for the preservation of voice (Sterne 2003); yet, the technology eventually became a means of mass producing copies of music (Attali 1985). The conclusion one must draw from this case is that new technologies lead to disruptions of old ways of doing things—disruptions that are unanticipated and unpredictable—and so it has been and will continue to be with networked computing. The intended uses of the computer were to further social controls by the elite (ensure communications under conditions of nuclear war); the outcome may be the overturning of certain systems of social control (i.e., the culture industry) (Attali 1985).

The second observation is this: Digitization has thus far produced strong tendencies in two opposite directions concerning the question of the control of culture:

> Digital culture enhances the ability of large institutions, such as the state and the corporation, to extend the reach of their information and management of the population. In the case of music, the culture industry has responded to digitalization by attempting to extend its control over culture, attempting to limit sharply the ability of consumers to use cultural objects as they wish.
>
> At the same time, digital culture empowers individuals to have positions of speech that are difficult to monitor, to act upon cultural objects in ways not possible when these objects were available only in analogue form, to transform, reproduce and

disseminate information in a manner previously restricted to expensive central apparatuses such as broadcast facilities. Because of the ease and cheapness of the creation, reproduction and distribution of cultural objects, users have extended their control over cultural objects such as by sharing files on peer-to-peer networks.

Networked computing confronts humanity with a dramatic choice of opposing possibilities: an Orwellian extension of governmental and corporate controls or a serious deepening of the democratization of culture. In this context, the most important question to ask about the DMCA is how society will establish practices around the digitalization of cultural objects. Will it follow (1) the wishes of the culture industry, or (2) the practices exemplified in peer-to-peer networks, or (3) some combination of the two, or (4) the impulses of some other set of agents?

Fixed vs. Variable Cultural Objects

On February 10, 2004 The Los Angeles Times reported that EMI blocked Brian Burton (also known as DJ Danger Mouse) from distributing "The Grey Album," a composite blend (a "mash-up" or sampling) of the Beatle's White Album and vocals from Jay-Z's "The Black Album." EMI's attempt to prevent the distribution of the album failed, only increasing its dissemination. Fred Goldring, a music-industry lawyer opines: EMI "…created their own hell." The Grey Album, the reporters continued, "…became probably the most widely downloaded underground indie record, without radio or TV coverage, ever. I think it's a watershed event." (Healey and Cromelin 2004). The protest against EMI included "Grey Tuesday" (February 24th) when more than 150 websites offered downloadable versions of the album and an estimated 100,000 copies were downloaded on that day alone. Copyright experts observe that "artists can't use a recognizable sample from someone else's recording unless the copyright holder grants permission" (Healey and Cromelin 2004). Goldring claims that "artists should have the absolute right to control their work. The problem is, how do you control that in the new world?… [But] what does [it mean to control one's work] in a world where everything can be digitized and transmitted around the world at the push of a button?" (Healey and Cromelin 2004).

EMI's action continues the effort of the music industry to repress sampling, an art form begun in the 1980s with Hip Hop. Many artists advocate, contra EMI, "open content" in digital culture, some who even elaborate an aesthetic based on the principle of variable cultural objects (Miller 2004). Artists who have authorized the downloading, altering and redistributing of their work include Bjork, Moby, Radiohead (posting loops on their website for downloading and using in other works) and Public Enemy "…allowing access to original master tracks of the vocals for open remixing…" (Vibe 2004)

Modern society developed in the context fixed cultural objects like books. These objects may be owned but they cannot be changed once they are produced. If they are altered, the user can alter only his or her copy. All previous and future copies are not affected by the alterations of the user. This is a limitation of analogue cultural objects. They can be mass-produced but only from fixed points of production, points that require great amounts of resources. The user cannot copy these objects in a mass form. This feature of cultural objects, their fixity, has had the further consequence of structuring society into two sharply divided groups, producers and consumers, each with their own capacities and limitations. Consumers were in a relatively passive position in relation to the objects.

Another feature of modern media culture is that, since reproduction required considerable resources, copies became commodities, that is to say, they were distributed through market mechanisms and acquired exchange values or prices. Analogue reproduction of cultural objects thus requires a type of material base that falls under the economics of scarcity. Air does not require a market because it is not scarce, at least if you live near the beach. Scarcity means that a group of people are willing to pay for an object or service because that is the only way they can obtain it. They go to a market to find these objects and the price of the objects will reflect the ratio of the number of these objects available and the number of buyers who can pay for them. The economics of scarcity also means that if I sell you an object, I no longer possess it. Only one person may own a given object at any time.

Fixed cultural objects like books afforded certain advantages to consumers. The consumer, having bought the book, could read it anywhere he or she chose. The consumer could lend the book to a friend or resell it. The consumer could copy the book by handwriting and later by photocopying machines, which, though illegal, is impossible to police. The consumer could burn the book or throw it in the trash.

Digital cultural objects do not fall under the laws of scarcity and the market because they require almost no cost to produce, to copy and to distribute, and like ideas they do not diminish when they are given away. They

are "nonrivalrous." There is no need for a capitalist market in the area of digital cultural objects and these objects need not become commodities. Their reproduction and distribution need not fall under the constraints of scarcity economics and indeed digital cultural objects resist market mechanisms.

Digitalization of cultural objects changes each of these limitations or practices and expands the possible practices of analogue cultural objects concerning their production, reproduction, distribution and use. It enables the inexpensive production of cultural objects such as sound recordings or moving images. It places in the hands of the consumer the ability to reproduce these objects very cheaply. And digital networks enable consumers to distribute cheaply cultural objects. It also enables the consumer of cultural objects to change them into new objects and to reproduce and to distribute them. Digitization also means the object is more difficult to destroy since it exists on the Internet. In short it changes the nature of the producer and the consumer, blurring the boundary between them. The consumer can now be a producer, reproducer, distributor, and creator of cultural objects. Thereby digital technology undermines the systems of controls that were associated with fixed cultural objects and brings control of culture itself into question by opening cultural objects to an unlimited process of alterations.

Copyright Law

The DMCA act (1998) extends the copyright law over analogue cultural objects to cover digital cultural objects, defined as texts, sounds, and images. Its main provision is to outlaw the "circumvention of technological measures used by copyright owners to protect their works and … tampering with copyright management information." (The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, p. 1). Thus programs designed to defeat copy protection (such as DeCSS and software that cancels the regional limitation DVD players are now illegal both to create and to distribute.

The 1998 law also aligns U.S. copyright law with recent agreements of the World Intellectual Property Organization acts. In addition it establishes ISPs as "safe harbors" in the sense that ISPs cannot be held liable for users' infringements but the ISP must enforce the rules against infringement and the RIAA is permitted to subpoena users.

One provision of the law [Section 512(h) of the DMCA (17 U.S.C. 512)] gives copyright claimants the right to subpoena ISPs for the identities (name, address, email address, phone) of users they allege are infringing their copyrights. It does not, however, let claimants of infringement get other information about user activity. The RIAA has until as of March 2004 used these subpoenas (almost 3000 to sue 382 individuals) to force ISPs to turn over the names of alleged filesharers, so the record labels can turn around and sue their fans.[4]

A U.S. Court of Appeals, however, ruled in December 2003 that the Recording Industry Association of America cannot use subpoenas to compel ISPs to reveal the names of alleged music file swappers. The RIAA may only obtain a subpoena from a U.S. District Court clerk's office after proving to a judge that it has sufficient evidence of infringement.[5] Finally, the DMCA provides for some exceptions, such as when a computer breaks down.[6]

Copyright laws were enacted in the late seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries first in Britain, then in the U.S. and Western Europe as a response to the new technology of the printing press that made possible the mass reproduction of text (Rose 1993). Copyright law is associated with patent law and trademark law but is somewhat different from them. Copyright law covered the medium in which inventions or acts of genius were embedded for reproduction. The medium of print required advanced technology and copyright law forbad anyone not authorized to use that technology for reproducing books and selling them.

Until the mid-twentieth century, copyright gave "authors" a monopoly over their innovations for about 17 years but numerous changes in the law extends this to about 100 years and includes the descendants of authors.

Original copyright law also ensured that "readers" had rights such as "fair use"— the right to quote a work in order to critique it or make fun of it. This provision has been seriously curtailed by the DMCA. Proposals by Microsoft and the culture industries known as Digital Rights Management and Trusted Computing would do away with much of fair use.

Copyright was adapted to new technologies of reproduction as they were invented and distributed in the areas of sound (the music industry, radio) and images (photography, film and television). In each case the rights of authors were whittled away in favor of control by media industries (Lury 1993). Each new technology changed the circumstances of reproduction, changed the medium in which the cultural object was embedded and placed on the

market, and called for changes in the nature and application of copyright law. For example, copyright law did not explicitly prohibit consumers from making copies (you will not find such a prohibition in books and they only were printed on LP labels after the spread of audio tape machines) because consumers did not have the capability of doing this in the media of print, film, early audio recordings, and so on.

In general one can say that, as reproducers of cultural objects became larger due in part to the need for greater amounts of capital, copyright law increasingly diminished the power of the author/creator and increasingly reduced the rights and capacities of the consumer in both cases in favor of the media corporation (Vaidhyanathan 2001). Copyright law is the chief means by which large corporations in general and music firms in particular attempt to control culture. In the words of Kimbrew McLeod, "…intellectual property law reinforces a condition whereby individuals and corporations with greater access to capital can maintain and increase unequal social relations" (McLeod 2001). Corporations use the threat of legal action systematically to stifle creativity even when the incident in question may fall fully within the "fair use" doctrine. The system of copyright law is so far out of whack that countless examples, such as Time-Warner's ownership of the song "Happy Birthday to You," force the conclusion that, with regard to intellectual property, the legal structure no longer provides any semblance of justice. Hence all citizens have an obligation to violate copyright law whenever they can. Since the legislative branch of government is under the sway of the media industry, the only alternative available to foster democracy and promote creativity in the realm of culture is Henry David Thoreau's practice of civil disobedience. And digital technology has provided citizens with a practical means to carry out this protest. Digitization threatens the media corporations because one no longer requires great amounts of capital in order to produce, reproduce, modify, and distribute cultural objects

Authors, Artists, Creators, Innovators

Contra the music and film industries, copyright is not about remuneration for artists, authors, creators and innovators, much less their heirs. Copyright was instituted to promote innovation in society, to improve the quality of life for all. In order to do that copyright provides a temporary monopoly for authors to designate firms to reproduce and distribute their work. The argument in copyright law is that the best way to insure the advance of science and the arts is to violate free market principles of competition and give authors the exclusive right to receive monetary rewards for their efforts. What benefits society is the innovation or creativity that is contained in the cultural object. Essential to democracy is the maximum dissemination of new ideas, new science and new art. Original copyright laws foster this aim.

Contemporary copyright law, especially as modified by the DMCA, (mis)uses the privilege given to the artist and instead enables the cultural industry to reap large gains. Only as a secondary result of the current arrangements do some artists receive substantial royalties. (Many artists have sued the music industry, claiming systematic underpayment or cheating, and won in the courts.)

The music industry argues against peer-to-peer file sharing that such transmissions violate the artists' royalty benefits. There is no question but that file sharing bypasses author's royalties. But the question is how to remunerate innovators in a digital network system. And the answer is by no means that the network must be crippled so that the music industry continues to perform functions of reproduction and distribution that are no longer wanted or needed. There are three problems I shall highlight concerning the question of author royalties in the age of file sharing.

First, it is by no means to be taken as a natural fact or a universal truth that artists and innovators receive compensation for the reproduction of their works. Each medium and art form is different in this regard. Musicians, for instance, certainly ought to be paid for their performances. Musicians' Unions have in some instances opposed recordings of music, especially when used in public locations like dance halls.[7] But who should be compensated for music in the case of reproduction technologies? Perhaps the engineers, the inventors of these technologies, ought to be paid royalties. The case of library collections of music remains apposite: borrowers of music CDs do not pay royalties to anyone so that no one is compensated yet the public good is served.

By way of contrast with the music industry, it is worth noting that in the case of film, cinemas provide a value added to the moving images/sound by displaying them in convenient locations, in comfortable circumstances, and on very large screens often with elaborate sound systems. Such enhancements to the film experience are worth compensation. Although the advent of HDTV and large screen TV monitors in home entertainment systems may

challenge cinemas on this score, at least for those who can afford them. The film industry has to some extent learned a lesson from the experience of the music industry. The MPAA hired Kenneth Jacobson, former FBI agent, to head its antipiracy efforts, who complained that downloading films on the Internet cut sharply the sales of DVDs and tapes. Yet the more serious aspect of film piracy concerns the unauthorized copying and selling of DVDs, according to Jacobson, amounting to more than 35 million in 2001. In some countries, he contended, "film piracy has become so rampant in countries such as China, Russia and Pakistan that the legal markets there have all but evaporated" (Muñoz and Healey 2001).

Second, file sharing, unlike some forms of so-called piracy does not entail the sale of commodities. File sharing is a non-market exchange. It is not similar to early piracy in print where shops would reproduce books and sell them without authorization from or compensation to the author. Nor is it similar to Asian factories that copy CDs and DVDs and sell them cheaply in local markets. In fact digitalization enables costless sharing of cultural objects. It resembles not violations of copyright but playing music in one's home with friends in attendance, friends who themselves did not necessarily buy the cultural object. One must account for the specificity of the medium of reproduction: digital reproduction, I would argue, does not fall within copyright at all because the kind of materiality of digital files is not characterized by the economics of scarcity. Unlike books, films and broadcasts, with digital media, unless commodified, there is nothing to pay for.

Third, artists have always incurred debts to others. They are not the complete originators of works of art as copyright law pretends but, at least partially, parasites that rely upon previous cultural creations, collaborators, and workers in related fields. Arts works are as much or more the product of collective labor as they are the output of individual agents. No other culture in human history but the modern Western one has detached artists from their context and elevated them in sanctified celebrity. But this cultural practice defies the history of art, with its figures like Rubens who painted only with a large staff of specialists and film-making with its numerous casts of participants. The collective nature of the creative process is nowhere more evident than in music, from the borrowing practices of Handel and Vivaldi, to the "coverings" of popular music as in Bob Dylan's reliance upon Woodie Guthrie, to the outright montage-like pasting of bits of works in hip hop and the practices of DJs (Hebdige 1987; Poschardt 1998). Art requires a cultural context of other art, numerous collaborators, and media producers. It also, let us not forget, requires audiences.

The figure of the artist as lone creator is today more than fiction serving the music industry as an alibi to abet its control of culture. With the increasing shift to digital culture, artworks, as we have seen, more and more take the form of variable cultural objects, in short, open content. The culture industries, as they have come to be institutionalized, cannot exist if cultural forms are developed as variable objects. Peer-to-peer file sharing is an important step in the articulation and elaboration of culture as open content.

For these reasons the question of file sharing is not as simple as the music industry would have us believe. A full understanding of the question requires some knowledge of the current practices of file sharing. To that end, I shall now present an overview of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.

Peer-to-Peer Networks

Most discussions of the current condition of music distribution and file-sharing begin and end with Napster (Lessig 1999). Observers presume that the fate of file-sharing on the Net rests with Napster. Since Napster was forced to shut down as a free network only to reemerge reborn, like the Phoenix, as a .com venture, these writers close the curtain on file-sharing. Of late, some writers throw KaZaA into the mix but again conclude that since shared files have decreased recently from a high of 900,000,000 to 550,000,000, the era of the free distribution of music on the Internet is over[8]. But such is hardly the case. A robust, heterogeneous matrix of file-sharing continues and evolves.

The circumstances of my own knowledge of file sharing are germane to this discussion. I first became aware of file-sharing in the Spring 1999 when I taught a class on Internet Culture and learned of file sharing from my undergraduate students. Students were asked to present brief reports on their favorite web sites. One student spoke about "Scour.net," a web site that contained links to downloadable mp3 music files. Even before Scour, file-swapping was rampant on Internet Relay Chat and Usenet. But it is true that Napster vastly expanded the frequency of file-sharing by its peer-to-peer architecture and ease of use. Shawn Fanning's program was vulnerable to legal

attack because a central location maintained a database of files, acting as a server for clients who used the program to find music to download. The newer "killer applications" do not suffer this weakness. Programs like KaZaA and Justin Frankel's Gnutella for instance enable each user to make their own connections with other peers, coming much closer to a true peer-to-peer connection. One can find an overview of the many types of file-sharing programs and networks on sites like Slyck (http://www.slyck.com/).

The most basic network for file-sharing remains Internet Relay Chat (IRC). Here, after invoking a client program, one makes direct connections with others and exchanges files while both parties remain online. There are also more elaborate subnetworks within the IRC domain. As long as the Internet functions as a decentralized system of networked computers, IRC will be difficult to police since there are no centralized sites to shut down. IRC however does suffer the limitation of scale: it does not provide the kind of networked information that facilitates mass interchange of information.

The next type of file-sharing occurs on Usenet, also known as Newsgroups. The original purpose of Usenet was the exchange of textual information, which was also true of IRC. For some time now, users developed methods of dividing up large music and even film files into chunks small enough to meet the size limitations of the Usenet system. These files are known as binaries and are bundled into groups. One downloads all of the parts and then reassembles them on one's computer, resulting in an mp3 file for music, a jpg file for images, or, for moving images, an avi file. Users then developed downloading programs that automatically assemble the parts into complete files. One difficulty with Usenet is the problem of finding the cultural object one is looking for amidst the profusion of thousands of groups. Faced with this limitation, users developed web sites where other users upload reports on each group, indicating the available content. This is done continuously, day after day. As with IRC, it is hard to imagine how Usenet might be policed. Usenet services contain the files but downloaders simply indicate their choices, as one would do at a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site. No record is kept of who downloads what files. The shortcoming of Usenet is that the files are available for a limited time only, since the content of the groups changes every couple of days.

More popular than Usenet or IRC are the numerous networks like KaZaA that deploy genuine peer-to-peer programs. Among these are the eDonkey and eMule networks. In these cases each cultural object is assigned a "hash" number, a long string of letters and numerals that identifies the film, game, ebook, program, or music album to all users connected to the network. The hash numbers are posted, under the file name, at numerous sites on the Web. The user goes to the site, clicks on the file name and the client program pops up on the user's computer and searches the network for locations where the file exists. The program then downloads the file in small parts from several sites at the same time, something Napster could not do. Nor could Napster resume downloading if the site in question went offline or the user went offline, a feat the newer programs perform flawlessly. Finally the program assembles the parts into a complete file when it is finished with the download. While you are downloading a file or several files with eMule, others on the network are uploading the same file(s) from your computer. These complex, interlocking web sites and programs are all free and developed (and continuously improved) by individual file-sharers.

Another, somewhat different system is Bram Cohen's Bit Torrent. This program also uses identifiers for files so that the location that contains information about the file does not contain the file itself. Like the KaZaA and eDonkey systems, Bit Torrent allows multiple, simultaneous downloading of parts of a file. With Bit Torrent, a separate window opens for each download and uploads are limited to the file being downloaded.

Thousands of individuals create programs, maintain web sites, upload hash numbers of "releases" (cultural content they have digitized and put on their hard disks) and hundreds of thousands, more likely millions, download and share files. Participants in peer-to-peer networks are found across the globe although numbers of users are no doubt distributed in direct proportion to general Internet use. The peer-to-peer landscape is maintained as a public sphere outside the commodity system. Some sites do request donations that are voluntary. A distribution system for cultural objects thus subsists without the support of any large institution and with the strong opposition of those corporations that have controlled cultural objects since the development of technologies for the reproduction of information. Despite the moral and legal threats and actions of the MPAA and RIAA, peer-to-peer file-sharing continues to flourish and even to expand. It seems that publicity about each new attack by the culture industries only makes more people aware of the peer-to-peer network and increases the number of participants. As one says in the movie business, no publicity is bad publicity for peer-to-peer networks.

Even as one marvels at the accomplishments of the peer-to-peer system, one may question the moral value of sharing cultural content. Surely downloading files is not a great creative act. Nor however is buying a CD in a

retail outlet, it must be admitted. One question at stake in the peer-to-peer phenomenon is the value one attributes to commodity exchange in comparison to sharing. But a deeper question still is the potential of peer-to-peer to become a dominant system of cultural exchange. An infrastructure is being set into place for a day when cultural objects will become variable and users will become creators as well. Such an outcome is not just around the corner since for generations the population has been accustomed to fixed cultural objects. But as we pass beyond the limits of modern culture, with its standardized, mass produced consumer culture, we can anticipate more and more individuals and groups taking advantage of the facility with which digital cultural objects are changed, stored, and distributed in the network. A different sort of public space from that of modernity is emerging, a heterotopia in Foucault's term (Foucault 1986), and peer-to-peer networks constitute an important ingredient in that development, one worthy of safeguarding and promoting for that reason alone. If copyright laws need to be changed and media corporations need to disappear or transform themselves, this result must be evaluated in relation to a new regime of culture that is now possible. In considering the alternatives, let us take the example of the music industry examine its claim to foster cultural innovation and democracy.

The Music Industry

This sector of the culture industry has been exceptionally destructive in its appropriation of copyright law. One can surmise, referring back to the OED definitions of "control" that the RIAA qualifies as a "control freak." Here are just some of the ways the RIAA has worked to redefine copyright law (and the law in general in relation to the music industry) to maintain and to extend its control over popular music:

The RIAA influenced legislatures through campaign contributions to make exceptions to laws governing labor contracts so that it could require artists to sign long term contracts for five to seven albums. When these statutes are not as favorable as the RIAA wishes, it manipulates the contract to extend its control over artists. Typically, the contract specifies that the music corporation has exclusive rights to the artists' future work. The corporation lengthens this contract for a number of years by spacing out the production of albums, arguing that this is the best marketing strategy. The music corporations habitually delay the production of albums to suit their marketing interests, thereby in fact, holding the artists under their contract for as long as the corporation wishes. This practice constitutes one of the few legal examples of indentured servitude in modern society (professional sports being another) (Shemel and Krasilovsky 1990).

The contracts with artists require artists to pay for the production of the music media (studio time, etc.), the design and packaging of CDs (about 25% of the retail price), and returns (about 10% of gross receipts). All of these costs are treated either as advances on royalties or deductions from royalties. The corporations essentially are limited to marketing the product and the Internet represents a form of distribution they do no control. The vast majority of artists never see a penny from the sale of their music. In fact, one critic reports "the record industry acknowledges that less than 10% of its artists will `recoup' or make back, the advances they're given when they sign a recording contract." (Wilcom 2003).

The music industry has corrupted the system of music distribution in several ways, some of which are:

a. It paid off radio disk jockeys to play its music, a practice known as payola, now a general term for bribery. The practice of paying for the performance of music began as early as the 1880s, but only after World War II did the payments go to radio djs with the "scandal" of exposure occurring in the late 1950s. Payola continues to be practiced today although on an informal, under-the-table basis (Segrave 1994).

b. It successfully destroyed the Digital Audio Tape format for home consumption in the 1990s. The RIAA pressured Congress to pass the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 which mandated the inclusion of copy controls that prevented making more than one copy of a tape. DAT also recorded at frequencies incompatible with those of standard compact discs, 48 kHz instead of 44 kHz. A superior consumer technology was thus destroyed by the music industry, indicating once again the incompatibility of technical advances with corporate controls.

c. It forced retail stores to maintain high prices for CDs, a practice that in May 2000 was ruled illegal by the Federal Trade Commission and subsequently by the courts (in an out of court settlement in 2002). In this case the music industry's monopolistic practice was aborted by the political system.

The concentration of the music industry to five major labels (Bertelsmann , EMI, Sony, Time Warner and Universal) has facilitated its control over artists, distributors, and consumers. In parallel with trends in other

media industries, the music industry has consolidated into an oligopoly structure that restrains innovation and stifles diversity in culture.[9] These companies have accounted for over 80% of the world-wide sales of recorded music (Negus 1999).

The music industry has not given royalties to artists from the sale of work distributed through the Internet. At the height of the controversy over the Napster file-sharing program, Hilary Rosen, speaking for the RIAA, proclaimed the moral superiority of the music industry over online "pirates" in protecting artists' rights while at the same time denying artists payment for the copies of music enabled by networked computing.

The music industry's response to file-sharing has been "lawsuits, draconian legislative initiatives that trample on people's fair-use rights, and threats of invasive actions against the very people who buy their products." (Wilcox 2003) In 2003 a computer company (Apple) began experimenting with distribution of music over the Internet. While costs of reproduction approach zero, Apple charges an exorbitant $1 for each song downloaded. It remains to be seen if the music industry can develop a viable business model in the age of digital reproduction and peer-to-peer distribution.

Most methods developed or imagined by the music industry to regain control of what they think of as "their product" involve crippling the technologies of networked computing. Introducing watermarks in files, threatening ISPs with lawsuits, defeating digital reproduction, including terminal dates or number of uses into music files, preventing audio CDs from playing on computers, sending out review copies in locked CD players, and so on. Here capitalism is directly in opposition to promoting progress in technology, a situation that is the complete reverse of its history during the Industrial Revolution and its legitmation by economic theorists like Adam Smith as the economic system most conducive to the progress of humanity and its material well-being. The conclusion is clear that the music industry has corrupted the democratic process of legislatures, the artistic process of music making, the distribution system of radio, CD and DAT sales, and the new technology of peer-to-peer file-sharing on computer networks. If anyone has a high moral ground in the area of cultural objects it is not the music industry. When they speak of piracy, we must add that property in the case of the music industry, to quote Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, is theft.

The Politics of Digital Music

I prefer to analyze the contemporary situation not as an ethical problem, but as a political one: who shall benefit from the technical advances afforded by digitalization? What limitations have to be imposed on the rest of society in order for the culture industry to maintain its predigital controls over cultural objects? Is this sacrifice worth it? Can capitalism continue to be legitimized in the area of cultural objects, if the technological advance of networked computing are held back in order to preserve the music industry in its current form?

In addition to corrupting our political process, the artist, the distribution media, retarding technical advances and delegitimizing capitalism, the music industry, to maintain its present degree of control over culture, would require new levels of surveillance over individuals that would seriously impinge on privacy (compelling ISPs to monitor their customer's downloads), reduce the scope of civil rights, and generally debase the basic freedoms of citizens. How is this so?

The beginnings of this process date back at least to the Bangermann white paper on copyright prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization meeting in the mid-1990s. At the time the music industry was clueless about the implications of networked computing for their industry. The Clinton administration however was one degree less clueless. The Bangermann report attempted to impose U.S. copyright standards on the world and to extend those standards to include digital technology. It seriously proposed that every copy of every cultural object fall under copyright law, meaning that if you copy an email from RAM to your hard disk that qualifies as a copy; if you copy from your hard disk to a floppy disk, this act also constitutes the act of copying. If you send a copy of a file to someone else, that also falls under the law. Each of these is a violation of copyright when the content has been copyrighted.

Why did the Clinton administration propose such an impossible expansion of intellectual property? For one reason, they made the proposal because cultural objects are second only to defense in export value of the U.S. A second reason is that the politicians were not aware that networked computing integrates copying within its functions and structures. Copying is automatic and continuous on the Internet. File Transfer Protocol, for example, is a basic function of digital networks. Copying is essential to the institutions of higher learning which developed

networked computer. It represents a basic condition for intellectual freedom, scientific advance, and critical thinking. The Clinton administration easily trampled these hallmarks of a free society simply for the economic gain of some wealthy groups. The music industry, when it finally woke up and recognized the powers of peer-to-peer programs, was even more eager to destroy these features of our institutions.

Institutions of higher learning, have been, I am sorry to say, intimidated by the music industry's threats of legal action. They have far too often put serious restrictions on the free flow of digital information. Some universities have resisted. The best example is MIT which until 2003 imposed no restrictions. The worst example is Columbia University, which, according to Wired, "Monitors Internet use and kicks students off the network if they download more than 1 M[ega]bit per second for 10 minutes or longer." (11:06 June 2003, p. 36). In the Fall of 2003, many universities were adopting pay-for-use music services and charging students for this (Harmon 2003). A joint committee has been formed (Joint Committee of Higher Education and the Entertainment Industries) to develop a compromise on downloading of music files through university servers, although the RIAA continues to seek legal remedies that would violate such agreements, such as lobbying for a bill in Congress, HR 2517, the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act. Universities are committee to the free and open exchange of information, while the RIAA is determined to survive regardless of the cost to the rest of society.

Conclusion: Alternatives to File Sharing?

By 2004 commercial alternatives to file sharing had emerged. The music industry's efforts in this regard however were weak and relatively unsuccessful. The Apple Corporation's iTunes provided the first viable downloading website for music, charging at first one dollar per song, then, as competition arose, less than 80 cents. But a Russian site, allofmp3.com, charged a mere 3.5 cents per song or .01 cent per megabyte[10]. Sites also appeared that allowed musicians to bypass the music industry completely, selling albums directly to consumers.[11] These are just example of commercial applications of music downloading that have successfully adapted the network to ideas developed in peer-to-peer networks. It remains to see to what extent they displace file sharing or become the new means of acquiring music.

We are clearly at a crossroads with regard to culture under the legal regime of intellectual property law. It behooves the university, users/consumers and others to resist the efforts of the culture industry in restricting the development of the digital domain. I argue we must not frame this resistance in terms of copyright law but in term of media of culture. We must invent an entirely new copyright law that rewards cultural creation but also fosters new forms of use/consumption and does not inhibit the development of new forms of digital cultural exchange that explore the new fluidity of texts, images and sounds. The issue of the control of culture must be framed in relation to the kinds of subjects and identities it promotes. Digital cultural objects enable the constitution of subjects in broader and more heterogeneous forms than modern culture with its fixed objects and delimited identities. At stake in the evolution of file sharing and other features of networked computing is a new culture of mobile and fluid selves, ones less beholden to the constraints of modern and even postmodern subject positions. Such a culture of the self is well adapted to encounter in a propitious manner the two great historical tendencies of the twenty first century: the emergence of intensified global exchanges of a transnational kind and the appearance of a new integration of humans and machines. These developments are not to be understood as utopian dreams but as the actuality we face. The salient question is "What will be our cultural resources in the confrontation of this fateful event?"

Endnotes

1. For a similar argument see Gillespie, T. 2004. "Copyright and Commerce: The DMCA, Trusted Systems, and the Stabilization of Distribution." The Information Society 20:239-254.

2. The class work on the history of the music industry since its inception is Sanjek, R. 1988. American Popular Music and Its Business: The First Four Hundred Years. New York: Oxford University Press.

3. Two studies stand out on the question of control: Beniger, J. 1986. The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press and Kelly, K. 1994. Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems and the Economic World. Cambridge: Perseus Books. /rhe former taking the position that digital technology furthers control by large corporations; the latter that this same technology undermines it.

4. Personal email from Wendy Seltzer (lawyer for the Electronic Frontier Foundation) December 1, 2003.

5. OpEd, Los Angeles Times, January 3, 2004, p. B14.

6. A full analysis of the legal aspects of the DMCA is expounded well in Lessig, Lawrence.2001. The Future of Ideas and Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. See also Lessig, Lawrence. 2001. The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. New York: Vintage.

7. See Thornton, S. 1996. Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital. Hanover: Wesleyan University Press for a discussion of the resistance of the Musicans' Union in England to the use of recordings in dance halls.

8. A study by economists in 2004 disputes the claim of the RIAA that sales have been adversely affected by file-sharing. Felix Oberholzer-Gee of the Harvard Business School and Koleman S. Strumpf of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill maintain that file-sharing has no measurable effect on sales of CDs. They suppose that downloaders would not buy the CD they are obtaining from peer-to-peer networks. Schwartz, J. 2004. "A Heretical View of File Sharing." New York Times.

9. For a history of this consolidation up through the mid-1970s and its influence on popular music see Chapple, S. and R. Garofalo. 1977. Rock `N' Roll is Here to Pay. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

10. I am grateful to Jamie Poster for alerting me to this site.

11. See for example http://www.cdbaby.com/ where artists sell CDs on the Web they make themselves. Garrett Wolfe informed me of this site.

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Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of Neoliberalism

Henry Giroux

As the Right wages a frontal assault against all remnants of the democratic state and its welfare provisions, the progressive Left is in disarray. Theoretical and political impoverishment feed off each other as hope of a revolutionary project capable of challenging the existing forces of domination appears remote. Militarism increasingly engulfs the entire social order as matters of "war and national security" become "consuming anxieties" that provide the "memories, models, and metaphors that shape broad areas of national life" as well as drive American foreign policy (Sherry 1995:xi). As U.S. military action expands its reach into Iraq, Afghanistan, and possibly Iran and Syria, under the guise of an unlimited war against terrorism, public spaces on the domestic front are increasingly being organized around values supporting a bellicose, patriarchal, and jingoistic culture that is undermining "centuries of democratic gains" (Buck-Morss 2003:33). As politics is separated from economic power, the state surrenders its obligation to contain the power of corporations and financial capital, reducing its role to matters of surveillance, disciplinary control, and order. Market fundamentalism and the militarization of public life mutually reinforce each other to displace the promise, if not the very idea, of the Great Society—with its emphasis on the common good, basic social provisions for all, social justice, and economic mobility. Fuelled by dreams of empire as well as the desire to mask the shape political power is taking in a period of economic and social decline, militarism and neoliberalism cloak themselves in the discourse of democracy in order to hide the barbarism being reproduced in the torture prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the spread of wage slavery in the interest of capital accumulation, and in the carceral surveillance and disciplinary measures being imposed on the nation's public schools. Democratic political projects appear remote and give rise to either cynicism, solipsism, or reductionistic ideologies on the part of many progressives within and outside of the academy. The crucial task of theorizing a politics suitable for the twenty-first century has fallen on hard times. Economistic theories return to dominate much of the Left, reducing politics to a reflection of economic forces, interests, and measures. Within the university, critically engaged intellectuals appear in short supply as most academics, especially in the humanities and social sciences, bid a hasty retreat to arcane discourses, retrograde notions of professionalism, or irrelevant academic specialities (Agger 1989; Said 2004). Rather than reinventing and rethinking the challenge of an oppositional politics within a global public sphere, the academic Left appears to be withdrawing from the demands of civic engagement by retreating into what Susan Buck-Morss (2003) calls "theory-world," a space where the "academic freedom of critical theorists coincides with our lack of influence in public and political debate"(p. 68). Hope, once embodied in the politics of persuasion, the drive for instituting critical education in a diverse number of public spheres, collective efforts to organize struggles within major institutions, and the attempt to build international social movements seems, at best, a nostalgic remnant of the 1960s. The naturalness and commonsense appeal of the neoliberal economic order produces a crisis of political and historical imagination, on the one hand, and an educational crisis on the other. It is in opposition to the current turn away from matters of history, culture, and politics that I begin with a quote from Susan George, a powerful critic of neoliberalism and a leading voice in the anti-globalization movement. She writes:

> In 1945 or 1950, if you had seriously proposed any of the ideas and policies in today's standard neoliberal toolkit, you would have been laughed off the stage or sent to the insane asylum. At least in the Western countries, at that time, everyone was a Keynesian, a social democrat, or a social Christian democrat or some shade of Marxist. The idea that the market should be allowed to make major social and political decisions, the idea that the state should voluntarily reduce its role in the economy, or that corporations should be given total freedom, that trade unions should be curbed and citizens given much less rather than more social protection-such ideas were utterly foreign to the spirit of the time. Even if someone actually agreed with these ideas, he or she would have hesitated to take such a position in public and would have had a hard time finding an audience (George 1999, para 2).

Times have changed and altered historical conditions posit new problems, define different projects, and often demand fresh discourses. The complex theoretical discourses fashioned in the academy in the 1980s and 1990s seem hopelessly disconnected, if not irrelevant, in the current moment. And the space of democratic political and social thought now appears exhausted by a panoply of military, religious, and market fundamentalisms that refuse to question their own assumptions and instead appeal to the naturalness and inevitability of their ascendancy and the historical struggles that produced it. George's comments are instructive because in resurrecting historical memory, they not only point to a current period in American history in which the seemingly impossible has become possible (Giroux 2004), but also gesture towards those forces that must be named in order to become the object of resistance and refusal. The impossible in this case is the specter of authoritarianism replacing a weakened and damaged liberal democracy. With the election of George W. Bush to the presidency in 2000, the United States finds itself in the midst of a revolution in which the most basic, underlying principles of democracy have begun to unravel. The nature of this right-wing revolution resides in the lived relations of the contemporary social order and the ways in which such relations exacerbate the material conditions of inequality, undercut a sense of individual and social agency, hijack democratic values—such as egalitarianism and dissent—and promote a deep sense of hopelessness and cynicism. Resuscitating a deeply anti-modernist past as a way to command the future, the Bush administration has evoked the cult of traditionalism, religious fundamentalism, and the absolute reign of the market as central features of an emerging authoritarianism designed to "roll back the twentieth century quite literally"(Greider 2003:11). The alliance of militant neoconservatives, extremist evangelical Christians, and free market fundamentalists imagines a social order modeled on the presidency of William McKinley and the values of the robber barons. The McKinley presidency, which spanned from 1897 to 1901, "had a consummate passion to serve corporate and imperial power" (Moyers 2004). This was an age when blacks, women, immigrants, and minorities of class "knew their place"; big government served the exclusive interests of the corporate monopolists; commanding institutions were under the sway of narrow political interests; welfare was a private enterprise, and labor unions were kept in check by the repressive forces of the state—all while an imperialist war raged in the Philippines. With the geographic shift to Iraq, all of these conditions are being reproduced under the leadership of an extremist element of the Republican Party that holds sway over all branches of government.

One of the central elements of the new authoritarianism is a structural relationship between the state and the economy that produces rigid hierarchies, concentrates power in relatively few hands, unleashes the most brutal elements of a rabid individualism, destroys the welfare state, incarcerates large numbers of its now disposable populations, economically disenfranchises large segments of the lower and middle classes, and reduces entire countries to pauperization (Harvey 2005; Giroux 2003). Neoliberalism not only dissolves the bonds of sociality and reciprocity; it also undermines the nature of social obligations by defining civil society exclusively through an appeal to market-driven values. At the same time neoliberalism feeds a growing authoritarianism steeped in militarism, Christian fundamentalism, and jingoistic patriotism, encouraging intolerance and hate as it punishes critical engagement and questioning, especially if they are at odds with the reactionary religious and political agenda being pushed by the Bush administration.

Increasingly, education appears useful only to those who hold political and economic power, and issues regarding how the academy might contribute to the quality of democratic public life on a national and global level are either ignored or dismissed. On the Right, neoliberal cheerleaders are pushing hard to turn the university into another outpost of corporate learning and training. On the Left, education as a site of dialectical struggle, persuasion, and critical engagement is all too often reduced to ritual debunking and demystification, revealing the political logic of a debased capitalist system. But revelation guarantees nothing and in this case substitutes a limited form of reportage for the hard pedagogical work connecting empowering forms of knowledge to the realities and social forms that bear down on students' everyday lives (Freire 1998). The collective struggle to widen the reach and quality of education as a basis for creating critical citizens—so alive in the sixties— is rendered defunct within the corporate drive for

efficiency, downsizing, profits, and an utterly instrumentalist notion of excellence. Cornel West (2004) has argued persuasively that just as we need to analyze those dark forces shutting down democracy "we also need to be very clear about the vision that lures us toward hope and the sources of that vision"(p. 18). I want to act on West's utopian call by recapturing the vital role that an expanded notion of critical education might play for educators, students, cultural studies' advocates, and other progressives by providing a language of critique and possibility which addresses the growing threat of free market fundamentalism to an inclusive democracy and the promise of a cultural politics in which pedagogy occupies a formative role in shaping both critical agency and the radical imagination.

But before I make that case, I want to address in more detail neoliberalism as one of the most powerful anti-democratic ideologies now threatening both the idea and formation of a critically informed citizenry, a viable notion of social agency, and the idea of the university as a democratic public sphere. In doing so, I hope to establish a context for analyzing the importance of cultural studies as a theoretical, pedagogical, and political intervention that makes clear both the responsibility of academics to understand and engage neoliberalism within the rising tide of authoritarianism in the United States and elsewhere and what it might mean to offer students and others the hope and tools necessary to revitalize the culture of politics as an ethical response to the demise of democratic public life. At the very least, such a challenge demands that educators and other cultural workers struggle to preserve and revitalize those institutional spaces, forums, and public spheres that support and defend critical education, help students come to terms with their own power as individual and social agents, and reclaim those non-market values such as caring, community, trust, conviction, and courage that are vital to a substantive democracy.

The Politics of Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism not only exerts unparalleled influence on the global economy, but also redefines the very nature of politics and society. Free-market fundamentalism rather than democratic idealism is now the driving force of economics and politics in most of the world. It is a market ideology driven not just by profits but by an ability to reproduce itself with such success that, to paraphrase Fredric Jameson (1994:xii), it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism, even as it creates vast inequalities and promotes human suffering throughout the globe. Wedded to the belief that the market should be the organizing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism increasingly drives the meaning of citizenship and social life while waging an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, the welfare state, and noncommodified values.

Neoliberal economics has dominated American society since the 1970s and has been embraced by both New Democrats and conservatives. Both political parties in the U.S. embrace the defining principles of neoliberalism, especially the notions that the market is self-regulating and should be free of interference by the government, that choice is defined as an economic prerogative, and that "economic transactions can subordinate and [in] many cases replace political democracy"(Newfield 2002:314). While there is some political opposition among the established parties to the brutalizing policies of neoliberalism, both political parties generally buy into a corporate driven legislative agenda, which includes:

> deregulation of business at all levels of enterprises and trade; tax reduction for wealthy individuals and corporations; the revival of the near-dormant nuclear energy industry; limitations and abrogation of labor's right to organize and bargain collectively; a land policy favoring commercial and industrial development at the expense of conservation and other pro-environment policies; elimination of income support to chronically unemployed; reduced federal aid to education and health; privatization of the main federal pension program, social security; limitations on the right of aggrieved individuals to sue employees and corporations who provide services (Aronowitz 2003:102).

Under neoliberalism everything either is for sale or is plundered for profit. One might also add to Aronowitz's list the attack on institutions dedicated to critically informing the public; the handing over by politicians of the public's airwaves over to a handful of powerful broadcasters and large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; the attitude toward entire populations, especially those of color who are poor are now considered disposable; the increasing resemblance of schools to either jails or high-end shopping malls, depending on their clientele; the pressure on teachers to get revenue for their school by hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties. Additionally, university enrollment and attendance in an era of drastic cutbacks and spiraling tuition becomes once again the near exclusive preserve of the upper middle classes (Giroux and Giroux 2004).

Corporations more and more not only design the economic sphere but also shape legislation and policy affecting all levels of government, and with limited opposition. As corporate power lays siege to the political process, the benefits flow upward to the rich and the powerful. In Bush's ownership society, government policy now works to benefit the biggest corporations. For example, Bush's 2006 budget contains drastic cuts for many of the major regulatory agencies not only compromising everything from emission standards to drug safety programs, but also presenting the "possibilities—indeed, probability—that these public agencies will become captives of private corporations they are supposed to regulate" (Drutman and Cray 2005:17). It gets worse. Included in such benefits are reform policies that shift the burden of taxes from the rich to the middle class, the working poor, and state governments as can be seen in the shift from taxes on wealth (capital gains, dividends, and estate taxes) to a tax on work, principally in the form of a regressive payroll tax (Collins, Hartman, Kraut, and Mota 2004). During the 2002-2004 fiscal years, tax cuts delivered $197.3 billion in tax breaks to the wealthiest 1% of Americans (i.e., households making more than $337,000 a year) while state governments increased taxes to fill a $200 billion budget deficit (Gonsalves 2004). Equally alarming, a recent Congressional study revealed that 63% of all corporations in 2000 paid no taxes while "[s]ix in ten corporations reported no tax liability for the five years from 1996 through 2000, even though corporate profits were growing at record-breaking levels during that period" (Woodard 2004:para.11).

As neoliberal policies dominate politics and social life, the breathless rhetoric of the global victory of free-market rationality is invoked to cut public expenditures and undermine those non-commodified public spheres that serve as the repository for critical education, public dialogue, and collective intervention. Public services such as health care, child care, public assistance, education, and transportation are now subject to the rules of the market. Social relations between parents and children, doctors and patients, teachers and students are reduced to that of supplier and customer just as the laws of market replace those noncommodified values capable of defending vital public goods and spheres. Forsaking the public good for the private good and hawking the needs of the corporate and private sector as the only source of sound investment, neoliberal ideology produces, legitimates, and exacerbates the existence of persistent poverty, inadequate health care, racial apartheid in the inner cities, and growing inequalities between the rich and the poor (Street 2004; Krugman 2003; Phillips 2003). Under neoliberalism, the state now makes a grim alignment with corporate capital and transnational corporations, legitimating the dangerous presuppositions that corporations should be planning our future and that progress should be defined almost exclusively in economic and technological terms rather than in social and ethical terms. Corporations, in turn, are not designed to be responsible citizens. On the contrary, their sole purpose is to make money and by default accumulate power. Unfortunately, when left unregulated, "they begin to overwhelm the political institutions that can keep them in check, eroding key limitations on their destructive capacities. Internationally, of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations and 49 are nations"(Drutman and Cray 2005:17).

In its capacity to dehistoricize and naturalize such sweeping social change, as well as in its aggressive attempts to destroy all of the public spheres necessary for the defense of a genuine democracy, neoliberalism reproduces the conditions for unleashing the most brutalizing forces of capitalism (Derber 2002). Social Darwinism with its ruthless indifference to human suffering has risen like a phoenix from the ashes of nineteenth-century pseudoscience and can now be seen in full display on most reality TV programs and in the unfettered self-interest that now drives popular culture and fits so well with the spirit of authoritarianism. There is no public politics in this discourse—only the private domain of market identities, values, and practices (Giroux 2004). As social bonds are replaced by unadulterated materialism and narcissism, public concerns are now understood and experienced as utterly private miseries, except when offered up on Jerry Springer as fodder for entertainment. Where public space—or its mass mediated simulacrum—does exist, it is the backdrop for a highly orchestrated and sensational confessional for private woes, a cutthroat game of winner-take-all replacing more traditional forms of courtship, as in Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire, or an advertisement for crass consumerism, like MTV's Cribs.

Conscripts in a relentless campaign for personal responsibility, Americans are now convinced that they have little to hope for—and gain from—the government, non-profit public spheres, democratic associations, public and higher education, or other non-governmental social forces. With few exceptions, the project of democratizing public goods has fallen into disrepute in the popular imagination as the logic of the market undermines the most basic social solidarities. The consequences include not only a weakened social state, but a growing sense of insecurity, cynicism, and political retreat on the part of the general public. The incessant calls for self-reliance that now dominate public discourse betray an eviscerated and refigured state that neither provides adequate safety nets for its populace, especially those who are young, poor, or racially marginalized, nor gives any indication that it will serve the interests

of its citizens in spite of constitutional guarantees.

In fact, the reconfigured state is increasingly becoming a carceral enterprise more concerned with punishing and policing than with nurturing and investing in the public good. Situated within an expanding culture of fear, market freedoms seem securely grounded in a defense of national security, capital, and property rights. When coupled with a media-driven culture of panic and hyped-up levels of insecurity, surviving public spaces are increasingly monitored and militarized. Recently, events in New York, New Jersey, and Washington D.C. provide an interesting case in point. When the media alerted the nation's citizenry to new terrorist threats specific to these areas, CNN ran a lead story on its beneficial impact on tourism—specifically on the enthusiastic clamor by tourist families to get their pictures taken among U.S. paramilitary units now lining city streets, fully flanked with their imposing tanks and massive machine guns. The accouterments of a police state now vie with high-end shopping and museum visits for the public's attention, with only the occasional murmur of protest. But the investment in surveillance and carceral containment is hardly new. Since the early 1990s, state governments have invested more in prison construction than in education, and prison guards and security personnel in public schools are two of the fastest growing professions.

Neoliberalism as Public Pedagogy

Within neoliberalism's market-driven discourse, corporate power marks the space of a new kind of public pedagogy, one in which the production, dissemination, and circulation of ideas emerge from the educational force of the larger culture. Public pedagogy in this sense refers to a powerful ensemble of ideological and institutional forces whose aim is to produce competitive, self-interested individuals vying for their own material and ideological gain. Under neoliberalism, pedagogy has become thoroughly reactionary as it operates from a variety of education sites producing forms of pedagogical address in which matters of personal agency, social freedom, and the obligations of citizenship conceive of political and social democracy as a burden, an unfortunate constraint on market relations, profit making, and a consumer democracy (Newfield 2002). Corporate-driven public pedagogy and culture largely cancel out or devalue gender, class-specific, and racial injustices of the existing social order by absorbing the democratic impulses and practices of civil society within narrow economic relations. Knowledge has become capital to invest in the economy but has little to do with the power of self-definition or the capacities needed to expand the scope and operations of freedom and justice. Similarly, corporate public pedagogy has become an all-encompassing cultural horizon for producing not only mega-corporate conglomerates but also market identities, values, and atomizing social practices. As politics increasingly becomes privatized, some neoliberal advocates argue that the answer to solving the health care and education crises faced by many states is to sell off public assets to private interests, just as they insist the problem of social security can be solved through private investment accounts. The Pentagon even considered, if only for a short time, turning the war on terror and security concerns over to futures markets, subject to on-line trading. Neoliberalism utterly privatizes politics and offers absurd solutions to collective problems such as in suggesting that water pollution can be solved by buying bottled water. Thus, non-commodified public spheres are replaced by commercial spheres as the substance of critical democracy is emptied out and replaced by both a democracy of goods available to those with purchasing power and the increasing expansion of the cultural and political power of corporations throughout the world.

Under neoliberalism, dominant public pedagogy with its narrow and imposed schemes of classification and limited modes of identification uses the educational force of the culture to negate the basic conditions for critical agency. What becomes clear in the new information age, or what Zygmunt Bauman (2000) calls liquid modernity, is that the power of the dominant order is not just economic, but ideological—rooted in the ability to mobilize consent, define a particular notion of agency, impose narrow visions of the future, and decouple politics from both social notions of agency and democratic visions of freedom and social justice. Within neoliberal public pedagogy, individuality has nothing to do with self-empowerment. Self-development is instead refashioned as the endless pursuit of personal interests. A belief in the power of a brutalizing self-interest replaces any notion of shared responsibility or social justice. Misfortune in this discourse does not arouse the obligations of citizenship but is relegated to the status of an individual weakness. Public goods are now transformed into sites for individual financial gain and social problems dissolve into the discourse of pathology. Poverty is now viewed as a crime. Racism is viewed as a personal prejudice (more often than not victimizing whites), and unemployment is a mark of weak character. Power, inequality, and social justice disappear from the language of the social, just as the individual increasingly lives

in a world in which private interests take precedence over social concerns.

As collective agents recede under neoliberalism, market forces incessantly attempt to privatize or commercialize public space. One consequence is that those noncommodified spaces and vernacular capable of providing individuals with the discourses, values, and subject positions crucial to identifying and struggling over institutions vital to the life of democracy begin to disappear from the political scene. Under such circumstances, matters of agency become even more crucial to viable democratic politics as those spaces capable of producing critical modes of pedagogy increasingly slip into the black hole of commercialized space. As public spaces disappear, it becomes more difficult to develop a democratic discourse for educating collective social agents capable of raising critical questions about the limits of a market-driven society as well as what it might mean to theorize about the future of public institutions central to the development of truly substantive democratic society. In the absence of public spaces that promote shared democratic values, a new authoritarian politics and culture emerge in which the state makes a grim alignment with corporate capital, neoconservative visions of empire, and Christian fundamentalism. Political power is now accumulated behind an alliance of economic, political, and religious fundamentalists who recognize that "military-like discipline abroad requires military-like discipline at home" (Harvey 2003:193). Repressive legislation is used to sacrifice civil liberties in the cause of national security; the government promotes a culture of fear to implement neoliberal policies at home and neoconservative visions of empire abroad; dissent is labeled as unpatriotic, and the media and political parties increasingly become adjuncts of official power (Giroux 2003; Barber 2003; Robin 2004).

As neoliberal economics is accorded more respect than democratic politics, the citizen has been abandoned and the consumer becomes the only viable model of agency. As public spending decreases, education is divorced from democratic politics and the political state increasingly becomes the corporate state (Hertz 2003). All the more reason to take seriously Hannah Arendt's (1965) claim that "without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance" (p.149). And it is precisely within such a realm that subjects are socialized into forms of individual and social agency in which they learn how to govern rather than be governed, to assume the responsibilities of engaged citizens rather than be reduced to consumers or investors. Arendt (1965) understood quite clearly that democracy can only emerge, if not flourish, within political organizations in which education was viewed both as a site of politics and as the foundation that provided the pedagogical conditions in which individuals could learn the knowledge, skills, and values necessary for those forms of citizenship, leadership, and social engagement that deepened and extended the realities of an inclusive democracy. Politics often begins when it becomes possible to make power visible, to challenge the ideological circuitry of hegemonic knowledge, and to recognize that "political subversion presupposes cognitive subversion, a conversion of the vision of the world"(Bourdieu 2001:128). But another element of politics focuses on where politics happens, how proliferating sites of pedagogy bring into being new forms of resistance, raise new questions, and necessitate alternative visions regarding autonomy and the possibility of democracy itself. Neoliberal ideology and pedagogy have been reproduced and reinforced within the advanced countries of the West through the development of new sites of pedagogy and new technologies that penetrate spaces that historically have been beyond the reach of the logic of commercialism and commodification. Hence, it is all the more necessary for educators and other cultural workers to take seriously both the proliferating sites of these new forms of ideological address and the work they do within the social order to create agents and subject positions that become complicitous with the brutalizing logic of the market.

At this point in American history, neoliberal capitalism is not simply too overpowering; on the contrary, "democracy is too weak" (Barber 2002:A23). Profound transformations have taken place in the public space, producing new sites of pedagogy marked by a distinctive confluence of new digital and media technologies, growing concentrations of corporate power, and unparalleled meaning producing capacities. Unlike traditional forms of pedagogy, knowledge and desire are inextricably connected to modes of pedagogical address mediated through unprecedented electronic technologies that include high speed computers, new types of digitized film, and CD-ROMs. Such sites operate within a wide variety of social institutions and formats including sports and entertainment media, cable television networks, churches, and channels of elite and popular culture, such as advertising. The result is a public pedagogy that plays a decisive role in producing a diverse cultural sphere that gives new meaning to education as a political force.

While John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and various other leading educational theorists in the last century understood the important connection between education and democracy, they had no way in their time of recognizing that the larger culture would extend beyond, if not supercede, institutionalized education, particularly schools, as the most important educational force over developed societies. In fact, education and pedagogy have long been synonymous

with schooling in the public mind. Challenging such a recognition does not invalidate the importance of formal education to democracy, but it does require a critical understanding of how the work of education takes place in such institutions as well as in a range of other knowledge and meaning producing spheres such as advertising, television, film, the Internet, video game culture, and the popular press. Rather than invalidate the importance of schooling, it extends the sites of pedagogy and in doing so broadens and deepens the meaning and importance of public pedagogy. What is being suggested here is that educators, cultural studies theorists, and others take seriously the role that culture plays, as Raymond Williams (1967:15) puts it, as a form of "permanent education."

The concept of public pedagogy as a form of permanent education underscores the central importance of formal spheres of learning that unlike their popular counterparts—driven largely by commercial interests that more often miseducate the public—must provide citizens with those critical capacities, modes of literacies, knowledge, and skills that enable them to both read the world critically and participate in shaping and governing it. Put differently, formal spheres of learning provide one of the few sites where students can be educated to understand, critically engage, and transform those institutions that are largely shaping their beliefs and sense of agency. I am not claiming that public or higher education are free from corporate influence and dominant ideologies, but that such sites of education, at best, have historically provided the spaces and conditions for prioritizing civic values over commercial interests, for recognizing that consumerism is not the only kind of citizenship, and for vouchsafing the purpose and meaning of critical education in a democratic society that bears its responsibility to present and future generations of young people. In spite of its present embattled status and contradictory roles, higher education, in particular, remains uniquely placed—though also under attack by the forces of corporatization—to prepare students to both understand and influence the larger educational forces that shape their lives. Needless to say, those of us who work in such institutions by virtue of our privileged positions within a rather obvious division of labor have an obligation to draw upon those traditions and resources capable of providing a critical education to all students in order to prepare them for a world in which information and power have taken on new and significant dimensions. In fact, the critique of information cannot be separated from the critique of power itself, providing a substantial new challenge for how we are to theorize politics for the twenty-first century. One way to take up this challenge is to address the theoretical contributions that a number of radical educators and cultural studies theorists have made in engaging not only the primacy of culture as a political force, but also how the relationship between culture and power constitutes a new site of politics, pedagogy, and resistance.

Cultural Studies and the Question of Pedagogy

Of course, my position on the civic obligations of the academy is not without its critics. It is not a position that supports traditional views of humanistic education, its canons, or its implicit demand for reverence rather than engagement. Consider, by way of the counter example, Jeffrey Hart (1996), Dartmouth professor and a Senior Editor with the National Review (the right-wing magazine founded by William F. Buckley, a founder of American conservatism and a former employee of the CIA). Echoing the central concerns of the culture wars that conservatives have been waging in full force since the 1980s, his claim is twofold: higher education has been taken over by radicals who are a product of the 1960s, and conservative students are being mistreated because they are overwhelmingly subjected to political indoctrination or harassment. Sounding the alarm on the disciplinary and theoretical advances of the last several decades—like cultural studies and women's studies—Hart responds to the question "How to get a decent college education?" as follows:

> Select the ordinary courses. I use ordinary here in a paradoxical and challenging way. An ordinary course is one that has always been taken and obviously should be taken—even if the student is not yet equipped with a sophisticated rationale for so doing. The student should be discouraged from putting his money on the cutting edge of interdisciplinary cross-textuality. If the student should seek out those ordinary courses, then it follows that he should avoid the flashy come-ons. Avoid things like Nicaraguan Lesbian poets. Yes, and anything listed under 'Studies,' any course whose description uses the words 'interdisciplinary,' 'hegemonic,' 'phallocratic,' or 'empowerment,' anything that mentions 'keeping a diary,' any course with a title like 'Adventures in Film.' Also, any male professor who comes to class without a jacket and tie should be regarded with extreme prejudice unless he has won a Nobel Prize (34).

Unlike Hart who believes that cultural studies is the enemy of not only higher education but also what he would

term the "disinterested" mind, I believe that cultural studies for all of its diversity and contradictions is one of the few theoretical traditions within the academy that links learning to social change and education to the imperatives of a critical and global democracy.

My own interest in cultural studies emerges out of its early concern with adult education, exemplified in the work of Richard Hoggart (1957), Raymond Williams (1958), Stuart Hall (1992) and Paul Willis (1981), and more recently in the work of Lawrence Grossberg (1997), bell hooks (1994), Stanley Aronowitz (2000), and Nick Couldry (2001), who focus on education more broadly. This tradition, often ignored today, views cultural studies as an empowering practice that "acts directly upon the conditions of culture to change them" (Couldry 2001:66), engages the politics of cultural studies as part of a broader project related to democracy, and views matters of pedagogy as central to the project of cultural studies itself. Within this perspective, intellectual work and practice within the university are articulated as a matter of democracy. Defining the task of cultural studies, Raymond Williams (1989) argued,

> it has been about taking the best we can in intellectual work and going with it in this very open way to confront people for whom it is not a way of life, for whom it is not in any probability a job, but for whom it is a matter of their own intellectual interest, their own understanding of the pressures on them, pressures of every kind, from the most personal to the most broadly political—if we are prepared to take that kind of work and revise the syllabus and discipline as best we can...then Cultural Studies has a very remarkable future indeed (161-162).

Such a project calls for intellectual work that is theoretically rigorous, radically contextual, interdisciplinary, and self-critical about its motivating questions and assumptions. This project engages culture through a wide variety of social forms and material relations of power, views theory as a resource, and historical memory as a series of ruptures rather than a totalizing narrative. Cultural studies in this perspective is not only deconstructive, but also willing, to quote Stuart Hall (1992:11), "to address the central, urgent, and disturbing questions of a society and a culture in the most rigorous intellectual way we have available." Such a discourse points to the hard work of providing a language of critique and possibility, of imagining different futures, and addressing the pedagogical conditions that make possible the agents, politics, and forms of resistance necessary to reclaim the promise of a truly global, democratic future.

My commitment to cultural studies emerges out of an ongoing project to theorize the diverse ways in which culture functions as a contested sphere over the production, distribution, and regulation of power and how and where it operates both symbolically and institutionally as an educational, political, and economic force. In this perspective, cultural studies recognizes the primacy of the pedagogical as a critical practice through which politics is pluralized, understood as contingent, and open to many formations. But cultural studies is also crucial for resisting those mutually informing material and symbolic registers in which matters of representation and meaning work to secure particular market identities, legitimate dominant relations of power, and privatize spaces of dialogue and dissent, especially as neoliberalism attempts to undermine the very meaning and practice of a substantive democracy.

Against the neoliberal attack on all things social, cultural studies can play an important role in producing narratives, metaphors, images, and desiring maps that exercise a powerful pedagogical force over how people think about themselves, engage with the claims of others, address questions of justice, and take up the obligations of an engaged citizenship. Within a cultural studies discourse, culture is the primary sphere/space/location in which individuals, groups, and institutions learn to translate the diverse and multiple relations that mediate between private life and public concerns (Bauman 1999). Far from being exclusively about matters of representation and texts, culture becomes a site, event, and performance in which identities and modes of agency are configured through the mutually determined forces of thought and action, body and mind, and time and space. Culture offers a site where common concerns, new solidarities, and public dialogue refigure the fundamental elements of democracy. Culture is also the pedagogical and political ground on which a global public sphere can be imagined to confront the now planetary inequities of symbolic and material power, just as it promotes the possibilities of shared dialogue and democratic transformation. Culture as an emancipatory force affirms the social as a fundamentally political space, just as neoliberalism attempts within the current historical moment to deny culture's relevance as a public sphere and its centrality as a political necessity.

Central to any viable notion of cultural studies, then, is the primacy of culture and power, organized through an understanding of how private issues are connected to larger social conditions and collective forces; that is, how the very processes of learning constitute the political mechanisms through which identities are shaped, desires mobilized, and experiences take on form and meaning within those collective conditions and larger forces that constitute the

realm of the social. This suggests the necessity on the part of cultural theorists to be particularly attentive to the connections between pedagogy and political agency. Yet, unfortunately, the much needed emphasis on making the political more pedagogical has not occupied a central place in the work of most cultural studies theorists, as it did in the field's earliest formations. Pedagogy in most cultural studies work either is limited to the realm of schooling, dismissed as a discipline with very little academic cultural capital, or is rendered reactionary through the claim that it simply accommodates the paralyzing grip of governmental institutions that normalize all pedagogical practices.

From a Pedagogy of Understanding to a Pedagogy of Intervention

In opposition to these positions, I want to reclaim a tradition in radical educational theory and cultural studies in which pedagogy as a critical practice is central to any viable notion of agency, inclusive democracy, and a broader global public sphere. Pedagogy as both a language of critique and possibility looms large in these critical traditions, not as a technique or a priori set of methods, but as a political and moral practice. As a political practice, pedagogy is viewed as the outgrowth of struggles and illuminates the relationships among power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-critically, recognizing the role it plays as a deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations. As a moral practice, pedagogy recognizes that what cultural workers, artists, activists, media workers, and others teach cannot be abstracted from what it means to invest in public life, presuppose some notion of the future, or locate oneself in a public discourse. The moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that our responsibility as intellectuals for the public cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimate, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students as well as colleagues.

Refusing to decouple politics from pedagogy means, in part, creating those public spaces for engaging students in robust dialogue, challenging them to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them to recognize their own power as individual and social agents. Pedagogy has a relationship to social change in that it should not only help students frame their sense of understanding, imagination, and knowledge within a wider sense of history, politics, and democracy but should also enable them to recognize that they can do something to alleviate human suffering, as the late Susan Sontag (2003) has suggested. Part of this task necessitates that cultural studies theorists and educators anchor their own work, however diverse, in a radical project that seriously engages the promise of an unrealized democracy against its really existing and greviously incomplete forms. Of crucial importance to such a project is rejecting the assumption that theorists can understand social problems without contesting their appearance in public life. More specifically, any viable cultural politics needs a socially committed notion of injustice if we are to take seriously what it means to fight for the idea of the good society. Zygmunt Bauman (2002) is right in arguing that "if there is no room for the idea of wrong society, there is hardly much chance for the idea of good society to be born, let alone make waves" (p. 170).

Cultural studies' theorists need to be more forceful, if not more committed, to linking their overall politics to modes of critique and collective action that address the presupposition that democratic societies are never too just, which means that a democratic society must constantly nurture the possibilities for self-critique, collective agency, and forms of citizenship in which people play a fundamental role in shaping the material relations of power and ideological forces that affect their everyday lives. Within the ongoing process of democratization lies the promise of a society that is open to exchange, questioning, and self-criticism, a democracy that is never finished, and one that opposes neoliberal and neoconservative attempts to supplant the concept of an open society with a fundamentalist market-driven or authoritarian one.

Cultural studies theorists who work in higher education need to make clear that the issue is not whether higher education has become contaminated by politics, as much as recognizing that education is already a space of politics, power, and authority. At the same time, they can make visible their opposition to those approaches to pedagogy that reduce it to a set of skills to enhance one's visibility in the corporate sector or an ideological litmus test that measures one's patriotism or ratings on the rapture index. There is a disquieting refusal in the contemporary academy to raise broader questions about the social, economic, and political forces shaping the very terrain of higher education—particularly unbridled market forces, fundamentalist groups, and racist and sexist forces that unequally value diverse groups within relations of academic power.

There is also a general misunderstanding of how teacher authority can be used to create the pedagogical

conditions for critical forms of education without necessarily falling into the trap of simply indoctrinating students. For instance, many conservative and liberal educators believe that any notion of critical pedagogy that is self-conscious about its politics and engages students in ways that offer them the possibility for becoming critical—what Lani Guinier (2003:6) calls the need to educate students "to participate in civic life, and to encourage graduates to give back to the community, which through taxes, made their education possible"—leaves students out of the conversation or presupposes too much or simply represents a form of pedagogical tyranny. While such educators believe in practices that open up the possibility of questioning among students, they often refuse to connect the pedagogical conditions that challenge how and what students think at the moment to the next task of prompting them to imagine changing the world around them so as to expand and deepen its democratic possibilities. Teaching students how to argue, draw on their own experiences, or engage in rigorous dialogue says nothing about why they should engage in these actions in the first place. How the culture of argumentation and questioning relates to giving students the tools they need to fight oppressive forms of power, make the world a more meaningful and just place, and develop a sense of social responsibility is missing in contemporary, progressive frameworks of education.

While no pedagogical intervention should fall to the level of propaganda, a pedagogy which attempts to empower critical citizens can't and shouldn't try to avoid politics. Pedagogy must address the relationships between politics and agency, knowledge and power, subject positions and values, and learning and social change while always being open to debate, resistance, and a culture of questioning. Liberal educators committed to simply raising questions have no language for linking learning to forms of public minded scholarship that would enable students to consider the important relationship between democratic public life and education, or that would encourage students pedagogically to enter the sphere of the political, enabling them to think about how they might participate in a democracy by taking what they learn into new locations and battlegrounds—a fourth grade classroom, a church, the media, a politician's office, the courts, a campus—or for that matter taking on collaborative projects that address the myriad of problems citizens face on a local, national, and global level in a diminishing democracy.

In spite of the professional pretense to neutrality, academics in the field of cultural studies need to do more pedagogically than simply teach students how to argue and question. Students need much more from their educational experience. Democratic societies need educated citizens who are steeped in more than the skills of argumentation. And it is precisely this democratic project that affirms the critical function of education and refuses to narrow its goals and aspirations to methodological considerations. As Amy Gutmann (1999) argues, education is always political because it is connected to the acquisition of agency, the ability to struggle with ongoing relations of power, and is a precondition for creating informed and critical citizens who act on the world. This is not a notion of education tied to the alleged neutrality of the academy or the new conservative call for "intellectual diversity" but to a vision of pedagogy that is directive and interventionist on the side of producing a substantive democratic society. This is what makes critical pedagogy different from training. And it is precisely the failure to connect learning to its democratic functions and goals that provides rationales for pedagogical approaches that strip critical and democratic possibilities from what it means to be educated.

Cultural studies theorists and educators would do well to take account of the profound transformations taking place in the public sphere and reclaim pedagogy as a central element of cultural politics. In part, this means once again recognizing, as Pierre Bourdieu (2003) has insisted, that the "power of the dominant order is not just economic, but intellectual—lying in the realm of beliefs"(p. 66), and it is precisely within the domain of ideas that a sense of utopian possibility can be restored to the public realm. Such a task suggests that academics and other cultural workers actively resist the ways in which neoliberalism discourages teachers and students from becoming critical intellectuals by turning them into human data banks. Educators and other cultural workers need to build alliances across differences, academic disciplines, and national boundaries as part of broader efforts to develop social movements in defense of the public good and social justice. No small part of this task requires that such groups make visible the connection between the war at home and abroad. If the growing authoritarianism in the U.S. is to be challenged, it is necessary to oppose not only an imperial foreign policy, but also the shameful tax cuts for the rich, the dismantling of the welfare state, the attack on unions, and those policies that sacrifice civil liberties in the cause of national security.

Opposing the authoritarian politics of neoliberalism, militarism, and neoconservatism means developing enclaves of resistance in order to stop the incarceration of a generation of young black and brown men and women, the privatization of the commons, the attack on public schools, the increasing corporatization of higher education, the growing militarization of public life, and the use of power based on the assumption that empire abroad entails tyranny and repression at home. But resistance needs to be more than local or rooted in the specificity

of particular struggles. Progressives need to develop national and international movements designed to fight the new authoritarianism emerging in the United States and elsewhere. In part, this means revitalizing social movements such as civil rights, labor, environmental, and anti-globalization on the basis of shared values and a moral vision rather than simply issue-based coalitions. This suggests organizing workers, intellectuals, students, youth, and others through a language of critique and possibility in which diverse forms of oppression are addressed through a larger discourse of radical democracy, a discourse that addresses not only what it means to think in terms of a general notion of freedom capable of challenging corporate rule, religious fundamentalism, and the new ideologies of empire, but also what it might mean to link freedom to a shared sense of hope, happiness, community, equality, and social justice. Democracy implies a level of shared beliefs, practices, and a commitment to build a more humane future. Politics in this sense points to a struggle over those social, economic, cultural, and institutional forces that make democracy purposeful for all people. But this fundamentally requires something prior—a reclaiming of the social and cultural basis of a critical education that makes the very struggle over democratic politics meaningful and understandable as part of a broader affective, intellectual, and theoretical investment in public life (Couldry 2004).

As the Bush administration spreads its legacy of war, destruction, commodification, privatization, torture, poverty, and violence across the globe, we need a new language for politics, justice, and freedom in the global public sphere. We need a new vocabulary for talking about what educational institutions should accomplish in a democracy and why they fail; we need a new understanding of public pedagogy for analyzing what kind of notions of agency and structural conditions can bring a meaningful democracy into being. Most important, we need to make pedagogy and hope central to any viable form of politics engaged in the process of creating alternative public spheres and forms of collective resistance. The question of agency cannot be separated from a concern about where democratic struggles can take place and what it might mean to create the affective conditions for students and others to want to engage in such struggles in the first place. Hope, as a precondition for agency, and resistance are crucial elements of democratic politics because not only do they rest on a promise of a better world but they view the future as something more than a repeat of the present. Hope is central to political change and must find a way out of the manufactured cynicism that accompanies current forms of neoliberalism and religious fundamentalism. We need to recognize, as Zygmunt Bauman points out, that the real pessimism is quietism—falsely believing in not doing anything because nothing can be changed (Bunting 2003). Most significantly, we need a new understanding of how culture works as a form of public pedagogy, how pedagogy works as a moral and political practice, how agency is organized through pedagogical relations, how individuals can be educated to make authority responsive, how politics can make the workings of power visible and accountable, and how hope can be reclaimed in dark times through new forms of pedagogical praxis, global protests, and collective resistance.

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Salvaging Democracy after the Election of 2004

Douglas Kellner

> Morality, thou deadly bane, thy tens o' thousands thou has slain.
>
> —Robert Burns

> I feel—I feel it is necessary to move an agenda that I told the American people I would move. Something refreshing about coming off an election, even more refreshing since we all got some sleep last night, but there's—you go out and you make your case, and you tell the people this is what I intend to do. . . . Let me put it to you this way: I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. It is my style.
>
> —George W. Bush November 4, 2004

Shortly after Kerry's concession on November 3, Bush and Cheney assembled their faithful for a victory celebration. Cheney predictably crowed about a "mandate," making it clear the Republicans would continue and intensify the extreme right-wing politics of the past four years. Bush smirked about a "historic victory" and then made conciliatory comments about unity and reaching "out to the whole nation," but it was clear that this was empty rhetoric. Bush had voiced similar sentiments after the election theft of 2000 and quickly went on to push a hard-right agenda and end up as the most divisive U.S. president in recent memory (Kellner 2001,chap.9).

The disunion of the country has become increasingly intense because the Bush administration governs in part through a politics of division and never before has there been such polarizing media, ranging from Fox Television and right-wing talk radio stations on the right to Pacifica Radio, Air America, and a resurgence of progressive documentary films on the left, as the Internet blazes with many different constituencies. Bush governs by dividing and conquering, bringing over conservative members of the other party to go along with his right-wing politics, so there is little possibility of healing and the likelihood of ever greater and deeper wounds in the body politic as the inevitable conflicts of the second Bush administration, some of which I signal below, unfold. On March 10, 2004, when speaking to AFL-CIO union workers in Chicago, John Kerry said in what he thought was an off-mike comment: "Let me tell you—we're just beginning to fight here. These guys are the most crooked, lying group of people I've ever seen." Although Kerry was savaged by the Republican attack apparatus for this comment, in retrospect, he was quite correct. It is well documented that the Bush-Cheney administration has governed with lies and deception (Conason 2003; Corn 2003; Dean 2004; Waldman 2004). As I argue in Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy, Big, Bold, and Brazen lies characterized the distinctive discourse and strategy of the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign (Kellner 2005, chaps. 5-6).

In a New York Times op-ed piece, "The Dishonesty Thing," Paul Krugman wrote that the key election issue was a "pattern of lies… on policy issues, from global warming to the war in Iraq." Krugman recounts how years ago when he began questioning Bush administration figures on tax cuts, the deficit, and other economic issues, he and other critics were denounced as "shrill." Citing a variety of establishment economic figures and reports, Krugman says that these documents reveal that he and other Bush critics were right and that the Bush administration was lying about their economic policies, using "fuzzy math" and fake figures to clothe the dubious results of their policies.

Worrying that Bush's economic policies might create a disaster and that so far the Bush administration has not begun to indicate solutions for economic problems they've created, such as the skyrocketing deficit, Krugman concluded: "Some not usually shrill people think that Mr. Bush will simply refuse to face reality until it comes crashing in: Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman, says there's a 75 percent chance of a financial crisis in the next five years. Nobody knows what Mr. Bush would really do about taxes and spending in a second term. What we do know is that on this, as on many matters, he won't tell the truth."[1]

For Bob Herbert of the New York Times, Bush's Big Lie was the war on Iraq, a disastrous policy that had now killed more than 1,000 young Americans and placed the United States in a Vietnamesque quagmire. Seething with anger, Herbert cited the previous day's Times, which published photos of the first 1,000 who died: "They were sent off by a president who ran and hid when he was a young man and his country was at war. They fought bravely and died honorably. But as in Vietnam, no amount of valor or heroism can conceal the fact that they were sent off under false pretenses to fight a war that is unwinnable. How many thousands more will have to die before we acknowledge that President Bush's obsession with Iraq and Saddam Hussein has been a catastrophe for the United States?"[2] In retrospect, the smears on Kerry by the Republican attack apparatus and Bush-Cheney's systematic lying throughout the campaign and the four years of their administration represent a low point in U.S. politics. In these comments, drawn from the conclusion of Kellner 2005, I first discuss the results of the 2004 election and how it shows that the US is a deeply divided country. And while Republican forces control much of the country, I will indicate how progressives won many victories and that majorities of people will support progressive issues. Yet, the electoral system in the United States is in deep crisis, and I indicate the parameters of the crisis of democracy in the United States and what reforms of the electoral system will be necessary if democracy is to survive.

Divided Country

> **In your re-election, God has graciously granted America—though she doesn't deserve it—a reprieve from the agenda of paganism. You have been given a mandate. We the people expect your voice to be like the clear and certain sound of a trumpet. Because you seek the Lord daily, we who know the Lord will follow that kind of voice eagerly. Don't equivocate. Put your agenda on the front burner and let it boil. You owe the liberals nothing. They despise you because they despise your Christ. Honor the Lord, and He will honor you.**
>
> **—Bob Jones III, president of Bob Jones** University

Once again in the 2004 elections, the country was deeply divided according to gender, race, region, ideology, religion, and age. According to the first round of election exit polls, turnout vastly increased among African-Americans, with almost 90 percent of them voting for Kerry as they did for Gore. Latinos also increased their turnout, with 54 percent of the Hispanic votes going for Kerry, down about 10 percent from Gore's total. As 55 percent of Asian-American voters chose Kerry, 75 percent of Jewish voters went for the Democrat. Women voted for Kerry approximately 53 to 47 percent, a loss from Gore's 10 percent advantage, although 62 percent of unmarried women voted for Kerry. More than 60 percent of the newly registered voters chose Kerry, who won 54 percent of the youth vote in the 18-24 age range. Those concerned about the economy voted overwhelmingly for Kerry, as did those citing the war in Iraq as a key issue. And 60 percent of urban voters opted for Kerry, down from the 71 percent who voted for Gore.[3]

Bush won a large percentage of white male votes, with 61 percent of them voting for him. He also won rural voters, Protestant voters, and 54 percent of Catholic voters, when for the first time a majority of Catholics voted Republican. Of the 45 percent of voters who earn less than $50,000 a year, Kerry won 56 percent to 43 percent, but of the 18 percent who earn above $100,000 a year, 57 percent voted for Bush. Gays and lesbians went for Kerry 77 percent to 23 percent. Gun owners voted for Bush 61 percent to 37 percent. Perhaps the major surprise of the election was how many voters surveyed said that values were more important to them than terrorism, Iraq, the economy, health care, or the other issues focused on largely by the Democrats. One survey indicated that one out of five voters interviewed in exit polls claimed that morality was their major issue, and more than 80 percent of these voters chose Bush.

It appears that issues of reproductive rights, gay marriage, and stem-cell research so incensed conservatives that they voted for Bush even against their own economic interests. The spectacles of gay marriage, so-called partial-

birth abortion, and Bush's "sanctity of life" orientation obviously motivated Republican voters. Anti-gay marriage initiatives were put on 11 state ballots and this issue helped to mobilize large numbers of pro-Bush voters. There were reports that evangelical churches prepared voting literature for churchgoers, that pastors came out strongly for Bush in sermons, and that entire congregations went en masse to vote for Bush. Likewise, conservative "pro-life" Catholic bishops wrote letters to their parishioners articulating anti-Kerry and pro-Bush positions. Thus, below the media radar, there was something like religious revivalism that turned out the Christian right for Bush. One of the shocking revelations that soon came out was that during the highly contested and close 2004 US presidential election, "then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger wrote a letter to U.S. bishops while the campaign was in progress, instructing them to deny Communion to any Catholic candidate unwilling to criminalize abortion. Ratzinger's letter did not win anything close to unanimous agreement, even among the American bishops, yet he succeeded in creating a public question about John Kerry's status as a Roman Catholic. The shift among Catholic voters in 2004 was small in absolute numbers — President Bush increased his support among Catholics by 6 points from 2000 to 2004 — yet, according to one analyst, it was large enough to turn the election in Ohio, Iowa and New Mexico. Arguably, then, Ratzinger won the election for Bush." [4]

It also seems that Bush's anti-intellectualism was extremely potent with many people, who identified with his "plain folks" aura and saw Kerry as an aristocratic intellectual. So, once again, people's perceived image of the president influenced their voting behavior. It also appears that 9/11 was a powerful bonding experience between Bush and his supporters, who at one time constituted much more than half of the population after 9/11. It seems that many of these supporters stuck with him through problems of the economy, exposures of Bush's blunders on 9/11, Iraq, poor debate performances, and other issues that mobilized about half of the voters strongly against Bush.

Later polls and analyses indicated that the so-called values issue was exaggerated in initial election retrospectives and that fear of terrorism was the most potent electoral issue.[5] The Bush-Cheney campaign successfully played on voters' fears of terrorism and liberal social change, at the same time appealing to conservative and religious values. The right-wing media apparatus, which presented powerfully positive images of Bush and negative images of Kerry, was of decisive importance in winning what appeared to be a Bush-Cheney popular vote majority and narrow electoral college victory. It's no real mystery how large numbers of voters went for the Republicans with right-wing propaganda going 24/7 on Fox TV (and its NBC soft-core versions), ubiquitous talk radio, a global Murdoch media apparatus, and a powerful right-wing Internet sector supported by conservative think tanks, book publishers, and periodicals.

Hard-core Bush supporters were impervious to reason and argumentation. They believed in Bush and had deep faith in him, and reviled Democrats and the "liberal media." When the 9/11 Commission report came out questioning ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq in the 9/11 attack, the Republican spin machine and their followers read it as confirming that Iraq was involved in 9/11 and that Iraq and Al Qaeda were interconnected. When the Duelfer report was released indicating that there really were no "weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq, Bush and his followers came out and said that the report indicated there were weapons of mass destruction. When Dick Cheney was asked if he still believed that there were connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda in 9/11, he claimed that he'd never made such an allegation, whereas there were sound bites and print sources indicating he had many times (see Kellner 2005, chap. 6).

No matter, truth and reason had little purchase on true Bush believers. They had decided in advance that whatever Kerry and the Democrats said was a personal attack on the president. Many of the faithful were also immune to critical media reports, which they took as "liberal media" attacks against Bush and accordingly disregarded them, getting their opinions and information instead from Fox TV, talk radio, or "politically correct" right-wing sources.

Bush believers had all the traits of the "authoritarian personality" dissected by T. W. Adorno and his colleagues (1950): deeply dualistic thought patterns that divided the world into good and evil, and us and them. Such personality types project "evil" onto their opponents and believe themselves to be "good." Like classic authoritarian personality types, many on the right are consumed with rage and scapegoat targets like liberals, feminists, gays, or other objects of their anger rather than seeing sociopolitical causes and solutions. Like Bush, his followers wanted simple explanations and solutions to complex situations and eschewed nuance. Bush's true believers were highly conformist, following the words and deeds of their leader, flip-flopping thongs at the Republican Convention or Bush events and chanting the slogans of the moment en masse. Immersed in crowd behavior, these followers were incapable of critical thought or seeing the flaws of their beloved leader.

A revealing survey by the University of Maryland's respected Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) indicated that Bush supporters were deeply uninformed, even on Bush's record, whereas Kerry supporters generally

knew what issues he stood for[6]. A CBS demographic map shown the day after the election revealed that almost every major urban area in the country voted for Kerry, as did university and college towns like Austin, Texas; Raleigh, North Carolina; and Iowa City, Iowa, but many rural areas went for Bush, providing fuel for those who like to distinguish between "metro" and "retro" America. The retro folks evidently dislike intellectuals and "elitists," voting for a man whom they perceived embodied their "down-home values."

The left-liberal cultural initiative to turn out young voters seemed to have mixed results. A massive turnout among young voters was supposed to favor Kerry. Exit polls showed that young voters, aged 18-29, favored Kerry by 12 points, a margin of 8 more points than Al Gore's percentage of young voters over Bush four years ago. In the final analysis, youth voters chose Kerry 54 percent over 46 percent for Bush. In a misleading election night story suggesting that the get-out-the-youth-vote efforts had failed, the Associated Press reported that "fewer than one in 10 voters Tuesday were 18 to 24, about the same proportion of the electorate as in 2000, exit polls indicated." In fact, many more young voters turned out, but so did other sectors of the population.

Later surveys showed that more than 20 million Americans younger than 30 voted, resulting in a 51.6 percent turnout for the group, a 9-point increase and significantly higher turnout than previous elections.[7] In some battleground states, youth turnout was as high as 65 percent, and television showed pictures of young people waiting in line for hours to vote. Thus, the 527 organizations such as MoveOn.org, all the anti-Bush documentary films, the Bruce Springsteen Vote for Change concert, P. Diddy's Vote or Die campaign, Rock the Vote, Choose or Lose, and the other campaigns definitely had an impact, although not the one desired by some who organized them. There were also cadres of young Republicans and conservatives, and church groups also took their young voters en masse to vote for Bush.

Perhaps the most overblown division, however, concerned the alleged rift between red and blue states. The entire Southern region of the country appeared to be firmly Republican and conservative, and the Northeast and West Coast seemed to be strongly liberal and democratic. But the so-called swing states are themselves deeply divided, as are some of the "red" and "blue" states. Hence, although there are significant regional divides between conservativism and liberalism, it is misleading to simply characterize the deep divisions in U.S. culture as those between "red" and "blue" states, as many media commentators are wont to do.

Another myth of the election was that Bush and the Republicans had received a "mandate" to govern, a myth pushed by the corporate media as well as the Republicans. Although Bush had won more votes than any presidential candidate in U.S. history, Kerry won the second-highest number of votes and never before had so many people voted against a presidential candidate as voted against Bush. The Republicans mobilized their troops, but so did the Democrats and the results were a record turnout from a highly divided country.

Indeed, well-respected surveys by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) confirmed what many surveys had shown over the years, documenting the extent to which overwhelming majorities of U.S. citizens favored strengthening health care, education, and Social Security. Many surveys also showed that strong majorities favored women's right to choose and gay and lesbian rights (if not gay marriage). The CCFR surveys also revealed that a large majority of the U.S. public believes that the United States should join the International Criminal Court and World Court, sign the Kyoto Protocols, allow the United Nations to take the lead in world crises, and rely more on diplomatic and economic measures than military ones in the "war on terror." Majorities also believe that the United States should resort to force only when "there is strong evidence that the country is in imminent danger of being attacked," thus rejecting the Bush doctrine of "preemptive war."

On Iraq, the University of Maryland Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) survey indicated on the eve of Election 2004 that "three quarters of Americans say that the United States should not have gone to war if Iraq did not have WMD or was not proving support to Al Qaeda," although nearly half said that the war was the "right decision." The PIPA survey indicated that large numbers of Americans, especially Bush voters, believed that Iraq did have WMD and ties to Al Qaeda. Other PIPA surveys confirmed the CCFR studies in that a large majority believes that the United Nations, not the United States, should take the lead in matters of security, reconstruction, and political transition to democracy in Iraq.

Progressive Gains

There is thus an underlying basis for progressive change in the United States that was not adequately mobilized

in the 2004 presidential election. There were, however, many local successes. As Tim McFeeley notes, Democrats gained control of at least seven legislative chambers (the Colorado House and Senate; the Oregon and Washington Senates; and the Montana, North Carolina, and Vermont Houses of Representatives. In contrast, the Republicans only gained control of four chambers: the Tennessee Senate and the Georgia, Indiana, and Oklahoma Houses of Representatives).[8] Moreover, "Progressives also won many crucial ballot measures: increasing the minimum wage in Florida and Nevada, approving stem-cell research in California, legalizing medical marijuana in Montana, promoting renewable energy in Colorado, and banning nuclear waste dumping in Washington." In addition, as McFeeley points out, during the past two years:

> While the federal government increased racial profiling in the name of fighting terrorism, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, and New Jersey all banned racial profiling.
>
> While the Bush administration increased its power to prosecute and imprison through the USA Patriot Act, Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Washington all enacted sentencing reforms that decrease jail sentences and sanction drug treatment instead of incarceration.
>
> While the Justice Department pushed federal prosecutors to demand the death penalty, South Dakota and Wyoming banned the juvenile death penalty, Illinois implemented substantial death penalty reforms, and seven states (Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Ohio, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico) guaranteed death row inmates the right to DNA testing to prove their innocence.
>
> While the administration opposed an increase in the federal minimum wage, legislatures in Illinois, Rhode Island, and Vermont (as well as voters in Florida and Nevada) approved higher state minimum wages.
>
> While Bush sided with the prescription drug manufacturers on a host of policies to maintain high drug prices, nearly every state has taken some action to lower drug prices, led especially by Maine, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, and Vermont.
>
> While the federal Food and Drug Administration refused to make emergency contraceptive pills (ECPs) more accessible, Hawaii and Maine enacted laws to make ECPs available from pharmacists without a prescription, and New York and New Mexico required hospital emergency rooms to provide ECPs to rape victims.
>
> And while the administration encouraged companies to plunder our natural resources, states have enacted dozens of pro-environment laws: lowering fuel emissions, cleaning up power plants, banning mercury, requiring energy efficiency, mandating recycling, and restricting greenhouse gasses.

Progressives have even won victories in "red" states: Georgia cracked down on payday lending; Idaho allowed some juvenile offenders to get criminal records expunged; Kansas and Oklahoma sanctioned in-state tuition at state colleges for undocumented immigrants; Tennessee became the first state to enact an anti-offshoring statute; and Utah repealed term limits (McFeeley).

Obviously, building on these victories will take significant energy and focus on state and local issues, but several organizations like Democracy for America, the Center for Policy Alternative Strategy, the Progressive Democratic Majority coalition, ACORN, and other groups are keenly focused on local issues as they work toward coalitions on national ones. In addition, there were other positive features for progressives in the 2004 election. As Evan Derkacz points out in "Bright Spots":

> The seven Democratic senators who voted against the Iraq war all won reelection—and they did it by an average margin of nearly 30 percent.
>
> Anti-war Democrat senators who won:
>
> Barbara Boxer-California-58 percent-38 percent
> Daniel Inouye-Hawaii-76 percent-21 percent
> Barbara Mikulski-Maryland-65 percent-34 percent
> Patty Murray-Washington-55 percent-43 percent
> Russ Feingold-Wisconsin-55 percent-44 percent
> Ron Wyden-Oregon-63 percent-32 percent
> Pat Leahy-Vermont-71 percent-25 percent
>
> Zoom in and the point becomes even clearer. In Oregon, where Kerry, who voted for the war, won by a mere 4 percent, Oregon Sen. Ron Wyden won by over 30 percent "despite" his vote against it. Wisconsin, which was too close to call on

> election night, didn't take very long to declare Russ Feingold, who voted against the war (ignoring warnings from his staff), the winner. He won by 11 percent. Writer John Stauber concludes, "The lesson is this: Russ Feingold proves that an antiwar, populist Democrat, a maverick campaigning to get big money out of politics, can win and win big." These statistics should strike fear out of the Democrats the next time issues of war and peace are on the table. Maybe, just maybe, if they can persuade the Democratic establishment to disabuse itself of the mistaken belief that reelection comes to those who adopt the safest position, rather than to those who make a strong case for the values they hold most dear, it has a shot at being relevant in the 21st century.[9]

Derkacz also points out that Howard Dean's "Democracy for America" picked progressive candidates in state and local campaigns all over the country and 31 of the 102 Dean Dozen candidates won, including:

> The mayor of Republican-dominated Salt Lake City, Utah, is now a Democrat.
>
> Openly gay candidate, Nicole LeFeveur, won a seat in the Idaho state legislature.
>
> In heavily Republican Alabama, progressive Anita Kelly was elected as Circuit Court Judge.
>
> In Florida, a first time, Dean-inspired candidate, Susan Clary, won as Soil and Water Conservation District Supervisor.
>
> Montana's governor is now a Democrat, Brian Schweitzer.
>
> Heavily Republican New Hampshire elected Democrat John Lynch, kicking the incumbent and ethically challenged Governor Benson out of office.
>
> Arthur Anderson won the race for supervisor of elections in electorally challenged Palm Beach County, Florida.
>
> Suzanne Williams won a state senate seat in Colorado, giving the upper house a Democratic majority.
>
> In North Carolina, openly gay Julia Boseman was one of several Democrats to defeat Republican incumbents to take back control of the State House (Derkacz).

As noted, there were progressive measures passed in so-called red and blue states on raising the minimum wage, increasing funding for education, expanding health care programs, funding stem-cell research, and opposing a cap on property taxes. On the environment, of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) 18 "Environmental Champions," all 18 won. In the eight congressional races that LCV focused on, seven environmentally "dirty" candidates went down to defeat. Hence, although there were dispiriting conservative trends in the national elections, there were many local examples that demonstrated a progressive base exists in the United States. But perhaps the underlying story of the election is that once again, as in Election 2000, the United States suffered from a dysfunctional electoral system, open to fraud, corruption, and confusion. Until there is radical change of the U.S. election system, democracy in the United States will continue to be in severe crisis.

A Dysfunctional Electoral System

> The essence of democracy is the confidence of the electorate in the accuracy of voting methods and the fairness of voting procedures. In 2000, that confidence suffered terribly, and we fear that such a blow to our democracy may have occurred in 2004.
>
> —John Conyers, Jr., Jerrold Nadler, Robert Wexler,
> *Members of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee*

In retrospect, it is tragic that John Kerry conceded so quickly because challenging the voting system, insisting that all votes be counted, pointing to well-documented examples of voter suppression, demonstrating problems with machines that do not provide accurate counts, and dramatizing the dangers of computer hacking to fix elections could have produced impetus to reform the system. As critics have pointed out, Elections 2000 and 2004 produced more than three million spoiled ballots that could not be read by voting machines, generally because old machines often malfunction; 75 percent of the machines in Ohio were of this vintage. A hand-count of these votes could have

made a difference. There were also thousands of provisional ballots to be counted in Ohio, many absentee ballots, and many irregularities to check out. It would have been important to carry out close examinations of the computer voting machines in Ohio and Florida to see if they provided accurate results.[10]

Examining voting machines could lead to voting reforms, such as those in California and Nevada, which required more transparency in the process, a paper trail to scrutinize in the case of a disputed election, and attempts to block voter fraud. There should be increased efforts to enable voter access and prevent voter suppression. Voting and counting procedures should be transparent, uniform, safe, and efficient. There should be agreed-upon recount procedures, criteria to count contested votes, and scrutiny of the process by members of both parties and professional election officials.

The problems with the U.S. election system, however, go far beyond the machines. The dysfunctional result evident in Election 2000 and 2004 reveal problems with the arguably outmoded electoral college system and the problematical nature of the U.S. system of proportional voting. Many citizens were surprised to learn in the disputed Election 2000 that the electoral college involved a system whereby those chosen to vote in the ritual in which the president was chosen did not necessarily have to follow the mandate of the voters in their district. In practice, state legislatures began binding electors to the popular vote, although as was abundantly clear in Election 2000, "faithless electors"—electors who vote for whomever they please—were theoretically possible. (Half of the states attempt to legally bind electors to the popular vote in their state, but it would still be possible for an elector to shift his or her vote, a dangerous outcome for a genuinely democratic society and a possibility much discussed after Election 2000.) "Electors" are rather mysteriously chosen in any case and this process should be examined and fixed.

Initially, the electoral college was part of a compromise between state and local government. Allowing electors to choose the president provided guarantees to conservatives who wanted the electoral college to serve as a buffer between what they perceived as an unruly and potentially dangerous public and the more educated and civic-minded legislators who could, if they wished, overturn votes by the people. Originally, the U.S. Congress was also elected in this manner. But in 1913 a constitutional amendment led to direct election of senators. Many argue this should also be the model for presidential elections. The current electoral college system, as critics have maintained, is based on eighteenth-century concerns and is arguably obsolete and in need of systematic reconstruction in the twenty-first century.

Moreover, the proportional representation system in the electoral college has serious problems that surfaced in the heated debates over Election 2000. Smaller states are disproportionately awarded with Electoral College votes, so that voters in less populated states such as Idaho or Wyoming have more proportionate influence in choosing the president than in states such as California or New York. As Jim Hightower notes, Wyoming's electors and proportionate vote represent 71,000 voters each, while Florida's electors each represent 238,000.[11] In New York, 18 million people now get 33 electoral votes for the presidency, but fewer than 14 million people in a collection of small states also get 33. As Duke University's Alex Keyssar argued in a November 20, 2000, New York Times op-ed piece, disproportionate weighting of the votes of smaller states violates the principle of one person, one vote, which according to a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s, lies at the heart of U.S. democracy. "To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would run counter of our fundamental ideas of democratic government," the Court announced in 1964. "Legislators," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "represent people, not trees or acres." Thus, the current system of proportionate state votes where all states get two votes and then the rest are divided according to population is unfair. A more reasonable system would simply allot states proportionate votes according to their populations, so that each vote throughout the nation would be equal in choosing a president.

Further problems with the U.S. electoral college and system of proportional representation involve the winner-take-all rule operative in most states. As the Election 2000 Florida battle illustrates, in a winner-take-all system, 100 percent of the state's electoral votes goes to a 50.1 percent majority in presidential elections (or less if there were more than two candidates, as is increasingly the case in presidential elections). Maine and Nebraska are exceptions, and it would be possible to follow their example and to split presidential state votes proportionately according to the actual percentage of votes candidates get in each separate state, rather than following the winner-take-all rule, where a handful of votes in a state such as Florida, or Ohio, gives the entire state, and even the election, to one candidate.

Hence, the Electoral College and U.S. system of proportional representation should be seriously debated and reforms should be undertaken if U.S. democracy is to revitalize itself in the coming years after the debacle of 2000 and persistent questions concerning 2004. As many have argued, there are strong reasons for proportionate representation in U.S. presidential elections.[12] However, separation of election officials from political operatives

and the training of professional, nonpartisan election workers should also be on the reform agenda. In Election 2000, Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, also head of the Bush-Cheney ticket in Florida, did everything possible to steal the election from Al Gore, and in 2004, Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell played a similar role. [13] To deal with all of these problems, a high-level commission could be appointed to study how to modernize and update the system of electing the president in the United States. Since the political establishment cannot be counted upon to undertake these reforms, it will be necessary for constituencies—academic, local, and national—to devise reforms for the seriously challenged system of "democracy" in the United States.

Furthermore, it is clear that money has corrupted the current electoral system and that campaign finance reform is necessary to avoid overwhelming influence by lobbies, corporations, and the corruption that a campaign system fueled by megabucks produces. The current election system, in which millions of dollars are needed for a federal election, ensures that only candidates from the two major parties have a chance of winning, that only candidates who are able to raise millions of dollars can run, and that those who do run and win are beholden to those who have financed their campaigns—guaranteeing control of the political system by corporations and the wealthy.

In Elections 2000 and 2004, the excessive amount of money pumped into the $3-billion-plus electoral campaigns guaranteed that neither candidate would say anything to offend the moneyed interests funding the election, and would thus avoid key issues of importance and concern. The debts accrued by the two major parties to their contributors were obvious in the initial appointments made by the Bush-Cheney Election 2000 transition team, which rewarded precisely those corporations and supporters who financed the Bush presidency. The Bush administration provided legislative awards for its major contributors, allowing the big corporations that supported them to write Bush administration energy and communication policy and to help draft legislation for deregulation that served their interests, in effect allowing big contributors to make public policy (see Kellner [2001], 187ff.).

In 2001, a McCain-Feingold finance reform bill was passed, but it has been continually watered down and is unlikely to reform U.S. political funding. Indeed, a record amount of money was raised for the 2004 election as loopholes were exploited to create new types of fundraising and political action groups. Thus, there is a definite need for public financing of elections. Four states currently allow full public financing for candidates who agree to campaign with fundraising and spending limits (Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont), and this would be a splendid model for the entire nation.10 Public financing for elections at local, state, and national levels would only be viable in a media era with free national television, free access to local media, and Internet sites offered to the candidates. Hence, the television networks should be required to provide free national airtime to presidential candidates to make their pitches, and television-paid political advertising should be eliminated (see the elaboration of this argument in Kellner 1990). The broadcasting networks were given a tremendous bonanza when the Federal Communications Commission provided a wealth of spectrum to use for digital broadcasting, doubling the amount of space it licensed to television broadcasters with estimates of the value of the space costing up to $70 billion. Congress failed to reestablish public service requirements that used to be in place before the Reagan-Bush-Clinton deregulation of telecommunications. As fair payback for the broadcast spectrum giveaway, broadcast media should provide free airtime for political discourse that strengthens democracy.

Efforts were made to get the television networks to enable the public to get free messages from the candidates, but they were defeated. President Clinton appointed an advisory panel to assess how to update public service requirements of television broadcasts in the wake of the spectrum giveaway. The panel recommended that television broadcasters voluntarily offer five minutes of candidate-centered airtime in the 30 days before the election. Clinton proposed this recommendation in his 1998 State of the Union address, but broadcasters fiercely rejected the proposal. In the Senate, John McCain and Conrad Burns announced that they would legislatively block the FCC's free airtime initiative. In fact, political advertising is a major cash cow for the television networks who regularly charge political candidates excessively high rates, although they are supposed to allow "lowest unit charge" (LUC) for political advertising. Such LUC rates, however, mean that the ads could be preempted, and desperate campaigns want to make sure that they get their advertising message out at a crucial time and thus are forced to pay higher rates. [14]

Voter rights initiatives also need to be carried forth to prevent voter suppression and provide adequate voting machines to all precincts, independent of their wealth or political connections. Once again in 2004, the Republicans practiced systematic voter suppression, challenging voters at the polls and intimidating potential voters in a myriad of ways. In addition, once again there were a shocking lack of voting machines and personnel, especially in swing minority and student precincts that typically vote Democratic. There should be strong penalties for voting suppression, fraud, too few voting machines, and inadequate poll staffing.[15]

There also should be a National Voting Day holiday, as many countries have, so that working people can vote without economic penalty. One of the scandals of Election 2004 was the terribly long lines in minority and working-class neighborhoods in Ohio and elsewhere, due to inadequate numbers of voting machines and not enough polling staff. There were reports in Ohio of lines lasting hours (especially in heavily Democratic neighborhoods), forcing many to leave the lines to return to work. This is an intolerable situation in a democracy, and efforts should be made to maximize voting access; to simplify voting procedures; and to provide adequate, trained, and nonpartisan election staff as well as reliable and trustworthy machines.

In addition, schools should provide, as Dewey argued (1917), citizenship education as well voter literacy. Ballots are often highly complex and intimidating and there should be efforts to begin educating people of all ages and walks of life on how to vote. Better designed ballots and more reliable voting systems are obviously a prerequisite for voting reform, but individuals need to be better informed on how to vote and what the specific issues are on ballots, ranging from local to state and national issues.

There is little doubt that U.S. democracy is in serious crisis, and unless there are reforms, its decline will accelerate. Although voter participation increased from an all-time low in 1996 of 49 percent of the eligible electorate to 51 percent in Election 2000 and 60 percent in Election 2004, this percentage is still fairly low. The United States is on the low end of democratic participation in presidential elections among democracies throughout the world. Obviously, much of the country remains alienated from electoral politics despite hotly contested elections in 2000 and 2004.

Onwards!

Democracy requires informed citizens and access to information and thus the viability of democracy is dependent on citizens seeking out crucial information, having the ability to access and appraise it, and to engage in public conversations about issues of importance. Democratic media reform and alternative media are thus crucial to revitalizing and even preserving the democratic project in the face of powerful corporate and political forces. How media can be democratized and what alternative media can be developed will of course be different in various parts of the world, but without a democratic media politics and alternative media, democracy itself cannot survive in a vigorous form, nor will a wide range of social problems be engaged or even addressed.

Reinvigorating democracy also requires a reconstruction of education with expanded literacies, democratized pedagogies, and education for citizenship. As John Dewey long ago argued (1917), education is an essential prerequisite for democracy and public education should strive to produce more democratic citizens. A reconstruction of education also requires cultivating media, computer, and multiple literacies for a computer-based economy and information-dependent society (Kellner 2002; Kellner 2004). In an increasingly technological society, media education should become an important part of the curriculum, with instruction focused on critical media and computer literacy as well as on how to use media for expression, communication, and social transformation.

Alternative media need to be connected with progressive movements to revitalize democracy and bring an end to the current conservative hegemony. After the defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964 when conservatives were routed and appeared to be down for the count, they built up a movement of alternative media and political organizations; liberals and progressives now face the same challenge. In the current situation, we cannot expect much help from the corporate media and need to develop ever more vigorous alternative media. The past several years have seen many important steps in the fields of documentary film, digital video and photography, community radio, public access television, an always expanding progressive print media, and an ever-growing liberal and progressive Internet and blogosphere. While the right has more resources to dedicate to these projects, the growth of progressive democratic public spheres has been impressive. Likewise, the energy, political organization, and finances mobilized to attempt to defeat the Bush-Cheney Gang were impressive, but more needs to be done to defeat the conservatives, building on the achievements of the past years.

The agenda for the Left the next four years involves sustained struggle against Bush administration policies to help to bring the most right-wing regime in recent U.S. history to an end, and to fight for a revitalization of democracy and a progressive agenda. To conclude, I'd like to quote a passage from Tony Kushner's recent play Caroline, or Change. The play is set in the 1960s at the time of the Kennedy assassination when much of the world looked to the United States as a beacon of hope and to the Kennedy administration as an instrument of progress. Coming out of the civil rights struggles, there was new hope that democracy and freedom really were on the march

and that reactionary forces were being defeated, making one proud to be an American. In the play's epilogue, Caroline's teenage daughter talks of how she and some friends had just torn down a Civil War statue, signifying the legacy of racism, and she declared

> You can't hold on, you nightmare men,
> Your time is past now on your way
> Get gone and never come again!
> For change come fast and change come slow but
> Everything changes!
> And you got to go!

Endnotes

1. Paul Krugman, "The Dishonesty Thing," New York Times, September 10, 2004.

2. Bob Herbert, "How Many Deaths Will It Take?" New York Times, September 10, 2004.

3. See the analysis of the polls in the New York Times special Election 2004 section on November 4, 2004, and the CNN Election Results analysis of voting patterns at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/. As I indicate below, there was later questioning of some of the initial exit polling results.

4. A 2005 GAO report that strongly suggests, what many of us have long suspected, that computer voting machines were highly unreliable and could have easy been rigged, see Bob Fitrakis & Harvey Wasserman, "Powerful Government Accounting Office report confirms key 2004 stolen election findings," at http://www.smirkingchimp.com/article.php?sid=23354&mode=nested&order=0.

5. See the analysis by Ira Chernus, "Voting Their Fears," at http://progressive trail.org/articles/041214Chernus.shtml. Chernus notes:

> The news told us ad nauseam that 22 percent of the voters chose "moral values" as their number one issue. But the real news is that this is a historically low number. It was 35 percent in 2000 and 40 percent in 1996. In the exit polls, when asked what one quality they wanted most in a president, only 8 percent chose "religious faith." Among those who called themselves "heavy churchgoers," Bush did no better in 2004 than in 2000. What about the states that passed gay-marriage bans, often cited as crucial for the Bush win? They gave Bush 57.9 percent of their votes; the other states, totaled, gave him only 50.9 percent—a 7-point margin for Bush. But four years ago, Bush's share in these same states was 7.3 points higher than in the other states.
>
> In a Pew poll taken just a few days after the election, voters were asked to choose from a list of factors that influenced their votes. Twenty-seven percent chose moral values; 22 percent chose Iraq. But when they were asked to name their most urgent issue (with no list to choose from), 27 percent named Iraq and only 9 percent moral values.
>
> When a postelection New York Times-CBS News poll asked: "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country?"—only 5 percent chose either moral values or abortion. Only 8 percent said yes to: "Should government officials try to use the political system to turn their religious beliefs into law?" Eighty-five percent said no. (Ten years ago, 23 percent had answered yes to the same question.) "Which worries you more, public officials who don't pay enough attention to religion and religious leaders, or public officials who are too close to religion and religious leaders?" Thirty-five percent worried about not enough attention to religion; 51 percent worried about leaders paying too much attention.
>
> And here's another little anomaly to take into consideration: Bush voters are more liberal than the media would have us believe. Nearly half of them worry most about public officials who are too close to religion. In the exit polls, about 22 percent of them favor gay marriage and 52 percent would legalize gay or lesbian civil unions. Twenty-five percent of Bush voters want no restriction on a woman's right to choose; another 38 percent think abortion should be legal in most cases.
>
> The often-quoted statistic about "moral values" begs the question of how voters interpreted those key words in post-election polls. In a Zogby poll, 68 percent of self-identified "liberals" said that "faith and/or morals" were important in deciding their vote (14 points higher than "moderates"). When voters were asked to identify the single greatest moral crisis facing America, one-third selected "materialism and greed" and 31 percent chose poverty, while the combined total for abortion and same-sex marriage was only 28 percent. In the Pew poll, only about 40 percent of those who said "moral values" influenced their vote named gay marriage or abortion as their highest concern. Pew pollster Andrew Kohut summed it up: "We did not see any indication that social conservative issues like abortion, gay rights, and stem cell research were anywhere near as important as the economy and Iraq." In addition, voters for Bush

chose their pocketbook and not necessarily religion in many cases, since in the 2004 election, 58 percent of those making more than $100,000 a year voted for Bush, compared to 54 percent in 2000. This income group made up 18 percent of the electorate in 2004, up from 15 percent in 2000.

6. In Molly Ivins' summary:

> In further unhappy evidence of how ill-informed the American people are (blame the media), the Program on International Policy Attitudes found Bush supporters consistently ill-informed about Bush's stands on the issues (Kerry-ans, by contrast, are overwhelmingly right about his positions). Eighty-seven percent of Bush supporters think he favors putting labor and environmental standards into international trade agreements. Eighty percent of Bush supporters believe Bush wants to participate in the treaty banning landmines. Seventy-six percent of Bush supporters believe Bush wants to participate in the treaty banning nuclear weapons testing. Sixty-two percent believe Bush would participate in the International Criminal Court. Sixty-one percent believe Bush wants to participate in the Kyoto Treaty on global warming. Fifty-three percent do not believe Bush is building a missile defense system (a.k.a. "Star Wars.").
>
> The only two Bush stands the majority of his supporters got right were on increasing defense spending and who should write the new Iraqi constitution.
>
> Kerry supporters, by contrast, know their man on seven out of eight issues, with only 43 percent understanding he wants to keep defense spending the same but change how the money is spent, and 57 percent believing he wants to up it. Molly Ivins, "Clueless People Love Bush," October 27, 2004, at http://www. smirkingchimp.com/print. php?sid=18432.

7. See the sources in Note 3.

8. Tim McFeeley, "Progressive Incubators," November 5, 2004, at http://www.tompaine.com/articles/ progressive_incubators.php.

9. Evan Derkacz, "Bright Spots," Alternet, November 10, 2004.

10. For a wide range of materials on voter suppression, machine malfunctions, potential fraud and corruption, and thousands of voting problems in Election 2004, see the sources at http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-1. htm; http://www.votersunite.org; http://www. openvotingconsortium.org; http://www.demos-usa. org; and http://www.verified voting.org; and http:// www.blackboxvoting.org. The only mainstream media figure following the 2000 voting fraud and corruption controversy was MSNBC's Keith Olbermann on his nightly news show Countdown and in his blog Bloggermann at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/6210240.

11. See Jim Hightower's proposals after Election 2000 for Electoral College reform at www.alternet.org. In his December 4, 2000 online interview, Howard Kurtz noted that Gore would have won the Electoral College if every state received electoral votes in proportion to population: "Bush won 30 states for 271 and Gore won 21 for 267. But if you take away the two electors for each senator, and just apportion electors by number of Representatives (i.e., in proportion to population), Gore wins 225 to 211" (http://www.washington post.com/ wpsrv/liveonline/00/politics/media backtalk120400. htm).

12. In a chapter on "Electoral Reform" after Election 2000, Ceaser and Busch (2001) lay out the case for a proportional representation system, as opposed to a direct popular majority vote electoral system, but do not consider the strong arguments that I cite above to eliminate the "unfaithful elector" problem by mandating direct presidential voting, nor do they take seriously arguments against the current U.S. system of proportional voting with its winner-take-all electoral vote system. In any case, in the current political climate, there is little pressure for major electoral reform, although on the local level there have been attempts to require updating of voting machines, streamlining of voting processes, stipulation of recount procedures, and other technical changes to avoid a recurrence of the debacle of the 2000 election in Florida; unfortunately, efforts to replace punch-card and optical-scan ballots with computerized voting machines may have made matters worse, necessitating another cycle of reform.

13. See Jack Miles, "The Unholy Alliance Against the Filibuster," Los Angeles Times, April 27, 2005 and Douglas Kellner, "The Media and Death: The Case of Terri Schaivo and the Pope," Flow, Vol. 2, Nr. 3 (May 2005) at http://idg.communication.utexas.edu/ flow/?jot=view&id=745.

14. On the need for public financing of elections, see Nick Nyhart and Joan Claybrook, "The Dash for Cash: Public Financing Is the Only Way to End the Unfair Tilt of the 'Wealth Primary,'" Los Angeles Times, April 27, 2003. The authors' groups Public Campaign and Public Citizen have been working for public financing of elections.

15. On the history of efforts to reform television advertising, see Charles Lewis, "You Get What You Pay For: How Corporate Spending Blocked Political Ad Reform and Other Stories of Influence," in Schechter (2001), pp. 62-73; and the Alliance for Better Campaigns, "Gouging Democracy: How the Television Industry Profiteered on Campaign 2000," in Schechter (2001), pp. 77-92. In another important article in Schechter (2001), Lawrence K. Grossman notes that one of broadcasting's "dirty little secrets" is its "sustained and high-priced lobbying against finance reform" (p. 75).

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Public Intellectuals, Information Politics and the Manichean Moment

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This essay is less about an abstract set of practices and more about examining the actual, probable, and possible roles (or nonroles) of intellectuals (and those who would claim such roles) in the early-twenty-first century. To do so, we must take note of some constitutive features of contemporary life, as they relate to those who would speak as American intellectuals.

First, we think, speak, and act in a post-9/11 social and political environment. The events of 9/11 reconstituted the United States, in the post-Cold War world, as a fundamentally insecure society, a society increasingly obsessed with its own physical security, fretful about its economic future, and the escalating costs of maintaining an aging generation of baby boomers. When combined with the reframing of post-secondary education as a private, rather than a public good (which has simultaneously facilitated state disinvestment of higher education while jumpstarting serial double-digit increases in post-secondary tuition and fees), the evangelists of the market face escalating doubts and anxieties among the members of their diverse congregation. We think, write, speak, and act in a social environment constituted by these durable structural tensions.

Secondly, a key assumption (of this essay) is that institutions of knowledge production and reproduction matter in American life. For whom they matter, how they matter, and why they matter reveal widely divergent agendas and world views (emphasizing everything from critical engagement with new forms of communication to the econometric goal of producing obedient, efficient, and depoliticized technocrats for social control).

Thirdly, intellectuals (like politicians, artists, ersatz entertainers, propagandists, televangelists, commodity marketers, PR agencies, and con men) primarily communicate to larger publics via evolving audio, televisual, and web-accessible textual and multi-media forms. Today's words, images and deeds will remain visible, audible, and retrievable, months, years, and decades later. Utterances initially addressed to specific audiences may be reframed, at any point in time, seamlessly inserted into alternative narratives, and recirculated in new contexts. The key factor enabling such rapid and prolific recontextualization is the intensification of routine information collection, storage, and the equally intensive, speedy distribution of these images, sounds, data, and signifiers, across the planet. Collectively, such technological ensembles can be collectively understood as "surveillant assemblages." As Haggerty and Ericson (2000) put it, surveillant assemblages facilitate the end of anonymity, or "the disappearance of disappearance" (pp. 605-622). As the myriad devices that compromise the hardware of such surveillant assemblages become cheap, ubiquitous and multifunctional, their integration into the routines of everyday life reconfigures everyday life. The result of such integration often renders the traditional dramaturgical distinctions of front-stage, back-stage and off-stage behaviors moot. Collectively, these behaviors are increasingly blended into variants of restylized front-stage presentations, inserted into multi-media formats, and circulated via high-speed networks.

What follows below is an embedded examination of the intellectual as a contested and active agents and icon, represented and representing, in media formats and worlds. What happens when, in one prominent and current case, prominent figures on the left and right rigidly cleave to preset ideological commitments, in the midst of controversy and scandal? Such a pattern of unreflexive and polarized reactions prompts us to ask: What does it mean to be a responsible and responsive intellectual, in the current environment? How does one practice responsible dissent and critique, at this point in our social and political history? What does it mean to "tell the truth," in these times? Perhaps

we have something to learn by analyzing a still unfolding case.

The Manichean Present: Iteration One

On the evening of September 11, 2001 at least two academics were at their computers, trying to make some broader sense of the World Trade Center attacks. After rapid editorial reviews, my "The World Trade Center and the Rise of the Security State" was published in CTHEORY on September 18, 2001. Assessing six decades of U.S. ideology and practice, the article predicted that the WTC attack marked a transition to a third period in post-WW II U.S. society, a period that I characterized as "a society of security."

It's now clear that we simultaneously entered an extended phase of political and moral rhetoric characterized by vivid and tightly held Manichean constructions of self and the world (Boyte 2002)[1]. For example, in my "Priming the Pump of War" (2002; 2004:117-125), I explored how the politicized Christian billionaire, Philip Anschutz, bankrolled an aggressive, extensive and sophisticated public relations campaign, in the pre-Iraqi War period, through his "Foundation for a Better Life" (FBL). The America constituted on the web pages of the Foundation's site (and in the public service announcements still playing on the 6000 movie screens that Anschutz controls as well as in cable television feeds) is concurrently evoked in the moralistic propaganda posted on thousands of billboards lining the interstate highways and bus stops in predominately "red" states. Part Norman Rockwell, part Norman Vincent Peale, the FBL campaign evokes an imagined past that never was, as the oddly conflated images and accompanying narratives of "simple virtues" facilitate a nostalgic hypernationalism, and a fantasy of simple unity in pursuit of a common destiny. As a form of "soft propaganda," the images and scripts of the FBL resonate with Goebbels' valorization of the simple and true virtues of "Der Volk," across the Third Reich, in the late 1930s. Like these Goebbelian images, Anschutz's FBL imagery remains a potential precursor for future violence.

In Boulder, we encounter the second academic: Just as Elijah Muhammad inverted Manichean racial representations without changing the fundamental binary modus operandi of the machinery, so, on the night of September 11, 2001, Ward Churchill (2001) enthusiastically and self-righteously keyboarded an article, "Some People Push Back: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens." Astounding in the sheer number of inaccuracies and gross simplifications of geopolitical reality, Churchill casts Al Qaeda as if they were a bank of Jedi Knights, implicitly assigning to Osama bin Laden the role of Luke Skywalker, nobly striking back at the Empire and its functionaries (such as Madeleine Albright, who Churchill compares to "Jaba the Hutt" [sic]). For Churchill (2001), the attacks represented

> a certain optimism [and] humanitarianism . . . a medicinal aspect . . . a tonic . . . [the perpetrators] manifested the courage of their convictions . . . [administered] reality therapy . . . [are not] unreasonable or vindictive . . . [these acts represent] gallant sacrifices . . . [but] the dosage of medicine administered [through the attacks] was entirely insufficient to accomplish its purpose.

These are all unqualified kudos typical of a Manichean discourse. For Churchill to sustain it, a very selective ahistorical memory and narrative is required. For example, when Churchill proclaims that "Middle Easterners, unlike Americans, have no history of exterminating others . . .," he omits significant regional events, such as, the Ottoman genocide of Armenians, the more recent Iraqi and Turkish campaigns against Kurds, complexities around the Lebanese Civil War, the repressive and gendered governance of Afghanistan by the Taliban, the historical persecution of Sufis and Bahais, or the latter twentieth century violence in several states of the Caucasus.

Like other, more accomplished propagandists, Churchill rhetorically devalues his target. Answering his own [implicit rhetorical] question, "Who are Americans?", Churchill casually tosses off a global generalization. Of course, Americans are a homogeneous and trivial people who uniformly

> [Obsess about] getting "Jeremy" and "Ellington" to their weekly soccer game, or [ensuring] little "Tiffany" and "Ashley" have just the right roll-neck sweaters . . . American adults [are] much closer to [embodying] Pavlovian stimulus-response patterns than . . . higher logic . . .

In Churchill's ür-narrative, all people of color are inherently virtuous, and whites, by virtue of their subject position and pigmentation, are of a lower moral order. Such broad, essentialist caricatures typify identity politics at its worst. Apart from essentialist problematic, questions have been raised about the academic quality of Churchill's

work, and multiple (and contested) charges of plagiarism. The responses of some prominent left-intellectuals, to Churchill's work and situation, have been simultaneously revealing and disappointing. As University of Colorado law professor Paul Campos (2005) pungently observed, preset and rigid ideological commitments may cause both a profound political ineptness as well as permanent blindness.

The Immediate Lesson

First, far from being either insightful or truly critical/radical, Churchill's discourse strengthens one pole of the current idée fixe, the present Manichean political and cultural frame. Right-wing purveyors of the current Manichean militarism recognize (and perhaps secretly celebrate, for tactical reasons) Churchill as the new Whittaker Chambers. He becomes the necessary example of the enemy within, of the intolerant poisoning the minds of a generation. For them, Churchill signifies a deeply embedded cancer in the body of the academe that must be aggressively countered with an immediate antidote. For Manicheans on the far right, this man is a gift: Irrational in his exuberance for retributional attacks, and arguably under-credentialed for his position, Churchill is sold to the body politic, by corporate news media and right-wing tacticians, as representative of all contemporary secular academics (Churchill signifies all that is wrong with those secular, flag-hating post-secondary institutions that the children of the disappearing traditional working class now must pass through, to compete in global labor markets.). In a society of everyday fear, it's fair to paraphrase Voltaire, in imagining the ideological usefulness of this academic for the right: "If Churchill didn't exist, we would have to invent him."

But there is no need to invent Churchill. Instead, he is placed in a peculiar satantheon. Accompanied by an "enemy of the people" inflected dossier served up in the format of a quasi-baseball trading card, Churchill's visage is added to the Manichaeistic "Campus Support of Terrorism" sub page on David Horowitz's detailed website, "DiscovertheNetwork.org: A Guide to the Political Left". Furthermore, it is to Horowitz, his staff, and his alternative form of Manichaeism that we now turn.

The Manichean Present, Iteration Two: A Horowitz of Horrors

According to its Geist, David Horowitz, Discoverthenetwork.org (launched on February 14, 2005) is a "Guide to the Political Left:"

> It identifies the individuals and organizations that make up the left and also the institutions that fund and sustain it; it maps the paths through which the left exerts its influence [and promotes hidden] programmatic agendas . . .
>
> The site is made up of two elements along with a powerful search engine . . . The first of these elements is a database of PROFILES of [1500] individuals, groups and institutions [in the form of] thumbnail sketches of histories, agendas and funding sources . . .
>
> The second data element of this site consists of a library of articles, which analyze the relationships disclosed in the database and the issues they raise. These analyses are drawn from thousands of articles, both scholarly and journalistic, that have been entered into the base and linked in the TEXT columns that appear on the PROFILE pages.
>
> All of this is in service of tracing the paths by which these radicals were able to influence institutions like the Democratic Party . . . One can thus trace the progress of a radical [leftwing] menu . . . into the heart of the American political mainstream.

DiscovertheNetwork.org is organized into many (and still developing) sub pages such as "left-wing millionaires club," "left-wing prizes," "funders," "academia," and "individuals." The "individuals" page is a prototypical example. On that page, each photo, in an overall array, is hyperlinked to dossiers on separate pages. The catalog's opening page features such diverse figures, arranged in a series of thumbnail photos, from right to left, in a presumed taxonomy of subversion, from George Clooney and Garrison Keillor ("affective leftists"), to Roger Ebert ("moderate leftists"), and Supreme Court Justice Ruth Ginsburg ("leftists"), to Michael Moore and Tom Hayden ("anti-American radicals") and finally, to Mohammad Atta and the abovementioned Ward Churchill ("totalitarian radicals"). The array functions as a gradated taxonomy of presumably corrosive influences. For Horowitz and his allies, all of these insidious "types" are inadvertently or advertently degrading the security of the American Republic. See the screen snapshot below:

Figure 1. A Web Page Snapshot of Horowitz's Inaugural Taxonomy: A Cohort of Agents Presumed to be Differentially Dangerous to the American Republic.

At the top of this web page, Horowitz (2005) explains the organizing logic behind a taxonomy that constructs these stigmatizing associative connotations:

> [The taxonomy's] organizing basis is [formed by] a commitment to egalitarian goals and social constructionist assumptions . . . and—in its radical wing—a nihilistic opposition to global capitalism, now referred to as "globalization." These radicals reject the . . . alleged "hierarchies" of western democratic capitalism, and regard America as the arch imperialist power and guarantor of private property globally. That is the reason for the inclusion of Islamic radicals alongside American[s] . . .

As a form of information politics on the web, Discoverthenetwork.org inverts Richard Rogers' (2004) naïvely propagated utopian notion of a Western European information and activist Internet as the sole property of "progressives" for eliding corporatist news media. Instead, Horowitz demonstrates a different use for web-based information politics: Horowitz catalogs the networks that fund "so-called" dissenters. Detailed "think maps" show how such presumably "insidious" networks are allegedly (if indirectly) connected to my Ph.D. Alma Mater, Arizona State University:



Figure 2. A Snapshot of A "Think Map" that "Reveals" the Presumably Nefarious "Leftist" Network Around Arizona State University

In Horowitz's Manichean vision, this neo-construction of diverse organizations and agendas are connected to each other through presumably unwholesome funding mechanisms and agencies, such as Soros' Open Society Institute, the Proteus Fund, the Ford Foundation, the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, and the Carnegie, Target and Verizon Foundations (among others).

Clearly, if the technology had been available, certainly these kinds of digital network maps would have been first assembled, and then accompanied by lurid and dark narratives, during the HUAC/McCarthy hearings of the 1940s and 1950s. As Scott Sherman (2000) has documented, much of the Horowitz's language reprises the sensibility of "the Red Scare." Fears about an internal army of traitors, known in the mid-twentieth century as "The Fifth Column," are now folded, into yet another science-fiction moniker, "The Shadow Party." (Just as Churchill's plumbs the "Star Wars" proto-narrative, Horowitz plumbs the narrative from the mid-1990s sci-fi series, "Babylon 5"). According to Horowitz (2005a), "The Shadow Party" consists

> [of] without exception, [of] groups and individuals [who are] anti-corporatist and socialist (often Marxist-Leninist), rather than pacifists and non-violent or merely liberal, as described in the general media. Their opposition to the war went well beyond the issue of the war itself.

For Horowitz, this "Shadow Party," stealthily promotes agendas that "are rooted in their radical opposition to the American status quo." Other nested pages on Horowitz's site echo the transposition of 1950s Cold War rhetoric in even greater detail. Consider the following example: In describing a linked site devoted to similar tasks, "The Center for the Study of Popular Culture" is depicted as follows:

> The Center for the Study of Popular Culture . . . is dedicated to defending the cultural foundations of a free society, a task made even more pressing by the attack on America of September 11th, the Iraq conflict and the internal opponents of freedom this attack has revealed. The Center is led by . . . David Horowitz . . . who has been called "the left's most brilliant and articulate nemesis,". . . (Horowitz 2005b)

In this formulation, "the internal opponents of freedom that this attack revealed" refers to those who would level any criticism of the Iraq War, or question the curtailment of civil liberties represented by some sections of the Patriot Act. (Presumably, even Peter Drucker would be placed on this list). For Horowitz and his minions, then, domestic dissent to Bush Administration's policies is the functional equivalent to an attack on America. In this formulation, dissent is terrorism. Substitute the word "communism" for "terrorism," and the resonance is easily discernable. Ostensibly, freedom is constituted by the lack of dissent. It is de facto wedded to blind obedience and ideological dogma, in Horowitz's worldview. As an ex-60s radical, Horowitz knows that many forms of political dissent, with differential but sometimes substantial claims of authority, often emerge from college and university campuses.

DiscovertheNetwork.org is a new and still developing site, but it exhibits a number of very familiar, if somewhat cartoonish, propaganda techniques, including unflattering and distorted photographs of ideological "enemies;" reductive and slanted mini-biographies, which are sprinkled with a patina of reasonableness and an ersatz appeal to "objectivity."

The Common Thread

Taken as the two faces of contemporary Manichaeism, Churchill and Horowitz, and the great majority of their academic and extra-academic allies, embody a recognizable iteration within American politics. Richard Hofstadter (1964) collectively framed such worldviews as epitomizing " The Paranoid Style in American Politics." For Hofstadter,

> The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of conspiracy in apocalyptic terms-he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the barricades . . . . Perceiving the conspiracy before it is fully obvious to an as yet unaroused public, the paranoid is a militant leader [who] does not see social conflict as something to be mediated and compromised . . . What is necessary is . . . the will to fight to [the] finish. Since the enemy is thought of as being totally evil and totally unappeasable, he must be totally eliminated . . . at least from the theatre of operations . . . Partial success leaves him with [a] feeling of powerlessness . . . The enemy is . . . [an] amoral superman-sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel . . . He wills . . . the mechanism of history . . . in an evil way. The paranoid's interpretation of history is distinctly personal: decisive events are . . . the consequences of someone's will. Very often the enemy is held to

possess some especially effective source of power.

From inverted ideological starting points, both Ward Churchill and David Horowitz embody the same Manichean impulse. Injected into campus life, as they are today, each represents a grave danger. For the potential hegemony of any Manichean narrative, whether it comes either from the ideological ground of a Ward Churchill or a David Horowitz, will always be a pedagogical disaster. In their global and paranoid aspects, Manichean narratives are inherently destructive of the process of education. They are monologic. They produce invective, fear, silence, degradation, marginalization, sullen obedience, and alienation. Manichean worldviews, left or right, preclude productive encounters with difference and diversity, and stifle the possibility of taking thought and perception into the unknown. As such, any such Manichaeistic hegemony precludes dialogue. And, after millennia of educational practices, dialogue remains as the beating heart of education. In that sense, the monologic stances of Ward Churchill and David Horowitz constitute competing manifestations of the same impulse. As icons, they stand for entire networks, but as individuals, they are but two of the hydra-heads emanating from the singular Manichean Medusa. But, these two Manichean hydra-heads have very different understandings of mediated communication, and have different resources in tow. And it is to this that we now turn.

Reprising the 1960s via Mediated Information Politics: Impulsivity, Contingency, and Tactics

On March 18th, the Associated Press featured a series of short quotes from Ward Churchill (2005), presumably from recent interviews, such as the one below:

> I don't think anybody expected this. I can't say I . . .plan[ned] it. I'd like to say that's how effective my method is. . . I riveted the entire nation on—what did I rivet the entire nation's attention on? It's just boilerplate now . . .

In the midst of a self-described weariness, Churchill preferred the conceit that he produced a meta-pedagogical moment, in the form of a national epiphany. But in the light of reality, he backed off, admitting that "he'd never thought that he'd become the poster boy for academic freedom."

But Churchill is far more than that. He has become a contested media icon, an over-coded ideological signifier, with different resonances for different audiences. His iconic status was a potential wrapped in a contingency, a marginality transported to the center of national political, cultural and academic life. This academic cause cerebra was technologically-driven, via a non-linear iteration of mediated representations, artifacts (such as audio recordings, answering machine messages, copies of allegedly plagiarized art, news footage), events, media tactics and strategies. As of late March 2005 textual and multi-media representations of Churchill are distributed across thousands of web sites, and blogs. Tactically inept in assessing the effect of his utterances in a multi-media information-distribution environment, an angry, self-absorbed, self-righteous, and bizarrely bumbling Churchill has been an easy target. Here's how Horowitz's cybercronies recently assessed Churchill's (and technology's) usefulness for the right, on another Manichaeistic web site, www.frontpagemag.com. The title of the transcript is "Symposium: Can the University Be Fixed?" (Glazov 2005) Next to the title is this rhetorical invitation that is strongly reminiscent of the Cold War. The site editors invite the readers to send this web page to their personal "ebrigade." On these pages, Glazov and Horowitz's fellow travelers /cybercronies articulate tactics and strategies:

> David Warren Saxe: Fixing universities? . . . How does Ward Churchill fit into this? Administrators . . . open[ed] doors for the unqualified . . . [It's] . . . affirmative action for faculty. . . Ward Churchill would have never been hired . . . unless somebody lowered the standards. How did this "Irish-English" white man get in, he claimed he was an Indian. . .
>
> Schweikart: In most universities . . . the inmates are running the asylum. Every position [that involves] a "women's history" . . . requires . . . radical feminists [who] can hire [only] a radical feminist. The same is seen with "ethnic" or "minority" hires . . .
>
> Kerney: Step One in reforming colleges and universities: Technology [is] enabling a dramatic power [shift in] information gate-keeping . . . . The next step . . . is to increase broadband . . . accelerate . . . ubiquitous fast wireless [in] education. When kids come to college with values far removed from that of their professors . . .and are equipped with sufficient knowledge to deal with . . . professors, then reform will [come] . . .

> Saxe: Technology [will] undermine . . . proselytizing professors . . . (Glazov 2005)

The assumptions of techno-determinism (and the unidirectionality of surveillance and representation that frame this monologue of the like-minded) are inherently suspect. (For example, Horowitz, who shares with Churchill the intemperance that comes with Manichaeistic zealotry, has recently been caught, by other advocacy websites, such as Media Matters, seriously misrepresenting student complaints at Foothills College and the University of Northern Colorado). And, given what we know about social change, it's also fair to say that those who smugly advocate a technologically-driven historical determinism will run afoul of the law of unintended consequences. It's equally fair to say that these right-of-center activists have substantial funding, allies across a number of institutions, from academe to corporatist media (such as Murdoch's Fox News) and astute mentors, in think-tanks, public relations and politics. Taken as a whole, it's easy to discern a well-coordinated, and very determined tactical and strategic "game plan," writ large. Much of the overall strategy is enabled by a continuous panspectral collection of data, images, audio, and text, as we witnessed in Churchill's ongoing case. Dataveillance is a task that Horowitz and his cronies are clearly dedicated to. Melded with finely honed skills (deftly practiced by other tacticians, such as Ted Jackson) in political "brand management," and an impressive range of propaganda techniques that would make the late Edward Bernays proud, it's a formidable, but contestable, mix for shaping "the definition of the situation." Given Churchill's profound ineptness and/or ignorance with the contemporary mix of multi-media formats, the array has plowed Churchill and his ideological allies into "a definition of the situation" akin to permanent stigmatization. Misreading the times, misreading opponents, misreading the effects of his own words and stance, Churchill has facilitated this degradation ceremony, and by association, of all of those who support him out of pre-set ideological commitments. How can it be otherwise when a recording (and the associated transcript) of Churchill (2003), giving public advice to a white male on committing acts of terrorism on U.S. national soil as recently as August 2003 at Seattle's Left Bank Bookstore, is easily available on the Internet? Here's a critical section:

> Question from [white male in the] audience: 'Why did it take a bunch of Arabs to do what you all should have done a long time ago,' that's my question.
>
> Churchill: I can't find a single reason that you shouldn't in a principled way-there may be some practical considerations, such as do you know how (laughter from audience)-you know, often these things are processes. It's not just an impulse. And certainly it's not just an event. And the simple answer is: You carry the weapon. That's how they don't see it coming. You're the one...They talk about 'color blind or blind to your color.' You said it yourself.
>
> You don't send the Black Liberation Army into Wall Street to conduct an action . . . [or the] American Indian Movement into downtown Seattle. Who do you send? You. Your beard shaved, your hair cut close, and wearing a banker's suit. . . . There's where you start.

With any understanding the current media, information and perceptual environment, you don't intentionally send out Ward Churchill as a public speaker, unless you're allied with David Horowitz. Churchill is the perfect manifestation, and an excellent projection of Horowitz's private Manichean demons. Churchill is the primo poster boy for Horowitz's imagined legions of internal members of "the Fifth Column." Churchill is as useful to Horowitz as Alger Hiss was to a young California Congressman by the name of Richard Nixon. Like Whittaker and Hiss, the mere mention of Churchill's name may well be evoked, in future, to stigmatize citizens who are responsible dissenters. The ramped-up ability to hyper-generate and circulate discrediting accusations, to ply an army of "spoiled identities" upon members of any political opposition is a task that now utilizes the daily detritus of surveillant assemblages. Whether such outputs are accurate or not, whether these outputs impart the truth or frame lies and smears, is not of import, in a tactical sense. For imperfect protocols of pattern recognition means that assemblages serve up data to frame narratives for both imagined and real threats. It's a recipe for an incipient fascism.

Anyone who participates as a public intellectual in the early-twenty-first century must do so tactically, in a media-savvy manner, knowing that the multi-media surveillant assemblage is, well, continuously assembling, and then redistributing. It assembles and distributes, in sometimes surprising iterations, traces of utterances, images, sounds, motion and deeds. Inputs must be soberly assessed. We can assume that they will have unintended audiences. In the post-9/11 "society of insecurity," the outputs of the assemblage meld with the fears of "an endless war" that frame our Manichean moment. Within a generation, it may well be that a Horowitzian Manichaeism (with an enhanced, technologically-enabled dataveillance capability) ostensibly brought forth to protect us from the less sophisticated

Manichaeism offered up by ideological and tactical dinosaurs of the 1970s, may well become the entrenched "Fifth Column," the enemy of freedom, that we will come, in short order, to fear and loath the most.

Counter-Tactics: Media Literacy in a Networked Age

In a recent article in The Academic Exchange Quarterly (2004), I first discussed some of the problems inherent in current and general modes of K-16 learning and testing, in the United States:

> Often, educational practices emphasize due deference and imitation . . . Students are taught [to perform for] externally defined rewards . . . and to appropriate masks of docility. . . Standard notions of learning function as an academic version of bulimia. Students are expected to "binge," obediently taking in "foreign" ideas and then ritually purging in a frenzy of test-taking. While developing a type of tractability . . . this approach frequently mistakes short-term memorization for the ability to create, apply and learn . . .

The article goes on to discuss the theoretical underpinnings, and practical assignments that are intended to create what Roland Barthes called "the writerly text." Such "texts" are the active construction of creative and alternative meanings that emerge from a fuller recognition of and engagement with mediated and textual products. In effect, students learn to recognize, and then deconstruct conventional assemblages of meaning. Post-analysis, they are encouraged to assemble new narratives, in the manner of the Levi-Straussian bricoleur.

Depending on the particular form of media, there are various ways to stimulate critical engagement. For example, if the object for analysis consists of local news reports, a detailed analysis that tracks visuals, via formal media protocols, can be useful. Such protocols emphasize the recognition and tracking of themes, images, tropes, and narrative segments. When properly taught, students begin move from the habits of distraction so common to media reception. In place of these distracted habits, students, taking the news as an object for analysis, begin to note the intertext that forms between the visual and auditory tracks. They also begin to apprehend the fact that the production of news involves the routinization of the nonroutine. They also begin to realize that the resulting construction (of a news item) is often an expression of the institutional priorities of ratings, news consultants, advertisers and political ideologists, rather than any kind of neutral window out into the world.

If the activity involves analyses of films, or cable television products, the ready availability of many scripts, plus the manipulative ease of the DVD format, can be easily melded with various semiotic approaches. Most films appropriate (or re-appropriate) a conventional stable of signifiers and signification patterns around a number of socio-cultural roles and scripts. Such stables of representational patterns usually include narratives around gender roles, race, class, and ethnicity, the market, the nature of social relations, as well as incorporating de facto ideologies of legitimacy and rationales for the exercise of various modes of power. The guts of this approach can also be applied to analyses of video games. The current generation of video games, exemplified by such popular products as Grand Theft Auto, Advanced Battlegrounds, and Mercenaries are, in many ways, distinctive artifacts of this particular cyber-Manichean moment. Semiotic analyses can explore the mimetic connections between cybernetic games, the Marinetti-like goal of remote, cybernetic warfare, and current Manichean-derived geopolitical discourse, policy and practice.

Other forms of analyses can take, as an object of study, the difference between the social construction of fact (as a form of truth telling), the propagation of opinion, and the creeping conflation of raw opinion with what Foucault called "games of truth." An additional and worthy task would be tracking current forms of pseudo-argumentation and emotive appeals that mimic historically recognizable forms of propaganda. For pedagogical and political purposes, a key consideration would be to track how such techniques have been smartly refitted for twenty-first century modes of representation and commodification.

While hardly exhaustive of approaches and techniques, this brief list embodies two urgent themes. First, we can identify the project as that of a reflexive cyber-epistemology. Cybernetic authentication networks and mediated worlds constitute much of how we know what we know. As technical ensembles and media formats change, our ways of apprehending and making sense of ourselves, and the world around us, concurrently change. On the most generalized level, all levels of schooling have done an inadequate job incorporating reflexive media literacy into curriculum. The result is a generation of students that may use technology, yes, but does not comprehend how such the formats of these market-based consumer technologies shape their worlds - their meaning, their identity, their

ideology and their engagement or disengagement with conventional and emergent forms of politics.

The second urgent theme is an iteration of an ancient motif. In an age of simulation, interconnectivity, and the increasing implosion of the virtual into the real, what does it really mean, in such an age, to tell the truth? It's a question that is threaded through all the pedagogical techniques and approaches described above. It motivates the deeper, more necessary but less accessible processes of self-interrogation and honest confrontation. It is a question that will have to be insistently asked, and the subsequent answers must be incisively queried, and requeried, in the years to come.

Coda

I end this essay with a moral tale: It's instructive to remember the late Arthur Miller's mid-1950s refusal to "name names" in testimony to the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Far from a pathological gesture of pacifism (as Churchill would have it), Miller successfully fought the contempt of Congress citation. Subsequently, Miller (2003) was able to universalize his experience, through his play, The Crucible. Far from segregating the moral and political message to "politically correct" audiences, the play has broad cross-cultural, cross-national appeal, and is widely produced in a variety of languages. Miller still speaks to and for a global audience that recognizes such configurations, allegorically exposing encounters with Manichaeistic moments past and present, and the damage done. When we encounter these dueling projections of the Manichaeistic impulse, represented by Churchill and Horowitz, in the interstices of our daily lives, we would do well to remember Miller's cautionary tale, about the terrible cost of this form of boundary construction and maintenance, as we go about our professional and personal lives.

Endnotes

1. For purposes of discussion, Boyte's definition of the Manichean impulse will suffice:

> American politics is now framed in Manichean terms associated with the mobilization of "innocents" against "evil doers" across the spectrum. Citizen groups on the left [and] right, demonize their opponents and proclaim their own virtues. . .What is left out of citizenship . . . is the concept of the citizen as a creative, intelligent, and, above all, "political" agent. . . someone able to negotiate diverse views and interests for the sake of accomplishing some public task.

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Virtual Economics and Twenty-First Century Leisure

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Why MMPOGS?

Is it possible that innovations in late-twentieth and early-twenty-first socio-economies have shifted the division between work and leisure? Moreover, might a shift have occurred not just in the time we devote to these activities—expanding and contracting both, ironically expanding work time for those who then have the most resources for newly truncated leisure time and doing the inverse to others—but also in the imaginations we carry into both?[1]

Collectively we imagine how our selves should operate in work and leisure time; what activities are appropriate, what attitudes are relevant, what actions fit in one but not the other and so on. We know how we conceive our selves and are confident we know how others conceive their selves in these realms, and we act on this knowledge constantly reacting to the expected and unexpected events we encounter, adjusting our knowledges and constructing our world as we go (Barnes 2000). In this way we generate a widely dispersed, objective and yet ever changing understanding of the self relevant to times we are working (paid or unpaid) and times we are playing (enjoyably or not). What might we ask of this collective construction in the light of the emergence of virtuality? There is not the space here to justify the assertion that virtuality has developed various social and cultural structures that are connected to but are yet often somewhat different from the social and cultural structures of reality and this claim will be taken as a basis for discussion. In addition, this exploration will itself help to add evidence to whether such a distinction may hold and, if so, what relations might be found (Jordan 1999; Jordan and Taylor 2004).

This paper offers some insight by focusing on one of the most virtual realms of all; massive multiplayer online games (mmpogs). Such games consist of up to thousands of individuals seated at computers that may be anywhere in the world as long as they are connected to the Internet. The really seated individuals then enter virtual worlds, using software on their computers to connect over the Internet to servers that co-ordinate and construct environments, in which they inhabit a graphical representation, or avatar, which they can use for communication and various actions. Such worlds as Everquest (swords and sorcery theme), Toon Town (children and cartoons), World of Warcraft Online (more swords and sorcery), and Star Wars Galaxy (ahem star wars) offer themes which inform the abilities characters gain. In Everquest one might be Fjalia Moonlover, the cute elf ranger, able to join groups, fire arrows, slay mythical beasts and follow quests, while in Star Wars Galaxy one might become Bobbbaaee Fetter, the bounty hunter, able to join groups, fire lasers, slay mythical star-themed beasts and follow star wars quests.

These worlds, however adventurous and absurd, represent the closest to a social virtual reality that the early-twenty-first century offers. In these worlds thousands wander and hundreds may gather together to work or fight. The characters appear as three-dimensional and move through environments rendered with various degrees of care and skill but all producing the unmistakable illusion that there is another place out-there—a world. The all-too-real sense that there is a 'there' there produces a strange situation in relation to play, for the generation of a society in persistent virtual worlds produces all the obligations of a social world within what should be fantasy play-time, ostensibly freed from mundane obligations so that pleasure may be produced.

The economics of these worlds are attractive to corporations as they combine one-off software purchases

as well as monthly subscriptions. When someone decides they wish to become Fjalia Moonlover then they have to first purchase the game, as you purchase any computer game; second, they have to ensure they have computer hardware and an internet connection that will cope with the game; finally, they have to pay a monthly subscription fee. As games develop, some major new pieces of software may emerge and are either given to players or require a new purchase of the software. This combination of regular income with one-off injections makes any mmpog with a strong population a potentially strong income-generator. Against this the corporation running the mmpog must maintain servers and customer support that are not needed or not needed in the same way for nonnetworked games.

Mmpogs may be, for two reasons, a privileged case for analyzing changes produced by the emergence of virtuality in the division of work and leisure. The first, already suggested above, is that they are the most advanced social form of virtual reality widely available. The second is the point just raised that play has been produced with a community as an essential, integral component and that this potentially reintroduces many of the mundane or onerous aspects of commitment to a community that play is designed to release us from, even for a short time.

Within this context of persistent worlds, which generate income flows for the corporations who own and produce the worlds, there have emerged schemes for selling virtual goods for real currency. This paper takes up a case study of the economics of one game and one server in which this occurs to make comments about the relation of work to the pleasures of mmpogs. To conduct this, after having made these preliminary remarks situating the appropriateness of mmpogs for such questions, I will first briefly outline previous work on virtual and real world economics. Second, I will outline a case study of the Prydwen server for European Dark Age of Camelot (DAOC). Finally, I will draw some initial conclusions concerning exploitation and play in virtual worlds.

Real and Virtual Economics

It is not my intention to outline in full real and virtual economics and their interaction. Such a topic in-total is clearly beyond current concerns. Instead the specific set of economics under the microscope here are the exchange of virtual items created within persistent game worlds for real currency and what this might reveal about play and work in mmpogs. A brief explanation of the mechanics of this is in order.

In nearly all persistent worlds various virtual commodities are produced. First, most worlds have a currency. In the world I studied, the Prydwen server for European Dark Age of Camelot, this currency is expressed as copper, silver, gold, platinum, and mithril, with the key currencies being gold and platinum which have the relationship of 1,000 gold equalling 1 platinum. Gold is obtained from killing monsters, who drop the currency to be looted when they die, or from selling other virtual items. There is a second source of funds in the items that are created within the game. These may be things like a an Arcanium Cudgel of Obvious Truth or the Axe of Mindless Rage, [2] and such items are either dropped from monsters, made by player-crafters or gained as a reward from a quest. Finally, in most games players must kill monsters or do quests to gain experience. As experience grows a player's character gains levels and new powers. Usually there is a cap with DAOC finishing levelling at 50, though there are then other ladders to climb. In summary, there are three sources of value in most mmpogs: currency, items and character experience. All these sources of value can be sold for real world currency, most often via the medium of Ebay but also from websites, irc-contacts or online fora from which professional and semiprofessional companies offer services.

One point is that this activity is often, though not always, illegal. The company that owns the game most often asserts ownership of all items produced within the game. That means that in return for paying subscription and one-off fees, players effectively rent all things within the persistent world from the owning company. Even items or currency created or produced by the player is considered, by the company, to be the company's property. Most company's also make it illegal to put their virtual property up for sale due to the perceived deleterious effect on the game. They try to prevent players paying with real currency to gain items, experience or in-game currency that other players have to play to gain because this undermines the game design. Some companies take action to prevent exchanges of real currency for virtual. For example in March 2005 Blizzard, who run European World of Warcraft, claimed to have unilaterally banned over 800 accounts, stripping players of access to their characters because they claimed to have evidence players had been involved in selling in-game currency. In contrast in early-2005, Sony announced it would open an auction house that allowed players to sell virtual goods for real currency on some designated servers for Everquest II. They also planned to take a percentage from each transaction (Sony 2005). Though experimented with in some smaller mmpogs, Sony's move represents the first large-scale mmpog to legitimize the trade of virtual for real currency. It received a mixed reaction, being vehemently attacked by Mark Jacobs, the CEO of Mythic Entertainment

who run the game Dark Age of Camelot analyzed in this paper. Jacobs stated:

> We remain committed to keeping our games as games and not as opportunities to encourage behavior that runs counter to their spirit of creativity and entertainment. We have no plans to participate in this type of service. We will gladly "leave money on the table" to ensure that whether or not you like our games, that they remain as that, games and not an entertainment version of day-trading. (Game Daily 2005)

Jacobs articulates a clean divide between leisure and work, arguing the game stops being a game once you import into it possibilities for real earnings. As indicated by Jacobs' attitude, in my case study trading real currency for virtual commodities was formally illegal but had never to my knowledge been acted against. The paradox here is that if the generation of values that are sold were a pleasurable part of the game, why would anyone pay real currency to avoid having to play that part of the game? We shall return to these points later. Here it is simply useful to note this legal position as part of the context.

Edward Castranova produced the pioneering study of such virtual goods economies. Exploring the mmpog Everquest some of his headline conclusions were that the normal hourly wage to be made selling virtual items was, in 1999, $3.42 USA per hour and that the GNP per capita of his virtual world was equivalent to Russia's (Castranova 2001). An example of Castranova's (2001) work is the following:

> A wage of $3.42 is insufficient to sustain Earth existence for many people. Many users spend upwards of 80 hours per week in Norrath, hours of time input that are not unheard of in Earth professions. In 80 hours, at the average wage, the typical user generates Norrathian cash and goods worth $273.60. In a month, that would be over $1,000, in a year over $12,000. The poverty line for a single person in the United States is $8,794. Economically speaking, there is little reason to question, on feasibility grounds at least, that those who claim to be living and working in Norrath, and not Earth, may actually be doing just that. (P. 36)

Castranova (2001) also calculated the exchange rate between Everquest platinum and the US dollar; 1 platinum piece being worth .01072 USD in September 2001 , as well as other macro-economic indicators (pp. 31-2). His overall conclusions pointed toward the growth of virtual goods economies, possibly fast and large growth.

In a less academic vein, Julien Dibbell (1999), who previously wrote one of the seminal accounts of online life in his account of cyberape, published a blog of his year long adventure buying and selling virtual goods in Ultima Online. Reading through his year long adventure offers as visceral a way as possible of exploring the life of the virtual goods seller. Similarly to Castranova, Dibbell suggests such a profession is possible. He reported a post-tax profit of £3,917 for one month, suggesting a comfortable income of around £46,000 a year might be possible (Dibbell 2004).

In the next section I will present data from a similar case study to Castranova's, which I do not believe contradicts his, or Dibbell's, work in any substantial way. However, Castranova's aim was to establish the validity of such enquiries. The aim of this case study will be to add a few more empirical bricks in a wall originally constructed by Castranova and, perhaps more significantly, to suggest a theorization of exploitation and play based on such economic behavior.

Mid-Pryd

Dark Age of Camelot is a swords and sorcery themed mmpog which emerged in the USA but was licensed to a French Company (Goa, owned by Wannadoo) which produced French, German, Italian and Spanish language versions and ran servers in all those languages, as well as European based English-language servers. There were two English language servers named Excalibur and Prydwen, which opened in February 2003. I investigated sales of virtual goods on Prydwen, where I was also conducting a sustained ethnographic investigation as well as having a lot of fun. Data was taken from www.ebay.com and www.ebay.co.uk concerning sales of virtual goods in August 2004, November 2004 and February 2005. I conducted two surveys in February, one that predated the release of a major competitor game, World of Warcraft, and one that postdated that release. These two later surveys were conducted 17 days apart.

In August there appeared to be one company called Xroadgames offering a full range of services (also selling in other games) with some small scale competitors offering limited services. By November a second company, FavGames, was directly competing with Xroadgames over the full range of services. By late Februrary 2005 both companies had stopped selling services for DAOC Prydwen. This reflected the release of World of Warcraft which

negatively affected player numbers on European DAOC in early 2005. Xroadgames and Favgames both closed their Ebay stores and Xroadgames closed its website, offering only the claim that it was being redeveloped. Favgames continued its website though no longer offering services for Prydwen, but for some DAOC USA servers and for other games such as World of Warcraft, Lineage 2 and Everquest 2.

I recorded data for both companies in regard to exchange rates between DAOC gold and real world currencies. In addition, I conducted one case study for Xroadgames in July 2004 of their total selling via ebay. I shall report first on exchange rates and possible wages. I will then explore the case study of Xroadgames.

Both Favgames and Xroadgames offered for sale on Ebay various amounts of Prydwen gold. These appeared on Ebay as fixed offerings to be accessed via the 'buy now'[3] option for such amounts as 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50 platinum with each amount offering a small discount for buying larger lots. Xroadgames also records a one-off purchase, most likely privately arranged between buyer and Xroadgames, for 90 platinum. The exchange rates are calculated by averaging out these different offerings.

Exchange Rates (one real currency buys x Prydwen gold)

US Dollar			
	Average	**Xroadgames**	**Favgames**
Aug-04	135.30	N/A	N/A
Nov-04	185.45	197.20	173.69
Feb-05 (pre-wow)	281.71	295.00	273.73
Feb-05 (post-wow)	324.09	358.15	296.84

GBPound			
	Average	**Xroadgames**	**Favgames**
Aug-04	247.46	N/A	N/A
Nov-04	348.97	369.67	328.28
Feb-05 (pre-wow)	530.72	555.76	515.70
Feb-05 (post-wow)	613.96	678.49	562.34

Euro			
	Average	**Xroadgames**	**Favgames**
Aug-04	165.78	N/A	N/A
Nov-04	244.04	258.51	229.56
Feb-05 (pre-wow)	365.36	382.60	355.01
Feb-05 (post-wow)	423.19	467.67	387.61

The collapse of the Prydwen gold standard is clearly evident in these figures. Whereas in August 2004 one US dollar bought 135.30 Prydwen gold, just before the release of WoW it had doubled in value, buying 281.71 gold. In the pre-WoW period the effect of Favgames entry into the market seems clear. Favgames continually undercut Xroadgames in a maneuver that drove the value of Prydwen gold down, until WoW delivered the coup de grace and both companies left the business of buying and selling Prydwen gold.

A calculation can be developed from these figures to analyze potential wages. I will outline this theoretical income and then check it against the real income for Prydwen for Xroadgames in July 2004. For the purposes of the in-principle analysis it will be useful to take only August 2004 and February 2005 (pre-WoW) into account; similarly, I will restrict currencies to the US Dollar and will forego separating Xroadgames from Favgames as no additional point will be made by continuing to do so.

An abstract definition of an hourly wage for supplying Prydwen gold is generated based on a number of

assumptions. First, I propose it is possible to generate two platinum per hour of uninterrupted game time. This figure is arguable however it represents a reasonable estimate based on discussions with players. Discussion of what type of work this represents will follow in the next section. Second, it will be assumed that all platinum that are produced will be sold. That is, it will be assumed that someone working 8 hours per day producing 16 platinum per day is able to sell all they produce. This assumption will be controlled for when discussing the real income of Xroadgames immediately after this section.

Wage for Selling Gold: in-principle

US Dollar			
	Amount Sold (plat)	**Wage per Hour**	**Weekly Wage****
Aug-04			
	2	19.99	799.60
	10	14.00	559.92
	30	13.27	530.67
Average		15.11	604.41
Average gross annual income*			29,011.46
Feb-05 (pre-wow)			
	5	7.34	293.74
	10	6.41	256.21
	30	7.72	308.96
Average		7.28	291.34
Average gross annual income*			13,984.49

*Assumes 48 working weeks.
**Assumes 40 hours work per week.

The official 2004 Federal poverty line for a single under-65 person in the USA was $9,827. (USDHH, 2004) This means that until the competition between Favgames and Xroadgames there was, at least, an in-principle possibility that working 40 hours per week generating Prydwen platinums could fund a liveable income for a single person. Neither figure approaches the $46,000 pa figure Dibbell generated as a possibility, but there are other factors at play here such as the size of the market. My figures, however, make unrealistic assumptions concerning the ability to sell all gold that can be produced and make no allowance for variations in work effort, server stability, Internet stability and many other factors. To control for this and examine a realistic view, a case study of Xroadgames at its most favorable time (just before August 2004) was undertaken.

We need to now take into account income from other factors than gold. Xroadgames in the month of July 2004, in relation to the Prydwen server of Euro DAOC, sold all three virtual game commodities; gold, experience and items. Experience was in the form of levelling, which means you could hire Xroadgames to take over a character of your own and level that character up or you could buy a level 50 character that had been created by Xroadgames. Items were mainly respec stones, which allow a character to change the skills that they have learned, and some rare items. For Prydwen, there were 50 sales of all three commodities, which constituted 56% of Xroadgames total Ebay business for that month.

The figures for July 2004 offer the possibility of an annual gross income of approximately $70,000 for only 56% of Xroadgames' business. We should note this was possibly the optimum time for Xroadgames on Prydwen with a lack of competitors and a reasonably healthy server population, also being July this is a peak month on Prydwen for player numbers as it is school holidays for many nations but before the most common periods for holiday trips away from computer access. To truly understand these returns for Xroadgames however we need to inject further

real world factors. There are two ways of understanding this business: first, could a company conduct this business themselves?; second, what profit can be made from subcontracting and buying services from other players and then selling virtual goods on? To generate some figures here, I will focus solely on generating gold and levelling characters from 1-50, because it is possible to make reasonable assumptions about the most efficient time in which to conduct these activities. As already stated, we can assume gold can be generated at the rate of two platinum per hour. From experience of power-levelling, that is utilizing the most ruthlessly efficient levelling means, we can assume 36 working hours to raise a character from 1-50. [4]

Sales: July 2004 Xroad Games

US Dollar			
	Number	**Amount Virtual**	**Amount US Dollar**
Gold	38	480,500 gold	3,391.68
Experience	11	Ten lvl50, 45 sundry other levels	2,453.00
Items	4	N/A	139.97
Total*	50		5,984.65

*Some sales were for multiple commodities.

Time: July 2004 Xroadgames

Prydwen Platinum			
	Number/Amount	**Time needed***	
		Hours	8 Hour Days
Gold	480	240	30
Experience	10 x 1-50 levels	360	45
Total		600	75

*Two plat = 1 hour, 1-50 = 36 hours

There were only 22 working days in July 2004. The seemingly large income of $5,984 per month is accordingly impossible for one person, who would have to have worked 19 hours per day for every day in the month. If three people shared the work, taking 25 days each and thus working the odd weekend or night, then they would each receive just under $2,000 gross per month. This produces a low but potentially viable annual income.

The second possibility, which is not mutually exclusive to the first, is that Xroadgames subcontracts. No figure for how much Xroadgames would pay for levelling were obtained, but it became known that in November 2004 Xroadgames would pay 2.2USD per platinum. This produces a difficulty as by November prices for platinum were dropping and it may well be that Xroadgames had already dropped its buying price. To control somewhat for this possibility I will assume payment of both 2.2 and 3USD per platinum.

With income from selling gold being 57% of the Prydwen business we can extrapolate that, if profit is made from reselling levelling experiences at the same rate as profit is made from reselling gold, then a possible total income from sub-contracting Pyrdwen services in one month could have been: 4,096 or 3,422USD. This translates into gross income of between 41,000 USD and 49,000USD, which coincides with Dibbell's high rather than Castranova's low annual income findings.

It is impossible to entirely accurately calculate the time needed to make the fifty transactions Xroadgames would have to have made to conduct such a subcontracting business. However, most gold trades require an Ebay auction to be set, the gold to be bought and payment confirmed. Once this occurs contact is made between buyer

and Xroadgames, via E-mail or online chat, and a mutual time is arranged at which Xroadgames logs on a character who passes the platinum to the character notified to Xroadgames. Even assuming some difficulties in connecting and missed arrangements, this process does not seem hugely time consuming. Passing on a levelled character would be even quicker, as it involves sending account details and does not require meeting in-game. Xroadgames must also, of course, spend time paying its subcontractors and meeting with them to exchange goods. However, these would be similar in form to Xroadgame's meetings with buyers. This rough analysis suggests that running such a business might well be within the potential of one or at the very most two people.

Sub-contracted Gold: July 2004

Prydwen Platinum and US Dollars			
	Amount	**Cost 2.2 per plat**	**Cost 3 per plat**
Gold Bought (expenditure)	480	1,056.00	1,440.00
Gold Sold (income)	480	3,391.68	3,391.68
Profit		2,335.68	1,951.68

Many assumptions have had to be made. For example, the most favorable business scenario is that of subcontracting but a pure subcontracting business assumes there are enough players willing to be subcontractors. It is far more likely that a mixture of subcontracting and 'in-house' generation of virtual goods will be stable and profitable. This was partially confirmed for Xroadgames when a player posted on a forum:

> The guy who is running Xroadgames is (used to be) in my old Alb/Excal [realm of Albion on Excalibur server] guild. I know him pretty well, and yes, let me tell you that he does treat it as a real job. During the weekdays he and his partner roams ToA [Trials of Atlantis, an area in DAOC], the two or three of them controlling an FG [full group] of farm classes (clerics, theurgists, paladins) and going around and getting artifacts they sell for RL [real life] money. (Anon. 2005, brackets added)

This points out that at least two people can be considered members of Xroadgames and that they spend some time creating value themselves. Given the difficulties of time noted above, however, it is certain that Xroadgames also involved itself in sub-contracting.

This analysis largely confirms Castranova and Dibbell's findings that businesses selling virtual goods are viable. It seems likely these are not going to be hugely profitable as it must be kept in mind most of the income figures given in my research are gross. This somewhat contradicts Dibbell's findings and Castranova's optimism but the figures are not solid enough to make completely firm conclusions. While such empirical work has, hopefully, some value in-itself, there remains the question of what this means and how these findings relate to questions of work and play.

Marx and Virtual Capitalists

While much has so far been said about profit, little about work and play has become clear. To return to the analysis of modern play and work, we need to gradually reverse our view from that of the business, which has been necessarily dominant in the previous section, to the player. There are two paths I wish to follow to approach issues of pleasure and work. First, we can look at the generation of value and try to track what that tells us about this economic process. Second, we can extend this discussion beyond the sometimes theoretically vexed issues of the creation of value to grasp at a broader understanding. I shall take these steps in turn.

First, in relation to the generation of value in immaterial commodities I need to specify this a little more by noting that I am addressing here a specific moment in economic cycles: that of the production of value and profit through the production of virtual goods. It is worth noting that this moment exists in a wider context, one which is reasonably well-articulated as three interlocking circuits of technology, marketing and culture which dominate virtual commodities (Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and Peuter 2003; Jordan 2004). Within this context I am exploring a quite specific point however, and I will leave Kline et al.'s analysis in the background.

We can begin our analysis by looking at profit, for even though there is a well- known disjunction between profit and the creation of new value—whole warehouses of new value can be created but until sold there is no profit—profit provides a first insight into sources of value. In my analysis there are two sources of profit. The first involves subcontracting in which the company uses the buy-low and sell-high road to profit. Such buy-low and sell-high tactics do not explain the generation of value; they refer to one means of extracting profit while, by definition, not adding value to the economic system as a whole. It would be foolish of virtual games entrepreneurs to ignore such a source of income but for our purposes this income relies on slightly deeper processes which produce the value that can be exchanged in the first place.

It also seems obvious where and how the production of value occurs from which entrepreneurs can then seek profit. Let me explain one of the most efficient ways to gain gold in DAOC. There is a dungeon called Darkness Falls inhabited by monsters (software controlled avatars) which, when killed, drop seals. These can be looted and accumulated by the player who kills a monster. Once enough seals are accumulated there are merchants in the dungeon who will sell armor, weapons or items for the seals. Once someone has looted enough seals and bought a load of armor or weapons, they then turn this all over to a crafting character who has used the system DAOC has implemented to allow players to learn to make items. With a crafter of high enough skill there are abilities other than making armor or weapons, which include the ability to salvage items; that is, to break them down into blocks of virtual raw materials. A crafter can turn the armor or weapons bought with seals looted in Darkness Falls into a load of metal and then turn that metal into various objects, usually hinges, which can be sold for gold to a nonplayer merchant (that is another software controlled avatar). Putting together the right team and farming seals quickly and then salvaging them is close to the quickest way of gaining gold in DAOC, though there are other methods.

This example shows that the production of value resolves to the player, not to the virtual goods entrepreneur. The entrepreneur can enter into this value production or can buy the product of a player's labor but new value embodied in various virtual goods—themselves reflecting entries in databases which are given graphical representation in the game-world—is the product of players' labor. This labor consists of the time players put into producing virtual commodities. We can now define these two economic positions: the entrepreneur who makes profit through buying other's labor or selling the products of their own labor or the player who produces commodities through their own labour. On first view, the virtual goods entrepreneur, like Xroadgames, looks very much like a combination of a petty bourgeois and a small artisan. To the extent that the entrepreneur buys and sells, they do not own the means of production which produced the value they seek to buy or sell and hence they operate very much as a petty bourgeois. To the extent that the entrepreneur invests their own labor they come across as a small artisan—that figure of precapitalist times—who owns their own means of production. The position of the player is analogous to this second part of the entrepreneur's work: the small artisan self-production. At first sight, and there is much insight here, mmpogs produce an economy that is precapitalist, something of an appropriate situation for games like DAOC that are themed on preindustrial or medieval times. However, there is a significant difference to the real artisans Marx (1976) analyzed, who were embedded in guild systems.

> The medieval guild system ... is a limited and yet inadequate form of the relationship between capital and wage-labor. It involves relations between buyers and sellers. Wages are paid and masters, journeymen and apprentices encounter each other as free persons. The technological basis of their relationship is handicraft, where the more or less sophisticated use of tools is the decisive factor in production. ... The master does indeed own the conditions of production—tools, materials,and so on—and he owns the product. To that extent he is a capitalist. But it is not as a capitalist that he is master. He is an artisan in the first instance and is supposed to be a master of his craft. ... his approach to his apprentices and journeymen is not that of a capitalist, but of a master of his craft, and by virtue of that fact he assumes a position of superiority in the corporation and hence towards them. It follows that his capital is restricted in terms of the form it assumes, as well as in value. It is far from achieving the freedom of capital proper. It is not a definite quantum of objectified labor, value in general, at liberty to assume this or that form of the conditions of labour depending on the form of living labor it acquires in order to produce surplus labor. (P. 1029)

Marx points here both to a phenomenon very close to the players who are producing value in mmpogs but also provides us with a crucial distinction. The value produced by players and entrepreneurs is not restricted in its form; it does achieve the 'freedom of capital proper'. This can be seen in the ability to transform virtual value into real world profit, the ability to trade this capital freely within the game, and the lack of any social system of masters, journeymen and apprentices. This may seem slightly paradoxical as crafters in the game do need to learn their skill by crafting, yet this is not in any way controlled—any player can take up a craft and through perseverance rise to the highest levels. The production of virtual commodities does not occur within a guild or master relationship, using Marx's analysis we

can conclude that each player is formally a capitalist.

Inside DAOC, and most likely inside the majority of mmpogs—even acknowledging some differences between mmpogs—each player owns the means of production. Every player has the ability to generate value and they gain this ability simply by playing the game. The means of creating value are universally owned in mmpogs. Each and every player can conduct the process I noted above to gain seals and salvage them, generating capital they are free to dispose. There are more or less efficient means of generating an income. For example, a solo player will gain the highest seals much more slowly than a player who can simultaneously play two characters. However, a solo player can choose other routes. For example, there are rare and highly valuable items that drop from monsters. A solo player can kill many such monsters, though not all, and then sell the items that drop. The occasional lucky break with a rare scroll dropping can generate sudden huge sums. This will be higher risk than the certainty of farming seals but it can also lead to large profits. The point is that each and every player, merely by entering the game, is gifted the means of production. They can exploit this means to a greater or lesser extent but there is no possibility of exclusion from such means.

The resulting conclusion from this is that within mmpogs there is only one factor that fundamentally determines the production of value: time. Two points underline this. First, the techniques for efficiently producing virtual value are generally known, through fora and player communication, and they require only time to master. If one reads and becomes convinced that the best team for producing gold by farming seals should be a shield-warrior, shaman and legendary grand master weapon crafter[5] then the only factor stopping someone achieving this within the game is the time needed to create and equip each of these. Second, the raw materials of virtual production—seals, rare scrolls—never run out. As is often said of mmpogs, these are economies in which the taps are full on; the more monsters you kill, the more seals or scrolls you will receive and the rate at which they drop will remain constant. This all means that, speaking specifically within the game context, value production is measured solely in time.

The translation of such time into value and then profits measured in real currencies begins to introduce further factors which unbalance the equality of access to means of production. For example, in the ideal team for farming seals I noted three characters but only two (warrior and shaman) ever need to be in-game at the same time. This means two accounts and the technical infrastructure to run two accounts simultaneously would be needed. I can do this with a laptop and desktop pc parked next to each other and one character on each, but I found it too hard to manage this by running both accounts on the one pc. [6] One barrier to full participation in this form of production is affording the real world cash to pay for two accounts and highly enough specified machinery. Similarly, to turn oneself into an entrepreneur requires the means of buying and selling, within a semilegal if not overtly illegal, context. Ebay solves much of this but it requires a further time investment.

A further point emerges here that might draw us toward the interpretation of players in mmpogs as artisans or petty bourgeois rather than as capitalists, for technically each player rents their means of production from the company they pay subscriptions to. Entering the game is the condition for becoming a virtual capitalist and entry to the game is controlled by the company who keeps the game running and demands fees to rent time in the virtual world. This is an important point but should draw us not toward medieval times, as the social system of guilds is quite simply absent, but to a form we might think is like a 'rentier capitalist'. However, this also does not quite work as in some theories the rentier capitalist is thought of as being akin to a stock owner, someone who owns capital that is invested in a business but does not take part in running the business. The renting of the means of production in the context of mmpogs is not like that. Rather, these virtual means of production should be understood as being integral to living this particular form of virtual life; it is not possible for someone to choose not to have the means of production; they can choose not to exercise them as vigorously as others but it is impossible to enter DAOC and not, at that exact moment, be given virtual capitalist status. It is not the means of production that are rented by the player, rather it is the means of virtual existence; becoming a capitalist is a part of renting a virtual life. Even taking into account that the virtual life is itself a rented one, allowing the company that owns the game to seek exploitation and profit from the players, the way the player operates within the game in terms of the production of value should be termed as capitalist. This status then underpins any attempt to translate virtual capitalist status into a combined real and virtual capitalist status, by selling virtual goods.

Access to the game means the gifting of the means of production to all players and the only restriction on the production of value in-game is time. For example, during my ethnographic immersion within the game I reached a point at which I was playing less and less, due to real world commitments, but the items needed by my characters to compete evenly were becoming hideously rare or expensive due to changes in the game design. My limited time as

a casual player was affecting my enjoyment because I was becoming even more ineffective. I solved this problem, at one point, by buying platinum and spending this on items I needed. In effect, I bought other players' time creating profit for Xroadgames based on their exploitation of either other players or themselves.

It is by excavating the entrepreneurs that we see these economic relations most clearly. The identification of time as the source of value also points us to a wider definition of exploitation than a strictly Marxist one. It is worth pursuing such a broader definition as the peculiar economic circumstances of mmpogs perhaps indicates issues beyond Marxism's focus. But before moving on two caveats are needed.

First, what I have identified as the production of value in the buying and selling of time incarnated as virtual goods should not be taken as the only form of mmpog economic relation. In addition, there are thriving gift economies. I remember passing on items to players and being chased in late December by a friend who wanted to give me a 'Christmas present', which turned out to be one of the rarer rings of Midgard. Such gift economies are common. Games also often provide means of players selling virtual items to each other using in-game currency. DAOC implemented a system of computer-controlled merchants who could hold goods for a player and sell them for pre-determined amounts, when combined with a means of searching these merchants the in-game economy was facilitated. World of Warcraft implemented an auction house which players could place goods on with reserve and buyout prices, again however only for the in-game currency. Second, I am not claiming these economic relations as either unique to or typical of all virtual economies. Clearly time is a major factor in all economies, though for how many time is the only factor in the production of value is a question posed by this analysis. Further work would be needed to compare different virtual economies and various real economic situations. I do however wish to suggest that the universal ownership of the means of production and the reduction of value production to time are typical of DAOC and many mmpogs and is an economic form worth comparing to other virtual and real economies.

I wish to complete this analysis by refusing to let Marxism retain sole possession of the theoretical field. Some will happily assume this is because Marxism is no longer a worthwhile theoretical field itself and may already be puzzled as to why I pursued it. This is not my assumption, though I accept Marxism's flaws are now widely and profoundly known, there remains much valuable work based on various Marxisms Terranova 2004; chapter 3). Instead, I wish to make a different point; which is that Marxism does not exhaust discussion of exploitations. Marxism defines one type of exploitation but there are others (Jordan 1999). The definition of time as the core resource which produces economic activity in mmpogs now provides a basis on which to widen the definition of this activity, particularly by defining more clearly why we might see this as an exploitative relation. It also points us in a, perhaps, unusual theoretical direction.

Heidegger and the Standing-Reserve

Heidegger's work is not at first sight an easy companion to Marx's. Yet, Heidegger's analysis of technology makes some useful remarks which, though not the only or even main point of his analysis, are relevant in exploring the meaning of exploitation in the context I have created. Interestingly they also point up a connection to the environmental movement. First, we should remember that mmpogs involve entirely technologically mediated social relations. This does not mean I am covertly asserting there can be non-technologically mediated social relations, but that the context of mmpogs is one in which technology saturates social relations as their foundation and condition of existence. Having noted this we can turn to Heidegger on technology to find the following comments.

Heidegger (1977) argues that modern science and technology demands "that nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of information" (p. 23). Furthermore, he argues that technology uncovers or unconceals nature as a 'standing-reserve' or as something available to calculation and then to use. This approach, inherent in technology, produces a number of dangers one of which is the following:

> As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. (Heidegger 1977:26-7) [7]

Exploitation is here understood as dehumanization, as the necessity driven by technology and science of treating

human beings as part of the reserve of nature which is able to be coldly calculated and then utilized. This is a point in Heidegger's work at which a connection is made to the modern environmental, particularly the deep ecological movement through the work of Hans Jonas (Wolin 2001). We see here a potentially expanded notion of exploitation which encompasses what I have been arguing is exploitation as time in mmpogs.

We may now reinterpret much of what goes on in mmpogs as players treating themselves as standing-reserves of time. We have now reversed our view from the virtual goods trader to the player and can see that the trader is a special case of the player; the special case in which the standing-reserve of time is translated into profit. The exploitation embodied by treating oneself and others as standing-reserves of time can now be seen to be embedded deeply inside the digital play of persistent worlds. It is not that these worlds are the only ones in which humans are treated as standing-reserves of time, as so many hours to be felled in order to chip value out of humanity, but it is within the virtual realm of persistent game worlds that all become absolutely dependent on treating their subjectivity in this way. This self-exploitation is carried out in part by predefining players through game design as capitalists, in control of their own means of production. Let me offer one final example from DAOC.

Virtual worlds are subject to major upgrades that expand areas or imbue whole new dynamics. DAOC in 2005 was an mmpog older than three years and had by then been subject to five[8] such major upgrades, as well as innumerable patches that adjust and correct. When I began playing the aim was to gain 50 levels, hope to have some good equipment and then to spend time fighting human controlled avatars from opposing realms or in high level encounters against software controlled avatars. By the time of writing, to participate on a reasonably equal basis, particularly in realm war against other human controlled avatars, the following things were roughly needed. [9] Level to 50 at least one of only certain types of characters as some are significantly less powerful than others, though this process has been made considerably easier than the early days. Gain access to a second level 50 character on a different account who is a shaman, this because shaman add spells to other players that considerably enhance abilities, such that not having these enhancements renders one at a significant disadvantage. Design and construct a suit of armour and weapons that maximize one's abilities, this involves first designing and then gaining items from monsters, farming gold to pay for items and to pay crafters to make items and to imbue them with magic. Some items themselves need to be levelled up by killing certain monsters and only when levelled reveal their full abilities, so this must also be done. The nature of such suits has changed with the introduction of new types of bonuses meaning all who designed suits when the expansion Shrouded Isles occurred, had to go through the whole process again and in a more difficult and complicated way after the expansion Trials of Atlantis emerged. A player should also gain master-levels which confer new abilities, of which there are ten and each level of which consists of ten tasks. These levels can only be completed in conjunction with either full groups of eight people or larger raids of multiple groups. Also, there is a need to gain realm ranks by killing player-controlled enemies from which you gain points which, once they accumulate to certain levels, give you access to new abilities; there are twelve levels of this, each level requiring ten stages. None of this involves much except time and some organization, and the organization often itself devolves simply into needing time. A lot of this is fun but can be felt as a significant grind. The fundamental need was to inject time from my life to achieve a state which allowed me, finally, to do what I enjoyed most which was fighting against other human- controlled avatars.

It is this need to farm time that creates the market for virtual goods entrepreneurs, not the unavailability of the goods. The conditions for successful virtual goods entrepreneurs are thus primarily a full population among who will be people who need to make use of others' time. Once the population drops to too low a level, as Prydwen did in early 2005, then there is no market for those such as Xroadgames. We have been able to begin with the professionals of time management in mmpogs and from here uncover some of the more general conditions of leisure in persistent virtual worlds.

The nature of this activity, of the pleasure of play in mmpogs, involves treating oneself as a standing-reserve of time which needs to be farmed. This self-exploitation is strongly, if not primarily, implemented by making each and every player, as a condition of entering the game world, a capitalist. Renting a virtual existence means becoming a virtual capitalist.

Conclusion

Exploitation as time lies embedded within the leisure and game worlds of mmpogs. However strange and fantastic they are-and I spent many hours over years 'being' a stone skinned troll who could fire lightning, use

shields and wield hammers-what we find within mmpogs is the intermingling of forms of work and leisure. Play as employment.

Strangely, this should not be read as play becoming necessarily less pleasurable. Fora associated with games frequently erupt into arguments about whether certain activities within an mmpog are 'fun' or 'a grind needed to get to the fun' and the difference between the two often depends on players' differing definitions of pleasure. The mmpog Planetside took this to its logical conclusion and offered very limited levelling, instead injecting nearly everyone straight into widespread conflict of human-avatar against human-avatar. The nonpersistent world online games, such as Counterstrike, similarly offer an 'off the shelf' experience in which no career is really created within the game. Mmpogs differ from these because the world is persistent and this supports a social and cultural realm that exists virtually, within the imaginary computer and Internet based world, albeit supported by various offline resources.

The collective imagination of leisure and work for those who play in mmpogs is more confused than some would make out. Earlier I quoted Mythic Entertainment's CEO Mark Jacobs criticizing Sony's decision to design into their game a mixture of real and virtual economies. Jacobs clearly distinguished the role of games as being that of 'creativity and entertainment'. My analysis points in a different direction. I argue that the possibility of selling virtual game commodities for real currency is based on design decisions, by company's like Jacobs' own, which predetermine each player to be, formally speaking, a capitalist who possesses their own means of production. The leisure of mmpogs means renting an existence which is, in part, capitalist. However much creativity and entertainment can be gained from mmpogs, the economics of the game cannot be divorced from the universal endowment of ownership of the means of production and the self-exploitation this then mandates as players must farm themselves for time. Within the fantasy and leisure world of mmpogs, the social relations of work reemerge.

What we find within mmpogs is the line between work and leisure shifted such that leisure engages some of the same social structures as work. In the definition of time as standing-reserve as exploitation we find one way in which virtual play realms replicate, if not help produce, relations of virtual and nonvirtual socio-economies.

Endnotes

1. Thanks to Jason Toynbee for comments and to those I have gamed with. Of course, all claims are my own fault.

2. These names are genuine.

3. On Ebay each auction can have an option to 'buy it now' by stating an amount which if paid closes the auction and awards the commodity to the buyer immediately. This is effectively a buy out price in a real auction. In this context the 'buy it now' is actually the primary vehicle with no-one expecting to pay less by participating in an auction because the 'buy it now' and the minimum auction price will be the same.

4. This figure for levelling from 1-50 may well be contested and it is possible there are faster records. It is however based on my only personal experience of a character being levelled and so is at least firmly founded in real experience. For DAOC aficionados, this character was pl'd in the 'old' Moderna days, according to the pbaoe/fop method. This is a method available to Midgard realm only though there are other methods for the two other realms.

5. Warrior and Shaman are types of DAOC characters who work well together in killing high level monsters. I am not asserting this is the best team, though it is likely to be one of the best. I base this assertion on knowledge of such teams, though perhaps the highest claims I ever heard for per hour production of seals was made buy a Shaman Savage team. The basic point that a tank type and a shaman will do well at this particular form of production seems to me incontestable, which does not exclude the definition of better teams or of more complicated debates about how to construct such a team (kobold or troll warrior?).

6. It is technically possible to run two accounts on the one pc but my experience was that this was too difficult on my desktop which did not posses the power to do this efficiently.

7. Heidegger goes on to argue that the second danger is that man then forgets his relation to Being and that this forgetting is the more fundamental danger. There is no need for my analysis to go to this point, though future work I am hopefully involved in will extend consideration of Heidegger and the virtual.

8. Shrouded Isles, Trials of Atlantis, Catacombs, New Frontiers and Housing.

9. They are not compulsory, but my ethnographic record makes clear that all these things, except for one, make realmwar more competitive and the lack of many of them makes a character close to useless in realmwar. The exception is the need to gain realm ranks which becomes progressively harder. I would suggest some realm rank level, perhaps about realm rank five, is close to necessary to remain competitive but becoming the highest ranks is not.

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Italian Fascism between Ideology and Spectacle

Federico Caprotti

In April 1945, a disturbing scene was played out at a petrol station in Piazzale Loreto, in central Milan. Mussolini's body was displayed for all to see, hanging upside down, together with those of other fascists and of Claretta Petacci, his mistress. Directly, the scene showed the triumph of the partisans, whose efforts against the Nazis had greatly accelerated the liberation of the North of Italy. The Piazzale Loreto scene was both a victory sign and a reprisal. Nazis and fascists had executed various partisans and displayed their bodies in the same place earlier in the war. Indirectly, the scene was a symbolic reversal of what had until then been branded as historical certainty. Piazzale Loreto was a public urban spectacle aimed at showing the Italian people that fascism had ended. The Duce was now displayed as a gruesome symbol of defeat in the city where fascism had first developed. More than two decades of fascism were symbolically overcome through a barbaric catharsis.

The concept of spectacle has been applied to Italian fascism (Falasca-Zamponi 2000) in an attempt to conceptualize and understand the relationship between fascist ideology and its external manifestations in the public, symbolic, aesthetic, and urban spheres. This paper aims to further develop the concept of fascism as a society of spectacle by elaborating a geographical understanding of Italian fascism as a material phenomenon within modernity. Fascism is understood as an ideological construct (on which the political movement was based) which was expressed in the symbolic and aesthetic realm; its symbolism and art however are seen as having been rooted in material, historical specificity. This paper will therefore trace its understanding of spectacle to Guy Debord's (1995) ideas on the concept, and, following Walter Benjamin (1999), will argue for a consideration of fascist politics as an aesthetic politics which was nevertheless deeply embedded in ideology and the historical geography of a particular period and place. We also argue that while analysis of Italian fascism may distill salient defining characteristics which may be applicable to 'fascist' regimes elsewhere and in different historical periods, and may help to understand these regimes' use of ideology and discourse, nonetheless this analysis remains rooted in a critical consideration of Italian fascism and wary of comparative approaches. Thus, while the work of Laclau (1977) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) are utilized because of their broadening of our understanding of the concept of hegemony, central to an understanding of authoritarian regimes worldwide, this paper is cautious of extending its scope to an offering of comparative linkages. As Laclau himself noted (see Beasley-Murray 1998), his theorizations on hegemony were generated from a consideration of the historical-geographical specificities of Peronism in Argentina. One may posit the same observation with regards to Gramsci and his embeddedness in a position of opposition in fascist Italy. The position of this paper regarding fascism and its national context in Italy can be related to Mark Bevir's (2000) idea of an "irreducible specificity of meanings", whereby ideas and words are political and cannot be read apart from their contexts. When Gramsci talks about hegemony, he is talking about a concept. When he talks about fascism, he is talking about Italian fascism.

In this paper, fascism will be interpreted as a society of spectacle based on an unstable ideological substratum. Firstly there will be an analysis of the problematic concept of fascist spectacle, based on an aesthetic form of politics, and its application to the arguments presented in this paper. Secondly, the paper will analyze the ideological roots of fascism and its particular characteristics, covering various salient and founding facets of fascist spectacle. Elite rule and the role of the leader will be discussed first of all, followed by fascism's ambiguous connection with modernity

and modernization. Thirdly, fascism's problematic relationship with modernity and futurism will be analyzed, and the fourth characteristic to be examined will be the nationalist side of fascism. Lastly, there will be a discussion of the role of war and military metaphors in fascist aesthetic politics. All these often contradictory characteristics are seen as contributing to the composition of the collage that is fascist spectacle. They were various facets which fascism presented to the observer in its attempt to solidify itself into a congruous whole. The final section presents some conclusions.

The Spectacle of Fascism and Aesthetic Politics

Fascism was heavily based on symbolism and myth (Falasca-Zamponi 2000). It drew on ideals of ancient Roman virtue in its aim to found a new, fascist nation which would stand head-to-head with other European powers and herald a new era. The fascist obsession with myth and symbolism could be understood in terms of fascism's attempt to represent and to conceal what Schnapp (1992a; 1992b) has termed its unstable ideological core. Fascist ideology was by no means well-defined, and attempts at delineating its boundaries are problematic. Furthermore, in order to capture Italian fascism's main reference points and characteristics, it is useful to interpret fascism so as to bring into evidence its constituent parts and their interplay. This section attempts this by interpreting fascism as a society of spectacle, as illustrated in the following:

The concept of spectacle was first developed by Guy Debord (1995) in his Society of the Spectacle . Debord notes the fact that the twentieth century saw the rise of an overwhelming form of public display, or spectacle, linked to politics. Additionally, Debord outlines his idea of spectacle in relation to the prevailing current economic system (see Marshall 1992). He moreover states that "the whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles; all that once was directly lived has become mere representation" (Debord 1995:12). However, spectacle itself is not mere representation. It is not a collection of images, stills or pictures. Spectacle is a social relationship between people, mediated by images (Debord 1995). In this sense, it is a represented reality at the same time that it becomes reality itself, or reality as a dominant group would have it. Furthermore, it is a reified social relation. As Marx wrote in the first volume of Capital, "it is only a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things" (in LukÀcs 1967). However, the overall picture appears more complicated (Tihanov 1995). On the one hand, spectacle becomes the reification of a social relation between people; on the other, spectacle itself can be said to work towards the reification of the dominant political-ideological system, in this case fascism. Thus, spectacle—at a time of crisis of modern systems of governance and economics—becomes a tool through which stability can be reinjected into the system, albeit temporarily (Laclau 1977).

This paper interprets spectacle based on Debord's framework and coupled with Walter Benjamin's theories of aesthetic politics. A short note on Benjamin is in order here. The German thinker's ideas can be criticized for their underdevelopment, as Benjamin died before he could fully work out the intricacies of his system of thought. However, this paper treats Benjamin's ideas as extremely useful because—yet again—of their historical, geographical specificity. Benjamin lived and died plagued by thoughts of fascism and Nazism and terrorised by their real presence and evolution during his lifetime. Therefore his theories, while not as complete as would have been desirable had he survived, are extremely useful in that they are a snapshot of theorization of a political system from a particular era. They possess that sense of urgency and direction which is also witnessed, to a greater degree, in Antonio Gramsci, another victim of Europe's totalitarianisms.

Spectacle is treated in this paper as an apparent and carefully manufactured display, projecting a fetishized image of reality. The spectacular process of fetishization conceals the social relations which have enabled the production of spectacle and the commodification of the image. This may seem like a contradiction of Debord's core idea of spectacle being a social relation between people, mediated by images. However, what this paper aims to highlight is that precisely because spectacle is a social relation, or a set of social relations, it can display a transformed version of the reality in which the social relations in question exist. Thus, spectacular displays (such as newsreels, films and street scenes such as parades or mass gatherings) can be manipulated and divorced from everyday life, whilst being rooted and grounded in that life. The image of reality they project is the reified reality of fascism as a thing. This is this meaning that the word spectacle takes on when used henceforth. In this way, spectacle becomes a useful tool of analysis since it embodies relations—and tensions—within fascism which were aesthetically disguised and presented

as something else altogether. Through spectacle, fascism ceased to be lived and became representation: the regime distanced the masses from everyday life through the presentation of an alternative reality in the image. Nevertheless, at the same time that the image mediated the construction of fascist spectacle, it became a solid commodity which can be the focus of research in that it is also a lens into the relations which produced it, and therefore into the forces at play within fascism.

Debord's concept is deeply intertwined with notions of power and the forging of a reality consonant with the world view of a certain power group, which in this paper would be identified with the fascists. The concept of spectacle has been applied to Italian fascism by sociologist Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi (2000) in her book Fascist Spectacle: the Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy. Falasca-Zamponi (2000), however, takes the concept of spectacle developed by Debord in 1967 and transcribes it unproblematized to the historical and geographical context of fascist Italy. Her book takes the word "spectacle" at face value, with little or no definition, with surprisingly little explanation of how the concept may be applied to the study of fascism. More reference to Debord would have been useful; his theory is only mentioned in a footnote. The result is that links between fascist issues outside the cultural-aesthetic sphere and fascist symbols and myths are not convincingly made (Caprotti 2003). What this paper aims to expand on is the aspect of fascist spectacle which is linked to the materiality behind the production, commodification and consumption of social relations as evident through spectacle in fascist Italy.

However, Falasca-Zamponi's (2000) spectacle-based analysis is useful in that she utilizes the concept of aesthetic politics and merges it with spectacle in order to understand Italian fascism. Following on from this, aesthetic politics is understood here as the mechanism through which enabled the formation of spectacle. Falasca-Zamponi relies on Walter Benjamin's (1999) study of the aesthetic character of fascism, carried out in his 1936 essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. Benjamin states that artworks before the modern era possessed a mystique, described as aura, which was attributable to the aesthetic distance between the artwork and the passive audience. In the modern era however, Benjamin continues, the technological reproduction of art caused a near total loss of aura. This leads to more active audience participation , because the reproducibility of art leads the spectator to engage with the work of art: one is no longer spectating but interacting (Benjamin 1973). Benjamin believed that art, in this way, could become a focal point for social struggle. Herbert Marcuse (1998), similarly, believed that art could become an instrument of opposition as long as it represented alternative realities and was not overly alienating (1998). In the case of fascism, however, Benjamin saw that technology did not lead to a loss of aura. Writing from the bleak outlook of the 1930s, when totalitarianism and authoritarianism seemed to be unstoppable forces, Benjamin saw that technology was used to enhance the symbols and aura of the work of art and to maintain the auratic distance between the audience and the product of fascist aesthetic politics. This served both to keep the masses subdued and to help them express themselves in the required manner. Thus, in a period of modern economic and political-ideological crisis, fascism responded by harnessing modernity to build hegemony. Benjamin argued that the process through which aura was reinstated caused aesthetics to be injected into politics, as political power aimed to become transcendent in the eye of the masses. Transcendence effectively liberated the fascist regime from grounded democratic responsibility in the political process. As stated by Falasca-Zamponi (2000):

> The notion of aesthetic politics will further illuminate the shady links between fascism's belief in the leader's omnipotence and its conception of the "masses" as object, between the artistic ideal of harmonic relations and the auratic embracement of war, between the construction of "new men" and the focus on style, between the reliance on spectacle and the attack on consumption, between claims to the spiritual functions of the state and the affirmation of totalitarianism. (P. 8)

Aesthetic politics has two consequences, according to Benjamin. First, it becomes an end unto itself. Thus, totalizing aims can be pursued without objections from tradition, laws, and ethics. Fascism could be seen as utiliizng this form of politics in order to pursue its goal of a totalitarian nation. The second consequence is war. This is because only war can give the masses an aim whilst preventing them from seeing and turning against an established order (Falasca-Zamponi 2000). This point will be analyzed in greater detail in the following.

The coupling of politics and aesthetics can be seen as the result of a particular historical process (Falasca-Zamponi 2000; Gilbert 1972; Tatarkiewic 1980). The path of aesthetics before its intertwining with art and politics can be traced as a precursor to the analysis of aesthetic politics (Falasca-Zamponi 2000). Originally,

aesthetics was mainly confined to the study of nature: aisthitikos in Greek signified perception through feeling. Aesthetics was based on the human experience of the world. From the eighteenth century onwards, however, aesthetics was incorporated as a discipline within western philosophy. During the Enlightenment it became concerned with the

study of cultural objects, which were by then being produced en masse through increasingly available techniques of reproduction. Aesthetics entered the realm of art, as nature was replaced by artificial objects as the discipline's main focus: One critic argues that aesthetics "born as a discourse of the body that would complement the philosophy of the mind, aesthetics turned the natural into its opposite - an intellectual object" (Falasca-Zamponi 2000:11). Art had until then been largely dedicated to representing humans and their expressions and desires. However, a split arose within art as modern artists increasingly decided to isolate and abstract themselves from the realm of the senses and from nature (Eagleton 1990). The idea of independent creation, or autogenesis, entered the artistic scene. The artist was no longer seen as a mirror of reality but as a creator of realities.

The idea of autogenesis can shed some light on certain issues connected with fascism's modernity and its reliance on the figurehead of Mussolini. Autogenesis has been seen as a modern response to a problematic relationship between culture and nature, whereby the culture/nature dualism leads to other problematic relationships such as the ones between public and private, active and passive, and the like (Falasca-Zamponi 2000). Cornelia Klinger believes that this leads to a polarization through which gender takes centre stage, as rational man, identified with culture, attempts to dominate an irrational, sensual, womanly, nature. The concept of autogenesis springs from the belief that in order to achieve freedom, man must overcome nature and its laws and limits: the promethean project of modernity. The Enlightenment ideals of self-emancipation and emancipation from material wants and needs have been identified as central to this project, an effort to overcome nature (Harvey 1996; Stokes 1998). Hence, Falasca-Zamponi (2000) believes that the concept of the domination of a womanly nature is crucial to an understanding of fascist aesthetic politics and some of its ideals. The relationship between aesthetics and the senses leads the author to an analysis of the subsequent alienation of sensual life under fascism. Mussolini can be seen as the conceptual, autogenetic artist-creator shaping the Italian masses, even though Barbara Spackman (1996) has noted that Walter Benjamin's (1999) understanding of fascism can be understood as a gendered account, participating in the fascist rhetoric of virility through its focus on the salvation of the masses from fascism. However, as seen above, technology was utilized by fascism in order to recreate the auratic distance between the work of art and the audience. In the case of Italian fascism, the autogenetic artist-creator can be seen as having aimed specifically at alienating the audience's critical capabilities and influencing it without the threat of being critically challenged.

Benjamin (1973) stated that alienation of the senses resulted from the onslaught of modernity. Bombarded and overwhelmed by images and sounds, the Modern Man (sic) resorted to defending himself through an internal "anaesthetic" procedure. The senses were repressed. According to Benjamin, sensory overload and subsequent alienation was a characteristic endemic not only to fascism but to the whole of modernity. However, fascism is seen as exploiting modern contradictions by trying to compensate for the loss of meaning resulting from "anaesthetization": desensitization opens a crack in perception which can be widened and filled by spectacle. Other modern contradictions (such as modernity's contradictory stance towards nature and tradition) will be analyzed further on. It must be noted, however, that fascism embodied and expressed in its own particular manner—contradictions which characterized the whole of modernity, and which can therefore arguably be found expressed in similar systems elsewhere, whether in Peron's Argentina or the modern-day People's Republic of China, where the organization of spectacle for a billion people is vastly sophisticated.

Within Italian fascism, spectacle was based on the use of a highly aestheticized form of politics. The injection of aesthetics into politics enabled the image, with its illusions and concealed production, to enter the political realm. The tensions within fascism were concealed (partially at least) and the public's attention directed elsewhere, through the employment of overwhelming visual, auditory and sensory displays and persuasion which concealed their own motivations and production and which fetishized the image above the material. Aesthetic overproduction led fascist politics to become an aesthetic politics. This was aimed at the creation and maintenance of spectacle as a means for control and as a means to represent itself as free of contradictions. As Falasca-Zamponi (2000) notes:

> I would like to stress Benjamin's point further and add that fascism actively strove to impel and actuate sensory alienation. In a time of new technologies, filmic panoramas, dioramas, and world exhibitions, fascism offered a phantasmagoria of rituals and symbols [...] flooding the senses. With photographic images and newsreels, appearances on airplanes and motorbikes, and speeches from balconies and extravagant podiums, Mussolini dominated the fascist spectacle. (P. 13)

Mabel Berezin (1997) points out that a clear focus on spectacle can be identified within fascism after its rise to power in 1922. Spectacle became the created reality through which fascist aesthetic politics worked and beneath which lay a reality of contradictions and problematic relationships. Berezin's (1997) focus on the year 1922 as a

grounding point in the general discussion on aesthetics and spectacle with reference to Italian fascism is decidedly useful in that it locates a more general discussion on aesthetics within the context of the history of Italian fascism. However, she separates spectacle and aesthetics by stating that the former replaced the latter and became the main force in fascist popular cultural initiatives after 1922. The separation of spectacle and aesthetics she proposes does not seem convincing, even though it may be achieved in a conceptual sense. Furthermore, Berezin does not qualify her understanding of spectacle sufficiently. Therefore the links between aesthetics and spectacle are not clear in her account, with spectacle seemingly falling within the broader field of aesthetics.

Fascism's Unstable Ideology: Ideology, Elites and Illusion

Fascist ideology is a highly contested terrain of enquiry. Paxton (1998) has highlighted that the character and ideological bases of Italian fascism, and indeed of fascism in general, are hard to define. The boundaries of fascism are ambiguous in both space and time. He points out that fascist regimes develop temporally and their early stages might be a poor indication as to their subsequent direction. It is also difficult to define fascism spatially, although this point gives us a clue as to its relevance, since fascist modes of government are not spatially or temporally confined to a certain period or place. For example, various states in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, from Russia under Stalin, to 1930s Japan, to Iraq under Saddam Hussein, have been described as "fascist" (Paxton 1998). An understanding of the ideological bases of Italian fascism is crucial to an understanding of the regime as a whole. Examining totalitarian regimes, Juan Linz (2000) has highlighted the need for an analysis of ideology: "The capacity for deception and temptation by totalitarianism is only equalled by its tragic legacy. Only work focusing […] on the ideological dimension of totalitarianism, as seen sometimes in films, newsreels, and literature, can capture the basis for the political institutions [of totalitarian regimes]" (p. 16-17). Ideology can be utilized as the starting point for an understanding of particular systems of governance and the societal systems they attempt to engineer (Sutherland 2005). In addition, many critics have argued that world-views are implicitly ideological, and even more so when concerned with the production of 'Grand Discourses' which, as in fascism, contribute to the manufacture of consent (thus becoming a more desirable route to hegemony than coercion) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 1987; Martin 2002). Italy was the first state to define itself as fascist. It will be useful to discover the ideological roots which contributed to the development of the movement.

The difficulty of defining fascist ideology is augmented by the fact that ideology itself is a concept which has taken on various meanings through time. It is a power-charged concept. As a term, it is seen as deriving from the age of the French revolution, although it underwent a variety of shifts in meaning up to the fascist era. It was initially conceived by Enlightenment philosophe Antoine Louis Claude Destutt, Comte de Tracy (1754-1836), during the "wild revolutionary decade" of the French revolution (Carver 1991). It was utilized to describe enlightened rule by an intellectual elite. The assumption was that intellectuals would discover the truth and governments and political authorities would implement policies based on it. It can be seen that from the start, ideology was a term closely associated with the leadership and intellectual activities of a particular elite (Duncan and Duncan 1992). The ideological element constituted by elite rule was later appropriated by Karl Marx, who provided an alternative definition. The ruling class was identified as creating ideologies that served the purpose of particular classes or individuals. Ideologies were thus interpreted as "illusions". Therefore, according to Carver (1991), "Marx's analysis ideology came to mean not just a body of ideas that conformed to certain formal characteristics, such as those of de Tracy's system, but any ideas, however unsophisticated, that gave apparent validity and assumed authority to the claims that members of different classes might make when they pursued their various interests" (p. 7). In Marx's view, ideologies could be reactionary, conservative, reformist or revolutionary, depending on how material interests were pursued and, once gained, protected (Eagleton 1990).

Fascists liked to portray themselves and their ideology as revolutionary. Their coming to power was mythically depicted as a revolutionary event. Fascism gained power on October 30, 1922, the day on which Mussolini became prime minister of Italy. This event had been precipitated by fascist Blackshirts, mobilizing and marching on Rome on October 27 (giving rise to the infamous "March on Rome"). This caused liberal Prime Minister Luigi Facta to declare martial law in the capital and to summon Mussolini to Rome on October 28. Eventually, the Blackshirts paraded through Rome on October 31, with few fatal and violent episodes. Fascism had gained power relatively peacefully and the March on Rome was but a coda to the whole affair. It was subsequently portrayed, however, as a

revolutionary takeover of power led by Mussolini. Later on, illusion became part of fascist reality as October 29 and was instituted (starting from 1927) as Day 1 of Year 1 of the fascist era (Falasca-Zamponi 2000; Payne 1995). This example illustrates the fact that fascist ideology can be seen as a reinterpretation of reality, aimed at supporting the rule of an elite, led by a leader. Representations of national history became part of the spectacle of fascism as illusion was translated into literal reality. As one critic has noted "tapping away at nationalism in this way is rather like cracking open an egg; the outer shell of rhetoric surrounds the ideological core" (Sutherland 2005:185).

Political reliance on elites is by no means a phenomenon restricted to fascism. Having said this, the conceptual development of the role of elites from the Enlightenment onwards influenced Italian fascism in a significant manner. The Enlightenment celebrated reason and science above traditional monarchic or religious authorities. Liberal ideology also came to the fore during this period. It was based on individualism, a limited state and an essentially laissez-faire economy. Fascism was opposed to liberalism. It saw it as a force leading to the pursuit of monetary wealth as its own end, class divisions and a separation between the state and citizens. The fascists pursued a more totalizing unity within the state, extending to economic activity as well as citizenship. However, Italian fascism absorbed certain Enlightenment ideas (Eatwell 1996). First of all, it incorporated the view that violence could be necessary to purge an existing order. We would add that in this respect the fascists were probably more influenced by the futurists, who saw violence and war as a social necessity[1]. Secondly, fascists accepted the idea that the will of the people could only be expressed when incorporated into a mass-based politics.

Fascism was also influenced by ideas developed during Romanticism, which originated in the eighteenth century onwards and was seen as a reaction against the Enlightenment (Eatwell 1996). Four Romantic ideas in particular were integrated into fascism. The first of these was the worship of nature. The second was hostility towards material values. Thirdly, fascism was influenced by the exaltation of genius over the mediocrity of the masses, leading to the concept of a national leader (Mussolini) who could engineer a national rebirth. Lastly, fascism took on board the glorification of the national over the universal and timeless. This Romantic idea contributed to the age of nationalism, which played a great part in the formation of Italy and the whole of modern Europe. Finally, Mussolini, initially an orthodox Marxist (Payne 1995), was also highly influenced by Marxist ideas of struggle as the means for societal development, and possibly combined this with his more nationalist ideas. Fascist struggle was supposed to be violent, revolutionary and composed of masses led by a dominating figure. Mussolini utilized the ideas elaborated by elite theorists, such as Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels, the former Italian and the latter German. Nietzsche's philosophical idea of the "Superman" as a will-based great leader of men who would turn politics into aesthetics probably also influenced Mussolini (Eatwell 1996).

Elite rule in Italian fascism was embodied, on the surface at least, by Mussolini, who was represented as the incorporation of the ideals and principles of fascism. This gave fascism a useful starting point for the exercise of authority. Ruling elites justify their decisions and aims through recourse to a myth of official "ideology" (Lasswell 1966). Elites attempt to propagate a homogenous power-based perspective based on political myth. This myth is identified through an official doctrine (assumptions about political goals and justifications of public policy) and a formula, constituted by expectations about courses of action which are authoritatively enforced (Lasswell 1966). To this we would add another characteristic of elite rule under fascism, namely the rejection of a counterideology. Mussolini, for example, portrayed liberalism as the opposite of fascism. The identification of an inimical 'Other' has been shown to be a crucial characteristic of populist regimes : in this case we are referring to ideological 'Others', but obvious examples can also be seen in Italy's foreign policy towards Africa and its antagonism towards Europe's established powers (Laclau 1977).

Mussolini was often represented as a leader of masses, embodying "virile" qualities (Falasca-Zamponi 2000). It is interesting to note that in the case of fascism, the study of elite rule highlights the conceptual contrast between a male leader and the masses which were represented as embodying female characteristics. This elitist conception is examined by Falasca-Zamponi as being rooted in mass-psychology and crowd-psychology theories elaborated at the turn of the twentieth century by the likes of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Gabriel Tarde, Gustave Le Bon, Robert Michels, and others[2]. Masses had been a focus for social analysis in France in the second half of the nineteenth century. At this time, uncertainty over the development of an industrial, urban-based society was coupled with a fear of the crowd as mass protests and strikes began to come to the fore. Crowds were seen in terms of irrationality and potential for criminal action, a concept which can still be seen today in urban geographical analysis of, for example, the use of CCTV footage as means of social control of public space in the city (Toon 2000). The importance of the urban sphere as a focus of late nineteenth century fear and power struggles is also noted by Ghirardo and

Forster (1985). Gustave Le Bon, exemplifying the concerns of the time, published his book The Psychology of Crowds (La Psychologie Des Foules) in 1895. The book characterized crowds and the masses as inferior forms of evolution, exemplified by children, women and savages (Falasca-Zamponi 2000). As a result, masses (and women, by association) were "scientifically" judged to be unfit for participation in the political process. These discourses were appropriated by Italian fascism.

Mussolini was aware of Le Bon's arguments (Eatwell 1996), which drew on the theory of cells. This stated that, during the process of evolution, the passage from monocellular to pluricellular life forms carries with it a risk of decomposition of the organism (in this case, the state). The transition is rendered possible through the coordination of cells. This point was translated into the need for a political leader to shape and direct the masses and organize the state apparatus, which would otherwise decompose into a decadent society. The leader needed to be male since women were identified with the masses. Women's subordination was therefore justified by the social application of a biological theory. Since masses were supposedly governed by emotions, a further corollary highlighted by Falasca-Zamponi (2000) is that the leader needed to communicate to the masses through myths and images, appealing to their emotions but not to their reason. Thus, Mussolini became the artist trying to plasmate the inert masses. Elite rule and identification of ideology and political direction with an artist-politician gave rise to the creation of illusions based on an official (albeit shifting and not fully codified in the case of Italian fascism until 1932) ideology constructed from centuries-old ideological roots. The ideological roots of fascism can be seen as being the building blocks for the stage on which fascism constructed and represented itself. These roots, and their consequences, will be further explored in the next section, which analyses the relationship between fascism, modernity and modernization on the one hand, and between fascism and futurism on the other.

Fascism, Modernity and Modernization

A characteristic of Italian fascism was its contradictory stance towards modernization. Fascism attempted to retain the benefits of modern technology and science whilst renouncing "modern" values and trying to hark back to "Roman" values. Fascist ideology reflected this tension between embracing modernity with its onslaught of technological, industrial, and social modernization, and the espoused need to rekindle traditional values. Spectacle was utilized to reconcile the tension between embracing and rejecting modernity and its products: the image was utilized to gloss over the underlying, problematic relationships which contributed to its construction and production.

Modernity, a Western European concept, is seen as a reaction to what existed before (Harvey 1990), namely the medieval and preindustrial era. Modernity, the full meaning of which cannot be explored here, is understood in this paper as the historical era which started in the western world with the Enlightenment. Part of its philosophical basis was closely connected with the idea that destiny can be shaped and is not simply determined by outside forces (Eatwell 1996). In a reaction to a medieval, theological world-view which saw man as reacting to divine and natural forces, modernity placed man in an anthropocentric universe of experience where potential achievements were attainable through progress. Progress was in turn predicated on objective and positivist science leading to technological advances, in a process of modernization. The process was not limited to science: progressive ideas were intermeshed with politics and society, as desirable sociopolitical goals became seen as attainable through modernizing the political process. It could be argued that this was the case with nationalism and the idea of nation, especially after the Congress of Vienna in 1821 and the European uprisings of 1848, which projected progressive nationalist ideas into the popular sphere.

Modernization was also seen by the fascist regime as useful for the construction of a nation. In a 1932 article published on the Enciclopedia Italiana under Mussolini's name but written by various pro-fascist philosophers, a totalizing view of the nation was crystallized in the statement that "outside the State there can be neither individuals nor groups (political parties, associations, syndicates, classes)" (1991:290). Modernization was accepted as long as it could be bent towards fascist aims. Mussolini could be seen as a man inextricably linked to the modern era, a Faustian "Developer" in Marshall Berman's (1999) terms, aiming to turn Italy into a vast construction site. Berman talks about the modern "Developer" as a person aiming to fulfil the large-scale project of modernity by wiping the historical slate clean. The fascist regime pursued its own 'creative destruction' too, but it relied heavily on the past in order to justify the policies that led to modernization and that nourished future aspirations.

Fascism's self-representation as a regime steeped in Roman ideology and classical values never totally shook off the lingering threads of its modernizing initiatives. Mussolini founded fascism in a profoundly modern and very urban geographical context. Italian fascism was founded in Milan, Italy's major industrial city, and its first struggles

were carried out on city streets and piazzas. Many of fascism's projects and achievements reflect the fact that it viewed modern industry and technology positively, as long as they could be employed as instruments for the attainment of national and personal development. This fact has historical roots, namely in the fact that modernization was seen as a tool for building a strong Italian economy to rival those of France and Britain. Joes (1977) relates this fact to the wish for prestige on the international stage after Italy's severe disappointment with the reparations and territorial gains afforded it by the post-First World War Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which was widely seen as not recognizing the blood sacrifice of one million casualties which Italy had contributed to come to Britain and France's aid.

Fascism's positive stance towards modernization is exemplified by various projects and initiatives. For example, the fascist regime was responsible for electrification, railway expansion and land reclamation. These initiatives were often shrouded in references to Italy's Roman past. The modernizing influence of the regime can also be seen by the fact that the proportion of population employed in farming and related activities fell below 50% for the first time in 1936 (Joes 1977). From 1932 onwards the fascist government also sanctioned the founding of several new towns in Italy. Ghirardo and Forster (1985), commenting on this, believe that the foundation of new towns could be seen as an integral part of a political program aimed at bringing Italy up to an equal or superior level in comparison with other industrialized countries. To make the point clear, Gregor commenting on modernization, stated that "Italian fascism, no matter what else it was, seems to have been an industrializing and modernizing political movement in both performance and intention. The fact that even the more orthodox Marxists are prepared to grant as much is instructive" (in Joes 1977 264).

In short, there is as much room for ambiguity in Italian fascism, as within modernity itself. Classical-leaning rhetoric and the concept of Romano-fascist values (the concept of romanitÀ) were coupled with the use of modern technology, science and industry. In fascism—in its motorways, factories, New Towns, land reclamation works—one can see a modern core through the shroud of rhetoric and spectacle. Utilizing Berman's (1999) description of modernity and applying it to Italian fascism, we could state that fascist modernity was composed of "brilliant designs, glamorous spectacles, so dazzling that they can blind even the most incisive self to the radiance of its own darker life within" (p. 138).

Modernity, Futurism and Fascism

Modernism was the cultural and artistic expression of the modern era. It encompassed fields as disparate as art, architecture, film, philosophy and politics. The role of modernism and futurism within fascism exemplifies the particular ideological relations which constituted Italian fascism from more general roots. It is seen as having some of its origins, in the Italian context, in the political culture of the Post-Risorgimento period, and particularly in the Italy of Giolitti. This period was crucial to the development of the avant-garde modernist movement (Adamson 1990), constituted by those European intellectuals who were imbued with typically modernist ideas of "cultural regeneration" in the period from 1900 to 1914, although similar modern ideas can be argued to have lasted to the present day. Regeneration was viewed as realizable through the constitution (or imposition) of a new set of values. Italian modernists did not limit themselves to the academic platform afforded by their most prominent, Florence-based journal, La Voce. They were prone to propagating their ideas at public events. Fascists noted the use of public space as an area for spectacle.

The vociferous futurists certainly influenced fascism in its early stages. Led by Filippo Tommaso Marinetti and based in Milan, futurists focused on the ideal of a violent, dynamic break with decadent "modern" society. They glorified war and its "purifying", regenerative qualities. Futurists also saw dynamic movement and technology as central to the constitution of a new society. In the first futurist manifesto, originally published in Le Figaro in February 1909, Marinetti (1973) laid out the key futurist beliefs: "We will glorify war—the world's only hygiene—militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for woman" (p. 22). Fascists were heavily influenced, at least at first, by futurist ideals. However, futurism lost drive after several of its founding members were killed whilst finding out what their ideals actually meant in the company of common infantry being slaughtered on the Alpine front in World War I. Antonio Gramsci (1982), one of Italy's most eminent intellectuals and a prominent communist antifascist, called Marinetti and the Futurists a "gang of screaming monkeys", arguing that futurism was in fact a rather unoriginal reelaboration of liberal beliefs (p. 749).

Modernism's influence lasted into the 1930s, even though many Italian modernists did not support fascism

(Adamson 1990). For example, many of the urban plans developed for new towns in Italy in the 1930s were modernist, rationalist and functionalist (Benevolo 1971). Fascists also retained the Vocean modernist convictions that industrialism and technology were to be used, but that positivism, seen as sterile and alienating, should be cast out and disconnected from the utilization of science and technological advances.

Within fascism, preindustrial social practices were to be combined with modern technology and industry (Adamson 1990). Moore (1971) has noted that this illustrates an attempt at modernization without changing Italy's social structure. Additionally, Schnapp (1992a) has noted that Italian fascism's frequent recourse to Greco-Roman, classical and neoclassical metaphors and myths in the late 1930s hides the fact that Mussolini, as head of state, was identified with modern characteristics as well as classical ones. For example, newsreels often pictured Mussolini arriving at public events in motorcades, or ploughing fields with the latest Fiat tractors, thus showing the attempted fusion of modern means with preindustrial values of rural life. Adamson (1990), furthermore, has gone as far as to claim that fascism could be seen as the "politicization of Italian modernism" (p. 360).

Barrington Moore (1971) underlines fascism's contradictory constituent qualities by defining it as the consequence of "conservative modernization". Modernists and futurists coexisted in what Adamson (1990) describes as fascism's often contradictory ideological whole. An example of this contradictory whole is the following, and the reader is advised to consult the accompanying figure whilst reading what follows. Within fascism, many modernist thinkers, artists and architects were part of an antipositivist, spiritualist camp they shared with idealists, who were interested in a more comprehensive view of society which united theory to pragmatic reality. However, fascism also accommodated syndicalists, ex-syndicalists and nationalists, who were essentially positivist and materialist. The contradictions and problematic relationships deepen when it is considered that the antipositivist modernists were "revolutionary" and aggressive, like the positivist syndicalist camp. On the other hand, the idealists, in the antipositivist camp, were rather conservative. This was also the case with the nationalists, especially members of Enrico Corradini's Italian Nationalist Association (Adamson 1990). Furthermore, whilst fascism drew on modernism and futurism, these two schools of thought were not necessarily at ease with one another. For example, one of Italy's most prominent futurist architects, commenting on modern architecture, stated that it was "a moronic mixture of the most various stylistic elements used to mask the skeletons of modern houses" and grouped modern and neoclassical art together under the description of "architectonic prostitutions" .(Sant'Elia 1914, in Sant'Elia 1973:160). These examples reveal why scholars of Italian fascism tend to tread carefully in what is essentially an ideological mess.

Nationalism and National Identity

The fourth characteristic of fascist ideology discussed here is the recourse to ideals of national identity and unity. The concept of national identity has to be grounded in the particular historical conditions that gave rise to fascism in Italy. This is in order to understand how a general concept (which has had worldwide impact) can influence a particular moment in history, pertaining to a specific regime.

Italy was unified in 1861 after the struggle of national unification called the Risorgimento. However, whilst the country was unified under a single monarchy and parliamentary system, there was no corresponding movement of social unification (Guidetti 1983). This resulted in a state divided along various planes. Gramsci, for instance, identified differences within Italy which were (and still are) crucial to an understanding of its heterogeneity. These differences originate from regionalism, the difference between North and South, and the strong sense of independence of each town and city within its borders (Guidetti 1983). Perhaps this was to be expected in a country which had been composed of various different states, such as the Papal States, independent kingdoms (such as Savoy) and dependent lands such as those under the control of the Spanish Bourbons in the South of Italy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the North. However, the liberal elites which governed Italy after unification, influenced by the echoes of the Risorgimento and of the nationalist disorders of 1848, tried to build a sense of nation and national identity. This project saw the discursive enhancement and heroic representation of various leading figures in Italy's path towards unification (figures such as Cavour, Mazzini and Garibaldi). These personages were utilized to instil a sense of national identity and to paint the Risorgimento in more nationalist terms. Italian reality and nationalist myth jostled for space in Italy's post-unification political and social landscape (Guidetti 1983).

The roots of nationalism and nationalist rhetoric in Italy during fascism were not exclusively confined to the fascist regime itself. Even though it is often clouded in primordialist rhetoric, nationalism is a modern phenomenon (Levinger and Lytle 2001). Likewise, Woolf (1996) draws on Hobsbawm and Weber to argue that national identity

arises through state action, even though it could be seen as the result of a process of modernization. National identity is "an abstract concept that sums up the collective expression of a subjective individual sense of belonging to a sociopolitical unit: the nation state. Nationalist rhetoric assumes not only that individuals form part of a nation […] but that they identify with the territorial unity of the nation state. Such an affirmation is ideological, in that it describes as a reality an ideal relationship that nationalists wish to exist" (Woolf 1996 25-6). The interplay between myth and reality within the idea of national identity comes to the fore. This interplay, as will be argued, is crucial to an understanding of fascist ideology and spectacle.

Nationalist rhetoric, used by liberal governments, was expressed and mediated through the urban arena. For example, a dialectic between tradition and modernity is identified by Bruno Tobia (1996) in the building of urban monuments from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards to represent a symbolic construction of the nation. One of the most significant examples of this is the Vittoriano monument in Rome, a massive testament to the myth-building impetus of liberal Italy. As Atkinson and Cosgrove (1998) have noted in their geographical study, it was also an urban monument later used by Mussolini for the goal of representing fascism.

Italian fascism, much like German Nazism, attempted to construct its own reality through the institution of myths and a legendary past, "not so much to legitimize as to establish the rule of the rulers in the eyes of the subjugated" (Nolte 1971:157). Two elements of fascist ideology are combined in order to construct myth: elite rule and nationalism. In Germany, the Nazi regime made recourse to völkisch myths of ancient Germanic rurality. In Italy the mythical structure was based upon Roman values which would form and shape the fascist male. Recourse to a glorious past can be seen as part of the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric (Levinger and Lytle 2001). A glorious past is utilized as the basis on which to form a diagnosis of ills leading to a degraded present. Degradation is characterized by various factors such as moral decline, loss of internal political unity and a decline in racial purity. A comparison of the degraded present with a glorious past is then utilized to justify a struggle against the present, in order to bring about a utopian future. These resulting tensions lead to mobilization (Levinger and Lytle 2001), and to a justification for political and social action on the part of a regime. Under fascism, the identified tensions were utilized, to a varying degree, to construct the myth of a new nation, based on new values and on will. The concept of will-based action was used as a semimythical explanation for political action.

The recourse to "will" as a catalyst for political reactions has deep roots not confined to fascism. This point was noted by Federico Chabod (1996), an antifascist academic who joined the partisan movement in Aosta during the years of Nazi occupation in Italy. He stated, in the course of a series of lectures given after the fall of the regime[3], at the University of Milan during 1943-1944, that the long transition between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a change from recourse to "judgment", to a use of "will", in justifying the making of nation-states. This is exemplified by discourses focusing on the idea of a revolutionary will. Mussolini, for example, talked about fascism's "totalitarian will" during the same speech in which he first used the term "totalitarian", during the fascist party's fourth national congress on June 22, 1925 (Falasca-Zamponi 2000:126).

As another critic, Chabod (1996), notes, national passions become such that politics start to take on an almost religious pathos (126). This was clearly the case with Italian fascism, which aimed to turn nationalism centered on fascism into a political religion, as Gentile (1996) has argued. Falasca-Zamponi, however, makes a valid point when stating that Gentile's understanding of fascism as a political religion does not fully explain fascism, even though it incorporates the appeal to nationalist symbolism in Mussolini's Italy. In particular, Gentile's approach does not fully reconcile the multitude of problematic elements at the core of fascism (Falasca-Zamponi 2000). It could nonetheless be stated that the same point applies to Falasca-Zamponi's own account, with her exaggerated focus on overt symbolism and myths in the external characteristics of fascism clouding and enlarging the reader's view of the proportion and importance which certain displays (such as the Roman step, or passo romano) held in fascism (Caprotti 2003).

Nationalism and the idea of nation played a great part in Italian fascism's self-portrayal. They were, in fact, key components of fascism's conscious construction of spectacle, which aimed at transmitting nationalist and fascist representations of reality to a national audience. Spectacle also amplified the concept of national struggle, which will be discussed in the next section.

Internal, External, Ultimate War

Fascism was heavily influenced by war and ideas of war as a regenerating force, as we saw in the section which

dealt with futurism. What is attempted in this section is, first of all, to reveal that Italian fascism relied heavily upon the concept of war for its construction of spectacle. The modern idea of war, linked to nation-building and seen as a tool for the resolution of internal tensions, was bent towards spectacular aims. This is because war, linked to the image in modernity through cinematography, propaganda and rhetoric, came to express struggles inherent to fascism. These struggles could only be resolved, and the regime's integrity and power base maintained, through recourse to clearly identified external or internal foes. The identified enemies of fascism, were they the Communists or the red proletariat, became "the Other" lying outside the totalitarian fascist state. This section discusses the relationship between fascism and military war (especially World War I), followed by an analysis of the conceptualization of war as an external and internal struggle aimed at creating coherence within the regime. Lastly, bellicose and military metaphors are described as forming a particular facet of fascism's spectacular self-representation.

When fascism came to power in 1922, most Italians were still heavily influenced by World War I. Over half a million men, from a population of 36 million (Keegan 1994), perished in the bloody Alpine campaigns against the Austrian and German armies. The first world war could arguably be seen as a much heavier influence than the Risorgimento on Italians and their subsequent perception of Italy, if only because it involved more people than the Risorgimento, and had a deep impact upon civilian life. For example Gramsci, in his analysis of fascism, saw World War I as a key factor. He did not attempt to view fascism as a "last stage of capitalism" and did not subtly misrepresent it, as did many of his fellow communists and Comintern writers such as Palmiro Togliatti[4]. Gramsci viewed fascism as the outcome of a specific historical and geographical process, which started mainly from World War I. He identified it as originating from the urban and later also the rural areas of Italy (Adamson 1980).

Whilst fascism was undoubtedly influenced by the irst world war, the stance of its founder towards the war was ambiguous and rooted in 1910s political uncertainty. Mussolini made much of his brief role in the trenches, glorifying the fact that he was wounded (1939). Until 1914, however, he had presented a fervently antiinterventionist façade, in line with his socialist credentials (Montanelli and Cervi 1991). The war was perhaps not so much a founding reality of fascism as was the perception that the Versailles Treaty of 1919 had not provided expected territorial gains for Italy, part of the group of nations which had "won" the war. This was not the case exclusively in Italy. John Keegan (1994), a military historian, has noted that "paramilitary parties were on the march in the 1920s, in almost every country that had undergone defeat or been cheated of its expectation of victory" (p. 367). Mussolini is described as a "voice for all those who felt that the British and French had taken an unfair share of the victor's spoils, though the Italians had made an equal blood sacrifice" (Keegan 1994:367). The leader of fascism spoke for many when he described the Versailles Treaty, Italy's weak and squabble-prone post-war liberal government and resurgent socialism as dark episodes: "I assert that the episodes of 1919 and 1920 had in them bacilli which, if not treated heroically, are deadly for the life of a civilized nation" (Mussolini 1939:65). He thought that fascism had risen to help Italy "overcome the factors of dissolution" (Mussolini 1939:66). This laid the foundations for a "revolutionary" act to save the nation. The act was the March on Rome, and as we have seen it was not revolutionary nor was it particularly violent. However, what matters in this case as in many episodes in the history of Italian fascism, is the manner in which the justification for a new political order was represented: through a metaphor of revolutionary war.

For the regime, war played an almost psychological role, in the sense that it was utilized to bind together fascism's heterogeneous and incongruous ideological mix. The fascist regime attempted to utilize metaphors of war in both an external and an internal sense so as to achieve the aim of appearing coherent. Mussolini aimed to achieve internal political conformity and acceptance. He tried to exteriorize his idea of struggle by envisaging and embarking on war against external foes. Falasca-Zamponi (2000) makes the valid point that this was an attempt to reconcile the dilemmas within fascism itself, whilst Benjamin (1999) thought that war was aimed at diverting the masses. External war can also be seen as a response to the modern juxtaposition of the processes of creation and destruction (creation of internal unity through the fictitious destruction of external "others"). Falasca-Zamponi, however, focuses too heavily on purely military conflicts (such as World War II) as examples of external war used by Italian fascism in an extreme attempt at rendering itself coherent. Furthermore, war and aggressive foreign policy have been utilized by various non-democratic or even self-defined democratic regimes throughout history in order to divert attention from pressing internal matters and conflicts. Thompson (1991) states that a corollary of violence and repression such as that used in fascist Italy is "the extent to which many post-fascist, supposedly antitotalitarian western governments have learned from, and greatly developed, the tactics, institutions and methods of control of the historically anathematised dictatorship of Mussolini" (p. 4).

Many conflicts within fascism were expressed through reference to war. These conflicts were played out in

nonmilitary ways within national borders, and portrayed as military struggles. As such they can be described as internal wars. This is the case, for example, with initiatives such as the Battle of Wheat (the drive for demographic expansion), or the "battle" for land reclamation in the Pontine Marshes. Fascism created and externalized struggles at various levels (political, economic, social, military, and racial) so as to relieve inner tensions and create an image of political coherence. This image was created through the use of spectacle, as defined in its use to mediate fascist relations into a seemingly congruous representational whole. The concept of war was utilized within spectacle for political aims in various ways. The following examines one of the most prominent examples, the bellicose metaphor.

War and military metaphors were often used to illustrate fascism's supposed coherence. Militarism was seen as healthy by the fascists, because of the way in which it could help to regiment and shape the new fascist male which was to be fertile and devoted to the state. Various youth organizations, for example, were aimed at shaping fascist youth from an early age onwards and incorporating them into the spectacle of fascism. Their military characteristics were used as metaphors for a nation on the war path. These organizations were structured in a manner similar to the Scout movement, with hierarchies of positions aimed at creating an organized, disciplined youth society. Thus, the Balilla collected young boys who proceeded, in time, to eventually become part of the Camice Nere, or Blackshirts. This regimentation was utilized in the formation of spectacle: youth parades were organised on city streets, with youngsters wearing the symbols of fascism and marching in step. Falasca-Zamponi (2000) has examined the fact that militarism played a part in public spectacle by highlighting the invention of the Passo Romano, or Roman Step, for fascist parades. Mussolini explained the importance of militarism, taking the Passo Romano as the starting point. As stated by Mussolini in 1921:

> [O]ur march...imposes individual control on everyone...impresses on everyone order and discipline. Because we want in fact to initiate a solid national discipline, because we think that without this discipline Italy cannot become the Mediterranean and world nation of which we dream. And those who reproach us for marching like the Germans should realize that it is not us who are copying from them but the Germans who copy and have copied from the Romans. Thus it is us who return to our origins, to our Roman, Latin and Mediterranean style" (in Falasca-Zamponi 2000:113-115).

The parades and public displays organized by the regime were examples of the formation of a public spectacle which was used to externalize a message of unity and common goals through recourse to military and war-oriented meaning. This type of spectacle was often found on city streets and piazzas, or represented through the media.

Conclusion: Spectacular Visions

The identification of various salient characteristics within fascist ideology is a starting point for research into fascism's aesthetic politics. The instabilities of fascism are interpreted in this paper as the raison d'être of fascist spectacle, because they were utilized to represent a coherence which is not immediately apparent in the various constituent parts and characteristics of fascist ideology and practice. Theoretical discussions on the role of spectacle can be tested against Italian fascism and the specific historical, geographical context of the development of fascist ideology. Furthermore, the construction of the spectacle by Italian fascism can be seen to have been an example of what Ernesto Laclau has described as empty signifiers. These are organizing principles with distinctive symbolic functions which embrace all meanings around a term rather than codifying a set of meanings and rejecting others (Martin, 2002). In this light, Italian fascism can be analyzed as having constructed spectacle as the shifting materialization of social relations, whereby fascism—through spectacle—came to mean different things to different audiences. This may be an obvious point. However, it is a key point when considering the consensus that Italian fascism managed to construct and maintain throughout the 1930s: spectacle became a tool through which consensus was organized and, more importantly, through which hegemony was articulated.

Endnotes

1. Although an endless sequence of cultural/historical reference and counter reference, it could also be argued that the Futurists were influenced by Enlightenment ideas in turn.

2. As has also been noted by Williamson (1999).

3. The fascist regime had fallen, but Mussolini was at the time the head of the Salo-Republic.

4. Lecturing at the Lenin School in Moscow in 1935, Togliatti (1976) travelled very far from objective analysis when he described fascism as "the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance capital" (Togliatti p.1).

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The Trek with Telos: A Rememberance of Paul Piccone (January 19, 1940—July 12, 2004)

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Paul Piccone was one of this generation's most influential critical intellectuals, whose analytical work ranged from phenomenological Marxism to analyses of neo-Stalinism in Eastern Europe to Carl Schmitt's geopolitical visions for new modes of civic action. Piccone was born in L'Aquila, Italy on January 17, 1940. He immigrated to the United States with his family at age 14, and they settled in Rochester, New York. After undergraduate studies at Indiana University, he did his doctoral work in philosophy at SUNY-Buffalo where he received his Ph.D. in 1970. He was appointed to a position in the Department of Sociology at Washington University, St. Louis, and published Telos from his office there until he was denied promotion and tenure in 1977. Following a tumultuous administrative and legal struggle to reverse that decision, he left the Midwest to set up shop in New York's East Village in the 1980s.

For over three decades, Telos survived as an independent "quarterly journal of critical thought" under his engaged and always intense editorship. Not long after turning 60, Piccone contracted a rare form of cancer during 2000. He battled it successfully for many long months, but on July 12, 2004, he died at age 64. A sharp philosophical critic and insightful political analyst whose award-winning book Italian Marxism remains the single best study of this subject, Paul Piccone also was the editor, organizer, and publisher of Telos. While he was a renowned scholar of international repute in his own right, Telos is his major legacy to the world, and it is the project for which he is best known.

Many often experienced bombastic or even brusque "first contacts" with Paul Piccone, but that intensity belied how fully he was borne along by a bubbling spirit of self-confidence, tough-mindedness, and craftsmanship. Much of this apparent bombast came from his unusual voice. And, in so many ways, that voice was the quality with which he defined himself—both personally and intellectually. Its sound engaged, enraged, or entranced, but his voice is what most will remember—first, and maybe last—about him. Echoes of this voice gather in his friend's memories, its conceptual cadence still collects thinkers together, and the power continues to move many in their lives. With everyone's memories, from his stories, and in the pages of Telos, Paul Piccone's voice will reverberate across the years for readers and writers.

Much of what Telos editors now do, have done, and will do in the future can be traced back in some way or another to Paul Piccone and Telos. While he could seem bombastic and brusque, he also was a generous and engaging person. Even so, one must keep the picture clear here. Paul Piccone could be quite cantankerous, cranky, or contradictory. On any given day, he would be argumentative and analytical, amusing and alienating, astonishing and aggravating. So time spent with Piccone was never dull. And, as Telos shows, he always strived to be, at the end of the day, ahead of the pack, attentive to his craft, and amazing in his philosophical and political passions.

Unlike too many self-proclaimed liberal academics, who talk the talk but never walk the walk of embracing real difference, Paul strode through life gathering together one of the most truly diverse gaggle of colleagues, collaborators, or real comrades one has have ever seen. From all classes, nationalities, races, identities, religions, occupations, and neighborhoods, a whole host of people would call Paul their friend, and they continued to do so throughout their lives.

Around, through, and within this very diverse array of rich individual "particularity," as Paul might have referred to such a collection of companions in his writings, his spirit continues. In people's stories about his unusual moments, brilliant arguments, nasty comments, silly jokes, little snits, or kind gestures, Paul left a great deal with all of them at different turns in their lives. Piccone was a great friend, astute colleague, and caring mentor. He created Telos, and he brilliantly kept it running for decades. His philosophy and practice of particularity were responsible for much of this success. For many critical theorists in the Anglophone world, he brought them together through the pages of Telos and then often changed how they thought. At the outset, Telos aimed at introducing phenomenological Marxism to North American readers, but it eventually turned to other topics, ranging from Adorno's aesthetics to neo-Stalinism authoritarianism to contemporary populism to Schmitt's geopolitics. Whether they agreed or disagreed with him and his work, Paul Piccone had an immense impact on critical scholars that must not be forgotten.

As Paul Piccone's almost lifelong project, then, it is very important to reevaluate the importance of Telos since 1968. Appropriately, the journal originally billed itself as being "launched on May 1, 1968" in Buffalo, New York, from within the belly of the State University of New York system by a small group of graduate students. Yet, oddly enough, from these beginnings Telos has been an enduring theoretical effort by a handful of radical thinkers with deep suspicions about almost everything and everyone that has come to be associated in the popular imagination with sixties' radicalism, the modern research university, popular counterculture, or the New Left.

Hoping to gain greater insights into the chaos of the Cold War era from the suppressed traditions of Western Marxism and Frankfurt School social theorizing, Telos editors and authors have made much of their lifework out of attacking not only the liberal welfare state but also New Leftism. If one does not believe that the New Left had its own internal critique, that 1960s radicals opposed the liberal welfare state, or that radical counterculturalists resisted the Great Society regime, then he or she can turn to the pages of Telos from issue no. 1 to no. 131 to realize the poverty of pandering philosophical or political punditry, which can be gained elsewhere in other journals, as the zenith of progressive or conservative thought in the United States.

By the same token, many other now conventional pearls of wisdom rolling around in the world's intellectual marketplaces about how no one foresaw the collapse of Soviet communism in the West or anticipated the crisis of liberalism in the United States also can be undercut, if not refuted, by turning through the pages of Telos since 1968. This realization might be hard to accept, because Telos is not, of course, the same sort of allegedly household name that the National Review, Commentary, Dissent or Partisan Review have been. Still, those better-known journals also have been the kitchens where such conventional wisdom has been often cooked and canned. Located first inside of university life at Buffalo, then St. Louis, and only later off-campus in New York City, Telos editors and authors were far removed from the ranks of familiar public intellectuals, whose phone and fax numbers pop-up from rolodexes spun around with the daily news cycle in downtown D.C. or midtown Manhattan, where the media snatch sound bites for on-air talking head commentaries or squibs of scholarship for op-ed columns. Few Telos writers have floated out into the mainstream of American public discourse, although many of have been read and become more recognized widely in Europe, Japan or Australasia. At the same time, those that have gained public exposure, like Lukács, Marcuse, Sartre, Habermas or Adorno in the early days as well as Baumann, Gouldner, Jacoby, Bookchin or Lasch later on, their voices were not reliable sound bite sources. Nonetheless, for over thirty-five years, Telos has remained in the spotlight—typically either in the vanguard or rearguard, as the occasion most suitably warrants—during almost every major development in social and political theory anywhere in North America and Western Europe. Whether it was Antonio Gramsci or Carl Schmitt, solidarity in Poland or perestroika in the USSR, workers' councils in revolutions or radical orthodoxy in religion, the fall of the Soviet bloc or the rise of new populists, Telos usually was there cutting the first theoretical trails into these analytical and political thickets. In fact, without Telos, there would be much less awareness of most strains of neo-Marxist, post-Marxist, and anti-Marxist critical theory.

Through the Telos Press, Piccone also introduced little-known and/or untranslated book-length texts as new translations to American readers, including important works by Antonio Labriola, Gustav Landauer, Lucien Goldman, Jean Baudrillard, Luciano Pellicani, and Carl Schmitt. Plainly, a new generation of critical theory emerged during and around 1968, and then it thrived during the Cold War years in the 1970s and 1980s. In turn, many of its key figures drifted to Telos as an outlet for their analyses. Because of the engagement of Telos with politically-grounded critical theorizing, most Telos authors did not withdraw, like most other academic theorists, into race/gender/class polemics, litcrit aesthetics, historicized hermeneutics, or academic victimology. Under Piccone's guidance, Telos' authors instead have raised hard questions. By concentrating concrete political analyses on the contemporary culture, economy and state made possible by the current capitalist world system, Telos writers have made their mark in many fields. A good cross-section of their names during the first two decades, ranging in the hundreds from Agger

to Zipes, was published on the cover of Telos 75 (Spring 1988). For nearly four decades now, Telos has asked what can critical theorizing—whether inspired by Lukács or by Schmitt—tell us about Western capitalism today as a global system of production and domination? How does it affect the workings of power in the United States? What impact does it have on the changing world system? Why did state socialism survive? How did bureaucratic centralism collapse? And, what forms do cultural, economic, and political domination assume now in present-day networks knitting together global corporate firms, compromised civil societies, and eroding national states?

Telos has probed the dynamics of the current economic and political regime, as it has consolidated its powers in the culture industry, welfare state, corporate capitalist enterprise, global neoliberalism, and transnational ecological destruction, but also has outlined several possible political responses to these forces. Telos also has been engaged politically and culturally in disclosing the changing codes of mystification, power, and domination deployed in this system's social production and consumption of meaning. Where other more liberal theorists might see increasing democratization, growing rationalization, and the reconciliation of the market with government in the strange civil society emerging post-Cold War era, the Telos analysis, more often and more rightly, has seen discord and difference: decreasing democracy, a growing irrationality, and a pernicious totality spreading destruction among its teetering parts.

Ironically, Telos in 2005 sits more or less where it was at its inception: out beyond the margins of the established academy, and still featuring the voices of alternative networks recruited from the contrary currents of many different intellectual traditions. Elements of the New Left, Old Left, New Right, Old Right all percolate traces of anarchism, socialism, populism, and even conservatism into the issues of Telos. To get a sense of this diversity, one needs only to reread back issues of the journal where Herbert Marcuse, Jean Paul Sartre, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Leo Lowenthal, Juergen Habermas, Claus Offe, and Oskar Negt appear along with Alain de Benoist, Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, Christopher Lasch, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean Baudrillard, Norbert Elias as well as Alvin Gouldner, Murray Bookchin, William Leiss, Andre Gorz, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Paul Feyerabend, Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort or Russell Jacoby, Mark Poster, Martin Jay, Doug Kellner, Joel Kovel, Trent Schroyer, James Schmidt, Stuart Ewen, Herb Gintis, John Zerzan and Regis Debray, Karel Kosik, Georg Lukács, Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, and Rudolf Bahro. Looking back at Telos after more than thirty-five years, readers will easily find most of the more significant groups of outriders, outlaws, and outsiders working in the transatlantic communities of cultural, political, and social theory. Some are internationally known public intellectuals; some are exiled émigrés; some are well-established academics; and some are free-lance critics. Yet, all of them have gained considerable importance, during and after, their time with Telos.

A select sample, for example, of some Telos editors from 1968 to 2005, which follows this commentary as an appendix, also lists how many important figures in contemporary social, political, ethical, and cultural thought (along with only some of their book-length publications) have made this trek through time over the years with Telos. This list includes such individuals as Seyla Benhabib, Carl Boggs, Cornelius Castoriadis, Andrew Feenberg, Ferenc Feher, Paul Gottfried, Agnes Heller, Axel Honneth, Russell Jacoby, Martin Jay, Christopher Lasch, William Leiss, James Schmidt, and Sharon Zukin. Paul Piccone and most Telos editors have had little use for more mainstream journals, and many liberal-minded thinkers largely were ignored in Telos due to their preoccupations with recapitulating banal social science and politically correct discourse. From its initial popularization of Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School of critical theory to its current investigations of radical orthodoxy and Carl Schmitt, Piccone and the editorial associates of Telos have pushed into those regions where few others either on the left or right have gone before, but also where many will soon choose to settle after outriding pathfinders from Telos have surveyed and mapped those unknown terrains.

Since May 1, 1968, then, Telos has introduced a diverse array of hitherto undiscussed or often undiscovered intellectual debates to a global English-speaking audience. Paul Piccone had a remarkable gift of political foresight about significant fresh intellectual developments and a talent for gathering new critical contributions about these ideas from numerous editors, authors, and commentators in many different Telos' networks. It was an achievement of Piccone's that should have recognized and rewarded by an allegedly modern research university, like Washington University, St. Louis.

Yet, it was not. In fact, as his academic career effectively was ended there, and his critical theoretical work in Telos also was increasingly sidelined, then sanctioned, and finally shunned after 1977 through the present-day. This reaction is astounding given how much Paul's work with Telos, and the writings that Telos brought into greater intellectual currency, have made significant contributions to American intellectual life. At the same time, the conditions under which Paul Piccone operated—first inside of a major research university and then later outside of

it as an independent scholar—say much about the reorganization and disoperation of academic activity in the U.S.A. over the past generation. On one level, what happened to Paul Piccone might reveal only the accidental fortunes of one person in one discipline-based department at Washington University, St. Louis at a specific time and place. Still, on another level, these professional particulars track larger trends touching upon all research universities and affecting too many departments, colleges, and disciplines as higher education in the U.S.A. has faced new internal pressures and external demands since the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s and 1980s.

Paul's work on Telos always was important and interesting. Still, its importance always should be seen in terms of how he coped with the reorganization of scholarly labor as he and Telos were forced to work around an "academic community" being restructured as the "knowledge business." As this change unfolded, the conditions in which independent scholarship and journals of criticism were received in the cities, economies, and societies where they are produced and consumed also changed radically. Paul's ouster from university life as well as his decision to relocate to New York from St. Louis took place at a critical turning point for the devolution of modern research universities, liberal arts disciplines, and the role of scholarship in public life.

Clearly, a sea change in the will of mass publics to pay for collective goods swamped over liberal capitalist democracies in the 1970s, as the election of Thatcher in 1979 and Reagan in 1980 illustrated. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, neither government's size nor spending shrank, but many believed they were as hitherto public services were outsourced to corporate contractors and as onetime collective goods were transformed into private responsibilities through student loans, defined contribution pensions, personal health care programs, individual child-care schemes, and for-profit infrastructure projects. Higher education was one of the first social programs to shift from a "general good" to a "user pays" logic, which put highly marketable, more apolitical, and old-line professional programs in the driver's seat on campus. Denying tenure to one sociologist, like Paul Piccone, dismantling a well-known sociology department, like the one at Washington University, St. Louis, and then denigrating those, like Paul, his colleagues, and many students, in the 1970s and 1980s with aspirations to take more radical civic paths in the future, was a very clear indicator of what lay ahead.

Despite the public relations blather in student recruitment literature for major research universities, most academic journals at such institutions are not always welcomed or even highly valued. Instead, they are labors of love, kept alive by dedicated editors and authors usually working with little or no institutional support. Once disconnected from the academy, even though they often are somewhat marginal in that milieu as well, journals for scholarly communication like Telos are even more difficult to sustain. The devotion of a small cadre of readers, the ever-shrinking lineup of maverick authors, and the implacability of the editor are what kept Telos going for decades. This was true when it was on campus at SUNY-Buffalo, Toronto or Washington University, St. Louis, but it became fundamental to the journal's survival off-campus in New York's East Village since the 1980s. Known more abroad than at home, followed more by those in prison than those in power, seen as crossing over the line when others feared even approaching the border, celebrated for its irreverent and unrelenting critique, Telos is a strange periodical that documents a stranger period in a one of the strangest lands around. And, this makes it essential reading.

Frequently vilified for its renegade disposition, ruthless editing, and radical orientation, Telos has never been a "professionally correct" operation. Indeed, many individuals associated with it over the years left in a huff—some personal, others political, some philosophical, and others polemical. In turn, those who endured in the intellectual networks tied into Telos often were regarded as professional pariahs, intellectual oddballs or disciplinary scofflaws. Linked loosely together by Paul Piccone, the Telos network has trekked for decades into and out of many exciting debates, stretching across topics from the Second International to the Cold War era to today's war on terrorism. Most were interesting, many were insurgent, and much of their substance blazed theoretical trails followed only years later by the timid "normal science" crowds in social science, philosophy, critical theory or the humanities. While such work has not been valued in the professional mainstream of many university departments, its value goes far beyond the small conversations conducted among those individuals nattering about the latest methodological innovations that preoccupy too many insipid, intellectual interactions. As the research university has turned toward generating measurable outcomes of applied knowledge, Telos always demonstrated something better waits beyond bland disciplinary boundaries in transformative engagé scholarship.

Rethinking one academic administrative event a generation ago, in remembering Paul Piccone's life then, is not meant to rehash the merits or demerits of his denial of tenure and promotion by Washington University, St. Louis during 1977 through 1979. Instead when looking back, one must recognize in this incident the many signs of larger and longer-lasting tendencies that continue today. At the same time, a look back reaffirms the accuracy of judgments about bigger transitions in higher education that Paul Piccone made as he saw them unfolding out of the second and

third order implications of his dismissal at that time. Clearly, Piccone's experience in 1977 anticipated much of this era's treatment of critical scholarship and higher education, as liberal capitalism in the United States plods toward 2007 and the 400th anniversary of its "founding" at Jamestown.

Paul Piccone's life as an intellectual, and the role of Telos as a decisively important journal for critical scholarly communication, matured alongside structural disruptions in the workings of American research universities. Paul's commitment to the demands of critical discourse from 1968 through 2004 was exemplary. His own intellectual project had many pluses and a few minuses, but the knowledge businesses of the research university ignored them all. Therefore, Telos must carry on with Paul's work, and advance the merits of sustained critique. Here, tough-minded scholarly communication, like that which has come together through Telos, or what will develop with Fast Capitalism, should continue serving all those who will need, have needed, or need now the intellectual and practical benefits that open, free and critical learning always were meant to provide.

Appendix: Various Telos Editors 1968-2005

This list of various editors, editorial board members, and Telos group participants from 1968 through 2005 is not complete. It simply provides a select overview of the range of individuals who have worked with the journal over the past years for now nearly four decades. As the list indicates, it is an eclectic group of critical thinkers and writers from around the world as well as from across a wide variety of disciplinary fields in the arts, humanities, and social sciences. Telos clearly has benefited from the diversity of their perspectives, the intensity of collaborations together, and variety of work that they contributed to the journal as writers, reviewers, and editors. I also want to note the invaluable research assistance contributed by Karen Jenkins, Marcy H. Schnitzer, and Xi Chen in compiling and editing this bibliography.

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Why Mills and Not Gouldner?

Charles Lemert

Looking back, one cannot help but be struck by the similarities between C. Wright Mills and Alvin W. Gouldner. Born within four years of each other (Mills in 1916, Gouldner in 1920), both were so archetypically tough guys that neither, were he starting out early in the 2000s, would get quite the same hearing in a time when feminist sensibilities are so well established. Both died relatively young (Mills at forty-five in 1962; Gouldner at sixty in 1980) —both, it would seem, of broken-heart syndrome, which, among other possible causes, may have had something to do with the then changing times.

Already by 1962, in the early storm of the American civil rights movement that issued in a series of new social movements, the writing was already on the wall that straight-shooting cowboys from Texas would have to clean-up their acts. Mills's heart began to give out when his wholly admirable Listen, Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba (1960) was about to be savaged on national television by a wing of the same liberal establishment that had rejected him at Columbia. No less, Gouldner died on the streets of Madrid after his failure to hold on to the love of his life. It was 1980, when street-fighters from the Bronx no longer impressed the girls as once they may have. If (and it is a big if) their final heart attacks were brought on by personal troubles aggravated by the gathering structures of public issues, neither could be held fully blameless nor fully accountable for their sad and early ends.

Yet, when men (and I mean men) are remembered or ignored, the cause must be sought in the work, which in these two instances is symptomatic of their personal styles. Yet, today, Mills is very well remembered, if mostly for his famous slogan that revived a sociology which, in 1959, was ill-prepared for the revolutionary decade already brewing. The Sociological Imagination comes to mind even among those who would never think of reading Mills seriously. The concept, as distinct from the book, was the acknowledged inspiration of an American New Left of mostly white northern students who took from the slogan a sufficient justification for demanding and proposing the outlines of a better world, as only the more serious among them studied the corpus as source books for, as Dick Flacks put it, making history.

Still, this being granted, one wonders in 2005 just how seriously it is possible to take, say, The Power Elite just shy of fifty years after it appeared in 1956. The book remains great because of its dual contributions—first, as an appreciative rethinking Weber's "Class, Status, and Party" as a systematic method for understanding power; second, as a source for the idea of interlocking elites which seems to have reached, by one or another means, President Dwight D. Eisenhower whose farewell address to the nation in 1959 called attention to the military-industrial complex. The former of these is itself sufficient to seal Mills's place in history, with or without The Sociological Imagination. Still, it is hard to imagine how anyone would today begin a project on power with primary reference to Mills. The work of advancing his conception of power as having economic, political, and cultural expressions was already been done by Pierre Bourdieu among many others, just as Bill Domhoff and others have fleshed out the idea of elites working in a community of interest, if not a conspiracy. Then, there is the Foucault-problem for even so subtle a top-down theory of power as Mills's—power is culture/culture is power; both arise as much from the bottom as from above. Whatever we eventually determine globalization to be about, it is at least about the requirement that now we must think about power with respect to its many articulations, including those by which it colonizes the culture that colonizes everyday life. Elites remain, of course, but the metaphoric lesson of 9/11 is that the lesser powers resist and confound the global elite even the higher circles work their will down upon the nameless masses.

Alvin Gouldner, on the other hand, is mentioned less often in inverse proportion to the value of his ideas to the current situation. Google Gouldner and Mills in 2005 and you will get a scant 4,000 for Gouldner and some

50,000 hits for Mills. Neither could have begun to imagine such a fast thing as Google, but Gouldner at least lived to see and write about the social foundations on the new class of rapid-fire technologies, while Mills was still filing his research clippings in paper folders. Gouldner, too, took his notes by hand in his dark attic study. The difference lay in Gouldner's prophetic theory of the social foundations of information technology as a culture of human proportions; hence the irony that a lifelong Weberian would see in the far reach of rationalizing techniques the prophetic hope Weber longed for as much as the iron cage that baffled him.

Shortly before Al Gouldner died in 1980, I asked him offhandedly what he would do next. He had just finished Against Fragmentation (published posthumously in 1985) which he saw as the fulfillment of the decade's work on Marxism and sociology announced in The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970). He said, no less off the cuff, "I may write my own critical theory," by which he meant, I believe, his own version of the German project. It was an odd thing for him to say because I would have thought he'd have seen the work he'd just completed as itself a very substantial critical theory—a project that, among other accomplishments, opened the differences between himself and Habermas and, certainly, Mills.

In the latter connection, Gouldner's Coming Crisis is remembered today in much the same manner as Mills's Sociological Imagination—as books still read, if and when, more for their political clues than their scientific value. They were, together, the book ends of the 1960s—or, at least, the sixties of the young and mostly white students who, after attacking university cultures, got serious in their opposition to the war in Vietnam. Mills is thought by many to have called forth this new left in 1960 as Gouldner is said to have called a good many of them back to sociology in 1970 after the turmoil began to recede under the ravages of age and Nixon's counterrevolutionary programs. Mills gave the younger radicals confidence in the power of imagination, while Gouldner gave us, as we grew older, his own conception of the reflexive intellectual—a model that helped justify the transition back from the streets to the academy.

Yet, unlike Mills's books of the 1950s, Gouldner's of the 1970s could well merit the effort of a fresh look. Of these the two that formed the heart of what I, if not Gouldner himself, always thought of as his critical theory, are The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology (1976) and The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (1979). In the former he introduces the concept he developed explicitly in the latter: CCD, Culture of Critical Discourse. The concept is awkward on the tongues of those who have grown up in the wake of a so-called linguistic turn in social and cultural studies. Had Gouldner lived he would have, certainly, worked more on CCD. Still, CCD stands up well enough, I think, against what was then the insufficient critical theory he thought he might displace.

In the years just after Gouldner's death in 1980, Habermas had completed the ponderous two volumes of Theory of Communicative Action. Few who were inspired by Habermas's writings of the late 1960s and early 1970s—of which none more wonderful than Knowledge and Human Interests (1968)—could have been encouraged by these bulging disquisitions that covered old ground in mind-numbing detail. Worse yet, looking back, what is now clear is that what went wrong with Habermas was that he had, at least then, turned toward the pure theory he had so stunningly exposed in 1968. Still, many were caught up by Habermas's writings, then and since, to such an extent that subsequent attempts in the 1990s to revive critical theory for a new age, thought little of Gouldner, more of Habermas parsed by Bourdieu, occasionally Foucault. Habermas held the ground on which Gouldner sought a stake. We might have been better off, critically speaking, had those in a position to do so allowed our disappointment with Habermas to lead us back to Gouldner.

Gouldner's Dialectic of Ideology and Technology and Future of Intellectuals were both critical explorations of the question then just dawning as the fog lifted from the world's first massive technocratic war—a war in Southeast Asia begun by out-of-control liberal technocrats in Washington (of which none more so than Robert McNamara) and ended by a cadre of younger and lower echelon technocrats in the Pentagon (of which none more representative than Daniel Ellsberg), not to mention the by-then well aged new left academics and their students. In Future of Intellectuals it was precisely this internal conflict between opposing sectors of the technocratic intelligentsia that served as Gouldner's most explicit illustration of the thesis on the Culture of Critical Discourse. "In short," he said in Thesis Six of Future, "CCD is a common bond between humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia, as well as among different technical intelligentsia themselves." Gouldner was here drawing on the theme of Dialectic in which the ideology and technology are described as having a critical edge which is rooted the nature of ideology itself. In this Gouldner salvaged ideology from the damage done by Marx's one-sided reduction of it in German Ideology. Of the latter's famous camera obscura figure of speech, Gouldner said, sarcastically, what about the cameraman? Ideology, Gouldner argued, is, simultaneously, a distortion of the interested origins of knowledge and the kind of knowledge that can serve to unmask the distortions. The ideology of Cold War containment used to justify American

intervention in Southeast Asia was cut of the same intellectual cloth as the progressive liberalism that came to attack the war as a betrayal of American values. Neither was on the side of the radical angels. Both were formed by an ideology of liberal humanism that was the glue of the American military and economic hegemony emerging after World War Two.

For Gouldner, everything was contradictory; nothing was sacred; and there were no attainable quasi-transcendentals of the kind Habermas sought. It was, in this aspect, Gouldner's faithfulness to a sociology of intellectuals that might have set him apart from both Mills and Habermas, who, differently, imagined themselves as engaged intellectuals able to profess universal theories and progressive (if not quite revolutionary) politics. Though he might have shuddered before the antiessentialist critiques that came into play after his death, Gouldner had scant regard for overly generalized theories. Quite apart from his own famously ponderous attack on Parsons in Coming Crisis, the books that followed directed his skepticism toward Marxism's vulgar totalizations. He was able to revive new class theory by describing it as, at best, a flawed universal class—as thus (in another figure he used) the hand we had been dealt, thus, the one we must play, which allowed him to account for Marx's missing cameraman. The intellectual need not be the pure revolutionary. It is sufficient that he be honest as to the contradictions of his position. Gouldner's critical theory as it took shape in Dialectic and Future was more rough-hewn but robust than the somewhat tepid idea of reflexive sociology in Coming Crisis. This is what gives Gouldner the edge over Mills. Gouldner's intellectual in a culture of critical discourse was better attuned to the contradictions of social history than Mills's more enlightenment ideal of the sociological imagination. Mills had a bit too much confidence that troubled persons could acquire a sociology of the structured issues on the simple grounds of knowledge alone. What is shocking today when one reads Mills closely is what shocks in a rereading of the 1962 Port Huron Statement of SDS it inspired— an innocent faith that to imagine the new social order is to make it possible.

Gouldner had no illusions about the potency of sociology in particular or of enlightened knowledge in general. For him critical theory was rooted in an insight that even the younger Habermas of Knowledge and Human Interests grasped only partially and passingly. Knowledge of all kinds is interested, to be sure; and the interest in emancipation is indisputably foundational to a critical theory. But does it follow thence that emancipated reason liberates us from the varieties of bondages that afflict the human condition? Certainly not. Critical theories are no less distorted and corrupted by the interests of those who produce them than are the varieties of pure technical knowledge produced in the interest of control. Knowledge is never one; always knowledges—many and unruly, always corrupt, sometimes emancipatory, occasionally powerful.

Had they survived their broken hearts, Mills and Gouldner would today be old men. One wonders what they would have to say to each other, if anything at all. Neither might have gone on to surpass the work he had already done. Still, one wonders what might have been. In the meantime, we have what they left which is enough, for me at least, to wonder why we read and remember Mills and not Gouldner? Is it the luck of the one to have invented a brilliant catch phrase? Or the bad luck of the other for having died after asking troubling questions still open decades later? Without taking any thing away from Mills's well deserved reputation, it is strange that a well-turned phrase ended up trumping a rough-hewn theory. Of this, we can be sure, Mills would not have approved, however much we would have enjoyed the lingering of his reputation.

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