FAST CAPITALISM

An Interdisciplinary Journal

Volume 12 • Issue 1

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Fast Capitalism is an academic journal with a political intent. We publish reviewed scholarship and essays about the impact of rapid information and communication technologies on self, society and culture in the 21st century. We do not pretend an absolute objectivity; the work we publish is written from the vantages of viewpoint. Our authors examine how heretofore distinct social institutions, such as work and family, education and entertainment, have blurred to the point of near identity in an accelerated, post-Fordist stage of capitalism. This makes it difficult for people to shield themselves from subordination and surveillance. The working day has expanded; there is little down time anymore. People can 'office' anywhere, using laptops and cells to stay in touch. But these invasive technologies that tether us to capital and control can also help us resist these tendencies. People use the Internet as a public sphere in which they express and enlighten themselves and organize others; women, especially, manage their families and nurture children from the job site and on the road, perhaps even 'familizing' traditionally patriarchal and bureaucratic work relations; information technologies afford connection, mitigate isolation, and even make way for social movements. We are convinced that the best way to study an accelerated media culture and its various political economies and existential meanings is dialectically, with nuance, avoiding sheer condemnation and ebullient celebration. We seek to shape these new technologies and social structures in democratic ways.

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Coming Home after the Surge: Dissecting *The Heart of the Matter* Report from The American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Timothy W. Luke

Overview

This brief statement is a meditation on mystification. At this moment, the United States of America is beset by crises, contradictions, and conflicts. It remains engaged in long-running undeclared wars. Voter turnout for many local, state, and national elections is abysmal. Corporations are officially recognized as legal persons with definite basic rights. Much of civil society escapes daily into the cybernetic haze of social media. The deep state has virtually everyone under some sort of surveillance. Now many members of the armed forces, once deployed overseas have been returning home after "the surge" in Iraq and Afghanistan, but remain wary of a recall to new deployments in Syria, Libya or Yemen. At this same conjuncture of events, however, an august group of academicians, artists, and activists recently joined a few other experts, while averting their eyes from these disasters, to write a national report about the declining condition of the arts and sciences that America's citizens need to assess these disastrous events in their public and private lives.

Coming together as the Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences, they produced a substantial white paper--The Heart of the Matter: The Humanities And Social Sciences for a Vibrant, Competitive, and Secure Nation--to extoll the national need to strengthen the humanities and social sciences at all educational levels. This bold move, they assert, would brighten America's already gleaming greatness. Learning more about the work of humanists and social scientists, according to the Commission, might help American citizens better participate more "meaningfully in the democratic process--as voters, informed consumers, and productive workers" (The Heart of the Matter [hereafter HM], 2013: 10), and thereby rise above the nation's current political malaise. Yet, they ignore, at the same time, the complex social forces whose influences neutralize collective power, estrange citizens in voting, and rob the country of good jobs needed for voters to be "informed buyers" in today's purportedly liberal democratic capitalism. Mystification then is indeed flowing through many aspects of this Commission's activities.

Because this report's writers appear to have, as Marx notes, "accepted its language and its laws," the market strictures of today's globalized political economy dominate the Commission's analysis, exposing how nakedly "the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion to the devaluation of the world of men" (Marx, 1978: 70, 71). Washington's inclination since 2000 to put the stability of insurance companies, money center banks, and equity markets at the heart of America's public policy matters suggests those elite institutions are valued far more than ordinary men and women. Even so, the Commission asserts more humanistic learning and social scientific research could make full amends for these troubles.

In actuality, The Heart of the Matter report implicitly concurs with Marx. The more citizens participate under the influences of a false consciousness derived from nonhumanistic learning or unsocial nonscientific teaching, the

desultory voter, uninformed consumer, and unproductive worker put what little life they have into the objectified routines of empty formalized democratic processes. Plainly, each citizen tacitly concedes the product of his/her civic agency and economic praxis is "an alien object" in which their lives no longer belong to them but rather "to the object" (Marx, 1978: 72).

From the perspective of critical new political scientists, the key mystification that one must confront here, at root, is scholastic simplicity. The Commissioners make a naïve claim: if all citizens could think better (due to having more humanities and social sciences knowledge), then our world will improve due to such improved thinking. Standing on this thin ice, the Commission issues a spirited call to arms. It is not a radical question, like "What must be done?" but rather an estranged, nationalist, and elitist plea "Who will lead America into a bright future?" (HM, 2013: 4). That America now can even be led, that a bright future beckons it, and that historical agents await awakening from their slumber by humanists and social scientists are big questions that the Commissioners all beg, but they also answer them immediately and positively. "Yes, we can" is their response, and the country must count upon its "educated citizens," even though those citizens ideally would have profiles more like their scholarly colleagues in the twentieth-century clerisy (Kotkin, 2014) than the everyday average commuters out on the freeways. In their document, they respond in some detail:

> Who will lead America into a bright future?
>
> Citizens who are educated in the broadest possible sense, so that they can participate in their own governance and engage with the world. An adaptable and creative workforce. Experts in national security, equipped with the cultural understanding, knowledge of social dynamics, and language proficiency to lead our foreign service and military through complex global conflicts. Elected officials and a broader public who exercise civil political discourse, founded on an appreciation of the ways our differences and commonalities have shaped our rich history. We must prepare the next generation to be these future leaders (HM, 2013:3).

To make such mystifying claims, one wonders if they understand anything about how empty civic education is today. Instead the commissioners, their directors, and their audiences, as a bloc of political true believers, appear to be "an absurdity," since their claims about liberal education could indeed be read as "the hallucinations of its death struggle, words that are reduced to phrases, spirits reduced to ghosts" (Marx, 1978: 613-614). For nearly two decades, humanists (Donoghue, 2008) and social scientists (Flyvbjerg, 2001) have been in despair about how little impact they have had in society since the 1960s. Do the report's authors know something everyone else does not or is this grand document only another academic ghost dance to conjure up lost days of yore when such learned discourses were honored and/or needed?

What Matters?

This analysis, therefore, will reconsider the apparent aspirations and stated significance of this American Academy of Arts & Science's study (founded in 1780 hereafter AAAS in this study), The Heart of the Matter: The Humanities and Social Sciences (2013). The report's production and dissemination mimics at the national level the machinations of power, position, and privilege found on most major research university campuses. And, so too does it follow the trail blazed by the quite influential National Academies report Rising Above the Gathering Storm (2007) that was produced to bolster the importance of science and technology disciplines in society. After three years of lobbying on the basis of that earlier 2007 report with which "the scientific community has worked to strengthen education in the STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) and to encourage new and expanded funding for scientific research" (HM, 2013: 6), humanists and social scientists, who know full well that they come up second, or indeed last, at universities, national academies, foundations, and government agencies, found a few friendly backers in Congress. With charge letters from the Senate and House, then, the American Academy of Arts & Sciences created a Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences with this bi-partisan backing from both chambers of Congress in 2010.

The members, missions, and meanings assigned to this undertaking are fascinating on many levels. They reveal much about civic challenges at this turn in history, the complex contradictions that keep them from being overcome, and cultural continuities in the USA over the past 100 to 120 years that have both constrained a "stronger, more vibrant civil society" and downplayed the "excellence in humanities and social scientific scholarship and education" (HM, 2013: 6). Even though the Academy, its commissioners, Congress and many others putatively value such knowledge,

might these seemingly well-intentioned, liberal democratic forces also express more rigid, if not repressive, agendas in the development of this report?

Without defining their terms, the major goals of their study are, ironically, stability-seeking, security-driven, and self-centered. Of course, science alone cannot do everything, so the humanities and social sciences must develop "a vibrant, competitive, and secure nation" (HM, 2013: cover). The professed purposes of "liberal education" then are pressed into an organized state-corporate academic plan that smacks of illiberal indoctrination, namely,

> The Heart of the Matter identifies three overarching goals: 1) to educate Americans in the knowledge, skills, and understanding they will need to thrive in a twenty-first century democracy; 2) to foster a society that is innovative, competitive, and strong; and, 3) to equip the nation for leadership in an interconnected world (HM, 2013: 6).

These goals strongly reaffirm the classic Progressive agendas of the USA's corporate elites that long ago turned "American schools into a central social institution for the production of men and women who conformed to the needs of a corporate and technocratic world" (Spring, 1972: 1).

These needs remain manifest in the Commission Report: Americans must be the strategic leaders of our world; they must have an education that makes them strong, competitive, and innovative; and, American understandings, skills, and knowledges must thrive by bringing the nation's proceduralist democracy into full sway across the world during the current century. Individual freedoms, self-realization, collective liberation are not being celebrated here. On the contrary, the report's goals largely are statist, parochial, nationalistic, and technocratic. In the final analysis, the affairs of the state are so dire today that even the humanities and social sciences--along with STEM disciplines--must be mobilized in the name of the nation's security, competition, and vibrancy. At the heart of these matters today, not unlike 50 years ago, "public safety seems to many Americans to require increasingly repressive measures on the part of the state whose powers have already dangerously expanded, and which finds itself inextricably involved in similar police actions abroad" (Lasch, 1966: 30).

Since the founding of the American Council of Learned Societies in 1919 during the aftermath of World War One, the policing of academic disciplinary boundaries, mission statements, and social purposes has been a recurrent worry among American academics (Mills, 1951; Ricci, 1987; Oren, 2013; and, Kotkin, 2014). Recognizing their essentially subaltern, if not marginal, status in an unabashedly industrial capitalist order that celebrates commerce and cash over concepts and collegiality, many liberal arts disciplines in the USA have been searching for acceptance and significance in the new industrial state by showing what their individual intellectual vocations might bring to the table for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Official commissions, which are struck by municipal, state or national authorities, provide good recurrent opportunities for announcing such "discoveries," and this recent appeal to the AAAS to launch a National Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences in 2011 is no exception. Since humanities and social science faculties often are being either administratively shunned, or sliced down to near nothing, on campus, their academic leaders want to wave formal documents like this one in front of deans, provosts, and presidents in attempts to prove they are still needed or maybe even valued.[1]

The Heart of the Matter, ironically, is then an intricate map of another new human terrain to be engineered systematically during the still long, and not much forgotten, global war on terror (GWOT). After twelve years of inconclusive, if not failed, war-making in the Middle East, the humanities and social sciences are mobilized in this report to maintain stability and consensus at home by anchoring the Republic's continued need "to connect us with our global community" (HM, 2013:9) and thereby guarantee "the success of cultural diplomacy in the 21st century" (HM, 2013: 6). While anthropology and psychology have been compromised during the big battles of this on-going GWOT in Southwest Asia, as behavioral and social science was in Southeast Asia during the shooting war against Communism five decades ago, these AAAS Commissioners explicitly are arguing human progress in liberal capitalist democracy needs the constant care and astute attention of social science to keep the American Republic on its rails.

Connecting with the global community, particularly as the anchor of "the West" standing resolutely against a host of nondemocratic, undeveloped, and anti-capitalist competitors, requires some modicum of domestic cultural capital, political tradition, and economic literacy that most only get from their humanities and social sciences at school. With more humanities and social sciences lessons, therefore, the report presumes the most positive possible outcomes will be assured. Otherwise, what will the global community want to emulate in America? The humanities and social sciences purportedly will keep these intangible intellectual and moral assets viable, and the USA will still remain competitive as a global model for attaining "the good life."

Where is the Heart?

The letters of invitation proposing to convene the Commission from the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, which were signed respectively by Senator Lamar Alexander (R)-Tennessee and Mark R. Warner (D)-Virginia plus Congressmen David Price (D)-North Carolina and Thomas E. Petri (R)-Wisconsin, were issued on September 27 and December 6, 2010. Interestingly enough, the Occupy Wall Street movement took hold on the busy streets of Lower Manhattan about a year later. On September 17, 2011 after Kalle Lasn and Micah White from Adbusters registered the www.Occupy/WallStreet.org address in the spirit of getting the USA "its own Tahrir," a loose national movement of social activists, civic groups, and unemployed people to follow the citizenship-in-action examples set by Egyptian activists in the occupation of Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011.

After selecting One Chase Manhattan Plaza and Bowling Green Park as prime venues, the OWS groups ended up settling in Zuccotti Park, once preemptive police actions blocked the first two locations. Although the occupation there lasted only about two months, it vividly marked one example of citizens engaged in democratic decision-making based on "a shared knowledge of history, civics, and social studies" which The Heart of the Matter report entreated the nation to support (HM, 2013: 10). Of course, this popular participatory engagement in democratic processes is not mentioned in the Commission's report in any manner whatsoever, because the Report appears to aim its humanities and social science teaching at the white-collar elites running Wall Street instead of the citizens in the park protesting against the 1 percent working in the Wall Street banks and brokerages near Zuccotti Park.

Civic incidents and political movements, like 2011's Occupy Wall Street rallies or the "9/12 Tea Party" Taxpayer March on Washington in September 2009, exceed the passive participant subjectivity so favored by mainstream American democratic theory since the 1950s. This narrow construction of capitalist liberal democracy is quite limited inasmuch as it intellectually, legally, and politically admits that it only generally "allows citizens to participate meaningfully in the democratic process--as voters, informed consumers, and productive workers" (HM, 2013: 10). Organizing on the street by many ordinary people, as a democratic mass public, does not match that profile of preferred political agency--so it is ignored.

The 53 members who served on the Commission were a select group that one maybe would imagine should favor having a "stronger, more vibrant civil society." Yet, their distinguished qualities betray an extreme narrowness in perspective, displaying how brittle and stressed America's civil society is. Not surprisingly, many are academics, and with few exceptions, they also are based in private and wealthy universities--Princeton (three members), Washington University, Harvard (three members), USC, Pennsylvania, Stanford (two members), Duke, Notre Dame, Amherst, Cornell, Miami, Johns Hopkins, NYU, Texas, George Washington along with a few from public schools--California-Berkeley, Texas, and Miami-Dade Community College. Some professors served, but college presidents, chancellors, and deans were more numerous. Some elite law firms, museums, libraries, and philanthropic organizations were represented, but major corporations were also represented quite prominently--Exelon, Lockheed Martin, TIAA-CREF, Boeing, Skywalker Properties, and Adobe Systems. A few relatively well-known artists--Ken Burns, Emmy Lou Harris, John Lithgow, and Yo Yo Ma--were participants as well as less famous journalists and judges.

The American Academy for the Arts & Sciences also was joined in this effort by the Association of American Universities (AAU), American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), and The National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), National Academy of Engineering (NAE), National Academy of Sciences (NAS), The New York Times, National Gallery of Art, and The Smithsonian Institution. Politically, the Commission had a former Ambassador to Afghanistan and former Governor of Tennessee plus a retired Supreme Court Justice and former Congressman. While the Commission featured literary scholars, poets, historians, musicians, law professors, humanists, churchmen, and communication scholars, it also enlisted prominent political scientists and theorists--Danielle S. Allen (Institute for Advanced Study), Kwame Anthony Appiah (Harvard), Amy Guttmann (Pennsylvania), and Donna E. Shalala (Miami). Gutman and Shalala also were sitting presidents of their universities. A fair number of engineers, economists, scientists, businessmen, and lawyers rounded out the mix; but, this small group of privileged elite individuals is employed mostly in professions linked to education, culture, law and government, which is far from a broad cross-section of American civil society.

Representatives from AAU and Ivy League schools dominated the university contingent; only one community college and one "selective liberal arts college" were invited. The clear implication is that "leaders equipped for an interconnected world" do not come from just any regional public university or small college. They would be recruited instead, like the members on this commission, from more refined worlds of intellectual interconnection.

The Commission held six fora around the nation, including Cambridge, MA; Stanford, CA; St. Louis, MO; Miami, FL; Durham, NC; and New York, NY to listen to a mix of voices from varied institutions, less visible schools, and different people, but the study itself was truly an AAAS product with 47 of 53 Commission members being AAAS Fellows, including its two co-chairs. Out in the six regional fora, the cast of characters was equally elitist.

Looking through the lists, it would appear not more than seven--a librarian in New England, a then current Stanford undergraduate, a US Marine sergeant who graduated at Stanford in 2012, an Eastern Shawnee Indian chief from Oklahoma, a bookstore owner in Miami, an assistant high school principal in Durham, NC, and a young playwright in New York City--could be called something like the "ordinary citizens" that humanities and social sciences are meant to make into truly enriched souls and solid citizens. Hence, this compact carnival of nationally known humanists, social scientists, politicians, and other public figures became a nomadic band of lobbyists pushing their special bill of recognition across the country to reaffirm their vocational purpose and collective utility to their countrymen and the nation's higher authorities.

At the six for a around the nation, the list of participants and where they convened does not suggest a major effort was made to break out of an equally elite envelope of well-positioned institutions and individuals. Four of the six for a were held in metropolitan areas with regional Federal Reserve Banks--San Francisco, St. Louis, New York, and Boston. And, former state governors, US Supreme court Justices, US Secretaries of State, major corporate CEOs, chairpersons of big charitable trusts, and smatterings of local professors, artists, K-12 educators, museum directors, writers, and arts council representatives came for a day of discussion in these major commercial hubs as well two other sessions--one in Durham, North Carolina and another in Miami, Florida. The Commission's message was laced with the classic Progressive elite's hopes to mobilize the humanities and social sciences to anchor a liberal education for all citizens. Still, very few ordinary citizens appear to have been invited "to reveal those patterns in the lives of real people" (HM, 2013: 17). Of course, one can claim that this whole cast of characters are "real people," but they plainly are far more real than the ordinary guys and gals who putatively need more humanities and social sciences to spice up their hum-drum everyday lives.

A Torn Heart?

The formation of commissions, like this AAAS body asked to report on the utility of the humanities and social sciences for the Republic and its citizens, is also in some ways demeaning. This Commission's framing statement misconstrues the importance of such knowledge as being little more than workforce training assets, civic preparedness instructions or globalization acceptance exercises. Corporate elites are, or have been convinced, about the merits of such learning for at least key elements in the striving upper middle class. Once again, these Commissioners were ratifying the importance of the same goals touted for over a century in the USA for themselves, the Commission, and the business elites who back their efforts. Many comparable commissions have been organized, made reports, and popularized their findings for at least as long as the social sciences have been organized in their current disciplinary configurations (Cook, 1910). A few recommendations made by such bodies have been followed, but most reports have been left sitting on the back shelves of dimly lit library stacks unknown and unread -- until the next monumental effort a decade or two later that comes the same conclusions.

At the current political conjuncture today, however, unwanted and unintended side effects also are complicating these traditionally honorific assignments: a division among business elites about the merits of higher education itself, a fixation upon job readiness over civic awareness, and a rising distrust in all science itself. Doubts about organized social science have been with us in the USA since Senator William Proxmire's (D)-Wisconsin "Golden Fleece" awards from 1975 to 1988 for frivolous spending on apparently silly studies. The efforts of latter-day prairie penny-pinchers, like Senator Tom Coburn (R)-Oklahoma or Congressmen Larry Dean Bucshon (R)-Indiana and Lamar S. Smith (R)-Texas, however, are more radical. They intend to curtail, cut or entirely close National Science Foundation funding, first, for the social sciences and then natural sciences they find "useless." This intense level of antiscientific bean-counting "know nothingness" is something new. Whether it is climate change science, new antibiotic drug research, field biology studies of endangered species, support for childhood vaccinations, environmental science surveys of mountain top removal mining, fossil fuel fracking or ethanol production, partisan disinformation campaigns by the religious right, industry lobbies or Tea Party libertarians have become aggressively dismissive of science itself as well as much of "the knowledge" it produces.

Four generations after the APSA was organized by bureaucrats, politicians, and social scientists at the turn of

the twentieth century, its membership--along with those signed up as members of the MPSA, NEPSA, SPSA, and WPSA--are enjoined frequently to call, e-mail or write their Congressional delegations to protect the discipline's continued intellectual legitimacy--as marked by continued funding for scientific research by the NSF.[2] Many of those in Congress who push these programs claim the money would be better spent on STEM-related research or new medical science; but, such justifications are disingenuous. Many of their backers and allies, if not the politicians themselves, also dispute the findings of climatologists, do not allow their children to get vaccinations against common pathogens, and dismiss the responsibility of the nation to care for the poor, infirm and aged even with such minimal public health insurance schemes as Obamacare.

To a very real degree, one must ask if The Heart of the Matter is, at best, the last gasp of civic Progressive education in a failing state or, at worst, another indicator of the elite's evidently pathetic cluelessness about today's extreme ideological crisis. That is, do the nation's citizens and elites, in fact, want to lead today's interconnected world, value competitive innovation, or seek the knowledge, skill and understanding of a twenty-first century democracy? Arguably, many do not, and they recognize, more easily than most academicians, corporate managers, artists or legal experts, that neoisolationism, protectionism, and quietism better suit the oligarchical plutonomy that has grown in strength within the USA since the late 1970s (Luke, 2011).

The ostensible civic-mindedness of this AAAS Commission Report, moreover, is also at odds with other white papers from organizations like the American Council on Education (ACE). This group is calling into doubt the putatively privileged role of faculty in higher education (ACE, 2014a) as well as the basic business model of higher education itself (ACE, 2014b). Funded by grants from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the American Council on Education has pulled together a number of university and college presidents to think about higher education in a group named the Presidential Innovation Laboratory (PIL). The openly corporate centered agenda of the Gates Foundation is evident in its assault on traditional "faculty roles" and outmoded "college business models."

Excited about the prospects for using more technology for teaching and learning, PIL is called for "a renewed focus on faculty roles" (ACE, 2014a). Needless to say, this model of instruction strays some distance from the traditional faculty roles of "working with students on moral development" (ACE, 2014a) as one might expect from a strong renewal of humanities and social science education. Without this anchor in strong university-level faculties, it is also unclear how the reintroduction of better humanities and social science education could work its way into K-12 education or focus on the international competitiveness of American businesses and government services.

The unbundling of university and college faculty roles, moreover, would truly be accelerated by shifting the "business models" of higher education to pay for providing different curricula aimed at more directly marketable skills to student populations continuously aggregated out of the vocational needs found in different age cohorts (ACE, 2014b). The need for humanities and social science learning is never-ending; but, if it never starts, due to the total domination vocationally structured curricula and STEM-centered institutional practices in schools, then the prospects for bringing these other forms of knowledge to bear for creating a more secure, competitive, and vibrant nation will largely be lost. On these counts, it appears that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation would not see greatly reduced humanities and social sciences teaching capacities as a crippling loss either to higher education or to its students wending their ways into the work force.

Instead, like other right-wing reformers, from ALEC to ACTA, the Gates Foundation seems to regard humanities and social science education as unwanted historical leftovers that now amount to the less and less that is relevant to the education of the twenty-first century workforce. Indeed, they are dead weight or disabling drag on the hull of reform, preventing swift passage of STEM-centered learning to the top of all institutions' "to-do" lists. At best, then, the humanities and social sciences are likely to be cut adrift by such reforms to float away on the murky waters of "general education," while the enduring ideals of liberal education are simply left to sink out of sight.

The True Heart of the Matter = HASSLE

The Commission's statement that "the strength of a republic depends on the ability of its citizens to participate fully in decision-making processes. . . by making informed decisions as voters, jurors, and consumers" (HM, 2013: 24) is a pious platitude, which many trends in American society work hard to paralyze. While the American education system may have been once focused on preparing K-12 students for "full participation in a democratic society" (HM, 2013: 24), oligarchical elites, negotiated legal settlements, and predatory corporations now are putting major roadblocks in the way of full citizen participation in campaigns and elections, jury trials, and rational informed

consumption.

In an educational system intoxicated by STEM initiatives, the humanities and social sciences are believed to have little apparent market utility. Their subject matter, instructors, and avowed purpose are either demeaned or ignored by the powers that prevail in America's liberal capitalist democracy. Those in power wish to stay in control, and few really want to confront "a broadly educated, well-informed, articulate citizenry" (HM, 2013: 24). Hence, civics is reprocessed as American history, reduced to formalistic rote principles or simply eliminated as local school boards and parents push for new instructional plans that focus almost exclusively on STEM-based workforce preparation skills. Like art, music, physical education or recess, civics is being recast as "a nicety" rather than "a necessity."

Common baseline competencies in history, government, and ethics are not being actively debated or developed; and, when they are, school administrators and teachers often run afoul of push-back from fundamentalist religious reactions, right-wing media ridicule or ruthless corporate rejections of such skills. Everyone must work, but should, could or would everyone participate in public life? Many detractors question this goal, do not want to see it happen, and, in fact, deny educators the time and resources to cultivate "the competencies necessary for full civil participation in American society: voting, serving on juries, interpreting current events, developing a respect for and understanding of differences, along with an ability to articulate one's sense of the common good" (HM, 2013: 24). These are complex and conflictual skills that require dissent, doubt, and disputation to operate effectively, but the Report's authors downplay those inescapable realities. The humanities and social sciences are critical for the liberal education needed to cultivate and keep freedom as a lived personal experience and shared collective value, but these necessities rarely are attained nicely.

While everyone is eager to affirm the centrality of STEM education for the nation, who sincerely recognizes the significance of gathering the "Humanities and Social Sciences for Liberal Education," or if you will "HASSLE," to sustain the Republic's development? Real teaching and learning require honest and tough training in the techniques and goals of fomenting a rich civic life, which should accept that democratic governance runs, in part, on the conflict, contradictions, and clash of opposing interests. To be free is also to be engaged in perpetual "hassles." Liberal education is about freedom, and being free will always necessarily involve conflict, a burden, challenge, a dissensus, and contradiction. These struggles, as James Madison and John Stuart Mill recognized, are what fulfill the promise of freedom, self-determination, and collective decision-making. Without HASSLE-based learning, liberal democracy fails, just as competitive technological economies wither in the absence of rigorous STEM-oriented training.[3] And, plutonomic elites value their STEM-driven assets far more than liberal democracy and its hassles. Indeed, a HASSLE-free society, for many among the top 1, 5 or 10 percent of society, is much preferred over a HASSLE-centered educational system, civic life, and national competitiveness.

That the USA has slipped behind other major economies, key allies or potential adversaries over the last 35-40 years should be no surprise. Few localities, state leaders or national authorities--despite sanctimonious studies like The Heart of the Matter--want to embrace HASSLE-driven teaching and learning as the nation spins further into poverty, weakness and insignificance, because HASSLE-trained citizens would decry these failures. Today, it is STEM "that matters," and HASSLE is, quite literally, regarded as "too much hassle" for late capitalist subjects to handle. Voices in the power elite continue affirming the importance of HASSLE, but actions taken by this same bloc of social forces does everything to make humanities and social sciences more and more inconsequential in the education, commerce, and administration of allegedly liberal capitalist democracies that are increasingly illiberal mercantile oligarchies (Kotkin, 2014).

In fact, another interpretation is that these elite educationalists are not interested that much in creating more real democracy. They are comfortable with a high level of mass aliteracy, civic disengagement, and social anomie. These incapacitating qualities permit "the public" to be much better served by liberal education's real target audience of upper middle class academic strivers, aspiring to gain entrance to the technostructure, corporate elite, state clerisy or cultural spotlight. This is the true crisis: humanities and social science have been derided or destroyed so extensively that even elite institutions, whose students need this knowledge, are now disserving their elite clientele. Progressive-leaning elite individuals do favor training "the right people" who should rule over, care for, or minister to "the people" as the wards of such refined technocratic demoligarchs rather than the constituents of merely elected crass democrats. The flows of capital, information, energy, and labor in global fast capitalism require special treatment, and those few strands of the HASSLE traditions that survive the next generation might only be pitched to speak to, for, and about the "kineformative kultur" of global capitalist exchange (Luke, 2005). To be caring and cautious, these Davos-minded global elites, in fact, do need good humanities and social science knowledge to glue together the class

fractions and their powers for the ruling blocs of their plutonomy.

Embracing HASSLE in the humanities and social sciences as a watchword for engagé scholarly focus, then, has a certain insouciant, if not provocative, quality. For some, a hassle is some activity that is not worth the difficult effort involved in doing it. STEM fetishists will betray themselves immediately by acknowledging humanities and social science learning is far too difficult for them--since "it's a hassle"--to exert any effort at mastering its complexities as they content themselves with STEM's putative mathematical elegance and simplicities.

More astute defenders of liberal education will immediately hear strains of John Stuart Mills' On Liberty, the French Encyclopedists' Deistic secularism or militant anarchism's quest for human emancipation in recognizing no truth or error is truly known without multiple troublesome confrontations with error or truth. Coming to full flower through humanistic learning as personal Bildung actually requires much bother, annoyance and trouble to actualize all of humanity's tragic and sublime potentialities. Moreover, the purposive troubling of settled unquestioned domination, routine or prejudice makes everyone more alive, conscious, and engaged by learning. One should best remain alertly unsettled than being ineptly settled. Humanities and social sciences are about individuals and societies, and many recognize not all is right for the people alone and in groups. For all these reasons, HASSLE is plainly needed.

Picking the right argument, starting the good fight, and initiating the needed annoyance, and spending the required time to be bothered are crucial. HASSLE is worth any hassle, and its values are most often realized by causing bigger hassles. The Commission shrinks from pushing this truth very hard in their project, so the HASSLE they pretend to defend must only root out systemic problems caused by the complex pressures of money, information, time or inconvenience. At their best, knowledge from the humanities and social sciences will free people, enlarge the ambit of substantive freedom, and move social practices to new ground, while providing better understandings of all that is in play. Implicitly this could be what the commissioners want, but the tepid establishmentarianism of their findings barely rise above glib ideological mystification. Ironically, the putative champions of HASSLE will not even get into a truly major hassle to defend HASSLE.

Contesting the hegemony of STEM, or its allegedly more engaged STEM-H, in society, education and academe will always be a major hassle, but HASSLE is well-worth every annoyance, bother or conflict down this road. Yet, there are no guarantees in today's ambivalent conditions. On the one hand, HASSLE-centered learning could recharge the slumbering masses in a truly democratic awakening, which some feared in Occupy Wall Street. Meanwhile, on the other hand, HASSLE-driven teaching could be made more available to the guardians working on and with Wall Street so that they might more gracefully guide a caring state, the open society, a diverse culture, and the plutonomic economy.

Bending STEM, Pushing HASSLE

The Heart of the Matter is a fascinating ideological text that invokes the importance of humanistic and social scientific education without any mention of decisive recent public events—from the build-up to the dotcom bust to the invasion of Iraq to the unraveling of Central America--in which such knowledge has been so sorely missing. Even though the report explicitly states "the views expressed in this volume are those held by the contributors and are not necessarily those of the Officers and Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences" (HM, 2013: 3), the contributors and the AAAS fail themselves and the nation in this report. They fall back from pushing hard to highlight HASSLE, and instead accept the traditional underworker status of the humanities and social sciences to STEM disciplines. Sensing a horrendous lack of literacy, rising civic unpreparedness, growing unawareness of vital texts, and spreading public disengagement, they push platitudes. At the bottom line, all students should get a little remedial help, but the elite few will be redeployed to advance their putative rededication to engaging the public, increasing access to online resources, investing in civic education, and supporting full literacy (HM, 2013: 10) to bolster the nation's moral fiber and civic timber.

After 30 years of global war on terrorism, the end of the Cold War, three inconclusive wars in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and decades of economic stagnation, this AAAS Commission superficially endorses anodyne treatments for the nation's intellectual and moral deficits. But, it eagerly specifies how such treatments should be administered by the well-educated elite clerisy (Kotkin 2014). This agenda meets their top-line goals by outlining an elaborate program of investments and engagements for the humanities and social sciences at "The Best Colleges and Universities." As they recycle common criticisms of shortfalls, gaps, and deficits that

have been recognized since the early days of the Space Race in the late 1950s when the decay of humanities and the social sciences obviously took root, the Commission's secondary and tertiary goals read like a wish list of pork for resource-starved and recognition-deprived elite academicians, including

- Increased investment in research and discovery
- Creating new curricula to anchor basic competencies
- Strengthening support for teachers
- Encouraging all disciplines to help all obtain clean air, safe water, adequate food, good health, sufficient energy, and universal education
- Communicate the importance of research to mass publics
- Promote language learning
- Expand international education support study abroad and international exchanges
- Develop a Culture Corps to educate the public
  (HM, 2013: 11-13)

Asserting these initiatives "are critical to our pursuit of liberty, and happiness, as described by our nation's founders. They are The Heart of the Matter" (HM, 2013: 13), the report then lays out a strange case--not unlike our Federalist Founding Fathers--for continuing humanistic and social scientific education for "the right people" striving above and apart from most citizens. This enlightened elite then could grapple with the gritty challenges of managing a capitalist economy, ruling a complex state or coping with a conflicted civil society.

Indeed, one can read their arguments as a self-interested ploy to celebrate the importance of the most select humanities and social science centers, since they are among the elite few in the top echelon of liberal arts based universities who actually try to master these disciplines. These degrees also are cash cows in many academic enterprises, and their institutions' books will stay better balanced to the extent that they can admit many more humanists and social scientists to subsidize the output of far more expensive STEM graduates. Any new infusion of HASSLE-tagged monies from foundations or states also are likely to be diverted to these supposedly world-class producers of humanists and social scientists as opposed to less visible regional training sites, like Chico State University, the University of South Dakota, University of Texas-Arlington, Indiana State University or Virginia Tech, which are regarded as training swarms of worker bees and drones for the corporate world. In other words, at The Heart of the Matter, one strangely hears this new class elite singing, like Devo in the 1970s, "we are the Culture Corps." And, they want--in a very comparable devolutionary manner--to secure American society's blessings to train more of themselves "to educate the public" whose many members apparently require this elitist "corps cultural" education in their humanities and social sciences to keep them in their progressively proper places.

The Heart of the Matter is a fascinating ideological text. Written during a decade of war against, in part, radical Islamist fundamentalism, Ba'athist authoritarianism, and antimodern quasi-criminal rebels, it speaks for bigger and better educational efforts in the humanities and social sciences purportedly to help the public better understand the crises of the day tied to such existential threats. Yet, it also "speaks to" the public about their need to endure being guided by a "cultural corps," instructing them about how and why "the best and brightest" require such learning. The heart of the matter then is serving the interests of this entrenched academic clerisy and sustaining their leadership of the people as a body politic of flexible citizens called upon to adapt to neoliberal competition, transnational values, and perhaps permanent war.

Endnotes

1. In this context, one also must be mindful of how liquid modernity's informatics flows are eroding all modes of scholarly activity and communication. On this shift, see Wouters, Beaulieu, Schamhorts, and Wyatt (2012).

2. These are the official organizations of political science as a discipline in the USA national and regionally: American Political Science Association (APSA), Midwest Political Science (MPSA), Northeastern Political Science Association (NPSA), Southern Political Science Association (SPSA), and Western Political Science Association (WPSA).

3. Here HASSLE flows along as the Humanities and Social Sciences for Liberal Education. A friendly amendment in another context would change the "A"

to "Art," or Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences for Liberal Education lest we let STEM coopt the Arts as STEAM: Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts, and Mathematics.

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Patriotism, Weapons Fetishism and Accountability: An Examination of the U.S. UAV Program

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Ubi cessat remedium ordiniarium, ibi decurritur ad extraordinarium
Where the ordinary remedy fails, recourse must be had to an extraordinary one
(Beres, 2011: 93)

In war, the technological imperative often trumps the legal one. This has been starkly illustrated in the legal and policy debates surrounding the use of unmanned vehicles, more popularly termed drones, in conflict. The US example on this score is particularly relevant. This paper argues that the drone program has been assimilated as a feature of what might be termed technological patriotism. This is characterised by a form of weapons fetishisation, by which the drone is deemed a supreme object of post-September 2001 conflicts. Such patriotism, as a consequence, is distorting. American citizens accused of committing terrorist attacks may be attacked and assassinated without due process. Constitutional protections are sidestepped, and justified on the basis of self-defence and the nature of the conflict. Accountability for such actions is thereby minimised.

The use of drones against citizens and non-citizens became a feature of US military policy under both the Bush and Obama administrations. Indeed, it has been argued that the use of such technology has far exceeded narrow legal directives about their deployment. "Drones, assumed for the purposes of the present report to be armed drones, have moved from the horizon into the realm of the known" (Heynes 2013: para 37). The passage by Congress of the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force in 2001 paved the way for the use of drones as part of the US policy, an expansive vesting of power that continues to blur the policy and legal context as to how it is used (US Congress 2001; Miller and DeYoung 1999).

Since then, the mechanised killing of human targets via the remote controlled means of bases in the US has become a matter of considerable debate domestically and beyond. In historical terms, it reaffirms the tendencies of states to greater states of automation in war, a theme underscored by Martin van Creveld (1989). The impact of such technology was made evident in 2013, when a debate was sparked as to whether Apple would accept Josh Begley's Drones app, which would notify users whenever a US drone strike was reported. It was rejected no less than three times (Gregory 2014).

The faith shown by American citizens in the drone program of the Obama Administration has increased with announcements that Washington's enemies are being disposed of with efficient and rapid ease. A study by the Pew Research Centre in 2013 suggested that the US ranked second after Israel in terms of popular approval for the use of drones, registering a figure of 61 percent (Drake 2013). The killing of the Islamic militant and US national, Anwar al-Awlaki[2], said to be behind shootings at Fort Hood, the Christmas "underwear bomber" incident, and an attempt to bring down a cargo aircraft using explosives in toner cartridges, was far from universally condemned for breaching matters of due process (The Economist 2013).

Supporters argue that it is clean, efficient and humanitarian in so far as it is specific in its targeting. Opponents argue that it places the US on a dangerous path, making the use of such weapons convenient and expedient, while

exaggerating their tactical effectiveness. What this paper argues is that the use of drones has become a fetish of the US military and foreign policy, one that is typical of the smugness that accompanies notions of "projecting power without vulnerability" (Gregory 2014). It signals the dangers inherent in the use of various military technologies which undermine legal rules while constituted as an essential part of the military industrial complex. The term suggested here is that of technological patriotism. First, a discussion of the technological idealisation behind such weapons is undertaken. Then, the complexity of weapons fetishism is examined in detail. The historical roots of this tendency are also considered with special reference to the US Atomic and Nuclear Program. This paper argues that an understanding of those links is useful in assessing the US military complex in terms of what weapons it embraces, and how such deployment is rationalised.

Situating Technology and Culture

Understanding drone culture in the US military establishment requires a broader discussion about the connections between warfare and patriotic identities. The resort to technological expertise as argued by Mark Mazetti (2013) tends to be privileged over human intelligence. The wedding of technology to patriotism is a constant feature of warfare and nationalism, though this came into its own during the twentieth century with the emergence of concentrated military complexes. Jack Snyder has argued that a "strategic culture" may well be discernible in certain contexts when examining such phenomena, something he employs with good measure when examining Soviet attitudes to limited nuclear conflict (Snyder 1977; MacMillan et al 1999). The logical assertion has not gone unnoticed in military courses, where culture features as a component of the curriculum.[3]

John Somerville considers the links between weapons and patriotism, the former being a neat functioning of the latter. Until the World Wars, weapons, in terms of characteristics and types, bore "only a technical relationship to patriotism" (Somerville 1981: 568). The greatest example in the twentieth century was how the construction and use of the atomic bomb against Japan became a patriotic assertion, even obsession. As Denise Kiernan (2013) shows, female employees on the Manhattan project were encouraged that their work would lead to a quicker end to the war. Other examples show that the patriotic project did not merely cut across the sexes, but also the races (Kinchy 2009). As John Dower (1997) explains, this narrative was "triumphal" and "heroic," and one that was strongly developed by one of the first eloquent exponents of the military industrial complex – the scientist James Conant (Dower 1996).

While there was also a terror of the atomic bomb after the end of the Second World War, Boyer notes that horror, by the 1950s, "had given way to an interval of diminished cultural attention and uneasy acquiescence in the goal of atomic superiority over the Russians" (Boyer 1994: 352). Security came first and battlefield ethics were left lagging. Opposition to the use of such weapons was carpeted as a matter of dangerous, if not delusionary, pacifism. The evolution of attitudes to the weapon had come full circle. "The dreaded destroyer of 1945 had become the shield of the Republic by 1950" (Boyer 1994: 349).

The shield of the republic produced a form of military fetishism. Critical theory sees this as a variant of product fetishism, or what Karl Marx termed "commodity fetishism." Marx has a specific reading of how this manifests, arguing that real social relations are effectively hidden in a process of objectification through human labour. What matters in this instance is attributed value, an "objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves but between the products of their labour" (Marx 1982: 308). It is precisely this "social relation" that is of interest here, in the values that are misattributed. And such fetishism as opposed to the use of weapons can also be found in the scholarship making use of Marx's theory, at least in part (De Santana 2009).

A body of work has emerged in critical theory examining the links between weapons and their associations with commodity theory. This is particularly relevant with the nuclear weapons establishment. According to Joseph Masco, nuclear weapons, or at the very least their possession, have been constituted as a social norm, "the preeminent national fetish of the United States." "Nuclear fetishism" has been suggested as a means of explicating the hollowness of deterrence theory, something that, in turn, builds upon critiques of international relations theory such as neorealism. [4] "Like commodities, weapons are sensuous things and at the same time supra-sensible or social. Their sensuous characteristics make them useful for exerting force" (De Santana 2009: 339). Nuclear weapons, when considered in terms of their social form of value or "property attributable to the network of social relations between states" is treated as if it were a natural feature of the physical substance of the weapon" (De Santana 2009: 339). Masco (2006) suggests that nuclear weapons are not commodities as such because they do not circulate, but the theoretical purview

is useful to extend. The nuclear weapon is considered as ordering and mediating relations between states, generating a false hierarchy by virtue of possession. Those who have the weapons prevail over those who do not (Masco 2006; Wyn Jones 1999: 144; Luckman 1984).

Slavoj Žižek terms this "fetishistic misrecognition", something he employs to considerable effect in examining the concept of divine rule as a function of monarchy. "'Being-a-king' is an effect of the network of social relations between a 'king' and his 'subjects'; but – and here is the fetishistic misrecognition – to the participants of this social bond, the relationship appears necessarily in an inverse form. They think that they are subjects giving the king royal treatment because the king is already himself, outside the relationship of his subjects, a king and as if the determination of 'being-a-king' were a 'natural' property of the person of a king" (Žižek 1989: 24; De Santana 2009: 338).

How lethal technologies can assume celebratory, even patriotic forms of identification is amply shown in the culture wars centred on commemorating the use of the atomic bomb five decades after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Curators at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. found themselves accused of being "revisionists" in attempting to show multiple representations of the bombings, including the suffering of the victims (Hubbard and Hasian 1998). A public relations campaign ensued, battling over the celebratory narrative of the role played by the bombing of Japan and the crewmembers, and the broader didactic purposes adopted by the curators on the consequences of using such weapons (Capaccio and Mohan 1995: 20; Hubbard and Hasian 1998: 497). Broader links and legacies were suggested in the initial version of the display "The Crossroads: The End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War." While the dropping of the bombs by the Enola Gay was vital in ending the war, it also emerged out of a set of various strategic considerations, including Cold War calculations along the lines suggested by the historian Gar Alperovitz (1995). The bomb's deployment on Japan could not be divorced from the implications of the next great political rivalry.[5] Then, after months of acrimonious debate, the organisers gave it a new name: "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Finally, and suggestively, the entire commemorative base was shrunk, narrowed to one single focus: "The Enola Gay" (Nobile 1995; Linenthal and Engelhart 1996).

The reaction to the anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings is a striking illustration of technological patriotism in action, one that subordinates and even erases victim narratives. The resulting Enola Gay display removed any reference to the Japanese perspective while featuring the pilot, Paul W. Tibbets, his crew and the aircraft as heroes. Visitors were treated to a 14-minute film focusing exclusively on their exploits (Meyer 1995: D1). This was certainly in line with the views of such individuals such as retired Major General Sweeney, who flew on both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions. For Sweeney, the moral demarcations in World War II were clear - the "Forces of evil were clearly defined" with an enemy that showed no intention of surrendering unconditionally (United States Senate 1995: 4-11). Portions of the Enola Gay were displayed, along with information on its restoration and general material on the Boeing B-29 Superfortress (Hubbard and Hasian 1998: 508).

The weapons and the crew became the symbolic referents of remote, effective and ultimately victorious actions, exhibited within a celebratory space that diminishes the humanity of the target. As the Assistant Director for Aeronautics at the National Air and Space Museum Thomas Crouch explained, both he and his curators had "failed to appreciate the deep and powerful links that bind the memory of the bomb to the incredible sense of joy and relief at the end of the war" (United States Senate 1995: 75).

The implications of the Enola Gay controversy in terms of how new weapons are justified as solutions to enduring problems are significant. Lethal technological supremacy allied to patriotic goals makes its deployment against human populations easier to justify. The constraints of the laws of war are lifted, giving way to other pressing considerations. Both John Dower (1986) and Ronald Takaki (1995), in examining the motivations behind the dropping of the atomic bombs, consider the racial dimension of the Pacific conflict. Indeed, Dower goes further in examining the psychopathology of war cultures that breeds folly and the broader indifference to suffering, and work that takes its cue from the Clausewitz claim that the "wish to annihilate the enemy's forces is the first-born son of war" (Dower 2010; Lacquer 2011). Takaki suggests, focusing primarily on President Harry S. Truman's psyche, that race and a language of "masculinity," along with his policymakers, figured prominently in the way the atomic bomb was viewed (Takaki 1995: 114-5).

Drones and Patriotism

A modern application of the Enola Gay syndrome, with its shrinking focus on civilian deaths and its extolling of

a patriotic machine quality, is amply demonstrated in discussions about the use of drones, which became significant after the attacks of September 11, 2001. It has even been argued, not entirely convincingly, that concepts such as "just war theory" prevailed with some force till the challenges posed by non-state actors in the wake of these coordinated attacks on the United States (Rengger 2002: 353). Officials within the Bush administration suggested that the nature of the war had altered the terrain of response. The US military would, in the words of Vice President Dick Cheney, "have to work… sort of on the dark side" and "a lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using methods that are available to our intelligence agencies to use any means at your disposal to achieve our objective" (Paust 2007: 12).

Parallels with the use of atomic weapons on Japan were even noted. Andrew Battista (2012), writing for North of Centre, a paper based in Lexington, Kentucky, found echoes in the way atomic bombs were deployed against the Japanese and the use of drone warfare in targeting militants. "The United States entertains the fantasy that it can make unilateral decisions about who lives and dies, all the while waging clean wars in which American lives are preserved and 'the bad guys only' are surgically removed from existence."

The embrace of the drone warfare program, deemed an effective, constructive killing system, has all the features of such fetishistic misrecognition. It renders such devices mysterious in the Marxist sense; and it obscures the social relations in the sense Žižek describes it, thereby making it attractive and, as the Obama administration has shown, unimpeachable as policy.

Significantly, in the manner described by Masco on the appraisal of nuclear weapons, it has the potential to become a social norm, a fetish amongst those of the security establishment. This is certainly the case amongst strategists and military adherents who have been debating amongst themselves the utility of such a program.

The overwhelming sense here is that faith placed in such technology has a displacing effect on rights, while it fetishizes the "procedure over complexity and intention over effects" (Burke 2004). Frank Sauer and Niklas Schöring consider that such forms of unmanned technology have proven to be attractive to democracies. The authors draw the conclusions that democracies can also be aggressive and do not "naively" take their "general peacefulness at face value." In fact, the use of unmanned vehicles has a special appeal for democracies, constituting a "silver-bullet" that might well backfire (Sauer and Schöring 2012).

The consequences of such a misrecognition, as described by Žižek, do more than obscure the objective framework of relations between the subjects vis-à-vis the use of drones. It is fatal to justice and the constitutional system that mandates the importance of due process. The weapon's use and value dispenses with the need to take judicial measures, relying, instead, in a field of extra-judicial rationale. In a sense, the use of the weapon exacts a just retribution, a form of de-facto justice that exists outside judicial strictures and procedures. Some of these are discussed in detail by Michael J. Boyle (2013). Suggestions have been made that such drone operations are effectively resulting in "blow back" operations against American interests, typified by the testimony of Pakistani American Faisal Shahzad who attempted to bomb a busy intersection in Times Square, New York. Drones, argued Shahzad "don't see children, they don't see anybody. They kill women, children, they kill everybody. It's a war and in war, they kill people. They're killing all Muslims" (noted in Boyle 2013: 1).

The value of drones in eliminating targets is extolled in various US military reports that emphasise its distinct advantages. They perform what has come to be known as the three "Ds": dirty, dull and dangerous tasks while also conforming to what is deemed as "light footprint" counter-terrorism (DOD 2007: 19). This reflects a broader tendency in the US armed forces to move to increasingly robotic forms of war where human agency is distanced from the scene of combat. According to Peter Singer, former Defence Department employee and advisor to President Obama's election campaign, robotic systems have proliferated. None were used when the US forces invaded Iraq in 2003. Six years later, there were 12,000 "robotic systems" performing 33,000 missions a year (Singer 2009). With the emergence of such technologies, "cubicle warriors" are becoming the norm even as the weapon is being fetishised (Shaw and Akhter 2012). Jacob Wood and Ken Harbaugh (2014) initially believed that such systems would not "do anything more than augment the manned systems that provide aerial reconnaissance and close air support for troops on the ground. We took it for granted that humans on the front lines would always play the lead role."

Just as nuclear weapons were normalised in US strategic thinking to the point that their tactical use could be considered feasible, and even necessary, drone technology is similarly assimilated into military orthodoxy. Criticisms about its use are deemed far-fetched and misplaced. Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow of Governance Studies at the Brookings Institute, insists that the Obama administration's approach to drone warfare has been misread, with commentaries casting "it in a far more menacing light than its rather restrained reality justifies" (2013). The administration was not "claiming undue power" in using such technology. Indeed, some analysts argue that UAVs

and their availability impose a moral duty to use them, an argument that has also been used in terms of employing extraordinary weapons to prevent the prolongation of war (Strawser 2010). There is "no need for special ethical concern for this weapons system as opposed to any other more standard weapon technology." What the use of drones suggests is a historical continuation of a project of "removing a warrior even farther from his foe for the warrior's better protection" (Strawser 2010: 343).

Drone technology has been deemed a natural extension of principled American power. Senator Eric Cantor made this position clear in a statement sympathetic to its use. Technological supremacy was indispensable for the assertion of American power, and a principled one at that. "If we're going to continue to be the leading force for peace, prosperity and security in this world, we're going to have to have the tools necessary to do so." Such technology need not be contrary to morality, ethics or law. "And I believe, just as in the prior administration, this administration – we can strike that balance to protect America, to employ technologies to do that, at the same time upholding constitutional rights" (Cantor quoted in Beattie 2013).

Consequences are thereby obscured in favour of procedural assumptions. In a study on the strategic context of drones, the authors acknowledge the support that drones can give forces engaged in "seizing territory or disrupting terrorist organisations. However, when drones are no longer part of the framework but rather supplant the framework and become the strategy entirely, they can have serious political blowback." (Foust and Boyle 2012)

The rationalisation of such supplanting frameworks is evident in the justifications for the lethal use of drones outlined by Harold Hongju Koh, formerly legal advisor to the State Department and Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale University. He deals with the policy of targeting and the weapons system used to attain that goal. Koh insists that the "very use of advanced weapons systems" is not the issue – the rules of targeting do not hinge on the type of system used. Pilotless aircraft or smart-bombs fall into the same category. The issue rather is that "they are employed in conformity with the applicable laws of the law" (Koh 2010). Dispensing with the issue of discussing the weak security environment within which the weapons system is used, Koh assumes that the laws of war are abided by in using them. Technological failure and intelligence gaps are ignored.

Deploying such weapons extraterritorially in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen has given some commentators cause for concern. A potential "global drone war" is in the making (Morely 2012). This does not bother such defenders of the drone policy such as Tom Rogan of the conservative National Review, who sees sovereignty – American sovereignty at least – as necessarily expansive. Unmanned weapons systems simply prove valuable in advancing the concept. In the case of Pakistan, for instance, the United States is using drones both with, and without consent, against an enemy which is both battled and supported by Karachi. "An expansive notion of extra-territorial self-defence is intrinsic to a counterterrorism policy that's rational" (Rogan 2013). Rogan himself is something of a technological patriot, seeing the remote weapons system as actually compliant with "humanitarian norms".

The illusion of total effectiveness in using such weapons is also encouraged, despite the fact that drone technology is marred by faulty intelligence and poor means of detection (Voice of America 2013). "What the public needs to understand is that the video provided by a drone is not usually clear enough to detect someone carrying a weapon, even on a crystal-clear day with limited cloud and perfect light" (Linebaugh 2013).

Technological patriotism in general is malleable in its construction around humanitarianism and the mitigation of civilian casualties. It ignores those attitudes outlined by former Reagan official and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy Paul Craig Roberts, who sees such drone culture as lethal and expansive. "We are now witnessing the expansion of Obama's Kill List. The list began under the Bush regime as a rationale for murdering suspect citizens of countries with which the US was not at war. The Obama regime expanded the scope of the list to include the execution, without due process of law, the US citizens accused, without evidence presented in court, of association with terrorism. The list quickly expanded to include the American teenage son of a cleric accused of preaching Jihad against the West. The son's 'association' with terrorism apparently was his blood relationship to his father" (Roberts 2013).

Another former Reagan official, Lawrence J. Korb, who was Assistant Secretary of Defence, has advanced the idea that a potential misuse of robotics will do the reverse as to what Cantor suggests, namely "undermine our moral standing, and the US can't be a global leader without such standing" (Olsen 2010). The UN Rapporteur, Heyns, makes a similar point. Drones, he argues, are proving too good to resist, a drug of security and military application. "Given that drones greatly reduce or eliminate the number of casualties on the side using them, the domestic constraints – political and otherwise – may be less restrictive than with the deployments of other types of armed force. This effect is enhanced by the relative ease with which the details about the drone targeting can be withheld from the public eye and the potentially restraining influence of public concern. Such dynamics call for a heightened

level of vigilance by the international community concerning the use of drones" (Heynes 2013: paragraph 18).

Such patriotism also ignores the culpability of the operator, the moral dilemma of the human behind the distant operating system, and its consequences. Beres provides a meditation on the subject, arguing that, "The overriding problem of international law enforcement is not that of Hostes humani generis, but rather the 'normal' human being, who adheres closely to most societal expectations, while secretly dreaming of corpses." Accordingly, that ordinary person is the creature behind "the past century's words crimes of war, terrorism, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity" (Beres 2011: 146).

The expansion of a law enforcement mechanism that employs assassination techniques by drone and extra surveillance satisfies this premise all too clearly. Individuality, suggests Beres is escaped through acts of collective violence, a sickness of the soul that finds form in killing outsiders. Suggestively, Beres speaks of these beings, having refused individuality, as themselves being robotic in inclination (2011: 147). Fitting, perhaps, is that this observation be taken further, to imply that highly defined technologies do have their role in overriding the very individualism that is repudiated by those who believe in collective violence. One robotic instinct confronts another, and the process of de-humanisation comes full circle. "Thus," writes Marge Van Cleef, "the illusion is promulgated that war can be waged with no domestic cost except the dehumanisation of US military people and the civilians who accidentally happen to be in the wrong place when the attack comes" (2010: 20).

Drones and Forms of Americanness

The fixation with drones and their use as extra-judicial killing machines has had another effect. It has stimulated a titanic contest between the security and legal establishments as to how Americanness is to be determined before robotic, drone technologies. Will a citizen's status matter in debates about how such weapons are used, notably in foreign theatres? The legal context of this is difficult enough as it is, seeing as the term "targeted killing" resists the definition of international law and has proven to be a fuzzy concept in US legal discourse. As Alston has explained, it is not a term of art in international law, nor does it "fit neatly into any particular legal framework" (2010: 4). One thing however, is clear. In Richard Miniter's words, "For the first time since the days of Abraham Lincoln, an American president has ordered the killing of a US citizen, far from any battlefield or courtroom" (Miniter 2011).

Legal attempts to bar listings of Americans on the CIA's terrorist target list have been rejected. Koh, in his address before the American International Law Society, did not see nationality as a shield – "individuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerents and, therefore, lawful targets under international law (2010). Nor were there bars at either international or domestic level on targeting and assassinating figures. A state "engaged in armed conflict" was not encumbered with any need to "provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force." (Again, faith in the extreme utility of surveillance and targeting is given credence.) Such a state did not engage in "assassination" if the targets were legitimately acquired in the course of self-defence.

Various arguments have been put forth from groups as diverse as the American Civil Liberties Union, former Republican Senator Ron Paul, and libertarians, that the Fifth Amendment – where no citizen shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" – is violated when such targeting of non-combatant American citizens is initiated without trial. Furthermore, the ACLU has argued that the CIA target list, being secret, is itself a violation of the due process clause (Miniter 2011).

The killing of US citizens by targeted drones strikes suggests the lengths the technological patriotism complex has gone. Lethal technologies can be used against "qualified" Americans, ersatz citizens who abridge their constitutional protections by virtue of conduct. Constitutional protections are suspended, and due process ultimately succumbs to the technological ease of elimination.

Such forms of Americanness were discussed by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), in questioning John Brennan, then President Barack Obama's nomination for the role of CIA director. Feinstein herself has taken the line that the use of lethal force against American citizens should be disclosed. "I have been calling for the public release of the administration's legal analysis on the use of lethal force – particularly against US citizens – for more than a year." (2013). The encounter showed the delicate manoeuvring currently taking place in the Senate about various forms of Americanness – at least in so far as it pertained to the use of unmanned vehicles. The drone program was being discussed, but transparency on the subject was out of the question. "One of the problems

is, once the drone program is so public, and one American is caught up, people don't know much about this one 'American citizen' – so called" (Feinstein 2013).

Feinstein and Brennan proved oblique on the subject, but Anwar al-Awlaki, who died in a drone strike in Yemen in 2011, was one such "so-called" American, having been born in New Mexico. The constitutional clothing granted by that mere fact did not stop Feinstein pressing for a concerted disrobing, suggesting an old form of negating "Americanism" to accommodate the drone wars.

Indeed, Feinstein persisted in using the qualified American category, showing the ease with which constitutional rights can become moveable features of the political landscape, provided the circumstances are present. If you are an "American so called" then you are entitled to be exterminated in an extra-judicial drone strike. "When people hear 'American'," pressed Feinstein, "they think someone who's upstanding. And this man was not upstanding by a long shot."

A series of assumptions are being made here – what an "American" is, what such a vague term as "upstanding" might be, and what is done to disqualify the appellation. "They don't know the incitement he has stirred up," noted Feinstein. "I wonder if you could tell us a bit more about Mr. Awlaki and what he's been doing."

Brennan didn't disagree with the line of questioning Feinstein was taking, affirming that al-Awlaki was not merely a "propagandist" but "involved in activities that were designed to kill innocent men, women and children, mostly Americans." One's constitutional status as a US citizen could not be held against the use of executive orders. The debate within the Obama administration on targeting specific US citizens took place between a "war wing" (then CIA director Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) and the ACLU wing, represented by Attorney General, Eric Holder and other lawyers. The argument there was that, as Yemen was not in an authorised field of battle for the US, as opposed to Afghanistan, there could be no "battlefield exception". According to Miniter, "So, after a lot of thought and reflection, and the urging of Clinton and Panetta, the president decided to abandon Awlaki to the traitor's death that he deserved. Obama decided that the constitution gave the president the power to kill those who make war against the United States, even if they are citizens" (Miniter 2011).

The contradictory nature of the Congressional discussion can be gathered by the white paper obtained by Michael Isikoff of the NBC network and authored by the Department of Justice. The white paper titled "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a US citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or An Associated Force" revealed the extensive qualifications on constitutional rights associated with American citizens deemed hostile the Republic (DOJ 2013). It emphasised the extra-territorial importance of the AUMF, that the United States is "in an armed conflict" with al-Qaida and its associated forces, and the seniority of the targets (DOJ 2013). "A use of force under such circumstances [those forces posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States] would be justified as an act of national self-defence" (DOJ 2013: 3). Drone strikes could take place "away from the zone of active hostilities," a consequence of seeing the nature of hostilities as part of a "non-international conflict".

The document goes on to claim that, "The Due Process Clause would not prohibit a lethal operation of the sort contemplated here." A calculus is imposed, one pitting the private interest of not having one's life taken against "the government's interest in waging war, protecting its citizens, and removing the threat posed by members of enemy forces". The "reality of combat" would render the use of force "necessary and appropriate," even against US citizens engaged in conflict against the United States (DOJ 2013: 5-6).

According to Amy Davidson, writing in The New Yorker, such reasoning resembled the apologetic language offered by John R. Stevenson in 1970 when, as a State Department legal advisor, he justified the Nixon administration's unsanctioned move into Cambodia ostensibly to combat Viet Cong and Northern Vietnamese forces. Indeed, Stevenson's legal summation regarding US actions in Cambodia is cited as a precedent that "the enemy" can be engaged from "a base in a new nation," which would bring it within the original armed conflict (DOJ 2013: 4 noting Stevenson 1970). Terms such as "imminent threat" and "capture is infeasible" become indistinguishable terms (Davidson 2013a). Emergencies dictate expediency.

President Obama similarly accepted a circumscribed version of American protections in his National Defence University address; the constitutional bar did not serve to protect US citizens from being targeted in times of armed conflict in distant, often inaccessible locations. The virtue of appropriately designed and adapted technology is noted in situations "where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians". The operations in Pakistan "cannot be the norm." A conflict which did employ such weapons was part of "a just war – a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defence" (Obama 2013).

The Obama administration has subsequently revised the policy, granting the military exclusive rights to target American citizens, rather than the CIA itself. In February 2014, the discussion about whether an American would,

in fact, be killed for purportedly arranging attacks on US citizens became public. In the words of Clive Stafford, director of Reprieve, a British-based human rights organisation, "It is a very sad day when US officials are squabbling in public over whether they should murder an American" (Al Jazeera and AP 2014).

There have also been attempts to bring officials behind the killing of al-Aulaqi, his son Abdulrahman and Samir Khan, all being US citizens, to book. This, it can be argued, is a form of a patriotic reassertion: the legal values of American citizenry tested before the courts in the face of the use of drone technology. Judge Rosemary Collyer of the US District Court for the District of Columbia accepted that the case was justifiable, even if the drone strike program emanated from the war making and national security powers of the executive and legislature (Nasser Al-Aulaqi v Leon Panetta 2014). In what can only be regarded as a formal acknowledgement of the extension of due process matters to the battlefield, the Judge did admit that the "interest in avoiding the erroneous deprivation of [the life of the subject] is uniquely compelling." Such constitutional deprivation could not have happened for either Abdulrahman, al-Aulaqi or Khan as their deaths arose in matters of negligence. The court did find, in terms of Anwar, that the complaint "states a 'plausible' procedural and substantive due process claim on behalf of Anwar al-Aulaqi."

The claim was, however, qualified. The extent that the violation is irremediable is emphasised by the justice's own view that, even if the government had violated Anwar al-Aulaqi's due process rights, there was "no available remedy under US law for this claim." Courts are reluctant to imply what is termed a Bivens claim, notably after al-Qaida and affiliate forces became the direct target of the 2001 Authorisation for Use of Military Force which was granted to the President. Despite finding for the government, Judge Collyer was not impressed by the "truculent opposition" to court requests for classified material showing Anwar al-Aulaqi as an enemy combatant, or that he was a member of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

A large issue at stake is that of evidence of culpability – the idea of imminent threat implied by the activity of such terrorist "targets." Drone warfare, by its nature, resists the evidentiary mould, a form of technology that makes the elimination of targets easier in times of emergency. With that in mind, modest proposals have been made to place the President "on firmer legal footing when using drones against American targets," in the words of George W. Bush's US Attorney-General Alberto R. Gonzales (2013). Gonzales, however, does not dispute the nature of what is a "state of war", though he does accept the Supreme Court's view that the President cannot act on a "blank check" on the issue of "the rights of the Nation's citizens" (Gonzales 2013: 59). Greater caution must be exercised. Such review, however, would only be a modest revision, constituting a possible false cover via legal oversight. Courts may well be ill-suited to assess claims in the realms of military necessity, unwittingly committing "a far graver sin to the rule of law in upholding patently unlawful uses of military force during wartime than those that resulted from such uses of force on their own" (Vladeck 2014: 28 noting Jackson 1944: 246).

The trend, however, is for the greater deployment of such weapons which continues to take place in a legal environment that has been left behind. Official reports from the UN Special Rapporteur on the use of armed drones have provided heftier guidelines that challenge the idea that "mere past involvement in planning attacks is sufficient to render an individual targetable even where there is no evidence of a specific and immediate attack". The use of such weapons in that sense "distorts the requirements established in international human rights law" (Heynes 2013: para 37; Emmerson 2014).

More subtle suggestions have also been advanced by such commentators as Micah Zenko, who argue that Washington should end signature strikes which target clearly identified militants on the basis of behavioural patterns and personal networks, and limit killings to a limited number of targets – terrorists, for instance, of transnational scope and ambition (Zenko 2012). While Zenko sees a role for such unmanned vehicles in security policies, he prefers to incorporate them within an international system of drafted norms and guidelines and the extension of law. Such views, however, suggest the fictitious cleanliness of such conflict, with its ease of regulation. In reality, they point to the continuing chaos of battlefield reality (Van Creveld 1985).

The Irresistibility of Drones

Jeremy Rivkin has argued, unconvincingly, that the Obama presidency's conduct is symptomatic of an evolving tendency towards higher degrees of empathy. "The president has made empathy the core of his personal philosophy and the centrepiece of political decisions, from the conduct of his foreign policy to the selection of Supreme Court

Justices" (Rivkin 2009: 177). The embrace of robotic technologies that further distance warriors from the scene of battle, desensitising policy makers to consequences, both domestic and international, as to how such technologies are used, suggests that the tendency is the reverse. Laws are not so much being undermined as being hollowed out by the deployment of such "cubicle warriors" and their machines.

In being fetishised, weaponised drones have become objects of faith, and the relationship between their operators, and the battlefield, distorted in a manner that amounts to a dire form of "misrecognition." Their defenders cite humanitarian grounds, and grounds of military necessity. Using such weapons has even served to override the protections offered by the American Constitution. Guilt or innocence is not a matter for due process in this case, but a mechanical resolution in an open-ended state of conflict. Military pre-emption, rather than a complex, sober assessment of past conduct, is what takes place. As Brennan himself explained, "None of those actions are to determine past guilt for those actions that they took. The decisions that they made are to take actions to prevent a future action – to protect American lives" (Davidson 2013b). Therein lies the self-fulfilling logic of extra-judicial killing: one is killing to prevent a dark future.

The modern technological state of surveillance, control and ordering of rights suggests qualifications to citizen's rights in the name of the secure society. What it also suggests is a radical project of hygienic, controlled killings that effectively deny the subject either human or legal status. "The expansive use of drones by the first States to acquire them, if not challenged," argues the UN Rapporteur, "can do structural damage to the cornerstones of international security and set precedents that undermine the protection of life across the globe in the longer term" (Heynes 2013: para 17). This is assisted by the nature of the violence. It is contained, and affected in distant spaces and territories. Public opinion will be less likely to be against such a clandestine, unknowing use of weapons against designated enemies, provided it takes place in the borderlands and outside any perceived harm's way to its users. Their lethality, to use the words of Boyer in describing the atomic bomb, has become a shield of protection for the Republic.

Endnotes

1.Senior Lecturer, School of Social, Urban and Global Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne.

2. References to the name vary, and are reproduced from the sources that mention that spelling.

3. School of Advanced Warfare, USMC, Student Requirements for the Middle East AY (1995-1996).

4. De Santana, "Nuclear Weapons as the Currency of Power," 343, making reference to Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 109: "Neorealism "fetishizes' material capabilities in the sense that it imbues them with meanings and powers that 'can only correctly be attributed to human beings.'"

5. The literature debating those motivations is extensive. For a survey, see James S. Walker, "History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb," Diplomatic History 19 (1995): 319-328; Barton Bernstein, "Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb and his defending of the 'Decision'," ; Robert James Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995); Samuel J. Walker, "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for a Middle Ground," Diplomatic History 29, 2 (Apr., 2005): 311-334.

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Thinking Dangerously in an Age of Political Betrayal

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> Thinking is not the intellectual reproduction of what already exists anyway. As long as it doesn't break off, thinking has a secure hold on possibility....Open thinking points beyond itself.
> — Adorno

> hat is, there are no dangerous thoughts for the simple reason that thinking itself is such a dangerous enterprise. ... nonthinking is even more dangerous.
> — Hannah Arendt

Thinking has become dangerous in the United States. The symptoms are everywhere, but one symptomatic display of anti-enlightenment, religious fundamentalism can be observed in the Texas GOP Party platform which states, among other things, that "We oppose teaching of Higher order Thinking Skills [because they] have the purpose of challenging the student's fixed beliefs and undermining parental control" to a Tennessee bill that "allows the teaching of creationism in state's classrooms."[1] Couple this with the call on the part of the Texas Republican party to ban the income tax, eliminate corporate taxes, sack the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Education, and the Department of energy, along with policies designed to force teachers to teach creationism and climate change denial in the schools.[2] What is often ignored in the reporting of such overt displays of ignorance is that religious and ideological fundamentalism are at the root of a right-wing political movement to mis-educate young people, keep the American public ignorant, and hasten a return to the Gilded Age. Just in case, students disagree with this retreat into ignorance, one freshman Tea Party representative in Arizona is pushing a Loyalty Oath bill in which "public high school students in Arizona will have to 'recite an oath supporting the U.S. Constitution' to receive a graduation diploma."[3] But, ignorance is not simply a matter of pedagogy, it also drives a great deal of state and federal policy. For example, the Koch brothers financed American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) "hit the ground running in 2013, pushing "models bills" mandating the teaching of climate change denial in public school systems."[4] At the same time, policy makers at the state level define a return to the Dark Ages as progress. As John Atcheson observes,

> For example, North Carolina law-makers recently passed legislation against sea level rise. A day later, the Virginia legislature required that references to global warming, climate change and sea level rise be excised from a proposed study on sea level rise. Last year, the Texas Department of Environmental Quality, which had commissioned a study on Galveston Bay, cut all references to sea level rise – the main point of the study. We are, indeed, at an epochal threshold. As Stephen Colbert so aptly put it: if your science gives you results you don't like, pass a law saying that the result is illegal. Problem solved. Except it isn't. Wishing reality away, doesn't make it go away. Pretending that the unreal is real doesn't make it real.[5]

At a time when anti-intellectualism runs rampart throughout popular culture and the political landscape, it seems imperative to once again remind ourselves of how important critical thought as a crucible for thinking analytically can be both a resource and an indispensable tool. If critical thought, sometimes disparaged as theory, gets a bad name, it is not because it is inherently dogmatic, jargonistic, or rigidly specialized, but because it is often abused or because it becomes a tool of irrelevancy—a form of theoreticism in which theory becomes an end in itself. This abuse of critical thought appears to have a particularly strong hold in the humanities, especially among many

graduate students in English departments who often succumb to surrendering their own voices to class projects and dissertations filled with obtuse jargon associated with the most fashionable theorists of the moment. Such work is largely rewarded less for its originality than the fact that it threatens no one.

What is sad about the issue of losing one's voice is that it is the first step in the triumph of formalism over substance. Endnotes become more important than content, ideas lose their grip on reality, and fashion becomes a rationale for discarding historical scholarship and the work of older (unfashionable) public intellectuals such as C.W.Mills, Ellen Willis, Paul Sweezy, or even James Baldwin.

At the same time there are many students who find the esoteric language associated with dangerous thinking and critical thought to be too difficult to master or engage. The latter points to the fact that some theories may be useless because they are too impenetrable to decipher or that there are theories which support bad practices such as high-stakes testing, creationism, faith-based evidence, the spanking of children, incarcerating children as adults, and other assumptions and policies that are equally poisonous. Theory is not inherently good or bad. Its meaning and efficacy are rooted in a politics of usefulness, accessibility, and whether it can be used resourcefully to articulate frameworks and tools that deepen the possibility of self-reflection, critical thought, and a sense of social responsibility. For instance, a theory is bad if it inadequately grasps the forces at work in the world and simply reproduces it as it is. Theory is also injurious when it is used to legitimate modes of inquiry and research that are bought by corporations, the military, and other state and private institutions to legitimate dangerous products, policies, and social practices.

Theory has no guarantees and like any other mode of thought it has to be problematized, critically engaged, and judged in terms of its interests, effects, and value as part of a broader enhancement of human agency and democratization. At its best, theory, thinking dangerously, and critical thought have the power to shift the questions, provide the tools for offering historical and relational contexts, and "push at the frontiers…of the human imagination."[6] Moreover, theory functions as a critical resource when it can intervene in the "continuity of commonsense, unsettle strategies of domination," and work to promote strategies of transformation.[7] As Adorno observes, "Theory speaks for what is not narrow-minded—and commonsense most certainly is."[8] As such, theory is not only analytical in its search for understanding and truth, it is also critical and subversive, always employing modes of self and social critique necessary to examine its own grounds and those poisonous fundamentalisms in the larger society haunting the body politic. As Michael Payne observes, theory should be cast in the language of hints, dialogue, and an openness to other positions, rather than be "cast in the language or orders."[9]

It is important to note that defending critical thought, thinking dangerously, and theory is not the same as solely mounting a defense of academics as public intellectuals or the university as the only site of critical thought, though both are important. When defined this way, theory is easily dismissed as an academic exercise and practice mediated through an impenetrable and often incomprehensible vocabulary. Theory and the frameworks it supports are just one important political register that keeps alive the notion that critical reflection and thought are necessary not only to address the diverse symbolic and material realities of power, but also for engaging in informed action willing to address important social issues. In this respect, as Lawrence Grossberg has brilliantly argued, theory is a crucial tool that enables one to respond to and provide a better understanding of problems as they emerge in a variety of historical and distinctive contexts.[10] Hence, theory becomes a toolbox that guides the work of many artists, journalists, and other cultural workers in a variety of public spheres who are well aware that their work has consequences when translated into daily life and must be the object of self-reflection.[11] Paraphrasing Grossberg, theory is not simply about the production of meaning but also the making of effects. At the same time, critical thought functions to "lift…human beings above the evidence of our senses and sets appearances apart from the truth."[12] Salmon Rushdie gestures towards the political necessity of critical thought, informed action, and its effects by insisting that "It's a vexing time for those of us who believe in the right of artists, intellectuals and ordinary, affronted citizens to push boundaries and take risks and so, at times, to change the way we see the world."[13] As Hannah Arendt noted, thoughtfulness, the ability to think reflectively and critically is a fundamental necessity in a functioning democracy. And the formative cultures that make such thinking possible along with the spaces in which dialogue, debate, and dissent can flourish are essential to producing critical literate and actively engaged citizens. This is especially true at a time when as Jonathan Crary points out "Mechanisms of command and effects of normalization [have] penetrated almost everywhere" and they have become "internalized in a more comprehensive, micro-logical way than the disciplinary power of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century."[14]

Theory is at its weakest and most oppressive when it supports a commonsense understanding of the framing mechanisms that guide the actions of human beings. One consequence is that it disavows dialogue and critique, and shapes knowledge and ideas into fixed and absolute meanings. It also shuts down analysis and poisons the

culture with an orthodoxy that limits critical agency to following the orders of others. As such, it is transformed into a pedagogical parasite on the body of democracy. This is quite different than a call for theory and critical thought that practice rigorous analytic work enabling students, intellectuals, artists, and journalists to be attentive to how they function as individual and social agents. Bad theory is also at fault for failing to address and engage the layered, complex social, political, economic, and cultural forces that shape not only our desires, values, and modes of identification, but also guide, direct, and the commanding ideologies and institutions of society. As a form of intellectual inquiry, theory thrives in those public spaces that both legitimate the world of ideas and refuse to separate them from addressing the major troubles of our time. At the same time, it is an important register, if not a reminder in such perilous times, for determining as Judith Butler observes, "not only the question of whether certain kinds of ideas and positions can be permitted in public space, but how public space is itself defined by certain kinds of exclusions, certain emerging patterns of censoriousness and censorship."[15] Rather than being a mechanistic enterprise, offering formulas and recipes, theory should provide the frameworks and tools for what it means to be a thoughtful, judicious, layered, complex and critical thinker willing to engage in communicative and collective action. Theory does not resemble the discourse of blind action, a stripped down instrumental rationality, or the vision of accountants. Nor, in this instance, does theory become an end in itself, an ossified discourse that defines itself to the degree to which it is removed itself from the world and vanishes in a black hole of irrelevancy and opaqueness. Theory as a critical enterprise is about both a search for the truth and a commitment to the practice of freedom. Not one or the other but both. Theory should be used to both understand and engage the major upheavals people face and to connect such problems to larger political, structural, and economic issues. In addition, theory is invaluable as a response to particular problems, allowing intellectuals, artists, academics, students, and others to connect their intellectual work and critical inquiries to the daily realities and struggles of a world in upheaval, one that is moving quickly into the clutches of a new type of authoritarianism.

America has moved a great distance away from the critical theories of thinkers such as Sigmund Freud, Jacques Derrida, Theodor Adorno, Edward Said, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, Ellen Willis, Simone de Beauvoir, and others. At the current historical moment, critical thinking is utterly devalued, viewed either as a nostalgic leftover of the weighty ideological and political battles that characterized the period roughly extending from the 1960s to the late 1980s or theory is dismissed as the province of overly privileged and pampered academics. Critical ideas and concepts in support of an equality, justice, freedom, and democracy, in particular, have lost their material and political grounding and have become sound bites either scorned by mainstream politicians or appropriated only to be turned into their opposite. Unfortunately for the promise of democracy, those who advocate theory and critical thought in the service of civic courage, engaged citizenship, and social responsibility are now either viewed as eggheads, elitist, or traitors. In this instance, theory is disdained and used as a form of self-sabotage, reduced to politically illiterate narratives couched in the discourse of critical thinking. How else to explain the disingenuous portrayal in the mainstream press of George Will, Thomas Friedman, and David Brooks as public intellectuals, despite the fact that they trade in a kind of ersatz theory. In the latter case, theory becomes a weapon used to empty language of any meaning, employed primarily to make war on the possibility of real communication, all the while reinforcing the ideology of demagogues.

If theory once inspired critical practice both in and out of the university, it seems that the heyday of critically informed thinking is over. As higher education has become corporatized, teaching and learning are increasingly defined through the metrics of commerce and profit while students are viewed largely as consumers. Critical thought and dangerous thinking is now viewed as beyond the pale of market considerations and thereby is seen as having little value. This is particularly true since the radical right has not only taken seriously the notion that pedagogy and changing consciousness is the essence of politics, but also have developed cultural apparatuses outside of the university that function as powerful forms of public pedagogy in promoting the values of a number of fundamentalisms, including religious, educational, and market-driven ideologies. Culture for the right-wing has always been a crucial site of power in the modern world and they have used this machinery of public pedagogy to create market-addicted subjects who appear hopelessly captive to the illiterate ideologies and slogans pumped out by Fox News, right-wing talk radio, and the editorial section of the Wall Street Journal. Ideas matter in this instance, but not in the service of freedom or justice.

Sound bites now pass for erudite commentary and merge with the banality of celebrity culture which produces its own self-serving illiteracy and cult of privatization and consumerism. Moreover, as the power of communication and language wanes, collapsing into the seepage of hateful discourses, the eager cheerleaders of casino capitalism along with the ever-present anti-public intellectuals dominate the airwaves and screen culture in order to aggressively

wage a war against all public institutions, youth, women, immigrants, unions, poor minorities, the homeless, gays, workers, the unemployed, poor children, and others. In this instance, thinking degenerates into forms of ideological boosterism and the crucial potential of thinking to serve as a dynamic resource disappears from the American cultural and academic landscapes. When thinking itself becomes dangerous, society loses its ability to question itself and paves the way authoritarian regimes of power. The success of conservatives in colonizing, if not undermining, any model of critical reflection often takes place by reducing thought to a matter of commonsense while supporting rampant forms of anti-intellectualism—most evident in the Republican Party's recent war on evidence-based arguments, science, and reason itself. At the same time, the success on the part of right-wing ideologues, conservative foundations, and anti-public intellectuals to shape domestic and foreign policy and gain the support of most Americans for doing so speaks to a roundly successful pedagogical and political strategy to manipulate public opinion while legitimating the rise of an authoritarian. At the least, this war on reason and politics raises serious questions about the failure of the academy to counter such views. In particular, it raises questions about the alienating nature of what passes for critical thought, theory, and informed commentary in the academy. Moreover, the issue here is not weather critical intellectuals can use theory to solve the myriad problems facing the United States and the larger world, but what role critical thought plays in various sites as crucial to developing the formative culture that produces critical modes of agency and makes democracy possible.

The assault on critical thought is taking place in a variety of spheres, including higher education, especially at a time when corporatism, a mad empiricism, and market-driven ideologies are the dominant forces at work in defining what counts as labour, research, pedagogy, journalism, and learning. The notion that thinking dangerously produces forms of literacy in which knowledge is related to issues of agency, public values, and social problems is quickly disappearing from higher education and other sites. For example, Republican governors in states such as Texas, Maine, and Florida defunding those fields of study in higher education that cannot be measured in economic terms, while redefining the mission of the university as merely an adjunct of corporations, the military-industrial complex, and government intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, higher education houses an increasing number of intellectuals who have slipped into diverse forms of unprincipled careerism in which matters of critical thought have less to do with politics and power, or social justice for that matter, than with a kind of arcane cleverness--a sort of ineffectual performance that allows them to threaten no one. This probably sounds harsh, but personally I have seen this trend growing since the 1980s and actually believe it has a lot do with the cultural capital and investment in careerism that many academics now bring to the academy and their roles as intellectuals—partly a response to the corporatization of the university. These are middle and ruling class intellectuals on the move, always looking for new opportunities, all too willing to be quiet, safe, and ready and eager for the next promotion. In addition, too many academics are giving in to the seductions and rewards of corporate power, and are complicit in destroying theory and critical thought as tools that enable faculty and students to relate the self to others, public values, and the demands of a robust democracy. Of course, what often happens in this case is that by not having any viable vision or sense of the political, for that matter, such academics do an incredible injustice not only to their roles as potential public intellectuals but also to critical thought itself. As Larry Grossberg once put it, they are clueless in taking up the challenge of theorizing the political and politicizing theory.

What is sad about this state of affairs is that theorizing the politics of the twenty-first century may be the most important challenge facing the academy and any other public sphere committed to critical thinking, thoughtfulness, dialogue, and the radical imagination. If we lose control of those spheres that cultivate the knowledge and skills necessary for rigorous analysis along with a culture of questioning, it will become more and more difficult for students and others to question authority, challenge commonsense assumptions, and hold power accountable. Thinking, theory, and ideas become critical and transformative when they become meaningful and have some purchase on peoples' lives. They also play a powerful role in shaping the formative cultures necessary to keep the spirit of democracy alive in a society. Theory or general frameworks of thought are always at work in what we say and practice. The question is whether we are aware of them and whether they constitute a hidden dimension of thought or are critically engaged frameworks. But the so called abuse of theory and critical thought in the academy is not simply the fault of errant professionalism and careerism. Defining theory and dangerous thinking as part of a critical pedagogy and emancipatory project becomes increasingly difficult for part-time faculty and those not on the tenure line who are harnessed with the increased pressures posed by the corporate university coupled with the market-driven production of an ongoing culture of uncertainty, insecurity, and fear which makes the black hole of despair more paralyzing and crippling.

Killing the imagination and the quest for truth is not too difficult when faculty are struggling to survive the

tasks of teaching too many courses, receiving poverty wages for their teaching, laboring under savage debts, and are excluded from the power relations that govern their time. Under such circumstances, time becomes a burden rather than a luxury to be used to enable one to be self –reflective, thoughtful, and capable of critically examining the assumptions and institutions that shape our lives. Of course, at the same time, there are still a number of public intellectuals including Cornell West, Chris Hedges, and Stanley Aronowitz to Gayatri Spivak and Dorothy Roberts who use theory to address a range of social problems both in and outside of the university including issues such as right-wing fundamentalism, the attack on the welfare state, racism in America, and a host of other issues. Moreover, there has been a resurgence of public intellectuals in and outside of the academy who are refiguring the role of dangerous thinking and critical thought as central pedagogical elements in fashioning a new language for politics, one that begins with the question of what a democracy should look like and in whose interest it should operate. Such intellectuals refuse the notion that any appeal to theory automatically makes them suspect. All of these intellectuals accept the notion that thinking becomes critical when it "brings theory into the focus of analysis by refusing to accept its authority without proof, by denuding that the grounds on which is authority is claimed be revealed, and, eventually, by questioning those grounds… theory is an activity rather than a body of knowledge…in that it produces practices" and refuses to be satisfied with the world as it is.[16]

On the other side, the diatribes against theory and dangerous thinking by the press, media, etc. can be construed as a kind of resentment, the product of a turf war, a defense of neoliberal fundamentalism, or an expression of ignorance and anti-intellectualism in the service of power. Of course, it is all these and more, but I think one important issue highlighted by Bob McChesney and others lies in the corporatizing of the media and its ongoing refusal to address important problems with intellectual rigor and theoretical depth--not to mention any simple honesty (Fox being the most obvious and horrible example).[17] The dominant media have become lap dogs to corporate power, serving largely as a source of entertainment, hate, and militarism, all provided in ways that resemble barking commands. Public spaces are simply being eaten up and turned into offshoots of what Fox News and hate right-wing talk radio have become, a toxic advertisement for various elements of right wing and fundamentalist discourses. Of course, there are alternative public spheres and one should never underestimate the power of resistance, even in times such as ours, but the colonizing of alternative views, ideas, and knowledge available to people constitutes not only a crisis of theory and critical thought but a crisis of pedagogy and democracy itself. This is not new, but it has become more intensified and dangerous. But in the current historical conjuncture, serious questions have to be raised about what role artists, intellectuals, journalists, writers, and other cultural workers might play in challenging the authoritarian state while deepening and expanding the process of democratization. One answer might be found in the important work of people like Edward Said, Pierre Bourdieu, Arundhati Roy, Noam Chomsky, Cornel West, Naomi Klein, Stanley Aronowitz, Bill Mckibben, and others who have provided important work in this regard.

One important function of dangerous thinking is that it foregrounds the responsibility of artists, intellectuals, academics and others who use it. Mapping the full range of how power is used and how it can be made accountable represents a productive pedagogical and political use of theory. Theorizing the political, economic, and cultural landscapes is central to any form of political activism and suggests that theory is like oxygen. That is, a valuable resource, which one has to become conscious of in order to realize how necessary it is to have it. Where we should take pause is when academic culture uses critical thought in the service of ideological purity and in doing so transforms pedagogy in to forms of poisonous indoctrination for students. Critical thought in this case ossifies from a practice to a form of political dogmatism. The cheerleads for casino capitalism hate critical theory and thought because they contain the possibility of politicizing everyday life and exposing those savage market driven ideologies, practices, and social relations that hide behind an appeal to commonsense. Both the fetishism of thinking and its dismissal are part of the same coin, the overall refusal to link conception and practice, agency and intervention, all aggravated by neoliberalism's hatred of all things social and public.

While there is more than enough evidence to distrust the appeal to democracy, especially in light of how the term is utterly debased at all levels of mainstream politics and in the culture in general, I think it is a term with a long legacy of struggle and needs to be reclaimed and fought over rather than abandoned. Derrida is particularly instructive in his insistence on distinguishing between the reality and promise of democracy—a distinction that points to democracy as a signpost that anticipates something better and in doing so offers a political and moral referent to think and act otherwise. I also think that the left and liberals have lost sight of the power of democracy as a term that can bring together a variety of diverse struggles, thus providing a referent for moving beyond particularized struggles while not abandoning them.

As part of an appeal to radical democracy, I think it is crucial for educators and other cultural workers to find

ways to talk about the social contract as a means of both invoking matters of the social and justice, or what John Rawls once called "the infrastructure of justice, and also affirming freedom as a constitutive part of the social, rather than in opposition to the social. Young people have raised serious questions about what a democracy looks like and who it might serve. Critically interrogating the meaning, reality, misappropriation and promise of democracy along with the necessary agents to have it come into fruition is an important political task.

The right-wing in its various guises has deeply devalued any democratic notion of the social and critical thought that it has become difficult to think in terms outside of the survival-of the-fittest ethic and culture of cruelty that now dominates reality TV, the bullies who set policy in Washington, and the sycophants who are media cheerleaders for Obama, the bankers, and corporate America. Fortunately, we have a number of brave souls in and out of the academy who refuse to give up the language of democracy–from Harvey Kay and Chris Hedges to the indomitable and courageous Bill Moyers.

Needless to say ideas without institutions in which they can be nurtured tend to fall to the margins of society. This is all the more reason to defend public and higher education and all of those public spheres where democratic ideas, values, and practices are taken seriously, and intellectual rigor becomes the norm rather than a side show. Think of the informed critical writing and interviews one can find in Truthout, Salon, Truthdig, Monthly Review Zine, Democracy Now, TomDispatch.com and a range of other online sites that refuse prescriptions and barking commands. These are the new cultural apparatuses of freedom for the 21st century and they need to be defended in the name of dangerous forms of thinking that are self-reflective, infused with democratic values, and expand the public good.

Critical thought and thinking dangerously are not just about reading texts and screen culture closely or for that matter using abstract models of language to explain the arc of history, politics, and human behavior. They are also about the frameworks we develop in terms of how we deal with power, treat one another, and develop a sense of compassion for others and the planet. I was so taken a few years ago by a similar sentiment reflected in a story that Jürgen Habermas told about being at Herbert Marcuse's side as he was dying and being moved by Marcuse's last few words "I know wherein our most basic value judgment are rooted--in compassion, in our sense of the suffering of others."[18] While it makes little sense to be trapped in a kind of ossified intellectual rigor, there is no excuse for believing that action uninformed by theory is anything but an expression of thoughtlessness.

We live in an era when conservatives and the financial elite collapse public concerns into private interests, define people largely as consumers, and consider everyone potential terrorists. Moreover, the apostles of neoliberal capitalism militarize and commodify the entire society, consider youth as nothing more than a source of profit, define education as training, undermine the welfare state in favor of a warfare state, and define democracy as synonymous with the language of capital. We live in a period that the late Gil Scott-Herron once called "winter in America." As the forces of authoritarianism sweep over every major institution in America, the time for wide-spread resistance and radical democratic change has never been so urgent. Such change will not come unless the call for political and economic change is matched by a change in subjectivity, consciousness, and the desire for a better world. This is, in part, a theoretical challenge and supports individual and collective efforts to reconfigure those public spheres where theory can emerge and be refined into modes of critique, understanding, and collective action. As a mode of resistance, dangerous thinking is the basis for a formative and pedagogical culture of questioning and politics that takes seriously how knowledge can become central to the practice of freedom, justice, and democratic change. At a time of lowered expectations, thinking dangerously raises the bar and points to making the impossible, once again, all the more possible.

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Space Construction in Media Reporting A Study of the Migrant Space in the 'Jungles' of Calais

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Introduction

In September 2009, French riot police armed with flame-throwers, bulldozers and chain saws demolished an illegal migrant camp in Calais known locally as "the Jungle" and dispersed its occupants (Garnham 2009). Over two years the camp had grown from a handful of occupants in a few makeshift tents to over 800 in a sprawling shantytown spilling into the town of Calais (Rawstorne 2009). This article explores how British newspapers' use of the "jungle" metaphor constructed a particular social imaginary of migrant spaces and their informal camps at a time when migrant shelters were a focus of policy and public concern. The jungle metaphor signified a barbaric space characterised by environmental degradation and lawlessness that encroached on ordered spaces of white civility. This construct was used to justify the razing of the camp, the demolition of the shelters and the dispersing of its occupants by the French police. However, mini-camps sprung up almost immediately all along the French coastline (Allen 2009c) and newspapers expressed fears of the local community that these could grow into mini-jungles (Allen 2009b) – a fear realised a year later with the emergence and demolition of the "new jungle" in a small village near Dunkirk (Finan and Allen 2010) which was similarly demolished.

Benedict Anderson (1991) argues that the notion of "nation-ness" has become a central construct in many aspects of modern thought. He posits the concept of a nation as an imagined community, as members "will never know most of their fellow members" and the notion of citizenship and belonging to the nation enables people to imagine the boundaries of a nation even when these boundaries may not physically exist (1991, 6). One of the significant historical developments, which facilitated the emergence of national consciousness, is the rise of print capitalism. Newspapers as part of this print capitalism facilitated this imagination and communion with the unknown other. A prominent aspect of Anderson's imagined community is the role of media, particularly print media where these can facilitate national conversations. These conversations allow people to be aware of each other's existence, experience and belonging to a community. Media are intrinsically implicated in creating a national consciousness and a bond between individuals. According to Anderson, "these fellow-readers to whom they were connected through print, formed the embryo of the nationally imagined community" (1991, 44). Thus, the role of newspapers as cartographers of the imagined community is facilitated through its sustained discourses and is an important part of the discursive, metaphorical and visual construction of the nation state in our everyday lives. This imagination of "us" is crafted by inserting imagined boundaries, defining inclusion and by marking out the "Other". In other words, media as a cultural artefact has a cartographic function in people's everyday lives, infusing spatial geography and boundaries and enacting these through narratives, visual and discursive frames. Despite the eminence of Anderson's thesis "imagined communities", this cartographic role of the media, particularly print media and its incumbent journalistic techniques to sustain a social imaginary of an imagined community, is under explored in journalism studies. What is well conceived in media and communication studies as well as broader scholarship on information and communications technologies (ICTs) is the ability of media to transcend time and space and to reconfigure

temporal and proximity-distance frames (Scannell 1989; Moores 2004; Ibrahim 2012).

This paper acknowledges the role of media and particularly newspapers in constantly invoking an imagined spatial geography in its discussions of national interest. The cartographic role of media is accomplished through a multitude of journalistic techniques including the use of images, imagery, narratives, metaphors, distance framing and robust agenda setting, where notions of belonging to a defined discursive space can elicit both cerebral and visceral responses. As Durkheim observes in the Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), time and space are social constructs. Places and spaces as social constructs are often subjected to ideological struggles over meaning. The sheer act of identification, the assignment of a place in a social structure, indicates distinctive roles, capacities for action and access to power within the social order (Harvey 1990, 419). David Harvey's (1990) materialist construction of space as a product of social relations and ideological struggles imbues a Marxist perspective to space production, equally implicating media as a capitalist and ideological enterprise within this frame. Hence media's production of space in sustaining the social imaginary of the nation-state is not divorced from the political context, power or ideological struggles. As Harvey (1990, 419) observes, "the very act of naming geographical entities implies a power over them, most particularly the way in which places, inhabitants and social functions are represented".

The framing of space in media while renewing the social imaginary of an imagined community is political. It is within this premise we analyse the spatial metaphor of the jungle in Calais. Our analysis of the spatial metaphor of the jungle draws on the concept of spatialisation as a social imaginary (Shields 1999), that emerges out of a politics of territoriality centred on discursive and material practices of media. Beyond Anderson's "imagined community," the discursive media practices which gave rise to jungle discourses need to be understood within a particular context of terrestrial politics where the unbounded regional entity of the European Union is juxtaposed against the bounded notion of the nation-state (whether it be the UK or France). The EU is presented as non-coterminous, where the borders are porous and malleable. The EU, and in particular France, is perceived as a space where large numbers of illegal migrants congregate at or near the French ports within the context of a de facto French policy of closing, banning or demolishing migrant shelters between 2002 and 2011. Against this political context, we argue that distinct spatialisation techniques were employed by newspapers to construct the violation of a bounded space in the discourses of the jungle. The habitus of space by the other was tightly entwined with discourses of White morality versus territorial violation. In so doing it reinforced and legitimised a particular geopolitics of space, while illuminating the cartographic role of newspapers in renewing the social imaginary of an imagined community.

Spatialization and Social Imaginaries

Spaces can be socially, materially and discursively constructed (Harvey 1973; Massey 1991; May 1996; Shields 1999). Shields conceptualizes this spatialization as a "social imaginary," where spatial divisions and distinctions provide the means to ground hegemonic ideologies and social practices (1999). In these "social imaginaries," issues of belonging, boundaries and othering can reflect discursive and material practices of "us" and "them", exclusion and inclusion. More recent literature has developed this further, arguing that landscapes and dominant features in these "become spatially bounded scenes that visually communicate what belongs and what does not" (Trudeau 2006, 421). They thus become critical to the construction of a "territorialized politics of belonging" in which the discourses and practices that maintain boundaries "correspond to the imagined geographies of a polity and to the spaces that normatively embody the polity" (Trudeau 2006, 421).

How the media construct boundaries with regard to migration needs to be understood within wider shifts in policy discourses of migrants and migration. Since the 1980s, assumptions and discourses about the rights of refugees to protection have been eroded as governments struggled to deal with increases in unregulated mass migration, people trafficking and international terrorism (Geddes 2004; Bosworth 2012). States, rather than offering sanctuary, have reframed migration as involving "risky outsiders and threatened insiders" and refugees as migrants (Millner 2011). A security-judicial apparatus has grown up around tighter border controls aimed at keeping migrants out and criminalising "certain forms of movement … [so] effectively rendering large proportions of the world's population as illegal" (Aas 2011, 26). "New spaces" have emerged both to detain migrants during the asylum process and as informal camps of makeshift shelters erected by migrants on wasteland or in disused industrial buildings in towns and cities (Isin, Engin and Rygiel 2007, 171). The security-judicial border controls render these as spaces of exception where the usual rights and protections afforded refugees or citizens are denied to those suspected of being

illegal migrants. These include the right not to be detained as well as the right to shelter and to welfare benefits (Isin, Engin and Rygiel 2007; Aas 2011).

EU Politics of Territoriality and The Social Imaginary of The Jungle

The politics of territoriality has taken a particular form with "Fortress Europe," a term that conveys the sense of a space under siege from waves of irregular migration, the response to which has been the tightening of the security-judicial apparatus on the EU's external borders (Bosworth and Guild 2008, 213). Recent legal changes require migrants to apply for asylum at the point of entry, but most wait until they reach their preferred destination – often Germany and the UK – so as many as 90% may be illegal under the new laws (Oxfam cited in Millner 2011, 236). The EU has also relaxed internal borders under the Schengen Agreement, which allows free, undocumented travel between signatory countries. Britain opted out of the Agreement and retained border controls, the consequence of which has been to render the French coastline the "extreme periphery" of the Schengen area and a site of relatively large congregations of migrants seeking to cross the sea border (Thomas 2013). Calais has seen a particular concentration of migrants because of its multi-modal transport links (i.e. ferry, train and lorry) which offer more opportunities for stowaways. As such, this renders Calais as a key site of cross-border tension as well as co-operation between the two countries.

French politicians blame the "problem" of large numbers of migrants in Calais on what they see as a clash between the attraction of Britain's over-generous benefit system and "inhumane" border controls, which block movement across the Channel, thus creating a bottleneck on their side of the border (Howarth and Ibrahim 2012). Conversely, British politicians blame France for loose border controls, summed up in expressions such as "'we don't have a barrier, we have a sieve'" (Damien Green cited Bosworth and Guild 2008, 704). Both governments have responded by seeking to deter migrants with more surveillance and tighter border controls in Calais (Mulvey 2010) and a raft of new laws, but rather than solve the problem it has created the sense of a "system … in perpetual crisis"; both governments "lost control of the debate" and British media hostility towards migrants hardened (Mulvey 2010, 456).

It is within this context of crisis that the jungle metaphor was applied by newspapers to the migrant camps on the French coastline. Rygiel has argued that Europe's migrant camps are "sites of contestation'" so their "very meaning" needs to be explored (2011, 1). At one level, the meaning of camps studied in this article is functional: they are located near major transit areas which present migrants with opportunities to leap onto passing vehicles headed across the Channel and meet the basic need for shelter. However the camps are also visible symbols of the presence of migrants, the scale of migration, and hence failed migration policies (Boswell 2012; Ibrahim 2011; Howarth and Ibrahim 2012). These two elements converged in the row over Sangatte Red Cross Centre, which closed in 2002 after a riot and pressure from the British government who argued that such shelters acted as a magnet for more migrants (Boswell 2012). This marked the beginning of a sustained policy in which charities were allowed to provide food, hot showers and basic medical care but not migrant shelters which were closed, banned or demolished. This fragmented policy forced them to erect their own makeshift shelters. The sprouting of these makeshift camps between 2007 and 2011 saw the emergence of the spatial metaphor of the jungle.

The closure of Sangatte brought British newspaper attention to Calais as a major conduit for cross-channel illegal migration (Boswell 2012). The row over the shelter became a "focusing event," which grounded and concretised the more elusive problem of illegal migration for journalists (Boswell 2012). It also gave impetus to a decade-long campaign by British newspapers, particularly in the two mid-market titles, the Daily Mail and Express, on illegal migration (see Ibrahim 2011; Howarth and Ibrahim 2012). Editors have argued that their campaigns were in the interest of their readers because the scale of migration posed major demographic changes and because of the failure of the government to solve the problem. However human rights organisations and analysts counter that coverage has drawn on "de-humanizing" labels for migrants and created a "misleading picture" of immigration "fuel[ing] political prejudice … and extremism" in Britain (Commission for Racial Equality 2007, 98; Migration Observatory 2013).

These political and social contexts have shaped the conditions in which a particular social imaginary of the jungle in British newspaper discourses emerged between 2007 and 2010. The spatial-political dimension created a sense of space under threat, in crisis, and the corresponding response of governments as being inadequate. At the same time there was a politicization of and increased media attention on migrant shelters and the spaces where

these sprung up. The spatial metaphor of the jungle is highly malleable, offering multiple cultural meanings (see Dove 1992); ranging from the exotic backdrop in wildlife documentaries (Horak 2006), the staged set and "contrived construction" of reality television (Wright 2006), to the older colonial meanings of the jungle as a barbaric space found in Rudyard Kipling's Jungle Book (1894) and Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1899).[1] What Kipling, Conrad - and more recently, the British newspapers analysed below - draw on is the literal meaning of the Anglo-Indian word "jungle" as "'tangled thickets'" (Zimmerman 1987, vii, cited in Dove 1992) and the dialectic between environmental characteristics of "feral" plants and animals and the culture of human inhabitants who do not "obey the norms and laws of the country" (Dove 199, 239).

For colonialists surveying the foreign land, this dialectic took on an added meaning in which the jungle was "an absence of civilization," (Dove 1992, 239, 240) and in Kipling's writings a "threat to the maintenance of order and hierarchy" and the "conflict between orderly colonialism and anarchic nativism"(Nyman 2001, 1007). Similarly, in Conrad's work the other is "the antithesis of Europe and civilization" (Achebe 1977, 324), the "savage counterpart to the refined" (Achebe 1977, 324) and a western hierarchy that ultimately "dehumanizes" the African other (Achebe 1977, 326). The "law of the jungle" evoked by the newspapers analysed below is not in the Kipling sense of a space where the rules of a community are intended to ensure order and the protection of individuals and society from threats to these (McBratney 1992), but more in the Conrad sense of a corrosive, corrupting force of the jungle environment where all norms are suspended and the civilised individual is debased. The metaphor of the jungle created a distinct "othering" of migrants as lesser human. Edward Said (1978) in his study of Orientalism observes how outsiders can impose associations and connotations on the identities of people by manipulating or coalescing traits and attributes. The metaphor of the jungle created a spatial category in which to isolate the migrant and demark him or her as different from the civilized population.

Spatialization Techniques in Newspaper Discourses

The discursive practices of the newspapers drew on the spatial metaphor of the jungle to construct a particular social imaginary of migrant spaces and shelters and their urgent threat to civilised Europe. The metaphor of the jungle as a spatialization technique was both able to create a distance from the plight of the migrants while inserting its imminent threat in the proximate locale of the French coastline. Discursive practices here also refer to the construction of collective meanings around dominant thematic discourses; the ideological premises and conflicts implicit in these; and the discursive technique – in particular of the spatial metaphor – used to construct spaces and their occupants in terms of belonging and un-belonging, that is, as "them" and "us", exclusion and inclusion. We analysed the use of the jungle metaphor in 121 online articles in Britain's two mid-market newspapers: the Daily Mail and the Express. (This was supplemented with four offline articles published in the Express, which mentioned the jungle in 2007 and 2008 but are not available online.) Both newspapers have campaigned against immigration and been criticised by human rights organizations for their coverage of migrant and asylum issues, and while their choice of discourse might be dramatic, their ideological positioning on immigration is broadly consistent with that of the "quality" newspapers (see Howarth and Ibrahim 2012). Furthermore, major changes in demography rendered the mid-market one of the most politically significant newspaper segments since the 1990s (Greenslade 2004). It is also a market segment dominated by the Daily Mail, which has come to occupy a space of particular political power and in tandem influence on political debate (Davies 2009) including on issues of immigration. The sensitivity of the British government to this can be seen in the way in which immigration issues, in particular cross-Channel illegal migration, have moved up the political and policy agenda (Mulvey 2010).

Beyond deconstructing the metaphor of the jungle, we analysed the newspaper discourses at three distinct levels of spatialization: the functional (shelter); the environmental (internal and external conditions - camps and political conditions); and the barbaric (violent criminality and lawlessness) and struggles against this. The analyses were organised thematically to show spatial and temporal continuities and shifts from the emergence of the Calais Jungle as a space of the unordered and uncouth, in which the growing barbarism serves to legitimise brutal or violent practices (i.e. demolition), to eradicate makeshift camps or shelters, render occupants of the jungle sub-human and those who were deemed criminal who needed to be expelled, or vulnerable so needed to be protected. The demolition of the camps – and the vegetation in them – thus becomes deeply symbolic of the politics of territoriality, manifest in attempts to reclaim civilised space from the jungle; to root out the corrosive and corrupting elements

that had crept in and threatened ordered, lawful Calais. However the sprouting of "new jungles" became visible manifestations of the failure of these eradication techniques and ultimately, the failure of policies aimed at deterring new migrants, the refusal of the French courts to legitimise detention and the deportation of migrants, the refusal of Britain to open its borders to more migrants, and an influx of refugees from the Arab Spring. Ultimately, what was threatened was more than civilised suburbia; what was threatened was one of the key edifices of the EU – the Schengen Agreement on free movement within the EU.

The Jungle as the Uncouth, Unordered Space

The metaphor of the Jungle as a barbaric space did not emerge with the first mentions of the term in the British newspapers. Initially, the newspapers referred to a handful of "makeshift" shelters on "inhospitable scrubland" on the main road to the port of Calais, a base from where migrants could leap onto passing vehicles headed across the Channel (Tristem 2007). By 2009, however, its occupants numbered over 800 in flimsy tents in a "sprawling shantytown … that grows by the day" (Rawstorne 2009), that is, a town within a town characterised by organic, unordered growth. The newspapers saw it as the "latest focus of a long and unending saga" (Rawstorne 2009), a highly visible and semi-permanent "symbol of Europe's struggle with illegal migration" (Express 2009). In view of this, the jungle metaphor became a symbol of failed policies by creating a social imaginary of a barbaric space.

The jungle metaphor operated at two levels. Barbarism as environmental degradation was evident in discourses of "squalor" (Sparks 2009a) and an assault on the senses where the "smell of human excrement and acrid smoke was almost overwhelming" (Reid 2009). Living conditions in the camp were likened to the "trenches" of World War I (Bracchi 2009) and labelling these "'inhumane'" was seen as an "'understatement … of the filthy conditions" in which "migrants have to survive in their tents, in the mud, with minimum hygiene'" (Allen 2009c). However, rather than focusing on the inhabitable conditions in the camps, the jungle discourse sought to alienate the public.

The camps were presented as unordered and unlawful spaces through the jungle metaphor. The Jungle was seen as a "magnet" and a "hiding place" for rapists, gang masters and people traffickers; a "no go area for the police" (Allen 2008). The journeys to Calais from Afghanistan, North Africa and the Middle East, while long and hard were seen as "civilised compared with … the Jungle,"(Fernandes 2009) for this was a space where the "law of the jungle" reigned (Rawstorne 2009). This was savage "law" of murder, rape, and fights between rival ethnic gangs armed with "clubs, metal bars and knives," all desperate to be one of the "few who …can get past the security checks" to get on one of the lorries headed for Britain (Allen 2009a). It was also a space of desperation coupled with an illegal economy of monetising human trafficking, where migrants idealised Britain as an "Eldorado" (Reynolds 2009) and were willing to "stop at nothing"(Sparks 2009c). The law of this Jungle took on a particular form with unscrupulous "criminal gangs exporting illegal migrants to Britain" who were free to operate largely unchecked (Allen 2009c). It was a space of "big business" infiltrated by "organised crime," and where people traffickers could charge the migrants up to $20,000 to get to Britain (Fernandes 2009).

The spatial references were recurrent in the newspaper discourses, highlighting how the disorder was often violating the ordered spaces of the civilised. Fights between migrants escalated into inter-ethnic "turf wars" which created "months of violence and disorder" on the streets of Calais (Hickley 2009). In one incident about 70 migrants "armed with iron bars and knives" started fighting with each other on one of the main streets (Bracchi 2009). The loss of control over one's environment became evident in the immediacy where the "situation is deteriorating fast" (Rawstorne 2009) and the violence "becoming more indiscriminate'" with sexual assaults on a pregnant woman and attacks on British holidaymakers (Bracchi 2009). Recreational spaces became "no go area[s]" (Rawstorne 2009) and businesses were disrupted, as was daily life; a "caravan showroom … [was] now boarded up", the owner of a truckers' café "at his wits end" was considering doing likewise (Bracchi 2009), and local traders had "seen business plummet as truckers fearful of stopping lest immigrants board their lorries, boycott the area" (Rawstorne 2009). The "law of the jungle", newspapers claimed, had extended "beyond the boundaries of this god-forsaken 'community,'" disrupting local business and threatening local residents with their desperation and determination to reach Britain (see Bracchi 2009).

What emerged between 2007 and 2009 in these discourses was the jungle as a barbaric space of environmental degradation and a space overrun by the uncouth and unordered, which warranted a robust response from the forces of law and order.

Eradicating the Jungle

The newspaper discourses on these migrant camps agitated for responses from the French authorities. The response demanded by the British newspapers from the French authorities was slow to come. Local residents talked about "setting up vigilante groups to forcibly clear migrants" (Rawstorne 2009) and an arson attack on a prefabricated unit intended to house hot showers was attributed to local residents "angry at the presence of migrants" (Allen 2009c). French minister Eric Besson pledged that the "'the law of the jungle will reign no longer"' and that the "'base camp for human traffickers"' (Bracchi 2009) would be demolished, to which his British counterpart added that the demolition of the camp would "disrupt illegal immigration and people trafficking routes" and deter migrants from seeking to come to Britain (Garnham 2009). The discourses of barbarism and disorder thus set the context for enforced action, namely the demolition of the camp and the dispersal or detention of its occupants.

The spatial clearing of the jungle was seen as asserting order and law back on the transgressed land. The violence of the demolition with bulldozers was justified through the expectation of expiating the land from the lawlessness. In a "dawn raid" (Garnham 2009) "bulldozers encircle[d] the camp" and 500 armed police – "one for each remaining migrant in the shanty town" – moved in (Reporter 2009). First they cleared the occupants; 278 of whom were detained, half of whom were children and were separated from the adults and taken to special centres (Garnham 2009). Then the police "brought in bulldozers to raze the maze of makeshift tents … workers with chainsaws cut down the trees and scrub bush that had supported the tents" (Express 2009). Thus the violent barbarism of jungle not only set the context for its demolition, but also served to justify the violent forcefulness of this. The camp, it was claimed, had become a "magnet for people from all over the world determined to cross the Channel and reach Britain" and the French minister claimed that is clearance was an "important step in making Calais 'watertight' to illegal migrants" (Reporter 2009). The brutal clearing of the camps was also meant to be performative, exhibiting the decisive actions and firm stance taken by the authorities in dealing with these spatial transgressions, with both newspapers carrying images of the demolition. The clearing of the space and imaging of these was supposed to assuage the public as to how order had been restored and how the White spaces had been reclaimed from illegal migrants.

Despite the brutal demolition of the jungle and the declarations from both sides to secure Calais from illegal migrants, the phenomenon of the jungle could not be contained. New camps "popped up" in Calais hours after the Jungle was razed (Allen 2009b); "at least 20 new mini-camps" sprung up around the town over the next few weeks (Allen 2009d); and others sprouted "all along the northern French coast" (Sparks 2009b). These were "makeshift" shelters "strategically located" on main transit routes, but unlike the Jungle many were "well hidden from main roads" (Giannangeli 2009) or "secret homes" created after "forcing open the doorways" of the wartime blockhouses (Allen 2009b). Some of these new camps were torn down but the French authorities "admitted … they are fighting a losing battle against migrants desperate to reach Britain" (Allen 2009e) and to stop new jungles springing up. The mayor of Calais claimed the "'squalid conditions"' in some of these shelters was "'almost identical [to] … the so-called Jungle"' (Allen 2009b), feared the "danger" of mini-camps "mushrooming into a new 'Jungle"' (Allen 2009b), and reported that there were frequent "outbreaks of violence," particularly knife fights between migrants and people traffickers (Sparks 2009b).

Within a year there were reports that a "New Jungle" had sprung up in the village of Teteghem, near Dunkirk (Finan and Allen 2010). Newspapers were less interested in the discourse of environmental squalor and more interested in the theme of encroachment, violence and threat. The village of 7500 residents had been "invaded" by 50 new migrants a week and "over-run" by a camp of 200(Finan and Allen 2010). The local mayor attributed the sprouting of the New Jungle to the "changed situation" following the demolition of its Calais predecessor, where migrants were now "trying" to get to Britain from "Dunkirk and the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend" (Finan and Allen 2010). People traffickers had targeted Teteghem because of its strategic location near the port of Dunkirk, then charged migrants to camp in the village (Finan and Allen 2010). There were reports of recent stabbings and shootings and local residents felt threatened by "dangerous and very violent" people traffickers and by "hardened" migrants with "nothing to lose and [who] will stop at nothing to get what they need" (Finan and Allen 2010). This promoted authorities into renewed action and the police "swoop[ed] on 200 British-bound migrants," demolished the camp and dispersed its occupants again in 2010 (Reporter 2010).

The closing of Sangatte and the demolition of the Calais jungle had been seen by British and French politicians in instrumentalist terms, as a way to "stop migrants flooding into Calais" (Daily Mail 2009) but a year later "they

continue to flood into the town" (Sparks 2010). Local aid workers dismissed the demolition of the camps as little more than a "publicity stunt" intended to "placate the British public" and that they "had no effect at all" (Sparks 2010). Unable to stop new migrants coming into the coastal areas, French politicians blamed their British counterparts for the "shambles" (Fagge 2009) and demanded that Britain sign up to the Schengen Agreement and allow free movement of migrants already within the EU (Allen 2009d). The mayor of Calais claimed that the "port would remain an immigrant dumping ground until Britain opened its borders and stopped asking France to do its dirty work," but this, the newspaper argued, would "allow all migrants to flood across the Channel" (Allen 2009d).

With the French authorities unable to stop new migrants moving into coastal areas and their failure to persuade Britain to open its borders, they were left to manage the spaces they occupied. Nevertheless, a clear conflict emerged between the political determination to take a tough stance and the determination of the courts to uphold human rights. These ruled that "collective arrests" after the demolition of the Calais jungle infringed individual rights (Reid 2009) and upheld the "migrants' right not to be detained" and their "fundamental freedom" to claim asylum where they chose, (Sparks 2010) effectively challenging EU policy.

Conclusion

This article set out to explore how two mid-market British newspapers constructed a particular social imaginary of migrant spaces and camps through the spatial metaphor of the jungle. We contend that the meaning of these camps needs to be understood in a particular context of territorial politics of space on the French coastline, centred on migrant shelters, which fractured basic human needs, juxtaposing the need for shelter as illegitimate, against other basic needs as legitimate. It was in this context that the jungle metaphor came to ascribe particular meanings to migrant camps that extended beyond functional spaces of shelters and opportunities to incorporate the barbaric. These were spaces of the uncouth and unordered. The barbarism was captured in the accounts of the environmental degradation of spaces that evolved organically (or through orchestration by criminals) and that encroached on surrounding environs as well as of spaces of violent lawlessness. Both were seen as warranting violent demolition. However, this failed to end the barbarism but dispersed it along the coast in mini-camps that created a new meaning of the jungle as an open-ended space. It also entrenched a powerful social imaginary in which many migrants already deemed illegal under changes to EU asylum law on asylum were seen as sub-human through their occupation of spaces of barbarism.

Endnotes

1. A notion of the jungle as a barbaric space can also be found in Upton Sinclair's exploited meat-packers in The Jungle (1906) and Evan Hunter's account of uncontrolled, violent children in an inner-city school in the Blackboard Jungle (1955). However these do not draw on the colonial subject and most of the migrants in the newspaper articles were from the former colonies.

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Driving, Dashboards and Dromology: Analysing 1980s Videogames Using Paul Virilio's Theory of Speed

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Speed and Inertia

Space and time is of central concern of Paul Virilio. Just as Lefebvre and Merleau-Ponty were concerned with the reductive effects of the scientifically conceived spaces of technology upon everyday life, so Virilio extends these concerns to the impact of time upon lived, or 'real space.' As techniques and technologies of managing time are applied to everyday life, so 'real spaces' are progressively diluted and individuals can no longer delineate between the private and the public: so called 'dead time' on mass transit systems is elided by Wi-Fi connectivity; Internet connected appliances are always-on for corporations to target advertising and governments to harvest data to increase national security, with the PRISM program showing little demarcation between either sphere. Inhabitants of contemporary societies are overlaid with a gossamer digital net, allowing spaces to be traversed in advance: GPS positioning covers the globe, permitting navigation and simulation of spaces pre-arrival, Google's variant navigation software shows topographical and actual views of journeys before they take place, war games provide tactical and strategic supremacy of potential theatres of battle, flight and medical simulators allow a view of future egocentric (airspace) and exocentric (the human body) spaces before any actual flight or operation is undertaken. Laborsaving devices privilege real-time over real-space, the result being that the temporal obliterates the spatial, 'here no longer exists, everything is now' (Virilio 2000b: 125).

The increasing reliance on machines reveals an urgent message which is central to Virilio's exposition on time and space. For instance, in the highly conceived, digital space of modern aeronautics, the pilot, crew and passengers are ensconced within the 'speed machine' of a metallic capsule, supplemented by electronic prostheses, which transforms the measurement of distance (space) into the measurement of duration (time). Thus, when passengers board a Boeing 747 bound for Los Angeles, they are instructed as to how long rather than how far they will fly, so that space is progressively reduced to its lowest common denominator, and the journey elided behind departure and arrival. The folding of space into time is achieved through the very speed of air travel: as duration decreases, so the room available to the passengers decreases, creating an inability to physically move around the cabin, a condition enabled by the personal consoles of music, films and games, ultimately generating a somnambulant desire for inertia. As speed increases, so space becomes reduced to a point, 'no doubt there will be no longer anything but arrival, the point of arrival, the departure will itself have disappeared in the instantaneity of the projection' (Virilio 2008: 110). The 'real spaces' of perception and lived space are summarily reduced, as inertia becomes a way of life. This is apparent in the everyday too, where individuals who are inert as they cannot summarily move through space under their own motility are provided with the prostheses of electric wheelchairs. Here they become part of the trajectory of the machine. The inert are the disabled fitted out with prostheses to realize a prototype for future human/machine integration 'the able but overequipped air force pilot resembles in every feature the equipped invalid' (Virilio 2000a: 65). The collapse of space into time is fully realized in digital space, placing us in the same position of inertia as the invalid or the aeronaut, evident in the mundane, but telling examples of shopping for books from Amazon,

or downloading videogames via Steam. For the armchair traveler commodities, communication and services are delivered on demand, with the maximum of commutable speed and the minimum of physical movement.

The Effects of Speed

With the technologies of the digital, the amount of 'space' available to the user is of unequivocal importance. The quantity of information which can be stored on a magnetic media has moved from bits, to bytes; kilobytes to megabytes; gigabytes to terabytes; the performance of a graphics card is measured in the availability of RAM, with the rider that miniaturization diminishes the physical presence of this in lived space by continually reducing the size of the desktop PC, tablet, smartphone or digital camera, with the current trend being towards wearable technologies, e.g. smartwatches or eyewear. As digital space increases in prevalence and importance by both enmeshing, overlaying and supplanting other spaces, there is a requirement to navigate with greater ease and rapidity. Therefore, as the storage space available to digital technologies increases, so does the speed of navigation, with the astronomy of numbers applied to tech representative of one thing: speed. CPUs are overclocked to wring the final iota of performance from searing silicon; mathematical calculations are measured in teraflops; communication speed is constituted by gross bit rate.

With the reduction of time taken to process a calculation concurrent with the increase in space, speed allows traversal between the co-dependents of space and time. With the current archetype of digital space being the Internet and its emphasis on the maximal communication of information in the shortest possible time, the reality of information is entirely contained in the speed of its dissemination. This theorem partly explains the exponential rise in the popularity of personal communication hardware and the social networks linked into them. Here, it is not the content which is important, but the medium, speed, which ensures that 'information is only of any value if it is delivered fast; better still that speed is information itself!' (Virilio 1995: 140). Therefore the medium is not only the message, but intrinsic to lived experience, evidenced in the incessant use of social media, keyboard and keypad, which via speed of response, allows navigation of a proliferating space with increasing brevity.

In this digital space, it is the user who is projected and distanced towards/from the subject or object. However, as I show below in the specific examples of the impact of speed upon the videogame, the time manifest in digital space simultaneously brings objects and surroundings towards the user, with dromology becoming , paradoxically 'the wait for the coming of what abides' (Virilio 2008: 110) as everything arrives without the need to depart. So, while the space of the digital projects the user towards the subject/object, the time of the digital projects the subject/object towards the user: speed acts as the medium between the two. This simultaneous and complementary fusion of space and time assumes control over ego-centric (introverted) space, in lieu of exo-centric (extroverted) space. The proclivity is towards travelling without moving: as users navigate with GPS and Google Earth, so they are locked into an inertia modulated by access to a screen via interface. Thus, technocratic societies with their reduction of interaction within tangible, physical spaces are seeing a 'progressive disappearance of anthropological-geographic reference' (Virilio 2000a: 68). Potentially, the employment of speed as a medium of transmission in the spatial and temporal realms has catastrophic consequences for 'real spaces' as instantaneity and ubiquity will abolish space along with the interval.

For the user of digital space, everything can be satisfied in the present chronos. Travelling the world can be reduced to instantaneous navigation and flattened onto the 'square horizon of the screen' where there is 'no more delay, no more relief' (Virilio 1997: 26). The archetype for this space was once the negative horizon of the desert, where the attempts of land-speed records rendered objects and landscapes a homogenous and dromogenous hell of the same (Virilio 2008: 134), but in the new model the digital stretches around the globe like cling-film, which falsifies the depth, the length, the distances of perception of time and space. Just as the motor car or civil aviation bring faraway lands closer to us, so in the digital the medium of speed distances us from the tangible subject or object. Such is the promise of digital space: to project and distance oneself, to instantly communicate, to homogenize and smooth out all spaces, so that all users are locked into a universal time of instantaneousness, without having to wrest physical bodies from inertia.

Yet the holy grail of many audiovisual technologies – and especially videogames – is to provide the illusion of topographical relief. This is evident in early era games, where a top-down, God's eye view generates a distance between player and avatar, before becoming more pronounced with the increase in processing speed. In order to optimize the illusion of relief, early commercial videogames employed the artistic technique of parallax scrolling,

where landscapes on the screen are refreshed at different rates, so that the ground in front of the player would move quicker than the mountains in the background. Such was the success of the technique that it lent itself to the title of Sensible Software's sci-fi shooter Parallax (1982). At the same time, developers experimented with isometrics to create the illusion of '2.5D' games, such as Zaxxon (1982) where the player would view the landscape from the corner of the screen. The effect was to provide the illusion of 'flying into' the screen, which, in a considerably updated format, provides the basis for the 3D representations of space seen in today's polygon-rendered first person shooters. With this rejoinder in mind, the second part of this paper will examine how Virilio's work can be used to analyze videogames of the 1980s where a variety of techniques, tricks and technologies were employed to convey ideas of speed and substitution in the videogame.

Virilio and the Videogame

The increase of speed and its correlated rise in inertia is a feature integral to technocratic societies. With each increase in speed, bodily movement is reduced to a perfunctory action. Travellators at airports allow people to move around with the minimum effort, preparing the traveler for the zero degree inertia of trans-Atlantic flight. Autobahns permit unlimited automotive speed, with the driver ensconced in a cabin bristling with technologies, rendering the driver obsolescent (Virilio 2008: 107). This has reached its logical conclusion with the use of the 'Reaper', an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in Afghanistan, which can stay airborne for longer than conventional aircraft as the inconvenience of the human pilot is removed. There is no need for a cockpit, life support systems or radio as the aircraft is controlled from Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, USA. A BBC report on the UAV stresses that control of the drone is 'no videogame' and yet the image of the RAF Wing Commander, chatting to the reporter while sitting at a console replete with screens and an Xbox 360 joypad as the Reaper flies on a non-stop 20 hours reconnaissance mission 7000 miles away from the gamer/pilot is clearly the manifestation of pure war, which transcends its normative area of conflict. While technologies of projection and distancing obsolesce the individual pilot, a gamer is generated in their place who, as outlined above, experiences a stretched cling-film of depth-free space. It is no surprise then, that the shimmering flatness of the screen is reflected in the mirage (1) of desert wars of the 21st century, and subsequently doubled in the desert setting of the UAV's control base in Nevada, a location so acquiescent to technologies of speed that vehicles from the last three world land speed records have been tested, developed, deployed and set there, in each case further increasing the inertia of the pilot of these vehicles powered by aerospace engines. The dromological effects of speed and inertia are so manifest in the experience of bodies who accelerate through space that

> He who gets behind the wheel of a racing car . . . completes his natural stereoscopic vision with a new type of prosthesis of vision capable of providing him with the mobile illusion of a kinetic transformation of his field of vision, the optical illusion being perhaps here only that of an alleged relief of perspectival space
>
> (Virilio 2008: 133)

In a similar way, dromology, Paul Virilo's term for the study of speed, is relevant to the significance of driving/racing games, which throughout the course of the history of videogames have proven to be one of the most popular and enduring genres. From the very first racing videogame Gran Trak 10 (1974), complete with three-spoke steering wheel, through to the 'car porn' of the Gran Turismo (1997-) series, the driving game has been at the forefront of innovation in design, high audiovisual standards and the use of prostheses or peripherals to project and maintain the illusion of speed. Indeed, it is through the driving genre that the importance of speed to the study of the videogame becomes apparent, as the use of the 'vehicle' in the videogame is not merely limited to the driving genre. To outline this I will discuss a variety of videogames, chiefly from the 1980s where the use of speed is crucial to their impact and success, and the parallels they have with Virilio's theory of speed.

Dromology and the Game of Driving: Monaco GP and Motor Mania

The use of the screen as a device to fuse inertia and speed belies a striking similarity between the videogame

and the vehicle, which requires that the users or occupants assume a trans-spatial approach 'the framed opening of the windshield is not therefore a window but rather a window-door which the passengers pass through without stopping' (Virilio 2008: 104). The effect of speed, where time and space collapse and extend into the vanishing point is enchanting for the auto-dweller, as the (wind) screen, acting like a looking glass, entices and permits us to view the future that we are hurtling towards. In the vehicle, passengers are inert, as the surroundings move dromoscopically around them, a technique employed by racing games to project the illusion of speed. While early racing games were represented on one screen and didn't alter throughout the duration of the game, as with Sprint 2 (1974), with the increase in processing speeds the practice of projecting the landscape onto the player's on-screen vehicle became the norm. This is especially evident from the 1980s onwards and can be seen in Sega's Monaco GP (1980), where corners would rush down the screen towards the player's car and in Motor Mania (1982).

Monaco GP was one of the first arcade games to feature a 'deluxe' model, where the player could sit down as if embedded in the cockpit of Formula 1 car, causing the player to be more inert than if they were standing at the upright model. Furthermore, although the orientation of the player in Monaco GP was horizontal, the monitor was vertical, as opposed to the horizontal orientation of later games, where the emphasis tends towards width rather than length. This may appear to be a trivial observation, but it is important to note that early driving games, in spite of moving the landscape towards the player, did not attain pure speed. The vertical orientation of the monitor is akin to an exploratory desire as seen in exo-centric space and exo-colonisation. The definitive example of this orientation is the ballistic positioning of astronauts in rocket propelled vehicles: vertical/ballistic orientation is literally and metaphorically a wish to reach for the stars. When the monitor moves towards the horizontal and there is a letterboxing of vision there is a tendency towards insularity, ego-centric space and endo-colonisation. This is best seen in the movement away from the exploration of the cosmos to the exploration of genetic code, where humans orbit human bodies, rather than celestial bodies. The movement to horizontal orientation is widespread and particularly apparent in screen-based technology, from the letterboxing effect of the now-ubiquitous 16:9 screen ratio to the advent of 3D representations in videogames, cinema and television broadcasts (Schroter, 2014). The outcome is that objects in the center of the screen of the gamer/driver scroll quicker than those on the periphery. The image is convexed and depth is generated to the field of vision. Known as 'motion blur', this visual technique is used extensively in contemporary racing games, with Sony Liverpool's WipEout HD (2008) augmenting the mirage further by supporting the use of 3D glasses. Contrary to Virilio then, the irony becomes apparent: the faster the vehicle the greater the relief.

If Monaco GP generates the illusion of speed, then Motor Mania produces a representation of speed. As the landscape scrolls down the left hand side of the screen towards the player's car, the gamer/driver is required to observe and assimilate additional information from the 'dashboard' on the right hand side of the screen. The dashboard takes the form of a plethora of gauges including a speedometer, milometer, fuel gauge and voltmeter. As the dashboard monitors and informs the position of the gamer/driver through the landscape, it also narrows the space of the (wind)screen, 'shrinking its passengers field of vision, the frame of the dashboard gives rise to an acceleration of the sequencing that reinforces the effect of the acceleration of the vehicle' (Virilio 2008: 103). Although the driver can see the landscape, the dashboard instruments permit a clearer view of the outside than the windscreen alone: a stereoscopy which serves as a double reduction to the distance-time of the trip and the letterbox framing of the (wind) screen. Horizontal orientation is discernible in Motor Mania where the dashboard takes up 50% of the screen, with the projection of information onto the gamer/driver of equal importance to the representation of the landscape.

Battlezone: Territories Unknown

As the above example of the Reaper UAV shows, the supplanting of human input by technology is a way of minimizing risk to those engaged in the execution of pure war. The ultimate desire of combat is to be absorbed into a digital space, to 'stay out of reach, all the while remaining present' (Virilio 1986: 39). This is an aesthetics of disappearance, of camouflage, where the warrior, via technology, removes the body from the war-zone. Disappearance is of tacit – and tactical – importance to the mechanized divisions of land armies, where tanks project false appearances and tank commanders, gunners and drivers are ensconced in a composite ceramic shell, shielded from the elements of war and nature.

There is the intimation of disappearance in Atari's Combat (1977), where, in one play mode, the tank is invisible to the players except for a few seconds after a shot is fired. However, it is Battlezone (1980), where the game, the tank, the gamer/driver and the dashboard are interfaced, seamlessly merged and identified 'with a victorious vision, to the point where the dashboard comes to seem rather like a misunderstood game of war' (Virilio 2008: 107). The player of Battlezone controls a tank in the first person perspective, but disappears as the gamer and the screen are hyper-mediated through the use of peripherals. The vanishing of the gamer/driver is shown in three separate but interconnected ways. First, the player views the landscape through a set of goggles, similar in form and usage to a periscope on a tank or submarine (and perhaps anticipatory of Google Glass technology). To move the tank, the player must manipulate two joysticks, representing the caterpillar tractors which propel the tank. Second, through the use of a radar screen at the top of the display, the game substitutes the warrior for technology, as the Doppler optics serve to augment the eyesight of the tank commander by bringing the vast expanses of the battlefield into close proximity, convexing the space of the battlefield through the periscope and radar. Third, the innovative 'vector' graphics used in Battlezone are particularly instructive as to the role of the tank in modern warfare. The use of a three dimensional representation of a landscape counters the flattening of space by opening the battlefield to depth, so 'the technology of vectors thus comes to replace the tactics of bodies' (Virilio 2008: 107). The use of vectoring means that the gamer/warrior can predict with some certainty the movements of the enemy in space, and therefore anticipate what will happen in the time of the future. Similar to the gamer/driver of Monaco GP with 'the prevision of the movement of the opposing horizon for the driver similar to the prevision of the enemy for war leaders' (Virilio 2008: 107), it is possible to see Battlezone as part of a wider project of a rigorous management of time and coincident social impact. First, Battlezone was adapted for use by the US Army as a trainer for their M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Bradley Trainer (aka Military Battlezone) was considerably more complex than its arcade variant as it incorporated gravitational effects which altered the trajectory of the shells and identifiable targets, so trainee tank commanders wouldn't friendly fire their allies. As one of the first military uses of videogames, Bradley Trainer identifies with what Virilio describes as a 'sophisticated form of Kriegspiel [war game] . . . dromoscopy would be in some ways a video game of speed, a Blitzkriegspiel [Lightening war game]' (Virilio 2008: 107). Therefore, in Battlezone speed, technology and gaming anticipates Der Derian's (2001) Military Industrial Media Entertainment Network (MIMENET) and Stahl's 'militainment' (2010) which, in fast, but highly controlled societies, are concepts vertically integrated into videogame technologies. Second, as with the notion of the gamer/driver seen in Motor Mania and Monaco GP, it is Battlezone's landscape which moves around the player, but, unlike other games of its era, it is the player who controls this movement. Battlezone's desire for speed is a witness to the simultaneous desire for control over that speed, as the more mobility increases, the greater the desire for control. As shown at the end of this article, the development of the dynamic of the control of the speed found in videogames is crucial to Virilio's analysis of wielding control over entire societies.

The Inertia of Speed: Pole Position II

Battlezone's move to a three-dimensional, first-person representation of a landscape was indicative of a widespread shift towards the dashboard viewpoint of the gamer/driver. This graphical representation, where the player is situated elevated and behind the car, or as a fly on the windscreen are termed 'third-person' or 'first-person' perspectives respectively. Pole Position II (Namco/Atari, 1983) with its inclusion of the Monaco GP deluxe model of arcade cabinet used the third person perspective while the gamer/driver races around a variety of Japanese Formula 1 courses. The difference between Pole Position II and the earlier first-person perspective of Battlezone is the use of sprite-based graphics, which enables the use of a wider variety of styles and colors. However, the use of sprite graphics has unforeseen consequences, for when the player reaches top-speed, the movement of the track towards the player is so quick that that it appears not to move and then, eventually, appears to move backwards. This is the mastery of 'real speed', so desired by F1 drivers, where to approach obstacles with such velocity is to have 'the impression that you are moving in slow motion' (Prost cited Virilio 2000a: 15) so that distance-time is abolished between objects on the landscape and the gamer/driver. Pole Position II's 'wagon-wheel' aliasing – the technical term given to an image that appears to stand still when it is drawn - is the essence of passivity, where spasmodic speed causes inertia. This is manifested twice: first embodied in the player who sits prone in front of the screen, then supplemented by the suspended animation of the stationary image, so that car speed and audiovisual speed

are rendered compatible. The twin poles of inertia evident here are experienced by the gamer and driver. Both are subject to the sensation of projection and distancing across time and space, but the videogame is doubly digital as it is a hyper-realization of an already digital experience,

> Dromovision, (automobile media) simulates the fleeting well before television (audiovisual media) simulates proximity . . . up to the moment hardly imaginable where instantaneity and ubiquity will abolish space along with the interval, making the dromovisual apparatus the perfect equivalent of the audiovisual in a single stroke!
>
> (Virilio 2008: 51)

The effect of the inert image on the perception of space and time by the gamer/driver betrays the ultimate aspiration of the automobile to mimic the image, or even to be superseded by it, as the 'image is the only high performance vehicle, the real time image which is supplanting the space where the car still moves from one place to another' (Virilio, 2000a: 14). This deftly explains why the driving genre has extensive videogame lineage and longevity as it is the digital's fundamental aim, from its genealogy in the vehicle of speed, to intensify everything into a vanishing point. The suspended animation of Pole Position II is a digital prototype, with (in)action reduced to the click of a micro-switch rendering the user distant and inert, the gamer/driver becoming an alias to the objects passing by so fast we can no longer see them move.

Vanishing Point: TX-1 and OutRun

The example of Pole Position II is not unusual among arcade games of the early 1980s but as it is the illusion of speed, rather than inertia, which is the desirous experience of the gamer/driver, ever-increasing clock-speeds of CPUs subsequently allowed hardware to portray speed with greater sophistication in sprite-based games. Namco's TX-1 (1983) was one of the first games to properly achieve this by delineating landscape features through the use of bright, bold colors to effectively contrast between the sky and the land. These graphics are complemented by the representation of the road employing the then widespread artistic technique of placing alternate horizontal black/light grey lines on the track to help generate the illusion of speed. Nevertheless, TX-1's key innovation was the inclusion of three monitors in a deluxe cabinet. These act as peripherals in two ways: first in that they produce a peripheral vision for the gamer/driver while they concentrate on the disappearing horizon of the main monitor. Second, they allow the gamer/driver to view more of the course than in games such as Pole Position II as it is possible to see 'around' corners by glancing directly into one of the horizontally orientated monitors to the right or left of the main screen. This technique mimics the windscreen and side windows of a conventional automobile, 'with the rear window, with its windowed doors and its front windscreen, the automobile forms a quadtriptych where the travel lover is the target of a permanent assault that recalls the perspective of the painting' (Virilio 2008: 106). As outlined above, at this juncture of the development of the driving game, perspective through artistic manipulation is vital to the perception of speed, and the quadtriptych of the three screens allows for the simulation of the passenger compartment. This is a crucial step forward for the videogame as substitute for the automobile, as in the driver's seat the immediate proximity matters little, the only important thing is what happens at a distance, so as the speed of the vehicle, processor and image multiplies, so distancing in space increases 'the greater the speed, the more distant the horizon' (Virilio 2008: 106). TX-1 contrived to distance the horizon by offering the gamer/driver a choice at each checkpoint which, combined with the epigram 'Time Extend!' shows how the future projection of the trajectory encourages acceleration through space. The inclusion of multiple screens which distance the horizon in TX-1 via the use of artistic techniques, peripherals and peripheral vision, is significant in that it realizes the desire for horizontal escape, enshrined in the history of Quattrocento perspectives where the high and low (i.e. the vertical or exo-centric space) are sequestered in favor of the vanishing point.

The introduction of Sega's OutRun (1986) to arcades was a seminal cultural event in the history of videogames. OutRun redefined the driving genre by replacing the sterile racetracks of Monaco GP and TX-1 with dazzling landscapes from the surf-lapped highways of California, the big skies of Arizona to the sun-dappled byways of Martha's Vineyard. In actuality, although OutRun is rightly remembered as the pinnacle of sprite based racing games, it is best described as a game which coherently integrated all of the best features of preceding titles into one videogame. The bright red deluxe cabinet with brake, accelerator and two-speed gearbox is modelled on the iconic

Ferrari Testarossa and, as was Sega's wont at the time, used hydraulics to simulate the movement of the vehicle. Sega's emulation of fairground rides - a first in videogames - where the individual is prostrate while propelled across two axes meant that crowds would gather to watch as players traversed American blacktop. Opulent in its presentation, OutRun is nostalgically commemorated as allowing the gamer/driver to choose from three distinctive music tracks, displayed on a radio set into a plush dashboard, the art of the motor flaunting the technique and the technology to the to the throngs of watching voyeurs-voyages. In addition to the sophistry of the dashboard, OutRun's core gameplay dynamic is the use of a 'goal' system which, akin to TX-1, requires the player to make a series of choices to reach the end of the game. In order to make these choices and reach the goal, the gamer/driver must arrive at each checkpoint before the countdown reaches zero, in order to trigger 'time extension'. Indeed, the very title of the game, 'OutRun' betrays the basest desire of gaming – and driving – what is it that the gamer/driver is trying to outrun?

> With the speed of the continuum it is the goal of the voyage that destroys the road, it is the target of the projectile-projector (of the automobile) that seems to trigger the ruin of the interval, it is the fleeting desire to go right to the end as fast as possible that produces in the opening out of the travelling, the tearing apart of the landscape.
>
> (Virilio 2008: 105)

The concentration of the gamer/driver on the countdown, so that zero-hour is never encountered shows how space is shredded by time, evidenced in the measuring of a trip by train or airliner by duration rather than distance. When the goal supplants the journey and the ends elides the means, 'the world becomes a video game, a game of transparency and transpiercing' (Virilio 2008: 103). OutRun's dedicated and eponymous hardware meant that it could incorporate radical artistic innovations to simulate the transpiercing of the landscape. This was achieved by making the perspective of the game inert in relation to the car, so when the car moved through the landscape the perspective remained fixed, as if a camera was affixed to the rear of the vehicle. This intensifies the inertia of the gamer/driver, so that while the camera remains stationary behind the Ferrari, the vanishing point also remains constant and infinite. The outrun across broad savannahs and narrow canyons, so magnificently realised in OutRun, becomes an outrun to the strategy of the beyond, a cyclopean focus on an instant, intangible vanishing point, a space that distances while projecting.

Concentration and Control of Speed: Operation Wolf

OutRun heralded an extended period of innovation in arcade manufacturing, with powerful hardware and bespoke cabinets becoming the norm. Taito's Operation Wolf (1987) invited the gamer to assume the role of a Special Forces operative on a plausibly deniable mission in an unnamed south East Asian country. While shooters were especially popular in the 1980s, they generally presented an abstract side-on, perspective, with the sidereal R-Type (1987) the paragon of the shmup genre. Operation Wolf, however, situates the player in a first person perspective, not dissimilar to that found in the classic Duck Hunt (1984). However, instead of being static, the screen scrolls horizontally, locating the warrior on an armored vehicle, or on the last level, a turbo-prop airplane. This illusion is reinforced through the utilization of peripherals in the game, with the horizontal/linear formation of the gamer/warrior 'being the means of maximal exploitation of firepower' (Virilio 2008: 58). To maximize the exploitation of firepower, the cabinet is equipped with a scale-model Uzi machine-pistol which utilizes haptic force feedback to replicate the firing of a gun. In addition the screen displays a dashboard, which tots up the logistical status of the battlefield by showing the amount of magazines, grenades and health remaining; hostages saved and, most pertinently, the amount of enemies killed/alive. This information is presented to the player, without their needing to identify the enemy's position in battle, so 'the art of the control panel, therefore appears on the one hand like a substitute for the hunt and its scenes' (Virilio 2008: 102) but, unlike Battlezone, as the gamer has no control over the movement of the vehicle, it is inertia which is substituted for mobility. This provides the vector for technological development. As with the UAV pilot or aeronaut the greater the speed the less the mobility: 'it is movement that governs the event (of war) and it is movement which produces the weaponry' (Virilio 2008: 112).

Operation Wolf, like Battlezone before with its present/absent logistical tallying uses the battlefield image so that it becomes impossible to imagine war without images. If, as discussed above, information is pure speed, then

speed becomes war in its purest state, that is, pure war. The movement towards this zenith of speed, is a movement to a perpetual state of emergency of a war which is everywhere, but where the front is absent. In Operation Wolf when the damage to the gamer/warrior reaches a critical level, gauges flash and an alarm sounds, alerting the gamer/warrior to the arena of danger but distancing any physical damage to the body of the gamer/warrior, projecting a psychological, ego-centric terror onto the individual; such is the manifestation of pure war a 'vectorial image of a combat without battle, but not without fear, that gives rise to an extermination that extends throughout the world' (Virilio 2008: 56). Operation Wolf adroitly realizes this. The final two levels are called 'Concentration Camp' and 'Airport' respectively, where the aim is to liberate hostages and then airlift them to safety. The pairing of two of the 20th century's most awesome technologies does not appear to be accidental and acts as a template for the world we now inhabit. It is not only the etymology which betrays the similarities, but the experience of those there which renders any differences between aviation and extermination nugatory. The tyranny of pure speed, is an intensification, a concentration: the arrival at the concentration camps of Oświęcim is, for train-passengers, quite literally, the terminal. Concurrently, the airport terminal concentrates speed of aviation and of processes. Airports, through the will-to-control of regulation, of prohibition, 'have the tragic character of the extermination camps' (Virilio 2008: 97) embodied in the use of pseudo-paramilitary uniformed personnel who are so ubiquitous that they pass into invisibility. Power is exercised with maximal immutability and minimal dissension and the more that mobility increases and is extended to greater and greater spaces, the more the demand for control intensifies. Pure speed is pure war is pure control: the endo-colonization of individuals, groups, races, entire societies renders every one of us a passenger, accelerating but inert, the speed of technocratic society an extended network of collapsed space and intensified time, generating users of inertia, exercised only through social control.

Endgame

There is little wonder then that the increasing popularity of the videogame, linked to its dizzying clock speeds and verdant graphics has caught up, surpassed and now informs the state of emergency. Pure wars are inaugurated and performed every day and night between millions of people as the first person shooter series Call of Duty is played on Xbox Live and PlayStation Network. With proliferating digital spaces, there are also additional spaces for pure war to take place: gamers themselves are subjects of targeted advertising and national security surveillance as their online play and communication is monitored by security agencies from the US and UK. The monitoring of these communities is justified by GCHQ and NSA (in an ironic, if unintended deference to Virilio) through their protest that the enemy is everywhere, but cannot be seen. Being camouflaged and out-of-sight, much like a tank commander or a paramilitary illuminates the totality of pure war in videogames: agencies of the state are so afraid of their own tactics being used against them that the image of Operation Wolf moves from representation to reality. Gamers, G-men, and politicians and soldiers, informed by reams of metrics on Xbox dashboards become gamer/warriors projected into digital space. Orbiting the battlefield, surrounded by a bubble of communication, distanced from lived space, separated from physical interaction, all are implicit in generating a 'concentration camp of speed [where] segregation and incarceration stem far more from the violence of displacement than from various police controls' (Virilio 2008: 57). This experience of the dromology of the space and time of the videogame can be acutely recalled in what is arguably the apogee of the series, Call of Duty 4's subtitle: Modern Warfare.

Endnotes

1. It is interesting to note that Mirage is the name given to the French Air Force's multirole fighter, itself deployed in a range of desert conflicts since its introduction in 1984.

Games

Battlezone(1980). Atari, Arcade

- Call of Duty 4(2007) Infinity Ward, Microsoft Xbox 360
- Combat (1977) Atari, Atari VCS, 1977
- Duck Hunt (1984) Nintendo, Nintendo Entertainment System
- Gran Trak 10 (1974) Atari, Arcade,
- Gran Turismo (1997) Polyphony Digital, Sony PlayStation
- Monaco GP (1980) Sega/Gremlin Industries, Arcade
- Motor Mania (1982) John A. Fitzpatrick, Commodore 64
- Operation Wolf (1987) Taito, Arcade, 1987
- Outrun (1986) AM-2/Sega Arcade, 1986
- Parallax (1982) Sensible Software, Commodore 64
- Pole Position II (1983) Atari/Namco, Arcade
- R-Type (1987) Irem, Arcade
- Sprint 2(1976) Kee Games, Arcade
- TX-1 (1983) Tatsumi (Manufactured under license from Namco by Atari Inc),

Arcade

- WipEout HD (2008) Sony, PlayStation 3
- Zaxxon(1982) Sega, Arcade

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Needless Necessity: Sameness and Dynamic in Capitalist Society

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In capitalist modernity, all that is fluid is frozen fast, and vice versa. Everything is at the same time solid and not. We need to do something. One must always produce.[1] But then, one must always produce the same. Production is always reproduction, no more, no less, albeit on an extended scale. Capitalist society is a treadmill:[2] "Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that," as the Red Queen asserted.[3] Society (re-)produces itself, using humans as its principal agents, as ever new and ever the same. Humans (re-)produce society as ever the same by making a fresh start every morning when the alarm bell tolls: a new morning promises gold – the matter of eternity – every single day anew. My consciousness is split on this matter: it tells me, on the one hand, that I have places to go (hooray!), I have some inner growing to do, but at the same time, I am proudly identical to myself (disregarding some metabolism-related corporeal change that one tries to keep separate from one's sense of selfhood). I who took out the student loan yesterday will have to pay up tomorrow, although the intervening time – not least 'the student experience', as they say – will have made me a whole new person (with places to go, hooray!). Growing up, experience – going-beyond-and-through: ex-per-ire – or not, contracts are to be fulfilled. This is a rule society will enforce.

This article explores the dialectic of a twofold compulsion characteristic of modern bourgeois society: on the one hand the dynamism grounded in the compulsion to expand production, to never stand still, relax and enjoy, always to increase the labors of self-preservation, on the other hand the static, sameness and identity that are produced by the 'real-abstracting' processes equally central to the capitalist mode of production, the locking down of humans in their identities, including those of sex and race. The article examines these matters through the prism of Adorno's late essay on the concepts of 'static and dynamic' that is taken as a vantage point for a reading of 'The concept of enlightenment' in Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment. The last part of the essay argues that capitalist society's needless necessities impose themselves on society through abstracting practices in everyday life but also produce an equally contradictory set of social movements that have now opened up a fragile prospect for the revolutionary overcoming of capitalist society. The key point of the argument is that Horkheimer and Adorno's unique emphasis on the critique of 'the economic' beyond that of 'the economy' is crucial to this radical perspective.

Ever Expanding Domination is the Identity of Society

Individuals grow up (or old, rather) but remain the same. An aristocratic class reinvents itself as capitalist in order to remain the same old class of exploiters: modernization. More advanced society means more of the same, but more the same, closure once more, but closer even. Some seek to change the world – put it back on track – in order to preserve it. Capitalism expands to stay the same. It is manically dynamic like no other societal formation has ever been while it is still as dull and repetitive as any that came before. However, capitalist history differs from what preceded it only by degree: society, since its inception, has always tended to expand domination. It has remained identical throughout in at least this one respect: expanding domination of inner and outer nature is what society essentially is. This is society's identity. Contrary to previous more optimistic assumptions, emancipation is not the goal of history but rather an unintended effect of its dynamic that is fiercely struggled for by forces that try to

slow down, perhaps bring to a halt, the train named telos by bending, mending and complicating the tracks, often exploiting the ironies of history.

Capitalist society has many enemies, and not all of them are good company.[4] Critical theory determines the trajectory of its critique by placing capitalist history into a larger, grander narrative. It says – as Horkheimer did not write – that 'he who is silent on the history of human subjectivity should not talk about capitalism, either' (let alone fascism). This is the premise from which Dialectic of Enlightenment was written. It steps back from a direct critique of capitalist modernity and adopts instead an anthropological perspective that does two important things: one, it rubbishes any attempt to search pre-capitalist history – those golden days when human thinking was still nicely suffused by myth – for the paradise lost that for example the turn-of-the-century 'cultural critics' of capitalist modernity had suggested we should want to return to. Two, it implies that determinate negation of the most negative form of appearance (fascism) of the most negative period (capitalist modernity) of a rather negative overall history (civilization) could just open up a small window on the beginning of actual human history: communism.

From the Critique of the Economy to the Critique of the Economic

To do this, Horkheimer and Adorno dissolved (conceptually) one of the premises of modern thinking about society, namely the notion that there is this thing called 'the economy' (a sphere separate from and somehow opposed to society, or the social, and the state, or the political), and instead focus on the elementary forms of 'the economic' as they are constituted in the history of human civilization, the capitalist present included. Whereas 'the economy' as a sphere is a rather recent phenomenon (and is likely to disappear, together with capitalism, in the not too distant future), 'the economic' has a much longer history (and threatens to survive the demise of 'the economy').[5] This somewhat indirect critique of capitalism largely bypasses what capitalism has to say about itself in the forms of political economy and economic science. It leads to the surprising result that 'the economic' is exactly what bourgeois apologists, slicing up human society into spheres each with its own logic respectively, say it is not: domination, conventionally assumed to be at home in the political sphere. In Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis, key aspects of domination, gradually emerging throughout human history but getting into their stride in capitalism only, are the rage of production (do!) and the ordering calm of abstraction (be!). They are critiqued from the standpoint of those who long to be calmly, peacefully drifting on water,[6] a.k.a. the standpoint of the proletariat (sellers of labor power who struggle not to be such). Those who in their struggles negate what they are – be they everyday, mundane, struggles that are often invisible to themselves, or else visible, self-declared struggles – are the principle inspiration for dialectical social theory and the figure of the 'non-identical' in particular.

Critical Theory's Method is to Distil Dialectical Concepts Out of Bourgeois Confusions

The dialectics of modern society are not an arcane secret known only to trained specialists. They are obvious. Every active member of this society can name and describe them if and when forced by circumstances. Dialectical social theory ('Critical Theory'), though, was formulated in circumstances adverse to widespread revolutionary apprehension of societal dynamics – namely in situations following massive historical defeats of emancipatory movements – by some rather bourgeois individuals with a desire to be traitors to their respective classes: sons of industrialists (Engels, Horkheimer) or children from 'educated' and 'lower middle class' families (Marx, Adorno). They developed a theoretical language that is precise, elegant, flexible – hugging rather than imprisoning its referents – but hard hitting, and they did so chiefly by working through the (typically less precise, elegant, flexible, hard-hitting) materials produced by some of their (former) classmates who aimed not to betray but to improve and defend bourgeois society: the classic authors of political economy, sociology, psychology – the disciplines of the self-clarification of modern bourgeois society. The critical theorists worked through the latter's writings in a manner often reminiscent of the interpretation of dreams: they sifted out the elements of truth that are contained in them in displaced, hazy, embarrassed, tentative forms.

Adorno's Critique of Comte's False Synthesis of the Concepts Static and Dynamic

A striking example of this method is Adorno's short meditation on one of the key organizing conceptual dichotomies in the writings of Auguste Comte, who thought that any society is composed of static elements and dynamic elements, which he discussed separately and then sought to bring together in a theoretical synthesis.[7]

Adorno suggests that this procedure is subject to the same criticism that Marx had directed at Proudhon in The Poverty of Philosophy: 'the false Comtean synthesis … externally combines what is in fact internally connected merely by its antagonisms.'[8] The static and the dynamic are abstractions from phenomena that are in reality neither or rather, both at the same time. The dialectic of static and dynamic, of sameness and the irresistible pushing forward of change, is key to understanding and, perchance, replacing capitalist modernity with a better one.

Social Statics are Static Only because Abstraction Murdered Them

Adorno borrows in this essay Marx's famous (Hegel-inspired but anti-Hegel) formulation that 'only abstraction from movement is static – mors immortalis' ('[only] death never dies'): what the philosophers consider to be static is only so because they arrested it, in their minds, by abstracting from, i.e. murdering, movement. Only death never dies: the only thing we can say with certainty to be true eternally is that things change (and in changing, kill off whatever they were the moment before).[9]

With Marx, Adorno proceeds from here, though, to go beyond Marx's critique of Proudhon's philosophical abstractions and points to the truth-content of those abstractions: also abstraction (namely, as Sohn-Rethel would say, 'intellectual abstraction') 'denotes societal reality,' namely the reality of – again, in Sohn-Rethel's term – 'real-abstraction.'[10] Adorno argues that only one static element has a place in Marx's theory, expressed (between the lines) as 'a negative ontology of antagonistically progressing society': the fact that society still remains 'under the spell of nature' and 'rooted in nature'. Society remains eternally dead as long as it is mere 'prehistory,' not yet human history. It will come to life and defeat mors immortalis when it enters history proper.

The thing that keeps it 'under the spell of nature' and prevents history (i.e. the history of human subjectivity) from beginning is – to use a phrase popular with philosophers – its over-determination by the economic:

> Its dynamic, the energetic dissonance, antagonism, is its static, the one thing that has not changed ever yet, and that has destroyed any social relation of production yet. Statically invariant has always been the compulsion to expand (...) . Thus, fate has reproduced itself on an extended scale. In order to avoid destruction, every form of society unconsciously works towards its destruction and with it also that of the whole [humanity] that lives on in the form of any society. That was its eternity.[11] Progress that put an end to prehistory would be the end of such a dynamic...[12]

Human history proper, it is implied, would be dynamic but not in a compulsory sense; real human history will spell death for mors immortalis. 'Right society' would overcome both static and dynamic. It would need neither the fetters of any essential beings nor 'blind movement.' Adorno argues that Marx's use of the phrase 'natural laws' when describing historically specific capitalist society points to his notion of their, as it were, naturelikeness, in the specific sense that they belong to human prehistory where humans are not yet in control of society and of themselves. In the same manner he suggests to read the term 'wage slavery' as more than just a metaphor: wage labor is but a rationalized form of appearance of the same old savagery that is slavery.[13]Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

What is Static, Is Probably Already Dead; What is Dynamic, is Not Necessarily Progressing

Adorno's essay cunningly translates a given conceptual dichotomy (formulated by 'traditional theory') into a dialectical constellation of concepts that illuminates an actual societal-historical dialectic. Comte links the static and the dynamic with order and progress respectively;[14] Adorno throws this neat little system (something Comte himself should have recognized as old-fashioned enlightenment 'metaphysics,' or else, in the jargon of postmodernism, an outdated 'grand narrative') up in the air with relish. The equation of the static and essential sameness with order relies on the assumption that what does not change serves the self-preservation of what exists. Historical evidence shows the opposite, though: societies that become static tend to self-destruct – this is true of all classical empires, but arguably even more so of capitalist society.[15] Likewise, crisis in capitalism should surely come under 'dynamics' but can be filed under 'progress' only in a negative, Hegelian-ironic, dialectical way (i.e. in Marx's sense: capitalism produces its own gravediggers, and in this specific, namely 'ironic' or negatively dialectical sense capitalist progress is human progress). Comte's idea of progress, though, can surely not rely on the actual dynamics of capitalist society (and he knew that, of course – hence his argument for society's need for steering by sociology, the religion of humanity and so on). 'Human nature,' by definition (as 'nature') understood to be static and essential and usually defined in terms of 'natural needs,' is in fact dynamic as human needs are defined societally as much as naturally: human needs are never independent of the ongoing mediation of humans with nature – which is what 'society' is – while the actual shape of society – presently, in human prehistory, yet – is not determined by human needs.[16] Most importantly, perhaps, is traditional social theory's lack of a perspective of transcendence: 'It occurs neither to

Hegel nor to Comte that antagonistic society, on the strength of its own dynamics, could be transmuted into a higher form, a form more worthy of human beings.'[17] Heteronomous order, characterized by domination, denial and renunciation, has been the invariant nature of all forms of society up to now, and this static, persistent characteristic fuels its dynamism: class struggle.[18] Society's static is 'what drives it onwards.' But it could be otherwise.

Static Reality Produces Static, Ahistorical Reasoning and Kills Time

At the same time 'reason in its reified form' – the essence of the rationalization underpinning the historical dynamism of human history, hugely intensified in the processes of modernization – is also something static. The 'ahistorical consciousness' that is typical of most contemporaries in developed capitalist societies points to a correspondingly ahistorical, 'static state of reality' that is linked, though, to 'the progressivity and the dynamism of the bourgeois principle' itself, 'universal exchange.'[19] Exchange is timeless, 'just as ratio in mathematical operations in its pure form excretes time.'[20] The two objects that are being exchanged as equivalents are assumed to remain unaffected by time for the duration of the actual exchange process. Adorno adds that time disappears also elsewhere: it is compressed as much as possible in industrial production, and society also does away with memory so as better to adapt to whatever happens to be the cutting edge.[21] Without memory of what came before, though, there can be no consciousness of change: time and history disappear in an endless succession of present moments whose dynamism remains the more invisible the more this dynamism accelerates.

Drastic Reduction of Labor Would Nicely Calm Down the Storming Forward of History

The dynamic of contemporary human (pre-) history is that of identity: it has remained limited to the one-dimensional dynamic of increased domination of internal and external nature, destroying and sabotaging all other potential aspects of dynamic.[22] Change, emancipation even, is possible, though, more than ever before, as Adorno is adamant to emphasize:

> Rather than primarily at 'productivity', the rationalization of labor processes could aim at reforming labor itself in a manner worthy of humans, fulfilling and differentiating genuine needs, salvaging nature and its qualitative diversity notwithstanding its being worked upon for human purposes.[23]

The human species has failed so far to become the 'subject of history' as it continues to fall back into nature by dominating it, but 'the immanent unfolding of the productive forces, making human labor superfluous up to a liminal point, contains the potential for change:'[24] the reduction of the quantity of societally necessary labor means that progress does not have to be one-dimensional anymore.

However, this perspective constitutes a threat to the relations of production and thus causes 'the system as a whole mercilessly to lock itself into its monomaniac tendency. Full employment becomes the ideal where labor could cease being the measure of all things.'[25] A static state of things that is based on the continued existence of poverty and scarcity inherently limits its own dynamic transformation to one that serves the progress of domination by the (reformed, reconstituted, dynamicised) societal static itself: Adorno illustrates this assertion with the observation that for example in 'backward' countries, i.e. those perceived as static by the more dynamic ones, the 'seemingly conservative' carriers of the static 'amalgamated themselves with the profitable principle of industrial progress' (one may think of Bismarck Germany as the blueprint for this process).[26] A different kind of static 'could be imagined', though: 'Satiated urge that lets things be the way they are.' But making the transition to the healing, laid-back, thoughtful calm of properly human history is no trivial matter: 'History will not calm down as long as it is constituted antagonistically.'[27]

Horkheimer and Adorno on Self-preservation, Economy and Emancipation

An alternative to 'the false Comtean synthesis' that Adorno dissected in his essay on 'the static and the dynamic' is provided in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 'The concept of enlightenment,' the book's first main section, treats societal divisions such as 'the economic' as real but not real at the same time while providing a dialectical account of the relationship between 'the economic,' truth and emancipation. Reading the as it were, 'deeper,' anthropological account given in Dialectic of Enlightenment can help unlocking the argument of Adorno's late essay that presupposes the former. In one of its key passages, Horkheimer and Adorno single out as central to Enlightenment philosophy,

and indeed as 'the true maxim of all Western civilization,' Spinoza's formulation in Ethica, 'conatus sese conservandi primum et unicum virtutis est fundamentum:' 'the endeavor of preserving oneself is the first and only basis of virtue.'[28] This virtue commands: one must preserve oneself, which translates as, there must be economy. It is no recipe for happiness. 'In the judgement of Enlightenment as of Protestantism, those who abandon themselves directly to life, without any rational reference to self-preservation, regress to the prehistoric.' Instinct itself is denounced as 'mythical' as are superstition, thoughtlessness and lust. There is no virtue in any of these.

The Self Mediates Societal Labor, but The Economic Apparatus Shapes the Self

The emphasis on the concept of self-preservation points to the economic core of enlightenment and civilization:

> In the bourgeois economy, every individual's societal labor is mediated by the principle of the self; individualized societal labor yields increments on capital to the ones, the strength for surplus labor to the others. But the more strongly the process of self-preservation is based on the bourgeois division of labor, the more it forces the individuals to alienate their selves, as they have to mold themselves body and soul on the technical apparatus.[29]

This overall civilizational process is continued and intensified rather than interrupted in the period we refer to as 'the Enlightenment':

> Enlightened thinking takes account of this, too: finally, the transcendental subject of cognition, as the last reminder of subjectivity, is itself seemingly abolished and replaced by the operations of the self-acting mechanisms of order, which, therefore, run all the more smoothly.[30]

Once enlightenment, virtue and rationality are grounded in self-preservation, the stripping down of the increasingly abstract notion of the self continues to its dismal extreme point in (logical) positivism that abolished even 'the transcendental subject of cognition.' Cognition is now considered a matter of logical processes that are not dependent on subjectivity. Logical positivism has eliminated with thought 'the last intervening agency between individual action and social norm.' After subjectivity has eliminated itself from its own consciousness, it has become 'sachlich' – objective, thingly, value-free – while reason has become 'a universal tool for the fabrication of all other tools.' It is 'single-mindedly trained on a purpose, automatic and outer-directed like the precisely calculated operations of material production', like manual work, subject to a fate it would not dare to challenge.[31] In characteristic fashion, the analogy between reasoning and manual production processes is grounded in the metonymic claim of essential sameness of enlightenment and civilization with 'self-preservation,' i.e. the economic principle.

Logical Positivism is Caveman Philosophy

From the critique of reason's reduction to a tool for tool making, Horkheimer and Adorno move to a critique of the centrality of formal logic in the context of contemporary logical positivism. They see its hegemony as an outcome of reason's self-limitation to a mere instrument that stems 'in the last instance from the compulsory character of self-preservation.' The latter 'ever again comes down to the choice between survival and death which still reverberates in the principle that from two contradicting propositions only one can be true and only one false.' The most modern philosophical fashion reflects thus a mental reaction that used to be adequate for prehistoric humans who needed to decide in a split second whether to run away or to throw the spear, without ambiguity or the luxury of pondering on shades of grey: in prehistory there was no time for dialectics. This begs the question, of course, why would such caveman philosophy geared toward excluding the middle still seem relevant to many in the twentieth century (and now the twenty-first)? Horkheimer and Adorno answer that this is the work of 'a society in which the maintenance of forms and the preservation of individuals only accidentally coincide. The expulsion of thought from logic ratifies in the lecture hall the reification of human beings in factory and office.'[32]

The fact that society subordinates the preservation of individuals to the preservation of social forms causes logical positivism's concern with form. Excessively formal thinking follows from the preponderance of social forms over social individuals and their concrete needs. Once spirit (as enlightenment) has finally reduced itself to the formal poverty of (logical) positivism, imposing binary caveman thinking: yes/no; kill/run, it goes into reverse and destroys the unfolding of spirit, i.e. itself. The single-minded, ultimately self-destructive, pursuit of self-preservation pure and simple culminates in capitalist crisis and modern warfare. Reason has outlived its usefulness for and is retired by the bourgeoisie. When in developed industrial society 'self-preservation has finally been automated, reason is dismissed by those who, as controllers of production, have taken over its inheritance and fear it in the disinherited:[33] the triumph of increasingly rationalized self-preservation – the economic – leads its ruling class to turn against reason

because they fear that reason has now jumped ship and gone over to the exploited.

Socialism Surrendered to Reactionary Common Sense When it Separated Spirit from Matter

Any contemporary attempt to unlock the radical implications of Critical Theory for the benefit of current and future emancipatory transformation of society must take account of the fact that its most sacred text – Dialectic of Enlightenment – is pivoted on a critique of the labor movement: Horkheimer and Adorno begin the final paragraph of 'The concept of enlightenment' with a critique of the latter's insufficient radicalism: 'socialism, in a concession to reactionary common sense, prematurely confirmed as eternal that necessity', namely the necessity of the societal domination that results from the struggle for self-preservation against overwhelming, hostile nature. The domination of nature, though, reflects and extends nature itself whose essence is nothing other than necessity and the struggle for self-preservation, thereby trapping humanity in prehistory: the progress towards history proper, that of humane society reconciled with nature, is arrested.

This domination that socialists falsely believed to be eternal is nothing other than that of 'the economy.' When humanity fights and dominates nature it is nature; when humanity reconciles nature on the basis of acknowledging its own being part of it, it transcends nature. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that socialism 'elevated necessity to being the basis [of society] for all time to come and degraded spirit – in keeping with time-honored idealist tradition – to the pinnacle [of the superstructure], clasping therewith as in a stupor the heritage of bourgeois philosophy.'[34] In other words, the traditionally-Marxist notion[35] that the economy was the 'basis' and that anything to do with thinking was housed upstairs in the 'superstructure' is a continuation of bourgeois thought that 'degrades' spirit by seemingly elevating it out of the realm where it would make a difference, the relationship with nature. We need to drag 'spirit' back down onto the shopfloor not least because embattled, alienated, unreconciled nature keeps striking back at us. In the traditional, in fact bourgeois, socialist perspective, 'the relation of necessity to the realm of freedom remained merely quantitative and mechanical', as socialism was then merely a matter of extending the latter at the expense of the former, whereby nature would continue to be 'posited as entirely alien' as it had been in mythology properly speaking; nature that remained alien and unreconciled, however, was bound to stage a backlash and 'become totalitarian and absorb freedom, socialism included'.[36]

Theory That is as Supple as Intransigent Can Wake Up Society and Inform Emancipatory Praxis: It Only Needs All

The situation is not entirely without hope, though: 'true praxis capable of overturning the state of things depends on theory's intransigence against the comatose state in which society allows thought to ossify.' It seems that those scattered bits and pieces of thought that escaped reification – such as critical theory, perhaps, or some thoughtful forms of artistic practice – can, by being intransigent, inform 'true praxis' that will shake society out of its coma. Here Horkheimer and Adorno add an attack on the conservative 'critique of civilization' and its reflection in professional sociology: 'Fulfilment is not jeopardized by the material preconditions of fulfilment, unfettered technology as such – this is what those sociologists claim who look now for an antidote, even a collectivist one, to master the antidote.' Technology in itself is not to blame but 'the fault lies with a social context that induces delusional blindness …, a fortress before which even the revolutionary imagination despises itself as utopianism and degenerates to the compliant trust in the objective tendency of history.' Horkheimer and Adorno encourage here 'the revolutionary imagination' not to capitulate before positivism; positivism, after all, fails to notice the positive fact that humans are the creators of (social) facts.

The text ends on a rather optimistic note: 'In multiplying Gewalt' – the word seems to be used here with the full range of its different meanings: violence, power, force, domination – 'through the mediation of the market, the bourgeois economy has multiplied also its things and forces (Kräfte) to such an extent that their administration no longer requires kings, nor even the bourgeois themselves: it only needs all.' The bourgeois overlords have developed 'things and forces' to such an extent that 'things and forces' transcend their own instrumentality and increasingly look down on their masters. Humans follow their example and 'learn from the power (Macht) of things finally to forgo domination (Macht).[37] 'It only needs all' is probably the understatement of the century, but also one of the most optimistic statements in Dialectic of Enlightenment, which on close reading (and considering the historical context) is a surprisingly cheerful book. Francis Bacon's utopia that 'we should command nature in action' has not only become reality by now but has also revealed itself as the dream (read: nightmare) of perfecting human domination in society. In the process, human knowledge has increased so much, though, that it can begin, finally, to dissolve

domination for good.[38] No 'Grand Hotel Abgrund' here, at all: instead, a fairly orthodox affirmation of Marxian optimism against the self-induced irrelevance of Marxism.

Reading 'The concept of enlightenment' through 'Static and dynamic' (or the other way round) reveals the radical – but well-obscured – core of Critical Theory: not only (!) the capitalist mode of production needs to be attacked but the concept of labor itself, and not only that: the latter's quasi-anthropological root, the monomaniac compulsion to self-preservation that fails to see that in its excessive success it becomes its own enemy, must be destroyed. At the same time, defeating capitalism will not be possible if the struggle is limited to capitalism's own domain: only through its expansion to the civilizational dimension does this struggle have a chance. The perspective that targets the civilization of compulsory, self-destructive self-preservation, though, includes from the beginning all the things that Marxist theorists for the last half-century have struggled so much to 'bring back in' to their reduced Marxist conceptions: sex/gender, the state, race/nation, and the entire much-quoted 'etcetera.' Thanks to capitalism (and especially its future ending) humanity is now faced with the opportunity to leap out of the state of nature – where self-preservation counts as the basis of virtue – into human history properly speaking. The civilization whose high point is capitalism has created the rational, transcendental subject of cognition, but then rapidly proceeded to destroy it, and critical theory that owes itself to the latter should certainly not applaud this destruction: reason, critique, subjectivity and enlightenment must be defended as they are needed to overcome and reinvent the civilization that created but then stifled them.

Identity and the Capitalist Dynamic through which Identity Forces Itself Upon Humans are Now Needless Necessities and Must Go

'Malum est in necessitate vivere; sed in necessitate vivere, necessitas nulla est … Epicurus dixit:' 'Living in necessity is bad, but not a necessity … said Epicurus.' Marx quoted this assertion by Seneca, paraphrasing Epicurus, in his doctoral dissertation.[39] We can say, by analogy: it is bad that there is economy but it is not itself an economic necessity. This could count as one of the principal propositions of critical theory. 'Living in necessity' – life in the key of self-preservation, of the economic, of restless dynamic and arrested identity – forces us to mold ourselves, body and soul, to the Procrustean bed – the mythological name for what in the industrial process is called a 'stereotype' – of the economy, giving up our 'selves' (to the point of having to ask whether there is such a thing at all) in order to 'preserve ourselves.'[40] A big question follows from here: how does unnecessary necessity impose itself on, and emerge from, our lives, and how can we get rid of it?

Necessity, Economy and Identity Impose Themselves through the Terror of Incessantly Repeated Abstracting Practices in Everyday Life

Consider the following sad story: one day, in the blistering heat of an English summer, I found myself browsing bookshops (just killing time, really) while I was down to my last fifty pence. In this disagreeable situation, I was confronted with the decision between purchasing a beautifully preserved second-hand copy of Shakespeare's Timon of Athens, which famously contains the insightful appellation of money as

> ...Thou visible god,
>
> That sold'rest close impossibilities,[41]
>
> And mak'st them kiss; that speak'st with every tongue,
>
> To every purpose! O thou touch[42] of hearts...,[43]

...or a small bottle of water. In an abstracting practice, I was forced to equate book and water as equivalents of the same fifty pence coin. What would have been incomparable without such mediation, had to be compared and evaluated against each other. These 'impossibilities' were being 'sold' red close' and 'made kiss' because '(d)ealing with commodities on an everyday level … involves … a continuous act of abstraction'.[44] The handling of money as well as the concern with its absence is a pivotal aspect of everyday life in the modern world (whereas in other forms of society it was limited to specific contexts and events, say, paying the priests or any other protection racket).

[45] These processes of abstraction, generalization, and homogenisation include that 'activities and products that, in other societies, might not be classified as similar are classified in capitalism as similar,'[46] such as book and water.[47]

The way a society interacts with nature is not in every case constitutive of that society; 'labor in capitalism, however, does constitute that society.'[48] Economy and necessity are necessarily at 'the base' of capitalist society: the complex, dynamic, and polymorphous ensemble of social relations in society dominated by the capitalist mode of production is synthesized and integrated by the daily terror of abstract labor and the exchange of equivalent portions of value.[49] The concept of abstract labor is pivotal for a society mad enough to reduce wealth to value, i.e. to consider worth only that which represents reified human labor, based on the exchange of commodities, in particular, on the exchange of the commodity labor-power.

In the Caveman Logic of Bourgeois Society, the Meaning of Life is Simply its Reproduction

The ways in which the capitalist dynamic ever again produces sameness include race-making, sex-making and normal-making – racialization, sexing, and normalization – which are processes that naturalize and hypostatize differences. They construct notions of genuineness by breaking up scales of continuous differences that shade into each other into separated, dichotomized, discontinuous pairs of opposites. They are processes of reduction, abstraction, separation and homogenization. The fact that modern bourgeois society acknowledges 'sex' as a valid and relevant social category, structuring both social practice and thought, is a matter of 'gender' in the sense of social meaning that emerges from specific relations of societal practice. The salient question is how does it happen that certain particular bodily differences, chosen from an infinity of eligible differences, are regarded socially significant? Why does it go without saying that human beings fall into exactly two categories that are based on a particular perception of differences between the organs of sexual reproduction? This conception – 'dimorphism' – logically presupposes a worldview that considers biological reproduction central to the meaning of human and social life. One must produce more humans: this imperative must have been a central economic category of human prehistory; today it remains as another instance of bourgeois caveman thinking. Rather ironically – being another aspect of the dialectic of enlightenment – the explicit, conceptually developed version of this tautological caveman perspective – reproduction of life as the meaning of life – was formulated only in bourgeois modernity where sex becomes an essential category, i.e. one that affects the totality of the characteristics of any human being.[50] Sexual dimorphism in this particular sense seems uniquely modern, although it may have been implicit in some of the various and often more fluid conceptions of sex and gender typical of different forms of human society before its global capitalist transformation.[51]

Racism as the Self-defense of Bourgeois Civilization, Economy and Self-preservation

The society that produced the conditions under which humanity can afford finally to exit its prehistory also produced the practices, institutions and ideologies that so far have most firmly prevented it from following through this possibility. This is the tension that is most painful: humanity's unnecessary, self-imposed suffering, stuck in the ancient mud as in a treadmill, but in full view, just narrowly on the wrong side, of the Gates of Eden. The capitalist mode of production is not the 'origin' or the (historical or logical) 'cause' of the social relations sex and race, and indeed has produced some powerful means to their abolition, but it guarantees their continuing existence (in changing, modernized form) because it is at the same time the barrier to their abolition.

If the perfecting of the techniques of humanity's self-preservation – economy in the widest sense of the word – is what civilization is about, then racism is its preventive self-defense. Man the untiring producer, assimilating himself to his own projection of himself as the divine Creator, the earth-subjecting Subject who is divine all but in name, tries to purify humanity from all not so divine, namely unproductive elements incapable of creativity, autonomy and transcendental freedom: 'Exterminate all the brutes!'[52] As the case of antisemitism shows, racism can also take the complementary form of a struggle against groups who are perceived as being too productive, dynamic, modern, capitalist etc., and therewith are feared to endanger the ordered, smooth, pleasingly regular forward march of civilizational progress. Capitalism in its conservative mode wants continuous progress but without rocking the boat too much. Those perceived as over-zealous modernizers may end up in the same camp where nation, state, and capital builders have already sent those they regard as the backward, superstitious, unproductive races.

The rhetoric of creation and productivity (including that of healthy fresh humans) provides a foundation for – typically nationalist – projects of class compromise across the antagonisms that fragment what at the time of the French Revolution still was perceived as the Third Estate. It is built on the cultural memory of all the suffering that

humanity had to inflict on itself to get this far: now, nearly there, gazes firmly fixed on Paradise, the sails stiff in the winds of progress, one does not want the less civilized, less disciplined, less modern to spoil it all (and especially not such rash, over-keen, über-modern upstarts like 'the Jews' who left savagery behind too rapidly, too recently to make a genuine and responsible contribution to modernity). Those who pride themselves on being creators of the world constantly worry about the danger of falling back behind the achieved status. This danger is incorporated in the dangerous races, enemies within the human species.[53] At the helm of the creation, modern racists fight the dangerous races in order to save humanity and civilization. To the extent that they are aware of the contradiction this constitutes, the racists suffer from bad conscience and concoct sophisticated excuses in the humanities and social sciences; hence scientific racism. The animal rationale must find reasons why 'the animal to be devoured must be evil.'[54] The nation-state in its more liberal guise, however, also has to take into account that level-headed nationals wish to see themselves as being enrolled in a good, patriotic, not a bad, racist nation. This desire is met by multi-culturalist spectacles which the national community performs with well-tempered song and dance while the dangerous races – like the dangerous classes with which they often overlap – are advised not to over-stretch the worried nation's goodwill and tolerance.

Capitalists Call Themselves Producers but are Really just the Exploiters of Old

The socialist idea that labor is the source of all wealth (which echoes Emanuel Sieyes' bourgeois-revolutionary argument in What is the Third Estate? that only the producers are really constitutive of society) was rejected by Marx in his critique of the Gotha Platform, to which Adorno refers in Negative Dialectic where he states that 'labor is always labor on something' that is non-identical to the subject and its activity: labor adds to the wealth – it 'adds value', in the language of economics – but it does not create wealth on its own.[55] Some wealth, indeed, is just there to be enjoyed without the need for labor to be added (nice fresh air, say); the fact that such wealth is invisible and indeed worthless – not valuable – to the capitalist economy is one of its fundamental flaws.

Horkheimer and Adorno in 'Elements of antisemitism' hint at the bourgeois ideology that underlies the concept of production when they state that the bourgeois 'claimed themselves to be producers while actually remaining the appropriators of old.'[56] The capitalist

> called himself producer, but secretly he – like everyone – knew the truth. The notion of the capitalist as producer, whether his profit be legitimized as the reward for entrepreneurship like in liberalism or as the director's salary like today, was the ideology that obscured the essence of the labor contract and the exploitative character of the entire economic system.[57]

The manufacturer has a vital interest in deflecting his responsibility for exploitation, i.e. the exploitation of the workers as a class by the bourgeoisie as a class (who in spite of their modern form of appearance are at bottom nothing but the modernized exploiters of old). The manufacturer points for this purpose to functional differentiations within the bourgeoisie whose different sections have to compete for the magnitude of their respective share of the surplus value appropriated from the workers at the point of production. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the manufacturers have in the concept of 'productive labor' a powerful ideological instrument – 'productivity' being a core aspect of the ideology that had been used in bourgeois revolutions against backward, unproductive sections of the still feudal aristocracy – that allows them to claim that they receive no more than their just rewards for contributing to production. The extent to which the destructive fury inherent in the bourgeois notion of the subject as creator has shaped modern history, though, has more than fulfilled the prophecy by the 'young-Hegelian' Heinrich Heine that

> Kantians will appear ... who with sword and axe will mercilessly rummage around in the soil of our European culture ... Armed Fichteans will enter on the scene, who, in their fanaticism of will, can be restrained neither by fear nor by self-interest, for they live in the spirit... .[58]

The socialists whom Marx and Adorno later lambasted for their bragging that labor was the source of all wealth (quasi-Fichtean idealists who denied the materiality of the objects of labor) merely tried to copy the revolutionary bourgeoisie's attempt to legitimize their claim to domination by presenting themselves as the producers.

Wealth Can Be Produced Now with Much Less Expenditure of Labor so that Necessity becomes Less Necessary; Social Movements Must Now Cash in Capital's Bonds

In suffering's countless currencies, humanity has paid plenty into the universal hedge fund of divine justice.

We have accumulated there a massive and well-deserved pension pot, and rather than paying in more and more, we need now to figure out how to cash it in. The value-form as a core structure of modern society has become increasingly anachronistic as social wealth is becoming more and more independent from direct expenditure of labor: productivity, historically accumulated human knowledge and experience, the worldly afterlife of thousands of past generations, works for the living and could, for the first time in history, free humanity from most of the drudgery, leaving only the (relatively manageable) necessary necessities: man has 'succeeded in making the product of his past labor … perform gratuitous service on a large scale, like a force of nature.'[59] The capitalist mode of production, though, based on the measurement of riches not as concrete wealth but in the form of abstract value, materialized in money, presupposing the continuously expanding consumption of living human labor, keeps that Golden Age in the bottle.

The main impulses that social movements in modern times up to now followed roughly fall into three categories: a conservative impulse to defend traditional forms (or rather, whatever people consider to be such); a liberal impulse to force modern capitalist society to deliver on its proclaimed ideals ('Liberty, Equality, Property and Bentham');[60] and those – of which we need more – that refer to 'the growing gap between the possibilities generated by capitalism and capitalist actuality' whereby 'actuality' includes ideas and ideals.[61] The third impulse reverses the liberal one by not appealing to supposed good intentions of capital but understanding capital as the Mephistophelian force that always intends evil but unintentionally produces the good, as well.

'The possible reduction of labor to a minimum could not but have a radical effect on the concept of practice.'[62] In a society that has overcome capital, the general large-scale reduction in labor-time and a qualitative change of labor would lead to a conception of work both quantitatively and qualitatively different from labor in capitalist society (as well as different from pre-capitalist drudgery).[63] Labor, reduced to a minimum, would cease being compulsive social mediation. Not having to act would now actually become the summum bonum that the classics had already claimed it to be (while in the present state of barbarism, far niente – doing nothing – presupposes indifference to suffering and is, in this sense, barbaric like 'a talk about trees' in Brecht's poem 'To those born later').[64] That contemplation is not yet the summum bonum is reflected in the bourgeois ambivalence towards happiness: the bourgeois spirit 'would guarantee the pursuit of happiness to the individual and would have it forbidden by the ethics of labor.'[65] 'Exertions rendered superfluous by the state of the productive forces become objectively irrational.'[66] Critical theory aims at a social order that gives everybody access to the fruits of past labor: past labor must be appropriated in order to liberate the living more and more from having to expend any labor at all. It distinguishes necessary necessities – the interchange with nature; the moderately regular cleaning of toilets – and historically specific, unnecessary necessities dictated by the needs of the capitalist mode of production. Overcoming capitalist society involves getting rid of the latter and rationally regulating the former under common, dignified and laid-back social control.

Working class, women's and minority movements, insofar as their fights aimed at equality and the universal validity of rights, have driven capitalism as far towards its own democratic best self as capitalism itself allowed them to do.[67] They demolished remnants of the ancien régime such as old-style patriarchy or classes-as-milieus that still recalled early-modern estates. Representing the progressive, abstracting, universalizing side of capitalist civilization (which some reactionaries quite perceptively held against them), they collided with its other dimension, namely concrete individual and group specificity. To the extent that they were movements of as much as against-and-beyond capitalist modernity, it was only logical for them to adapt to that other side and to reclaim and reinvent concreteness and particularity. The cold breath of capitalist universality, whose agents they had been, caught up with them. They turned around and reconstructed differences and identities. But the movements that successively and in concert developed to maturity contradictory aspects of advanced capitalist society thereby also created the elements of revolutions to come, i.e. their own negation and that of capitalist society. The dialectic of modern society warrants that all things modern subvert themselves.

Endnotes

1. 'Man soll etwas vor sich bringen.' (Horkheimer and Adorno 1986, p. 211). This rather old-fashioned phrase is usually understood to mean 'to acquire wealth' but seems to have originated as a literal translation of the Latin producere.

2. Postone 1993.

3. Carroll 1992, p. 127.

4. Cf. Stoetzler 2012

5. The separations of state, civil society, family and economy that characterize bourgeois modernity are precarious and can be expected to evaporate in the heat of the ever-more intense closure of the totality, continuing a tendency that in the core countries has been underway for more than a century. The diagnosis and examination of this tendency of de-differentiation has been one of the main themes of Critical Theory, and has sometimes led to a somewhat nostalgic glance at the interstices between these (partially antagonistic) 'spheres' that sometimes more, sometimes less, permit the development of strong individuality and the formulation of critique.

6. Adorno 1994, 208; Adorno 1978, 157.

7. In the two middle sections of this article I reconstruct the arguments of selected passages of two key texts, Adorno's '"Static" and "dynamic" as sociological categories' and Horkheimer and Adorno's 'The concept of enlightenment.' I dedicate a lot of space to these two texts because methodologically I hold that discussions of canonical authors are the more meaningful the more they are based on detailed readings of exemplary texts that convey a sense of their train of argument rather than selective, and therewith more arbitrary, referencing of various texts from across their oeuvre. As for Critical Theory, Adorno's late essays as well as Dialectic of Enlightenment contain some of the most developed, subtle and condensed, and in this sense, exemplary arguments.

8. Adorno 1975, 40; 1961, 43.

9. Adorno 1975, 40; Adorno 1961, 43. The phrase 'mors immortalis' is from Lucretius' De rerum natura (book 3, line 869; Lucretius 1992, 254-255). The formulation is used by Lucretius to emphasize that life is mortal in the context of his argument that human beings can have sensations and feelings only while alive, namely when body and spirit are 'welded and wedded into one whole.' Once that whole is interrupted, we do not exist, and 'he who is not cannot be miserable.' Even if exactly the same corporeal and spiritual bits and pieces should subsequently come together again being 'welded' into a new living being, this new being would not have recollections from the earlier one who had ceased to exist: although composed of identical elements, the new whole would be non-identical to the previous whole.

10. Adorno 1975, 41; Adorno 1961, 44; Sohn-Rethel 1978; see also Jappe 2013.

11. Adorno uses the past tense here: 'Das war ihre Ewigkeit.' I assume this is a grammar mistake; as the formulation stands it implies that the eternity of mors immortalis has already ended and human history has begun. This would be an unduly optimistic assessment. The following sentence ('Progress...') is in the subjunctive, indicating a possibility not a reality.

12. Adorno 1975, 41; Adorno 1961, 44.

13. Adorno 1975, 42; Adorno 1961, 45.

14. Adorno 1975, 27; Adorno 1961, 35.

15. Adorno 1975, 33; Adorno 1961, 36.

16. Adorno 1975, 30; Adorno 1961, 32.

17. Adorno 1975, 35; Adorno 1961, 38.

18. Adorno 1975, 37; Adorno 1961, 40.

19. Adorno 1975, 38; Adorno 1961, 41.

20. This argument was also made by Sohn-Rethel (1978), with whose work Adorno was familiar.

21. Adorno 1975, 39; Adorno 1961, 42. Spectacles of commemoration as organized by state- and other ideological apparatuses are potent weapons in the destruction of memory (see Dreyfus and Stoetzler 2011).

22. Adorno 1975, 43; Adorno 1961, 46.

23. Adorno 1975, 43; Adorno 1961, 47.

24. Adorno 1975, 44; Adorno 1961, 47.

25. Adorno 1975, 44; Adorno 1961, 47.

26. Love 1996.

27. Adorno 1975, 44-45; Adorno 1961, 48.

28. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 35; 29; 22.

29. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 36; 29-30; 23.

30. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 36; 29-30; 23.

31. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 36; 30; 23.

32. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 37; 30; 23.

33. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 38; 32; 24-5.

34. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 47; 41; 32.

35. By this I mean Marxism in the mode of what Horkheimer (1937) had described as 'traditional theory', or else, de-dialecticized, post-critical Marxism.

36. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 47; 41; 33. The argument that Adorno formulated a critique of 'the economy' that incorporates but goes beyond that of political economy has been made in Dirk Braunstein's outstanding book on Adorno's critique of political economy (Braunstein 2011). For a review of the book in English see Stoetzler (2013).

37. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 48-9; 42; 33.

38. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986; 1997; 2002: 49; 42; 34.

39. Marx 1968, p.322.

40. Procrustes was a vicious character killed by Theseus on his way to Athens. He tortured passers-by with a hammer, stretching their limbs to fit his very large bed. A stereotype is a cast metal printing plate made from a mould; the Greek word 'stereos' means hard, solid, also unfriendly, and is also the root of 'sterile'. In the modern context 'stereo' means three-dimensional.

41. i.e. things otherwise incompatible.

42. i.e. touchstone.

43. This is from act IV, scene 3, lines 389-392. Marx points to this place in Grundrisse (Marx 1973:163).

44. Postone 1993, 175. Postone follows in this respect Sohn-Rethel. In spite of his critique (see below footnote 49) he acknowledges the superiority of Sohn-Rethel's argument over e.g. Grossman's (Postone 1993, p. 177).

45. Protection rackets scare their victims and then offer protection from that scary thing that they may have invented, or exaggerated, or, if it is real, they might themselves be operating or be in cahoots with. Religions that operationalize a notion of an overwhelmingly powerful being beyond our control that needs to be appeased through priestly mediation fit this description, as does the pre-modern state. The modern state does of course a lot more than that, but the contemporary discourse of 'security' assimilates it again to being a protection racket. It often uses other people's religiosity as its (secular) religion, using those others' fanatic-neurotic fetishism (for example 'religious fundamentalism') for its own calculating-cynical fetishism (capitalist rationality).

46. Postone 1993, 153.

47. The everydayness is also emphasized by Adorno when he writes that 'the preponderance of anything objective over the individuals ... can be experienced crassly day after day' (Adorno 1990, p. 300).

48. Postone 1993, 157.

49. Postone (1993) and Jappe (2013) criticize Sohn-Rethel for failing to theorize abstract labor as well as the commodity abstraction. Although this is an important critique, his failure to grasp the concept of 'abstract labor' does not invalidate Sohn-Rethel's main contributions as the issues he is most centrally concerned with – the constitution of abstract thinking and the critique of Kantian a prioris – are not related to capitalism but to the beginnings of commodity production and exchange in classical antiquity and their expansion in early modernity and can therefore not be explained with reference to abstract labor. For the context of developed (industrial) capitalist society, though, Sohn-Rethel's position could be restated and saved – against his dismissal of the concept of abstract labor – by saying that generalized commodity exchange is only conceivable under conditions of generalized wage labor and abstract labor; the exchange of the commodity labor power for wages coincides with the exertion of abstract labor, so that (in developed capitalism) labor itself is a form of commodity exchange: labor power cannot actually be abstracted from labor as its sale does not precede its consumption (although one could interpret the labor contract as the selling in advance of a legal title on that labor power, and as such separate, but that is probably not how most people actually conceive of and experience it).

50. I have discussed these issues in Stoetzler (2008) and (2009).

51. It is possible that the same phenomenon is caused in one context by one set of causes, in another context by another set of causes. A similar argument could be made in regard of race. Asian societies seem to have had a concept of race before the advent of European colonists which must affect the established Marxist argument that the concept of race is a product of European colonialism. However, one needs to look at what exactly the meaning of the concept has been, or is, in the different contexts, and how it emerged and changed. A certain social form (sexual dimorphism; race) may have been arrived at by different societies on different routes but changed its meaning in the process of different societies becoming part of the capitalist world system.

52. Kurtz in Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness (Conrad 1996, p. 66; this is near the end of part two of Heart of Darkness).

53. cf. Balibar 1991, 58ff.

54. Adorno 1990, p. 23.

55. Adorno 1990, p. 178. On Sieyes see Sewell 1994.

56. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986, p. 182.

57. Horkheimer and Adorno 1986, 182-3.

58. Heine 2002, p. 242.

59. Marx 1976, p. 510.

60. Marx 1976, 280.

61. Postone 1993, p. 392.

62. Adorno 1990, p. 244.

63. Postone 1993, p. 362.

64. Brecht 1976, p. 318.

65. Adorno 1990, p. 257.

66. Adorno 1990, p. 349.

67. cf. Postone 1993, p. 369.

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1950 and the Crisis of the American Interior

Charles Lemert

> Nobody dast blame this man. You don't understand: Willy was a salesman. And for a salesman, there is no rock bottom to the life. He don't put a bolt to a nut, he don't tell you the law or give you medicine. He's a man way out there in the blue, riding on a smile and a Shoeshine. And when they start not smiling back—that's an earthquake. And then you get yourself a couple of spots on your hat, and you're finished. Nobody dast blame this man. A salesman is got to dream, boy. It comes with the territory.
>
> — Requiem for Willy Loman, Death of a Salesman

Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman opened on Broadway February 10, 1949. Tennessee Williams' Streetcar Named Desire opened on Broadway just more than a year before on December 3, 1947. Both were tragedies of American consciousness. In Miller's play Willy Loman killed himself at least as much because he has lost himself as for the shame of being found out by Biff, his son, in the midst of a fatal affair. In Williams' Streetcar, Blanche, lost in the chaos of her life, is committed to a mental hospital where out of her confusion she utters the famous line: "Whoever you are, I have always depended upon the kindness of strangers." Then too, earlier (in 1942), Eugene O'Neill finished writing Long Day's Journey into Night, a play that like the other day dramatizes a family's descent into ruin.

Each play in its way foretells the crisis of the day and of the times. This is why they are widely considered the three most important theatrical dramas of America's 20th century. It is a truism of sorts that art is the early warning system of a culture's coming crisis.

But what, exactly, was that crisis? O'Neill's Long Day's Journey into Night was written in wartime. Yet, in America, the shock of Pearl Harbor late in 1941, was but a prompt to a period of mobilization and global triumph in 1945. Also, in 1941, before Pearl Harbor, Henry Luce coined the celebratory assertion that the 20th was the American Century. Long Day's Journey into Night, that same year, was a probe below a national innocence that still now holds some in its spell. It is, thus, properly of the same conjuncture as Death of a Salesman and Streetcar Named Desire. In their time, hot war in the past, the Cold War was already chilling America's brief moment of shear global dominance from August, 1945 to Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. Yet, at home, many Americans were living the good life later analyzed in John Kenneth Galbraith's 1957 book, The Affluent Society. Post-war affluence was widely thought to be a new day for the working class. That there was another, darker class of poor and racially excluded Americans was not at all on the radar of the liberal intelligentsia. (Michael Harrington's The Other America would not be published until 1962 when it got John F. Kennedy's attention.)

In 1941 America remained, for most part, blissfully innocent of what would come in 1950. The 1940s playwrights were not. The year after Death of a Salesman, however, all but the most naive could not help but think that something had begun to fade from an original belief in an America's special providence built on hard work. On February 9, 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy gave his notorious Red Scare speech in Wheeling, West Virginia claiming that he had a list of Communists working for the State Department. The speech was not recorded. He waved a list allegedly naming anywhere from 57 to 284 sympathizers. No one saw the list. Then began an internal crisis of American consciousness. McCarthyism quickly came to represent the extent to which one could not trust

even the most trustworthy public servants—teachers, diplomats, politicians, actors, army officers, and, in effect (and in principle) anyone who did not tow an imperceptible ideological line.

The crisis quickly found ample global evidence for fear. On February 14, 1950, just five days after McCarthy's Wheeling speech, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China signed a mutual defense pact -- an accord by the world's two largest communist nations made all the more threatening by the fact that, the year before, Mao's Communist Party had defeated Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party. Then on September 6, 1950, President Harry S. Truman ordered American troops to defend South Korea against the North. The initial results were disastrous. North Korea over ran most of the South until General Douglas MacArthur's brilliant naval end run from Pusan in the very south to retake Inchon in the north. Soon after on October 19, 1950, the world was again at world when China entered the Korean Peninsula. Then and there Global Communism was aligned against United Nation troops representing something like Global Democracy.

McCarthy was censured by the United States Senate on December 2, 1954. The hot war in Korea ended in an armistice on July 27, 1953. Yet, as is perfectly evident, variants of Senator McCarthy's baseless scare tactics linger on today, however attenuated, in the delusional racist attacks on President Barack Obama. So too Korea, remains divided under ever more insane token Communist leaders. Technically the 1950-1953 war is still on, thus lending Vin Diesel and Dennis Rodman a certain entertainment value. The global threat of North Korea remains serious.

Though replayed against different circumstances, the crises of 1950 endure. It was then, as the three great plays of the 1940s foretold, that American culture began to doubt itself. To be sure, listening to political speeches today, that doubt is very well repressed. Yet, few on the intelligent Left can deny that America, at least, soon perhaps Europe as well, eventually the so-called West are in decline. Among social scientists, none put the fact of American decline sooner and more pungently than Immanuel Wallerstein in "American and the World" in February, 1992, in Theory and Society. It was here that Wallerstein declared that the then present was a period from, precisely, 1945 and 1989-91—a period in which American exceptionalism fed a cultural founded on hybrids and Calvinist guilt. Put somewhat too psychoanalytically, pride is an external expression of the ravages of internal guilt—and expression that takes the form of violence when attempts to love away the guilt fail, as always they do.

It is not often that social scientists are as prescient as artists can be—a sad fact illustrated by the 19th century founders of the social sciences who were, at least, a good generation behind in diagnosing the crises of their times. Emile Durkheim's anomie lagged well behind Alfred Jarry and the absurdists (and never quite got the point even after the Cubist movement in Paris between 1906 and 1911). Max Weber's dread of the iron cage may have been a remote consequence of his appreciation of Nietzsche but Weber's inability to see beyond over-rationalization lacked all the poetic intensity of Nietzsche's aphoristic genius in, say, the uncompromising disdain for European culture in Twilight of the Idols (1888).

Not even Sigmund Freud—whose 1990 Interpretation of Dreams was, in its way, more deeply radical than the key ideas of other of the classic social theorists—had to reinvent himself two decades later in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) wherein his dual drive theory exposed the probability that the Unconscious is as much about deadly violence as about creative love. Hence, another decade later, in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), he would articulate the lesson of the violence of the Great War and of the greater war already in the making early in the 1930s. Freud, ever the scientist, was not the poet Karl Marx was, but it is well known that he read widely in the literature of his day and that his consulting office was decorated in ancient art from Africa. This aside, for any thinker in his declining years (Freud was seventy-four in 1930) to make so great an intellectual leap as he did to a theory of the primordial evil in modern civilization one must be a poet of sorts; and especially so when the social theory of his declining years was so apt to the times and so at odds with prevailing sentiment.

Marx, however, was markedly the finest poet of the lot. "All that is solid melts into air all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober sense, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind." Here, in the most imaginative line of the 1845 Manifesto, Marx (with Engels' consent, one supposes) puts forth the utopian resolution of the contradictions in his highly abstract theory of alienation of the year before in the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Even Freud and Marx, the most poetic of the early social thinkers, could do no more than paint a picture of global violence, in the one case, and of the hope of a social revolution, in the other. In this respect, one is hard-pressed to say than any of the founders of modern social thought came any more than close to a robust theory of just how deep the crises of their industrializing generations were. Though each was a prophet of a sort, none even began to outline an enduring theory of how, if at all, science might contribute to the deep structural contradictions of the modern world. Nor did any of their contemporaries. William James and Georg Simmel (if not Herbert Spencer) were influential thinkers with their own poetic flair, but neither did better than the

canonical fathers of the social sciences.

The forgivable failures of the fathers stand in sharp contrast to a short list of remarkably innovative thinkers who published major and enduring works in and close after 1950. By contrast to those who preceded them (and, sadly, most who have come after) all of them wrote enduringly influential master works that came hard on the heels of the great American tragedies of the 1940s. All dealt directly or indirectly with the crisis of 1950—that of the cancerous collapse of the American self-confidence in the integrity of the interior lives of both the individual and the nation. The four notables were David Riesman, Erik Erikson, Erving Goffman, and Edwin Lemert. All wrote clearly. None (with the possible exception of Goffman) possessed any particular artistic or literary flair. As individuals, none was quite like any of the others.

At the time, only Lemert and Goffman were certifiable sociologists (though, as time would tell, Goffman always defied the terms and conditions of normal social science). Riesman was a lawyer teaching social studies at the University of Chicago. Erikson, of course, was and would remain a psychoanalyst. Each wrote texts in or close by1950; namely: Riesman's Lonely Crowd, Erikson's Childhood and Society, Goffman's "Cooling the Mark Out," and Lemert's Social Pathology. Each text was formative in two senses: as key to the author's intellectual career; as a path breaking work that changed social and analytic thought for years to come. Yet, the authors were different one from the others; and each was idiosyncratic in his own way. Nevertheless, though each wrote an accessible, even elegant, style that made his work important beyond their immediate fields of endeavor, none was a popularizer. What did they, collectively achieve, in relation to the crisis foretold by the playwrights? How did they engage the crisis and redefine it for those who came after?

David Riesman's Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character was written with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney. More than any other book of the day, Lonely Crowd diagnosed the crises in the American national character by finishing the story first told by Max Weber. Where Weber famously defined and described the transformation of Western culture from the eternal yesterday of traditionalism to the desperately rule-bound culture of the individualistic entrepreneur, Riesman wrote of the collapse of that very individualism based as it was on an interior sense of self-directed, productive work in the world. Both Weber and Riesman were, in their ways, fatalistic about the horrors of the iron cage and moral consequences of other-directed conformism. Weber's rational individual was trapped. Riesman's inner-directedness was fading away in a culture of adjustment and conformity to the expectations and faddish norms of others—of, that is, ultimately of the demands of an American national character that was losing its traditional ways. For example, from the introductory chapter of Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character:

> What is common to all other-directed people is that their contemporaries are the source of direction for the individual—either those known to him or those with whom he is individually connected, through friends and through the mass-media. This source is of course "internalized" in the sense that dependence on it for guidance in life is implanted early. The goals toward which the other-directed person strives shift that guidance: it is only the process of striving itself and the process of paying close attention to the signals from others that remain unaltered throughout life.

Pretty good sociology for a young lawyer without training in the field.

And good enough to become a best seller for years to come. Lonely Crowd has sold more than1.5 million copies over the years, more than any other sociology book in the modern era. The book is a sprawling interpretative and theoretical discussion the American character and its perturbations in the post-WWII era. Though readable enough to be widely read, Lonely Crowd is a technically subtle scholarly work and scholarly enough for Riesman, in subsequent editions, to criticize what he came to consider his over-reaches and other mistakes. Yet, the book struck the very same chord Arthur Miller had struck the year before in Death of a Salesman. Like Willy Loman, Riesman other-directed man is "way out there in the blue, riding on a smile and a Shoeshine".

Erik Erikson's Childhood and Society was his first great book that was written for psychoanalysts. It nodded here and there to what he would name in so many words in his 1968 book Identity: Youth and Crisis. Technical though it was, Childhood and Society quickly won a readership that, in time, spread from those in the psychoanalytic know, to many a reader in other fields as in time it did to the general reader. There began, for example, samples of the full-blown biographical studies—Young Man Luther (1958) and Gandhi's Truth (1969)—that advanced Erikson's sophisticated approach to the link binding history to psychology. He was the founder, therefore, of psychohistory but also, more than anyone else this side of Freud, the one who understood that psychoanalytic thought and practice were embedded in histories that go well beyond the personal histories reported in session. Yet, quite in contrast to Lonely Crowd, Childhood and Society, upon first look, bore no resemblance to a book that would have the enduring

and popular effect it has had.

Childhood and Society is still the classic text on what Erikson importantly called the "Eight Stages of Man," wherein the gender insensitive "Man" may be forgiven for its implicit reference to the natural history of Humankind—history with roots in anthropology. The stages in Childhood and Society were, to be sure, those of the moral and social development of the child that made possible the subsequent stages of adult life. Each stage, including those of adult life, Erikson described as a tension between opposing states of emotional and mental self-understanding; thus, a crucial secondary theme, is the omnipresence of anxiety which he defines as "a diffuse state of tension."

The stage that became paradigmatic for his concept of identity crisis was adolescence for which the anxiety produced polarities are precisely identity versus role confusion. Thus in the chapter on youth in Childhood and Society (page 235):

> The growing and developing youths, faced with [puberty's...] physiological revolution within them, and with tangible adult tasks ahead of them, are now primarily concerned with adult tasks ahead of them, and are now primarily concerned with what they appear to be in the eyes of others as compared with what they feel they are, and with the question of how to connect the roles and skills cultivated with the occupational prototypes of the day.

The adolescent mind is, according to Erikson, a mind in "moratorium" —frozen so to speak by the power of this particular tension in which the wish to be an autonomous individual struggles with a need to conform.

Unlike Riesman, Erikson makes no full blown commentary on American national character. But he does hint at the obvious allusion to, in effect, America's then emergent state of adolescence arising on the sudden growth of its global power and the new information technologies that aggravate awareness of fads and trends that called, the young, especially, to conformity. Some have said that "youth" was more or less invented in the day or, at the least, youth culture then came to be the provocative aspect of the affluent culture. Erikson does not go that far, but he does comment in the shallowness of American post-war moral commitments (page 276):

> Today when there is so much demand for homes in defensively over-defined, overly standardized, and over-restricted neighborhoods, many people enjoy their most relaxed moments at crossroads counters, in bars, in and around automotive vehicles, and in camps and cabins, playing that they are unconfined and free to stay, free to move on. No country's population travels farther and faster.

Elsewhere, in the conclusion, Erikson introduces Arthur Miller's Willy Loman's son, Biff, as a prototype of the American adolescent who, like his father, can't figure out how to live a life that dependents on nor more than a smile and a Shoeshine. Erikson never says that Biff embodied American national character at the time. But he could have.

Erving Goffman is justly famous for the locution impression management, which first appeared in his earliest book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956). For those who might quibble that 1956, while clearly in the conjectural time of the 1950 crisis, is off date, I propose Goffman's earliest great paper, "Cooling the Mark Out"—a paper that was taking shape in 1950 when Goffman was in Scotland doing fieldwork on the Shetland Islanders, the empirical subject of Presentation of Self.

"Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure" was published upon his return in 1952. By contrast to the other works here discussed, "Cooling the Mark Out" is lesser both in length and in its foundational effects on the author and his followers. Yet, it is notable for its originality even amid the still then distinctiveness of the sociology at the University of Chicago. The Chicago School, until recently was known in sociology for contrariness amid the formal nature of the rest of American sociology. Still more so, Goffman, two years from finishing his Chicago PhD, was defiant even in that company. Lloyd Warner, his thesis advisor, advised him to study the Shetland Island community as a whole and in a traditional ethnographic manner. Goffman chose instead to remain in his hotel to study the community interactions in that one, very local, setting. Here were planted the seeds of Goffman's central empirical frame, the interaction order, which would not be formalized until much later. For example, the opening paragraphs of "Cooling the Mark Out" (Psychiatry 15 (4): 451-52):

> In the argot of the criminal world, the term "mark" refers to any individual who is a victim. ... The confidence game—the con, as its practitioners call it—is a way of obtaining money under false pretenses by the exercise of fraud and deceit.... The con is said to be a good racket in the United States because most Americans are willing, nay eager, to make some easy money, and will engage in action that is less than legal in order to do so. The typical play has typical phases. The potential sucker is first spotted, and one member of the working team (called an outside man, steerer, or roper) arranges to make the social contact with him. The confidence of the mark is won, and he is given an opportunity to invest his money in a gambling venture which he understands to have been fixed in his favor. The venture, of course, is fixed, but not in his favor. The mark

> is permitted to win some money and then persuaded to invest more. There is an "accident" or a "mistake" and the mark loses his total investment. The operators then depart in a ceremony that is called the blowoff or sting. They leave the mark but take his money.

Those already familiar with Presentation of Self will readily spot early versions of its central concepts—the con, the team, the play, the ceremonial sting. Together these dramaturgical elements explain Goffman's stunningly radical general theory as to the practice of daily life. We live with others in everyday life where, to be a self, we must manage impressions with the cooperation of a team of friends and others in the know. They support our play before others we seek to impress. When successful, our "self" is established by a con with these others in a particular setting. The con is to be recognized as the one we present ourselves to be. The mark is left with nothing tangible save the false impression that the one in whom a degree of trust was invested is, for the time being, real somehow.

Goffman develops his theory of the presented self most economically in a later book, Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity (1963). Here all of the ideas outlined in "Cooling the Mark Out," "On Face-Work" (1955), and Presentation of Self come together in Goffman's discussion of the politics of identity. A social identity is one accomplished in the confidence play with others. One's personal identity comprises those knowable personal marks that if revealed in a play could destroy the con. A personal history of deviance, for example, must be covered by the control of that information in an interaction setting where one wants to be taken as a normal. The con must not allow the mark to know that the fix is on. But, finally, and in crucial reference to the crises of 1955, an ego identity is little more than the feeling the stigmatized mark has in an interaction. For example, Stigma (1963: 106):

> The concept of social identity allowed us to consider stigmatization. The concept of personal identity allowed us to consider the role of information control in stigma management. The idea of ego identity allows us to consider what the stigmatized individual may feel about stigma and its management.

In other words, we are all marks with feelings about the interplay of social and personal identities. Whether a recognized deviant or a presumptive normal, all are vulnerable to being found out for what we "really" are.

It is here that Goffman cites Erik Erikson's general theory of the interplay of the personal and the social—of the adolescent need for identity while anxiously suffering the tension of the personal with the social caused by role confusion. Hence Goffman's strange idea of normal deviancy as ubiquitous among social individuals who, in effect, have no interior self they can carry from setting to setting. Curiously, it is here also that Goffman cites the fourth of the theorists of the crisis of 1950, Edwin M. Lemert.

Edwin Lemert's Social Pathology (1951) may be rightly considered the text that reinvented the theory of social deviance by introducing the idea that known deviants are created in a subtle process of societal reaction. Lemert's general theory of deviance as it appeared in Social Pathology was first outlined in a 1948 conference paper. In the book, he quotes that paper to define his theory (Social Pathology, page 22):

> We must pertinently ask at this juncture whether the time has not come to break abruptly with the traditions of older social pathologists and abandon once and for all the archaic and medicinal idea that humans can be divided into normal and pathological, or, at least, if such a division must be made, to divest the term "pathological" of its moralistic unscientific overtones. ... Thus, by [...] definition, sociopathic phenomena simply become differentiated behavior which at a given time and place is socially disapproved even though the same behavior may be socially approved at other times and places.

Edwin Lemert's theory, thus announced, emerged in Social Pathology and other of his writings, as a powerful tool for examining a full range of deviant practices.

In a later article—"The Behavior of the Systematic Check Forger" (Social Problems 6.2, 1958) —Lemert interviewed men (usually men, then) who were incarcerated for forgery. With rare exception, he found them atypical of the larger prison population. They were more highly educated. Their criminal careers required them to be creative in how they passed bad checks. They had organized their lives into a career as check-men. And, most interestingly, they were often glad to have been found out; and, once adjudicated, they were model prisoners. Why this profile? Lemert astutely interprets them as men socially isolated by having to work alone. In the day when banking was almost always done with paper checks, check-men were forced to live and move alone from place to place to avoid being found out. They were, thus, lonely and isolated for want of a favorable societal reaction to their genius. Thus, in the end, Lemert concluded, their social pathology arose upon an intolerable social condition of being alone, unappreciated by society for their unique accomplishments. Arrest and incarceration was a societal reaction that

relieved their sense of social unworthiness. Conviction was for them a societal reaction that brought them back into the social fold.

Edwin Lemert did not become iconic among general readers as did Riesman, Erikson, and Goffman. But he clearly invented a theory of social pathology that resonated with the work of others in the crisis of 1950. Lemert's social pathology as a career composed on a string of societal reactions (or in the case of the check-men the absence thereof) depends on the more general assumption shared by the other three.

What characters we may become, for better or worse, demand a complicated social struggle for recognition by others. When the individual (or in Riesman's case, the nation) turns away from a belief in the enduring nature of the interior life (whether of a purportedly distinct self or of an exceptional national culture) then ongoing life must confront the role confusion of conformity to others.

Arthur Miller, Tennessee Williams, and Eugene O'Neill portrayed such a turn as a morbid catastrophe. David Riesman, Erik Erikson, Erik Erikson, and Edwin Lemert were not morbid. They were scientists; yet each gave vent to a kind of literary imagination that was consistent with the morbidity of the playwrights. The crisis of 1950 was a crisis wrought by a growing uneasiness with the prospects that post-war America could cash in on its new global confidence game -- whether, that is, the force of America's external obligations would rob the nation and its individuals of identities forged in a fading past of personal and national isolation.

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Through a Glass, Darkly: Jean Baudrillard and the Mirror of Critical Theory

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According to Jean Baudrillard (1975), Karl Marx's critique of political economy "assists in the cunning of capital" (31). In other words, Marxism, in this account, is a particularly duplicitous variant of capitalist ideology. This is a rather damning assertion to level against a critical theory that sees the analysis and overcoming of capitalism as its guiding historical objective. Moreover, it is an assertion with decidedly far-reaching implications. For if Baudrillard's critique of Marx is well-founded, then the claims of many post-structuralists, post-Marxists, post-colonialists and post-modern thinkers who counsel a relegation of the Marxian project to the dustbin of history (either overtly or tacitly) are also legitimate; thus Marxism, in this account, can be considered, at best, a dead ideology, a spent historical force – at worst, it is a misdirection of the emancipatory energy of those on the left who subscribe to a Marx-inspired critical theory, a misdirection that renders them complicit in the very thing they seek to overcome. As such, insofar as the Marxist critique of political economy is irredeemably bound to the capitalist mode of production in such a way that it actually operates in collusion with the continuing reproduction of the social configuration it seeks to abolish – and this is Baudrillard's position from roughly 1973 onward[1] – then perhaps the best course of action for those interested in the critique of contemporary forms of domination and exploitation is a strict adherence to an on-going silence where Marxism is concerned, such that Marx's socio-political project (and attendant Marxist discourses) might finally be left to rest in peace. Perhaps this is so.

Or perhaps there is life yet in the Marxian project. Perhaps it is "high time that [Marxist critical theorists] should openly, in the face of the whole world [of academic criticism], [rearticulate] their views, their aims, their tendencies, [redouble their critical-political efforts], and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of [Marxian capitalism] with a [critique of the condition of post-Marxism itself]" (Marx and Engels 1978: 473).[2] For while critical approaches to Marxist thought, such as Baudrillard's The Mirror of Production, appear rather damning, I would like to suggest that this appearance is grounded in a misunderstanding of Marx's methodological developments spanning over the course of his writing career. In other words, Baudrillard's critique of Marxist political thought is, I contend, a critique of received interpretations of Marx from mainly the 1960's and 70's – Baudrillard thus reads Marx through the lens of the disappointments of the Paris Spring of 1968, that is, 'through a glass, darkly' (1 Corinthians 13: 12).

Far from grasping the essential thrust of Marx's mature critical theory of capitalist social formations, Baudrillard (1975) reads into Marx some of the most problematic metaphysical assumptions of the modern epoch, "the metaphysics of the market economy in general and [of] modern capitalist ideology in particular" (59). He then proceeds to burn this straw person to the ground. His critique is thus a project that turns, essentially, on methodological questions. For it rests upon a reading of Marx that misapprehends historical materialism, fails to grasp the abstract-concrete relation in Marx's work, and misconstrues dialectics for an antagonistic and jagged but essentially linear chain of causality, all of which can be summed up, in Baudrillard's terms, under the rubric of 'productivist ideology'[3]. It should be noted, however, that I do not mean to argue that Baudrillard has merely fabricated the object(s) of his critique. All too often, those writing under the banner of Marxist theory have subscribed to positions and methodological assumptions located well within the blast radius of Baudrillard's commentary.

Baudrillard's Conservative Radicalism

But this has led commentators such as Gerry Coulter (2011) to claim that "if we take Baudrillard's understanding of Marx to its logical conclusions – we can provocatively say that the left was never really anything more than a prosthesis of the right." This position is, I think, something of an overstatement – not all of Marx's interpreters, to say nothing of Marx himself, fall victim to the assumptions against which Baudrillard sets his critique. Moreover, even if we are willing to abide this brand of blanket cynicism for the moment and marginalize the struggles of those who have worked, often in the service of real socio-political gains, against the hegemony and/or social domination of capital, it seems fair to say that Baudrillard collapses Marx's writings into a set of historically circumscribed representations popular amongst some Marxists during the middle third of the 20th century, representations which he summarily dismisses as obsolete[4]: in his own words, "the work of the negative, the work of critical thought, of the relationship of forces against oppression, or of radical subjectivity against alienation, all this has (virtually) become obsolete" (Baudrillard 2010: 36). As such, Baudrillard's apparent[5] willingness to dispense, almost entirely, with the Marxian critical perspective and methodology bespeaks a tendency toward a conservative and cynical political/theoretical nihilism that despairs of the possibility of effective counter-hegemonic praxis and hence does away with the responsibility to critically engage with the capitalist social formation – and it does so in the name of radical critique.

Yet, even if this sort of approach is radically critical it nevertheless leads to a position that is, at the same time, radically disempowering. As Wendy Brown (1995) points out "the very meaning of radical critique is transformed when there is no historical prospect of redressing the critique, when there is no social dynamic, and when the power deployed by the dominant class [or system] is not retrievable by the subordinate class" (93).[6] 'Radical critique', in Baudrillard's hands, thus becomes the (ineffectual) ritual play of a kind of modern Cassandrian theoretical sect, destined to 'know' our unpleasant social destinies but never to be taken seriously or, at any rate, sufficiently grasped by anyone with the power or will to make a difference. In other words, Baudrillard replaces the Marxian project "with a form of semiological idealism and technological determinism where signs and objects come to dominate the subject" (Kellner 2006); this is what Baudrillard would come to theorize as simulacra. Indeed, as some theorists have pointed out, Baudrillard's account of 'the simulacra' has "a very high degree of descriptive power" (Dyer-Witheford 1999: 176). For, as Nick Dyer-Witheford (1999) explains, "[the simulacra] registers a situation in which control of the media often (if not as uniformly as he suggests) gives established power the capacity not just to promulgate specific beliefs and values, but to set the very parameters of perception" (176).

Nevertheless, this is a form of idealism, a contemplative reflection, a mirror of critical theory; it is what Theodor Adorno (1984) referred to as an illusion of the concrete which "rests on the reification of results" (37).[7] In other words, Baudrillard seems to naturalize the contemporary situation, even as he claims that the contemporary power of the media, of sign economies, is historically unprecedented; this constitutes a variation on the imperialism of Hegelian historicism, an imperialism in which all that has gone before is teleologically annexed to the present.[8] In this way, as a consequence of the idealism of his theory, Baudrillard's social critique founders against the impassable reef of his merely contemplative/speculative stance. Incidentally, Michel Foucault (2010) once remarked that it is all too easy to overlook our proximity to Hegel, and hence his influence on our thinking; Baudrillard often seems unaware of the idealist and conservative implications in his work, of the way that he makes the present into the final stage of history – in short, he seems unaware of "the extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to [him]" (235).

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Arthur Kroker (1985) should characterize Baudrillard as a tragic figure – radically transgressive in aspiration and conservative in fact (70).[9] This is closely related to Baudrillard's willingness, in the end, to jettison the analysis of capital. In other words, owing to his position that capitalism (as Marx understood it) has already been overtaken and replaced with a vast and impenetrable system of signs, Baudrillard ends up occupying a deeply pessimistic theoretical position with respect to his prognosis for a change in the contemporary mode of production. His claim that we have moved beyond anything that Marx himself might have recognized as capitalism leads him at once to say that class conflict and social contradiction are no longer centrally or even peripherally relevant,[10] that critical theory is now a useless sham,[11] and that we must try, insofar as this is even possible, to pass through the illusory materiality of the present which, in Baudrillard's account, is really all that remains of capitalism.[12]

Misappropriating Marxist Critical Theory

So far, I have gestured toward what I see as some of the central problems of Baudrillard's reading of Marx's critical theory. I have suggested that Baudrillard sees Marx's critical theory as historically relative. That is, Marx's reading of the capitalist social formation, for Baudrillard, suggests that "capital (its historical function) produces the social" (Coulter 2011) and along with it, the critique of that social form. As a general formula, this claim is not, on its own, overly problematic – it corresponds roughly to the idea that the capitalist bourgeoisie produces its own gravediggers (Marx & Engels 1978: 483). However, Baudrillard's related claim, which is to suggest that we have left the productive form of capitalism behind and entered a new stage of history,[13] engenders a 'critical' position which asserts, at base, that since Marx's critical theory was adequate only to the 'era of production', it is no longer relevant or, properly speaking, critical.[14] A corollary of this assertion is that Marxist analysis thereby misapprehends the contemporary social configuration and hence serves to mask the actual conditions of social domination at work in the present. Insofar as Marxism operates in this fashion, it serves to redirect critical focus away from contemporary techniques of domination, perfected, in Baudrillard's (1983) estimation, in the movement "from capitalist-productivist society to a neo-capitalist cybernetic order that aims now at total control" (111), leaving these new techniques free to pursue their own logic – that of a total and culminating internalized dominion, hegemony in Baudrillard's terminology.[15] This idea, the idea that Marxism not only succumbs to productivist ideology, but constitutes, aids and abets it, describes, in a general form, the essence of Baudrillard's critique of Marxism as well as the general problems endemic to his critical approach.

If one of the strengths of Baudrillard's reading of Marx is his emphasis on sign systems, his related eagerness to proclaim the death of the system of commodity production is perhaps one of its most puzzling aspects.[16] Indeed, according to David Harvey (1989), Baudrillard's recognition of the increasing importance of sign-economies leads him "to argue that Marx's analysis of commodity production is outdated," (289) as we have already seen, because for Baudrillard, "capitalism is now predominantly concerned with the production of signs, images, and sign systems rather than with commodities themselves" (289). But as Harvey (1989) goes on to argue, "The transition he points to is important, though there are in fact no serious difficulties in extending Marx's theory of commodity production to cope with it" (289). If this is so, why then does Baudrillard insist that Marxist critical theory is now extraneous to contemporary existence?

The answer lies in Baudrillard's misapprehension of the key elements of Marx's methodological approach, as well as his misapprehension of the manner in which Marx deploys those elements. To begin with, Baudrillard's apprehension of dialectics corresponds more to what might be described as reductionist Marxist ideology than to Marx's actual analytical methodology. According to Baudrillard (1981b), dialectical analysis, "the general form of Marxist analysis," follows the procedure, at the social level, of an articulation and (predicted) resolution of "contradictions between forces and relations of production" (164), between productive labour and private property. To be sure, many have taken this formula to be one of Marx's key contributions to critical socio-political analysis. But rendered in this (reductionist) way, the essence of Marx's approach to the critique of political economy appears to be bound to idea that the characteristics that best define capitalism are the following: "class relations structured by a market economy and private ownership of the means of production" (Postone 1998: 49). These relations are understood to be relations of domination grasped primarily "in terms of class domination and exploitation" (Postone 1998: 49). And these relations are, furthermore, understood to be in contradiction with the forces of industrial production. In other words, as Baudrillard understands it, the essence of Marx's analysis is that the relations of production – private property and the market – constitute the essential form of capitalist domination exercised over the forces of production – understood as industrial labour/production – which are posited as the basis of the liberating potential intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production. But in this account of Marx's analysis, the idea of an intrinsic (immanent) dialectical contradiction is grounded, in fact, in a transcendental category – industrial labour as the 'true producer' of social wealth hidden beneath the 'false' social relations of market mediated private property. Baudrillard thus renders Marx a 'socialist Ricardian', which according to Stuart Hall (2003) entails believing that "since labour [is] the source of all value, all men should become labourers exchanging equivalent amounts of labour" (144).

What this reading of Marx fails to grasp is the radically immanent nature of his use of the dialectic. Marx is not simply suggesting that there is an empirically immanent class/group in capitalist society whose interests, if emancipated, would change the essence (deep structures) of capitalism via a change at the surface level of structures

of accumulation (distribution). This approach would merely set antagonistic classes next to one another and assert that a historical dynamic will emerge – this would be Kant's position, grounded in human striving toward universal morality. It is, in other words, a variant of positivism/idealism. As Hall (2003) points out, "the method which merely sets opposites together in an external way, which assumes that, because things are neighbours, they must therefore be related, but which cannot move from oppositions to contradictions, is 'dialectical' only in its surface form" (120). Nevertheless, Baudrillard appears to mistake precisely this type of positivist/idealist (or rather, 'metaphysical' – due to the fact that it attributes unobserved political tendencies such as a tendency toward overcoming antinomies to this opposition) antinomy, for the dialectical method of analysis at work in Marx's critique. Moishe Postone (1996), conversely, points out that Marx's use of the dialectic posits contradiction at the cellular level of social organization; dialectical contradiction "should not be understood simply as a social antagonism between laboring and expropriating classes" (88). For, again, this would simply appeal to a metaphysics of wealth production (grounded in a humanist concept of labour) fused together with a positivist sociology of class antagonism (as opposed to dynamic contradiction) – exactly the charge that Baudrillard levels against Marxism in order to substantiate the claim of its complicity with the prevailing state of affairs. Rather, "social contradiction refers to the very fabric of a society, to a self-generating 'nonidentity' intrinsic to its structures of social relations – which do not, therefore, constitute a stable unitary whole" (Postone 1996: 88).[17] As such, Baudrillard's insistence on a superficial and metaphysical reading of Marx's use of dialectical method leads him into a whole host of misinterpretations.

For example, because Baudrillard grasps the Marxian dialectic as a metaphysical (and Manichean) antagonism between the abstract and the concrete, wherein the concrete side of the dialectic is apprehended as that which is legitimately 'human', he builds a critique of Marx's concept of use-value that is inadequate to Marx's critical theory. Baudrillard (1981a) begins his critique of use-value with the claim that "to be sure, there could be no exchange value without use value – the two are coupled" (130); however, he goes on to say that "neither is strongly implied by the other" (130). He then argues that contrary to the supposedly concrete category of use value in Marx's analysis, use value is actually both abstract and an aspect of capitalist rationalization (and hence domination). In fact, Baudrillard's critique of the category of use value is close to Marx's own, notwithstanding Baudrillard's misrepresentation of Marx's position. Moishe Postone (1980) characterizes this common misinterpretation (a misinterpretation which is also Baudrillard's) of Marx's concept of the fetish character of capitalist social relations as follows:

> One aspect of the fetish, then, is that capitalist social relations do not appear as such and, moreover, present themselves antinomically, as the opposition of the abstract and concrete. Because, additionally, both sides of the antinomy are objectified, each appears to be quasi-natural: the abstract dimension appears in the form of "objective," "natural" laws; the concrete dimension appears as pure "thingly" nature. ... Forms of anti-capitalist thought which remain bound within the immediacy of this antinomy tend to perceive capitalism, and that which is specific to that social formation, only in terms of the manifestations of the abstract dimension of the antimony. The existent concrete dimension is then positively opposed to it as the "natural" or ontologically human, which stands outside of the specificity of capitalist society. Thus, as with Proudhon, for example, concrete labour is understood as the non-capitalist moment which is opposed to the abstractness of money. That concrete labour itself incorporates and is materially formed by capitalist social relations is not understood (109-110).

As such, when Baudrillard argues that "the same logic (and the same fetishism) plays on the two sides of the commodity specified by Marx: use value and exchange value" (Baudrillard 1981a: 134) he is in effect arguing in concert with Marx himself.

However, when he accuses Marx of "not submitting use value to this [commodity] logic of equivalence in radical fashion, [and of] maintaining use value as the category of 'incomparability'" (Baudrillard 1981a: 134), he has misread Marx in just the way that Postone suggests is characteristic of 'forms of anti-capitalist thought which remain bound within the immediacy of the antinomy of capitalist social relations.' Furthermore, when Baudrillard (1981a) claims, on the basis of this misreading, that Marx contributes "to the mythology (a veritable rationalist mystique) that allows the relation of the individual to objects conceived as use values to pass for a concrete and objective - in sum, 'natural' - relation between man's needs and the function proper to the object" (134) he mischaracterizes Marx's argument. Marx does not hold that objects conceived as use values in capitalist social relations are in concrete relation to the needs of a transcendental human subject. Just as with production and consumption, use value and exchange value, under the capitalist mode of production, mediate one another: "The mediation is teleological. Each … finds its end in the other" (Hall 2003: 122-123). And lastly, when Baudrillard (1981a) claims that "this is all seen as the opposite of the abstract, reified "alienated" relation the subject would have toward products as exchange values" (134), he reveals the ideological nature of his polemic via his clear misreading of Marx's categories. In other words,

Baudrillard reads Marx as maintaining the position that, in fact, Marx criticized. Baudrillard then proceeds to occupy Marx's actual theoretical position – that the manifestation of the commodity fetish, made up of concrete use value and abstract exchange value, is a function of ideology – only to then declare Marxism obsolete. Since Marxism, whatever else it may be, is one of the signifiers commonly associated with the critique of capitalism, Baudrillard in effect delegitimizes the critique of capitalist domination by calling into question the existence of capitalism as it is represented according to his own, though not according to Marx's actual rendering of the critique of political economy.

Finally, Baudrillard's misinterpretation of Marx can be attributed, as I have suggested, to the metaphysical nature of the concepts that he himself ascribes to Marx's analysis. In other words, Baudrillard's determination to find metaphysical assumptions in the Marxian analysis of capitalism only serves to indicate that he has failed to grasp the role that historical materialism plays as a methodological precept in Marx's critical theory. For Baudrillard (1975), a central problem of historical materialism is that, in his estimation, it bases "the intelligibility of the contradictions of political economy on the structural givens of the finished system (capital)" (65). Here Baudrillard interprets Marxism credibly, if in my view incorrectly, as a kind of historicist approach to social dynamics. There are at least two possible responses to this.

First, Slavoj Žižek, leaning towards Hegel in his interpretation of history, argues that it is not that Marxist political economy "projects itself retrospectively" (Baudrillard 1975: 66) onto all other forms of society and then posits a logical progression from one successive stage of history to the next, but rather that "all civilized societies were class societies, but prior to capitalism, their class structure was distorted by a network of other hierarchical orders (castes, estates, and so forth) – only with capitalism, when individuals are formally free and equal, deprived of all traditional hierarchical links, does the class structure appear 'as such'" (Žižek 2010: 196). Despite appearances, Žižek claims that this is not a teleological argument. Instead, his argument works retroactively such that "once capitalism arrives (emerging in a wholly contingent way), it provides a universal key for all other formations" (197). Theoretically, this argument can answer a number of objections to traditional Marxist views such as critiques of Marxist history that claim he is committed to a kind of teleological causality. Also, it is wholly consistent with Baudrillard's (1975) characterization of Marxist historical materialism as "the projection of the class struggle and the mode of production onto all previous history" (67). However, it is difficult to see what methodological role this model can play other than to colonize all of history according to the dictates of the present. For Baudrillard (1975) – and here I am inclined to agree – this rendering of history, a kind of 'coming to historical consciousness', is closely related to "the vision of a future 'freedom' based on the conscious domination of nature" (67). If this is true then we would appear to have bought into precisely the kind of metaphysics of the subject/object that Baudrillard critiques, a metaphysics of history grounded in the productivity of 'concrete labour', a productivity that has been consistently exploited at the distributive level of the relations of production.

However, Moishe Postone (1996) offers another possible response to Baudrillard's objection to Marx's historical method. Postone's view is that Marx's critique of capitalism involves a "historically specific social explanation of the existence of a historical logic" (258); the historical specificity of Postone's reading of Marx's critical theory "rejects any notion of an immanent logic of human history as yet another projection onto history in general of capitalist society's conditions" (258), conditions beholden to bourgeois humanist metaphysics, for example. This reading of Marx's historical materialism also avoids the productivism that Baudrillard goes to such lengths to attribute to Marx by grounding that productivism in the structures of capitalism as a historically circumscribed mode of social organization and production. As such, the productivism that Baudrillard attributes to Marx is, in this account, an element of the object of Marx's critique – of bourgeois political economy. Likewise, Postone's rendering of historical materialism avoids a teleological metaphysics of human history, writ large, while still retaining the ability to explain the dynamics of capitalist history.

> The idea that an immanent historical logic characterizes capitalism but not all of human history opposes any conception of a unitary mode of historical development. Yet such a notion does not imply an abstract form of relativism. Although the rise of capitalism in Western Europe may have been a contingent development, the consolidation of the commodity form is a global process, mediated by a world market that becomes increasingly integrated in the course of capitalist development. This process entails the constitution of world history. Thus, according to such an approach, a universal process with an immanent logic of development that provides the standpoint of a general critique does exist; it is historically determinate, however, and not transhistorical (Postone 1996: 258).

Finally, because Postone renders Marx's historical materialism as a critique of a historically determinate form

of social organization, Baudrillard's (1975) claim that Marx's critique of labour in capitalism "produces the universal abstraction of the concept of labour and the retrospective illusion of the validity of this concept for all societies" (85) ceases to appear as a problem of the Marxian analysis. It can instead be explained with reference to the fetishization of the categories of the abstract and concrete, a fetishization that emerges on the basis of social organizations arising with a mode of social production whose essence is the commodity form.

Conclusion: Pace Baudrillard

In sum, Jean Baudrillard makes a number of salient critiques of what can be termed Marxist ideologies. And while he articulates important criticisms of Marx's categories that could serve as useful correctives and reinterpretations of the way that Marx's texts, concepts, categories, and methodological commitments have often been read, he nevertheless misrepresents Marx's texts themselves. As such, he abandons the project of articulating a revitalised critical theory of the capitalist social form and thereby often retreats to a pre-Marxist critical position – a pale reflection of the robustness of the Marxian critical method. Proclaiming the end of the dominance of the commodity while simultaneously denouncing the excesses of the contemporary consumer society in which we find ourselves today, a society which is no less subject to the whims of capital than when Marx was writing, Baudrillard appears to be trapped amongst the reflections and projections of his own errors of interpretation. In that sense, Baudrillard's social critique expresses itself in an idiom that is at best merely outdated, at worst, where Marxist analysis is concerned, he is speaking a language that is all his own. And if we recall that the Greek word idion referred to what was one's own, then where Baudrillard's critique of Marx is concerned we might say the following: "it is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing" (Shakespeare 1993: l. 27–29, Scene 5, Act 5).

References

1. According to Douglas Kellner (n.d.), "in his first three books, Baudrillard argued that the classical Marxian critique of political economy needed to be supplemented by semiological theories of the sign. His argument was ... that the transition from the earlier stage of competitive market capitalism to the stage of monopoly capitalism required increased attention to demand management, to augmenting and steering consumption." However, if Baudrillard's early work moved in the universe of Marxian critique, by the mid 1970's he declares "the end of political economy and thus the end of the Marxist problematic and of modernity itself" (Kellner 2006; Baudrillard 1975).

2. I am playing with Marx's language here. The original quotation reads as follows: "It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a manifesto of the party itself." In addition, the kind of project I am suggesting is by no means original and is well under way. Post-modernism and its by-products - post-structuralism, post-Marxism, post-colonialism, etc. - have come in for criticism from a number of scholars such as Douglas Kellner, David Harvey, Frederic Jameson, Terry Eagleton, Stuart Hall, and Slavoj Žižek, among others. More recently, Vivec Chibber has published a very strong critique of the post-colonial project in his book Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital. As such, I am suggesting that this project, already under way, be sustained and intensified. However, I am not interested in simply dismissing 'post' branded theories and critiques. Rather, I am interested in their recalibration, so far as that is possible, such that they can be reoriented toward the critique of capitalism.

3. For Baudrillard (1975), "productivist ideology" can be summed up as follows: "by positing use value as the realm beyond exchange value, all transcendence is locked into this single alternative within the field of value. Qualitative production is already the realm of rational, positive finality; the transformation of nature is the occasion of its objectification as a productive force under the sign of utility (the same is true simultaneously of human labor)" (45). In this way Baudrillard claims that Marxism adheres to a transhistorical metaphysics grounded in the productive utility of labor.

4. See, for example, Baudrillard's (1981b) critique of Hans Magnus Enzensberger.

5. I say 'apparent' because despite Baudrillard's repeated claims that Marxism is no longer relevant, he himself never really stops writing about it.

6. Baudrillard (1981b) does hint in the direction of what could be considered a form of resistance or revolutionary praxis in terms of "restoring the possibility of response" (170). This is basically a call for a complete rethinking and reconfiguration of the ownership and structure of global communication with reference to an increased degree, or possibility of the exercise of human agency. However, Baudrillard never really develops this abstract and very general line of thought. Instead he takes a deeply nihilistic turn in his subsequent work. Arthur Kroker (1985) claims that this pessimistic/nihilistic turn "is the basic condition for human emancipation as well as for the recovery of the tragic sense of critical theory" (81). But here too, radical critique and human emancipation, as Wendy Brown seems to imply, are grasped in terms of an "exploration" of contemporary experience with no explicit reference to a praxis by which to redress the critique. Furthermore, Kroker's claim that a pessimistic realism is the basic condition for human emancipation seems to go against the empirical 'facts' – Kroker's claim is mere assertion, undergirded neither by reason nor research. The student movements of the 1960's, for example, took place at a time and in a discursive context when political campaigns still made use of progress narratives such as Lyndon B. Johnson's 'Great Society'. By contrast Eugene Genovese (1976) documents the relative rarity of slave revolts in the seemingly hopeless (from the perspective of American Slaves) American South in his book Roll, Jordon, Roll: the World the Slaves Made. These examples seem to suggest just the opposite of what Kroker claims.

7. Adorno (1984) goes on to say in the same breath that idealism in this sense is "not unlike positive social science which records the products of social processes as ultimate facts to be accepted" (37). Indeed, as a "reification of results", idealism is in a close relationship to positivism with the caveat that one need not take a positive attitude toward those results. Herbert Marcuse (1999) points out that Auguste Comte, one of the forefathers of positivism, "explicitly stated that the term 'positive' by which he designated his philosophy implied educating men to take a positive attitude towards the prevailing state of affairs. Positive philosophy was going to affirm the existing order against those who asserted the need for 'negating' it" (329). Clearly, an idealist position allows one to accept the prevailing state of affairs without taking a positive attitude towards it. One can simply take a resigned attitude towards prevailing affairs. If Comte thought that a positive attitude was necessary to counteract the perceived requirements of negation, Baudrillard shows that there is an alternative – one can simply despair of the possibility of negating the prevailing state of affairs. Either way, prevailing affairs remain safe and sound. As such, the key difference between the positivist and the idealist where social change is concerned seems to rest with the allowable range personal dispositions.

8. Ironically this is just what Baudrillard (1975) claims is the problem with historical materialism's approach to "primitive societies" (49-50).

9. Kroker, while recognizing Baudrillard's nihilism and referring to him as a tragic philosopher, sees these qualities as indications of Baudrillard's stark and progressive realism. But he never does address the socially conservative role that tragic art often plays. At any rate, what seems clear is that there is not so much disagreement amongst commentators about the content of Baudrillard's writing as there is concerning Baudrillard's aesthetic - he leaves us in the lurch as to whether he is progressive (hopeful), conservative (pessimistic), or somehow both at once.

10. According to Baudrillard (2010), "caught in a vast Stockholm syndrome, the alienated, the oppressed, and the colonized are siding with the system that holds them hostage. They are now 'annexed,' in the literal sense, prisoners of the 'nexus,' of the network, connected for better or for worse" (37).

11. On this point, according to Baudrillard (2010) "current critical thought continues along its trajectory but it is no longer the critical thought of the Enlightenment and modernity, which had their own object and their own energy. It is merely an epiphenomenon of a world where there is nothing left to analyze in the hopes of subverting it. This thought is no longer current because we are no longer in a 'critical' situation, like the historical domination of capital. We have entered a hegemonic form of total reality, of closed-circuit global power that has even captured the negative. All that is left today is the specific product of this posthumous situation where it no longer has a historical reason to exist or any effectiveness" (40–41).

12. On this last point Baudrillard (2010) claims that "in any event, the question of 'capital' must be reconfigured. ... We must try to pass 'through the looking glass,' beyond the mirror of production" (42). This is an interesting position to take. For here Baudrillard appears to suggest that something very much like ideology is in play where capitalism is concerned. However, this claim certainly fails to avoid contradiction with his earlier claim (see note 11) that there is nothing left to critique, or rather to 'transcend', for lack of a better term.

13. Baudrillard's (1993) rendering of this claim reads as follows: "The end of labour. The end of production. The end of political economy. The end of the signifier/signified dialectic which facilitates the accumulation of knowledge and meaning, the linear syntagma of cumulative discourse. And at the same time, the end of the exchange-value/use-value dialectic which is the only thing that makes accumulation and social production possible. The end of the linear dimension of discourse. The end of the linear dimension of the commodity. The end of the classical era of the sign. The end of the era of production. It is not the revolution which puts an end to all this, it is capital itself which abolishes the determination of the social according to the means of production, substitutes the structural form for the commodity form of value, and currently controls every aspect of the system's strategy" (8).

14. In the postscript to Max Horkheimer's (1972) now classic essay "Traditional and Critical Theory," critical theory is defined in terms of its object of analysis - "men as producers of their own historical way of life in its totality" - and with reference to its practicality - "the real situations which are the starting-point of science are not regarded simply as data to be verified ... [but also] the intervention of reason in the processes whereby knowledge and its object are constituted." Finally, "critical theory in its concept formation and in all phases of its development very consciously makes its own that concern for the rational organization of human activity which it is its task to illumine and legitimate. For this theory is not concerned only with goals already imposed by existent ways of life, but with men and all their potentialities;" which is to say, finally, that critical theory makes normative claims on the basis of its analytic and practical claims (244–245). If Baudrillard is correct in claiming that we have left behind the social formation in which the form of human praxis analyzed by Marx, abstract labor as the bearer of value, engenders social organization, then he has a strong case to suggest that Marxism no longer grasps one of the elementary requirements for a theory to be critical, "the real situations" in which humans find themselves. However, Baudrillard fails to make a convincing case to show that we have left this form of social organization behind.

15. Baudrillard (2010) differentiates between hegemony and domination as follows: "'HEGEMON' means the one who commands, orders, leads and governs (and not the one who dominates and exploits). This brings us back to the literal meaning of the word 'cybernetic' (Kubernetiké, the art of governing). Contrary to domination, a hegemony of world power is no longer a dual, personal or real form of domination, but the domination of networks, of calculation and integral exchange. Domination can be overthrown from the outside. Hegemony can only be inverted or reversed from the inside. Two different, almost contrary paradigms: the paradigm of revolution, transgression, subversion (domination) and the paradigm of inversion, reversion, auto-liquidation (hegemony). They are almost exclusive of each other, because the mechanisms of revolution, of anti-domination, as history demonstrated, can become the impetus or the vector for hegemony" (34). This conceptual differentiation is problematic, mainly as a consequence of its ahistorical approach. However, a critique of Baudrillard's concept of 'hegemony' is beyond the purview of this analysis.

16. Baudrillard (1975) phrases his rejection of Marxism in the following way: "The super-ideology of the sign and the general operationalization of the signifier everywhere sanctioned today by the new master disciplines of structural linguistics, semiology, information theory, and cybernetics - has replaced good old political economy as the theoretical basis of the system. This new ideological structure, that plays on the hieroglyphs of the code, is much more illegible than that which played on productive energy. This manipulation, that plays on the faculty of producing meaning and difference, is more radical than that which plays on labour power" (122).

17. This claim bears significant similarity to Bertell Ollman's (1976) argument that Marx subscribes to a philosophy of "internal relations" (Ch. 3).

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Displays of Colonial Shame in Puerto Rican Reggaetón

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Yo soy el que nadie entiende, el loco demente,
la voz del pueblo,
el más buena gente,todo lo que yo te hable va a ser desagradable,
muy inteligente y supuestamente, poco saludable.
Gracias a mis insultos,
los niños tienen que escucharme bajo la supervisión de un adulto[1]

— Calle 13 "Ven y Critícame"

Yo no planto bandera pues yo no soy Cristóbal Colon,
yo soy de Las Acacias cien por ciento de corazón,
de ningún caserío yo me quiero hacer dueño,
no soy un extranjero soy puertorriqueño[2].

— Vico C "La Recta Final"

It was summer 2004 in Puerto Rico, I had just gotten my hands on the new Barrio Fino CD, and I was on my way to the local Sam's Club in Ponce to meet Daddy Yankee. I was ecstatic on the way there and blasted the CD as loud as it could go in the car. I arrived about two hours early and the dense line, made up of equally exited fans, stretched around inside and outside the door. I never got to meet Daddy Yankee because he decided to leave (after several hours) before it was my turn. I, and the countless other fans who left Sam's Club that day without an autograph or picture, were not bitter. We played our CDs loudly on the way back home and were not ashamed to love reggaetón[3]. Fast forward to Puerto Rico today, and while reggaetón is still fairly popular at parties or at local youth hangouts, the love for reggaetón has greatly decreased on the island. Gone are the days when people were not ashamed of liking the genre. Now, listeners of reggaetón are stereotyped as being without morals, overly sexual, and having criminal inclinations. Reggaetón is still a popular genre in the wider Latin American community, as evidenced by the numerous reggaetón artists that appear on popular TV shows, such as Nuestra Belleza Latina, and by the reggaetón artists who still win music awards and whose music tops the charts. Why is this acceptance of the genre by the wider Latina community not a reflection of Puerto Rican sentiments?

Radio stations, music videos, and elaborate concerts are just some of the ways that music is part of the burgeoning culture industry. With its entertaining yet innocent façade, the music industry has covertly helped shape many aspects of contemporary culture, such as fashion trends, personal identity, and even media production styles, to name a few. According to Debord (1970), spectacles refer to media events that are produced by the culture industry and are designed to influence audience behavior in order to maintain their hegemonic relationship with the ruling class. I use Kellner's (2003) diagnostic critique as my methodological framework. Kellner explains that "The conception of cultural studies as a diagnostic critique thus combines using social theory to interpret and contextualize phenomena of media culture with developing close readings and situating of cultural texts to elucidate contemporary culture and society" (29). This framework facilitates the analysis of the rise and fall of reggaetón because it provides insights into

how the culture industry shapes the perception of the genre among the Puerto Rican population.

I believe that the key to unraveling this peculiar phenomena is to understand that Puerto Rican's changing acceptance of reggaetón has an adverse relationship with the culture industry's standardization of the genre, coupled with Puerto Rico's unique relationship with colonial shame. Rivera et al. (2009) explains that "reggaeton is neither hip-hop nor dancehall nor Latin nor tropical in the traditional sense, yet it draws from all of these (and forges imagined connections with them) in projecting a discursive, resonant sound" (8). She also contends that reggaetón, with "Its suggestive sonic and cultural profile has animated contentious debates around issues of race, nation, class, gender, sexuality, and language" (1). While it is true that reggaetón originally gained popularity among lower-class youth, this does not represent the characteristics of the wider audience. Much like hip-hop, which was characterized by its "blackness" but whose main audience was white suburban male teenagers (Rose 1994), reggaetón is characterized as a lower class Puerto Rican genre, despite its success in the general Latino market, which cuts across economic barriers.

I chose to focus on Puerto Rican reggaetón over other international manifestations of this genre due to Puerto Rico's tumultuous colonial history coupled with its uncertain political status, which has resulted in a phenomenon called Puerto Rican shame. Negrón Muntaner (2004) argues that Puerto Rican attempts to value themselves have "frequently been staged through spectacles to offset shame" and that Boricua identity as we know it would not exist without the "shame" of being Puerto Rican (xiv). This shame is not the product of an individual inferiority complex, but rather a mechanism that constitutes "social identities generated by conflict within asymmetrical power relations" (xiii). Puerto Ricans have historically been disadvantaged due to their constant colonial status since the fifteenth century. Boricua identities have been produced in a political environment marked by various "sites of 'colonial' shame" in which Puerto Ricans have been degraded; as a result, Puerto Rican pride is not a freely chosen affirmation but the "effect of a subjection" (6). Puerto Rico is a colony whose residents are born American but who are second class citizens due to not having the same rights as their mainland counterparts, such as the right to vote in a Presidential election, despite being allowed to vote in primaries. Since the identity that defines itself as a source of special pride is so closely tied to shame, the identity is "constitutively shameful" and is, inevitably, an "ambivalent" identity (8). Many Puerto Ricans proudly uphold their Boricua ethno national status, despite the fact that they are legally Americans. I believe that Puerto Rican colonial shame was a key factor in the massive popularity of the reggaetón spectacle in the early 2000s.

The culture industry's one-dimensional representation of Puerto Rican reggaetón was increasingly degrading, which played a role in how Boricua's viewed the genre. For the most part, the current media in Puerto Rico has distanced themselves from reggaetón in order to dis-associate themselves with the negative stereotypes accompanying the spectacle of reggaetón. Negron-Muntaner (2004) states that the most vital cultural productions that deal with Boricua identity have "sprung not from the denial of shame, but from its acknowledgment into wounds that we can be touched by" (xvvi). Puerto Ricans readily appropriated themselves as the original reggaetón artists in the genre's heyday. Nonetheless reggaetón took a turn, much like hip hop did in the nineties. Agger (1992) states that "The ideological outcomes of the culture industry are in a sense unintended; they emerge in the interplay of authorial, directorial, and audience assumptions about the nature of the world" (65). Hart (2009) expands on Agger's idea to assert that "the effect of the culture industry's cycle of assumptions on the one-dimensional representation of hip hop music and its reflection and reinforcement of Whites' perceptions of Blacks and Black Culture. The reinforcement of Whites' historically negative racial attitudes emerge unintended through a complex cycle of assumptions between the director (culture industry), the author (hip hop artist), and the audience (White consumers)" (v). These same assumptions apply to the one-dimensional representation of reggaetón in Puerto Rico. The difference is that instead of white culture devaluing black culture, Puerto Ricans base their evaluation of the genre on negative stereotypes revolving around poor people who live in public housing projects. Therefore, the director remains the culture industry, but the author becomes the reggaetón artist, and the audience is the middle to upper class Puerto Ricans, irrespective of the color of their skin.

Reggaetón fell out of favor with the wider Puerto Rican public after its boom in 2005. Critics publicly accused reggaetón of not being creative because all of the songs in the genre use the same rhythmic beat and they argued that reggaetón aggressively promoted sex, violence, and drugs, which made the genre a bad influence on the general public. These same critiques against reggaetón mirror the public discourse, which attacks the urban poor and is not based on fact. Reggaetón artists readily accept that their music was originally widely accepted by lower class youths, but a great quantity of reggaetón fans come from different social classes and racial backgrounds.

Puerto Ricans were eager to be the face of a widely successful and promising new musical genre that boasted

audiences from diverse cultures and social statuses. Puerto Rican reggaetón is worthy of study as part of the hip hop diaspora because it was originally Puerto Rican artists who put the genre on the international map (Chosen Few 2005). Puerto Rican artists such as Don Omar and Daddy Yankee brought reggaetón to the mainland and made it popular among the Latino/a population. Early optimism for reggaetón reached its height in the mid-2000s. This hype led to talk that it could replace Spanish hip-hop and influenced the creation of many reggaetón-only radio stations and production companies both in Puerto Rico and in the United States. Reggaetón made the top of the popular playlists and artists won prestigious music awards, such as Daddy Yankee, who won the Latin Grammy, the Billboard Music Award, and the ALMA Award in 2005.

I divide the Reggaetón into two phases: underground reggaetón and mainstream reggaetón ("Vico C Still Holds it Down" 2006). Reggaetón is typically defined as music that has the characteristic "boom-ch-boom-chick" drum rhythm (Marshall 2010). However, due to current trends in the expansion of the genre, it is now typically called música urbana and includes music with various rhythms. I agree with the inclusive term música urbana because I think that a genre can have various rhythms, but for the purposes of this essay, I will refer to the collective genre of música urbana as reggaetón in order to stay true the genre's origin.

The first phase of the genre, which I call old school reggaetón, spans roughly from the early nineties too early 2004. According to the documentary The Chosen Few (2005), reggaetón as a genre had its origin in Panama in 1989 with artists such as El General, Nando Boom and Pocho Pan, who combined Jamaican reggae beats with Spanish lyrics. Its unique characteristic rhythm, however, became popular in the 90s and had roots in dancehall reggae, particularly with the song "Dem Bow" by Jamaican Shabba Ranks. Marshall (2008) elaborates by explaining that in reggaetón, the "features that more audibly connect dancehall reggae—most commonly and recognizably defined by its minimal 3+3+2 drum rhythms—to the harmonic and melodic conventions of the roots of reggae tradition" (135). According to longwoof.com, old school reggaetón featured dembow prominently.

According to the documentary, The Noise by Dj Negro (2003), Puerto Ricans in the early 90s were eager to get new music from Panama, but they could not because communication between both countries was scarce and difficult. DJ Negro took the initiative of opening The Noise nightclub in San Juan in order to cater to the needs of the audience. He came up with the idea of taking Panamanian instrumental records and recording over them with Puerto Rican artists. This opened up the genre in Puerto Rico by allowing previously inexperienced artists to participate in the creation of reggaeton and Spanish hip hop. The resulting music became immensely popular in the underground music scene. DJ Negro became a music producer sought after by young talent, including Vico C, who became the "self-described 'philosopher of reggaeton'" (Billows 2005). During this underground phase, the reggaetón genre, specifically the artists, enjoyed greater autonomy. According to Vico C in the documentary The Chosen Few (2005), the public was tired of listening to the standardized music produced by the industry. Once they saw the realness of the underground movement, they became loyal and adopted it.

Reggaetón arrived in Puerto Rico in the early-nineties and gained popularity with artists and producers such as DJ Negro, DJ Playero, and DJ Erick in conjunction with support from major dance clubs such as The Noise in San Juan. The underground nature of reggaetón in Puerto Rico was seminal to its development. Puerto Ricans were influenced by east coast hip hop due to their political status, which gave them easy access to the music ("Reggaeton" n.d.). The distribution of the music was primarily taken up by lower and middle class youths, who in turn supported the dance clubs that played the genre ("Reggaeton Music" n.d.). The timing of the height of genre was fortuitous because Spanish rap had become popular around the same time, with artists such as Vico C. Reggaetón began in the underground scene but eventually propelled into American popularity after its introduction to the New York, Chicago, and Miami dance clubs. Reggaetón became mainstream with N.O.R.E.'s "Oye Mi Canto" and Daddy Yankee's "Gasolina" in 2004 ("Reggaeton" n.d.).

Similar to the development of the country music genre (Peterson 1997), in the early days of reggaetón, the genre was not mediated by the culture industry, which led to greater creative freedom. Underground reggaetón tracks featured creative lyrics that had a mixture of topics, including those designed to protest violence and inequality, like for example, "Mataron a un Inocente" [They Killed an Innocent Person] by the duo Héctor y Tito[4]. In the song, they appeal to the audience to stop violent crimes. This song reverses the dehumanizing tendency of street violence by providing a pathos-based description of the effects of violent acts. They remind everyone that not only is violence unnecessary, but it also affects a wide range of people and often involves innocent victims. This song features the typical dembow rhythm, but not all underground reggaeton followed this pattern. Reggaetón songs produced before the massive push for commercialization that began around 2004 also featured rhythms that differed from the stereotypical "dembow" such as Vico C's "La Recta Final" [The Final Stage]. Daddy Yankee's first recorded song,

"Donde Mi No Vengas" DJ Playero 37 features a more traditional reggae rhythm and gained immense popularity in the underground scene.

Puerto Rican colonial shame had several functions during the development of the reggaetón genre. Originally, lower class Puerto Ricans, who predominantly came from public housing projects, readily accepted the new genre because they recognized that the music was authentic and dealt with issues they struggled with (Hector interview in Chosen Few 2005). Tego Calderon coincides and adds that people from this socio-economic area were fed up with not having representation in the media. This made them view reggaeton as a chance to enter public discourse and fight against the oppressive status quo. However, not all Puerto Ricans had this initial reaction towards reggaeton. Middle class Puerto Ricans met it with resistance, which manifested in protests, censorship, and boycotts. Negron Muntaner & Rivera (2009) explain that measures were taken to keep reggaetón off of the airwaves because of its so-called corrupting influence. Politicians even attempted to take legal actions against the genre because they believed that it promoted violence and had a relationship with the drug trade.

Ethnic identification also played a role in how the upper and middle class viewed reggaetón. Historically, many Puerto Ricans, especially those in the upper and middle class, along with politicians, have attempted to whitewash themselves (Negron-Muntaner 2004). Several scholars have concluded that Puerto Rican attempts to identify themselves with (white) Spain is a way to differentiate themselves from the United States while also appearing desirable by negating their African influence. Whitewashing is also evident in the 2000 census, where 80.5% of Puerto Ricans identified themselves as being white, versus only 8% that identified themselves as being black. Negron-Muntaner (2004) argues that these results show "a clear example of how racism…informs self-identification within parameters that are different from American ones" (212). These trends in ethnic identity were initially detrimental to the acceptance of underground reggaetón in Puerto Rico. Reggaetón, with its suggestive beats and African rhythms, coupled with an association with the lower classes and its subversive nature, was difficult for many Puerto Ricans to initially accept.

A function of Puerto Rican colonial shame is to promote Puerto Rican ethno-national pride and superiority in order to counter "American claims of Puerto Rican racial inferiority" (Negron-Muntaner, 2004, 16). Julio Morales analyzed in depth the discrimination, poor salaries, high unemployment, and generally poor living conditions faced by Puerto Ricans. He found that the negative stereotypes attributed to Puerto Rican migrants were the result of neocolonial oppression, which controlled the ideological discourse of American culture and politics during the first half-century after the American invasion. Eugene Mohr states that "among the nation's ethnic groups they are distinguished by a long list of negatives: lowest family incomes; highest percentage of low-level jobs; and homes without breadwinners; and the highest rate of school dropouts and of deaths from homicides, accidents, drug abuse, and cirrhosis of the liver" (xi). Therefore, the initial reaction against reggaetón by middle and upper class Puerto Ricans was an attempt to distance themselves from the negative connotations of the genre and to make themselves appear more favorable in the media.

Puerto Rican ethno-nationalism with regards to reggaetón manifested itself clearly in the period between 2004 and 2006 during the worldwide reggaetón craze. Puerto Ricans named themselves the main proponents of the genre and gave reggaetón a favored position within their culture. LeBron (2011) claims that after the "death of salsa" and reggaetón's success in international music markets, the genre became repositioned as Puerto Rico's national music, or "the new acoustic scaffolding of the nation" (222). Rivera and Negron-Muntaner (2009) identify the public's shift in acceptance of reggaetón with the 2003 political campaigns, where

> el cuerpo político cambió sutilmente de bando. Durante ese periodo, se volvió muy común ver a políticos en plena campaña bailando patitiesos en su esfuerzo por mostrarle al electorado joven que ellos estaban al día con la moda. Ya para 2007, cuando la cantante pop mexicana Paulina Rubio expresó que su sencillo de reggaetón era un tributo a Puerto Rico ya que «está claro que el reguetón es de ustedes», y nadie protestó, el escritor Juan Antonio Ramos declaró que la guerra contra el reggaetón había acabado. «Hace cinco o siete años atrás tal afimación habría sido tomada no solo como un lamentable desatino, sino como un monumental insulto a la dignidad del pueblo puertorriqueño», escribió Ramos sobre la afirmación de Rubio. «El éxito del reguetón es tal que se ha quedado sin detractores (...) No sería exagerado decir que hablar mal del reguetón es casi un sacrilegio. Es casi ser un mal puertorriqueño.»[5]

However, this patriotic fever died down once the homogenization process was completed and Puerto Ricans began to hear the critiques against reggaetón by the media. There are numerous articles in El Nuevo Dia [The New Day] (the most popular newspaper on the island) that brutally attacked reggaetón. In keeping with the theory of Puerto Rican shame, audiences began to reject the genre because of the negative associations with it. According to

Negron Muntaner (2004), Puerto Ricans strive to show the world how great their "country" is in order to subvert the shame of their colonialism and history of facing oppressors with passivity. Reggaetón, before its widespread commercialization, was touted as a product that represented the ingenuity and worth of the Puerto Rican people. The culture industry changed the genre, which caused the Puerto Rican population to no longer want to be associated with it. There are numerous articles published in Puerto Rican newspapers and online that present Puerto Ricans critiquing reggaetón.

The culture industry changed the nature of reggaetón and made it one-dimensional, like it did with hip-hip, as explained by Hart (2009). Instead of promoting varied lyric content and innovation, homogenization of the reggaetón genre was prescribed in order to maintain hegemony and gain corporate profits outside of the Puerto Rican diaspora. The dembow rhythm was standardized and artists began to join major record labels such as Universal Music Group, which produced Daddy Yankee's breakthrough CD "Barrio Fino" [Fancy Neighborhood]. After the homogenizing influence of the culture industry, popular reggaetón songs promoted the stereotypical image of underprivileged Puerto Ricans who endorsed violence, were extremely sexualized, and participated in illegal activities.

A cursory look at the Puerto Rican artists with the most #1 hits in the Latin Rhythm Albums Chart proves this point. Daddy Yankee in Barrio Fino had hits other than "Gasolina" that portray unfavorable images of Puerto Ricans such as "Dale Caliente," which glamorizes criminal behavior, and "No Me Dejes Solo" and "Lo que Paso Paso," which refer to women in a vulgar manner.[6] Barrio Fino: En Directo features the hit single "Rompe" which describes a confrontation between two drug dealers at the club.[7] Wisin y Yandel, the reggaeton duo with the most number one singles of this category also feature degrading stereotypes. In their albums, Pa'l Mundo and Tomando el Control: Live the duo sing to women in a constant sexualized way while also glamorizing drug trafficking in their music videos, particularly for their song "El Telefono.[8]" Don Omar is also a reggaetón heavyweight, especially with the success of his albums Reggaetón Latino and King of Kings. In the song, "Reggaeton Latino," Don Omar tells a woman to let herself go and have sex with him while in "Dile" he accuses a woman of being a cheater for sleeping with him while having a boyfriend and claims that she has no excuse for her actions. He finally implores her to sleep with him again. These themes are also repeated in his songs "Salio el Sol" and Belly Danza." [9]

Rossman (2015) explains that in order for songs (and new genres) to be successful, they must fit into one of the pre-established genres. The more a song fit a particular mode, the more airplay and popularity it would have. He claims that "a program director or music director who is evaluating a song is evaluating it in terms of its relevance to the station's format… Format so completely structures radio that its effects reach upstream into the music recording industry" (72). This directorial control over the production of commercialized reggaetón is unfavorable to Puerto Ricans because, as Hart (2009) describes, audiences eventually reach the point where they are "unable to separate themselves from the scripted reality of the culture industry, individuals move in tandem with the dominant ideologies that reinforce unequal social structures based on race, class, and gender" (11). Authors are removed from the pictures by big music producers and instead the directors give the audience music that caters to their already pre-established beliefs. Puerto Rico is a small island with only a few million people on the mainland. Reggaetón directors and authors who wanted to cross over from the small Puerto Rican audience had to produce songs that the wider American public could relate to. This phenomenon is not exclusively tied to reggaetón. Hart and Rose made similar claims about the one-dimensional (and often stereotypical) representation of blacks in hip hop.

Therefore, after reaching mainstream success on the mainland, Puerto Rican reggaetón was initially praised by Puerto Ricans as being the next mainstream representation of their ethno-national music. Puerto Rican sentiments shifted, however, after the initial reggaetón boom of the early 2000s due to the negative associations that became standard for the genre. This genre that became a spectacle that promoted Puerto Rican ethno-national superiority became instead a hegemonic force that reinforced historically negative ideologies. This caused the function of colonial shame to shift from promoting ethno-national pride to rejecting the genre in order to turn away from the negative associations of the genre.

There have been several attempts by the media to explain the decline of reggaeton's popularity among the Puerto Rican population. Critics attack reggaetón as promoting gang violence and drug use/distribution. Gangsta Rap has likewise gained notoriety as being militant and promoting violence. However, Rose asserts that it is important to note that Gangsta Rap and hard core hip-hop are styles of protest music. The topics of their songs often reflect the reality of many listeners and serve as a method of rebellion, such as Public Enemy's "Night of the Living Baseheads" which Rose explains is a song that protests racial discrimination and crack use in the black community. Reggaetón is no different. The more hardcore version of reggaetón, called tiroreo, contains violent images and drug references, but original reggaetón artists such as Vico C and Calle 13 used their lyrics as a buffer and rebellion against oppression.

For example, Calle 13's "Intel-Lú-Ayala" is about political injustices during Spanish and American colonialism that remain overlooked.

Reggaetón has also been critiqued for relying too much on the repetitive dembow rhythm, which fails to invite artist creativity. On the contrary, many musical genres such as country and rock use repetitive rhythms. Dembow has also been deemed by critics as overly sexual. According to Simon Frith (2011), ethnic music has usually endured this critique because of the difference between ethnic and Western musical styles. Traditional high music was regarded as one that did not need a physical reaction (such as in a classical music concert, where nobody moves). Music with African beats is different because it is more rhythmic and thus promotes a physical response from the listener.

Not all reggaetón has been chastised, however. Old school reggaetón remains in high regard among Puerto Ricans, which further coincides with the public's shift in acceptance and the culture industry's influence on the genre. Currently, reggaetón sales are down among Puerto Ricans and there is a tendency for artists to try to change reggaetón's image in order to distance themselves from the commercialized homogenous genre of the early 2000s. Music stations that once played reggaetón only re-branded themselves as música urbana and now play a mix of hip hop and reggaetón, as well as remixed popular songs. Nevertheless, when one considers Horkheimer and Adorno's (1972) culture industry thesis, it becomes clear that the so-called variations within the modern manifestation of the genre is actually a façade and only creates the illusion of choice. This change within the reggaetón industry might be too little too late to save the genre. For example, YouTube users that publish new Puerto Rican reggaetón music videos are often met with critical comments that favor an artist's "classic" songs over new ones. This is similar to what has happened to hip-hop artists, whose classic music is typically favored.

Frith (2011) explains that "Music constructs our sense of identity through the direct experiences it offers the body, time and sociability, experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives" (124). The homogenizing effect of reggaetón, through the influence of the culture industry, led to a decrease in popularity among the Puerto Rican population due in part to the negative images that became associated with the genre. Puerto Rican colonial shame is a phenomenon that manifests itself by promoting a positive image of Puerto Ricans, a characteristic that is essential to understanding why increased commercialization and standardization of the genre was met with harsh critiques and the eventual decrease in reggaetón's popularity. Negron-Muntaner explains "identification with Boricua stars by Puerto Ricans is as much a misrecognition of their marginal location as an articulation of a desired insider status…to the extent that stars call attention to the 'contributions' of Puerto Ricans … they also make Boricuas feel valuable—that they too have given to American culture—and hence more socially secure and less ashamed" (31). Therefore, this trend can be categorized as thwarting the masochistic tendencies of the culture industry because the denial of reggaetón among the Puerto Rican community ultimately takes a stand against the unjust way that they are portrayed by the media.

Endnotes

1. I am the person who no one understand, the demented crazy person/ the voice of the people, the friendliest person/ everything that I say will be disagreeable/ very intelligent and supposedly, not healthy/ Thanks to my insults/ children have to listen to me with adult supervision.

2. I don't conquer with a flag because I am not Christopher Columbus/ I am 100% from the heart from The Acacias, I don't want to be the owner of no projects/ I am not a foreigner I am Puerto Rican.

3. Reggaetón has many spellings. I use this spelling because it is the most widely accepted variant in Puerto Rico. Quotes from sources that contain different spellings will remain unchanged.

4. Original lyrics: Mataron, mataron un inocente/ Volando él se fue/ Ya lo mataron su cuerpo descargado/ Y el enemigo seguí disparando/ Sus padres lloran también llora su hermano/ Y sus amigos lo quieren ver parado.../ Dios te lo dijo pero también te lo puede quitar/ Y si tu matas también te mataran/ Y me pregunto por qué mi gente se está acabando/ la vida es una y la vivimos matando/ recuerda el juicio se estará acercando .../ Héctor y Tito sufren/ al saber que muchos amigos ya cayeron

5. My translation: "Political parties have subtlety changed their stance. During this period, it was very common to see politicians dancing stiffly in the middle of their campaigns in an effort to demonstrate to young voters that they were up to date with current trends. Then in 2007, when the Mexican pop singer Paulina

Rubio stated that her new reggaetón single was a tribute to Puerto Rico because "of course reggaetón is yours," and no one protested, the writer, Juan Antonio Ramos, declared that the war against reggaetón had finished. "It was five or six years ago that this type of affirmation would have been taken not only like a lamentable blow, but also as a monumental insult to the dignity of the Puerto Rican people," wrote Ramos in reaction to Rubio's affirmation. "The success of reggaetón is such that it has been left without naysayers (...) It would not be exaggerated to say that to talk bad about the genre is almost a sacrilege. It's like being a bad Puerto Rican."

6. Selected Lyrics:

"Dale Caliente": Que llamen al nueve-once, que es tiempo de juego/ Dígale que Yankee ahora está tirando el fuego

"No Me Dejes Solo": Canto de fresca, te gusta ir de pesca

"Lo Que Paso Paso": es una asesina ella conlleva la medicina/ engañadora que te envuelve y te domina/ una abusadora ella como sabe te devora/ y si no tienes experiencia te enamora

7. "Rompe": Que pasa, socio? Que es la que hay?/ inche buey pensaste que esto era un mami/ No voy a dar break, deja ese guille de Scarface/ Get out my way, usted no vende ni en eBay/ No das pa' na' conmigo estas Frito Lay

8. Selected Lyrics from the CD Pa'l Mundo:

Rakata: Le gusta que Wisin la jale por el pelo/ Grítalo/ (Papi, dame lo que quiero)

Noche de Sexo: Empecemos en la playa/ Terminemos en la cama/ Trae la toalla porque te vas a mojar

Selected lyrics from the CD Tomando Control Live:

El Teléfono: Quiero tocarte/ Enredarte en la red/ Ponerte a la pared, pa devorarte/ Entonces suéltate, lúcete, sedúceme/ Vamos aprovéchate/ Enciéndete, libérate y caliéntate/ pa' devorarte. The music video that accompanies this song is interesting. The song is about wanting to make love over the telephone. There are several innuendos that the duo is singing about underage girls because they reference her parent. This is also made evident in the music video because one of the models wears a skimpy school girl uniform. It should be noted that the age of sexual consent in Puerto Rico is 14. The context of the video, however, differs from the lyrics because it shows the singers (along with Hector the Father) transporting cocaine from one country to another while presenting scenes of them gambling and showing off their money.

9. Selected lyrics from the CD Reggaeton Latino:

"Reggaeton Latino": Lucete, modelo/ Coge vuelo, revulea tu pelo/ Aunque tu gato le den celos/ Eso, salvaje, rompete el traje/ No hagas aguaje, baila con lo que te traje

"Dile": Que quizás fue la noche la que te traicionó/ O el perfume de pelo lo que te cautivo/ Que ya no tienes excusas pa' tu traición/ Porque con llorar no se compone/ Entonces a mí dame otra noche

Selected Lyrics from the CD King of Kings:

"Salió el Sol": Ella baila hasta sola/ Como grande mueve la cola

"Belly Danza": Me excita bailocuras/ Te cura/ Provoca tu calentura/ Bailando La mambura caliente/ Figura. que toca el suelo con tanta soltura

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Marxists Internet Archive Takedown

Tai Neilson

Administrators of the Marxists Internet Archive (MIA) removed the texts based on Marx and Engels' Collected Works (MECW) from their website on May 1, 2014. The works were taken down in compliance with a directive from the publisher Lawrence and Wishart (L&W) that claims ownership of the 50 volume collection. L&W's directive sought to retract these works - works by, arguably, two of the most important radical intellectuals that have been deceased for more than a century - from free public access. This incident exposes continuing conflicts at the intersection of intellectual property, labor and digital technologies. More specifically, it demonstrates how legal and ideological discourses of ownership and authorship are mobilized to benefit capital at the expense of public knowledge and even authors themselves. L&W's claim over these works stem from MECW's status as a derivative work. An analysis of the history of these works reveals that they are the product of many types of labor including the work done by Marx and Engels, academics, students, translators, publishers and online volunteers. This paper asks: how have economic and political interests shaped discourses of authorship and intellectual property that allow L&W to assert ownership over some of Marx and Engels' works? In what ways do new production practices and technological changes serve to challenge L&W's claim? And, what alternatives to the current intellectual property regime can address the needs of knowledge producers and the public?

The two institutions involved in the controversy over MECW represent different models of publishing. MIA uses the internet to facilitate collaborative production and the free distribution of information. It is a nonprofit, public archive that began in 1990 and is maintained through volunteer labor (http://marxists.org/admin/intro/index.htm 2014). The vast majority of the material in the archive is drawn from the public domain, and all MIA-created content is held under Creative Commons license, which permits users to freely "copy, distribute and/or modify" the material (http://marxists.org/admin/intro/index.htm 2014). Collaborative, online projects serve as alternatives to market mechanisms for distributing information goods. However, organizations like MIA, which draw on voluntary, unpaid contributions and publish information online, still face operating costs and limitations based on intellectual property law.

The sustainability of publishing models that rely solely on voluntary contributions is called into question by ongoing operating costs and legal challenges. To try to cover some operating costs MIA prints and sells a small selection of books. Voluntary organizations are unlikely to have the resources to compete with more traditional publishers when they are faced with litigation. MIA has maintained a policy of compliance with what it terms "bourgeois legality." More generally, this policy has meant limiting the website's content to texts that are already in the public domain. MIA has also complied with demands to remove material from its archive. In 2008 the archive's administrators removed sections of Antonio Gramsci's (1891-1937) Selections from the Prison Notebooks at the behest of L&W who claim ownership of the works translated by Quintin Hoare (http://marxists.org/archive/gramsci/index.htm 2014). This set a precedent for the case examined in this paper. Content based on the MECW was removed when L&W declared that the material was being distributed in breach of copyright (http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/cw/index.htm 2014). In both cases, L&W's claim to ownership relied on the material's status as derivative work. In other words, L&W claims to own the particular translation or compilation of the works, and in both cases MIA's administrators removed the material without legal recourse.

L&W represents a more traditional model of publishing and labels itself an independent British publisher. They were founded in 1936 as a partnership between Martin Lawrence, the British Communist Party's press, and Wishart Ltd, a leftist publisher. L&W publishes "literature, drama and poetry, as well as political economy, working-

class history and the classics of Marxism" (http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/about.html 2014). In a response to criticism directed at the company for directing the takedown of MECW material, L&W note that:

> As small radical publishers ourselves, we are of course familiar with the complexity and difficulty of publishing in the digital age. The debate over MECW is a proxy for what L&W have been continuously grappling with for the last two decades: how to run a sustainable radical publishing company in this new context (http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/collected_works_statement.html 2014).

As L&W's response indicates, the conflict over MECW highlights the cleavages between two models of publishing and represents a microcosm of wider debates about intellectual property, labor and digital media.

L&W invokes the body of intellectual property law related to copyright to lay claim to versions of the works of Marx and Engels. Copyright is a legal apparatus that affords the producer of a creative work the rights to publish or sell their product, but authors can also transfer this right to third parties such as publishers (Foster and Shook 1989). Increasing recognition that the production of knowledge is a collective and ongoing process is placing pressure on copyright law and its basis in romantic understandings of the individual author. Further, the role of patents and copyrights as "social innovations designed to create artificial scarcities where none existed naturally" is made even more palpable as the internet can facilitate the proliferation of information (Arrow 1996: 125). By tracing the material and discursive history of these legal mechanisms it is possible to show how a cultural and legal formation as recent as intellectual property has established itself as a seemingly natural and eternal social good.

Histories of Intellectual Property

The legal and ideological apparatus of copyright has been subjected to criticism on historical and theoretical grounds. Michel Foucault spurred a number of historical critiques of the concept of authorship and intellectual property with his influential (1977) essay "What is an Author?" In the essay, Foucault argues that the author's function is a product of "the modes of circulation, valorization, attribution, and appropriation" of discourses that operate in a particular society (Foucault 1977: 137). The intellectual property laws that have been enacted in the West establish their legitimacy through concepts of the author, individual creativity and private property. These discourses were produced in the interest of writers, publishers and political rulers in Europe in the eighteenth century. Two different, but related, tracks to intellectual property rights emerged in Western Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. In continental Europe, moral rights for authors draw on idealist philosophy to justify economic and extra-economic rights for authors. In the Anglo-American context, Lockean and utilitarian approaches established a legal tradition of intellectual property. In both cases, the interests of publishers, states and writers shaped the discourses and legal apparatuses of intellectual property.

In continental Europe, writers and artists vied with commonly held interpretations of the arts as crafts that merely drew on preexisting ideas and whose products, in turn, constituted part of the public domain. In The Author, Art, and the Market (1994), Martha Woodmansee demonstrates how German poets and philosophers set out to produce a new concept of the "author" with monopoly rights over the products of their labor. Writers began to challenge existing pedagogical and utilitarian conceptions of art, suggesting that art has an intrinsic value. They coupled this notion with an emphasis on the individual genius of the artist (Woodmansee 1994: 30, 39). These writers had personal stakes in representing art as an intrinsically valuable endeavor and securing the right to their literary creations as property. This was made more pressing as Germany shifted from a patrimonial economic model of artistic production, in which artists were awarded honoraria from wealthy patrons or publishers, toward a market model.

Immanuel Kant, Johan Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel served to bring these new understandings of art from the periphery to the center of philosophy. Kant (1785) argues that the reprinting of books impinges on the author's agency. His approach understands writing as an act of speech, and reprinting, for Kant, constitutes an act on behalf of the author with or without their permission. Further, Fichte (1793) distinguishes three types of property in relation to books. He contends that ownership of the physical book is conferred on the buyer when the book is sold, and the ideas in the book become the communal property of the buyer and the author insofar as they can be appropriated through intellectual effort. However, the author retains ownership of the **form** in

which these ideas are presented (Woodmansee 1994: 51). And, more generally, Hegel contends that the actualization of human will and freedom requires the ownership of property (1974 [1821]: 19-20). These idealist philosophies justified the enactment of copyright laws in various pre-German principalities, and eventually the Berne Treaty of 1886 codified the rights of authors not only over the sale of their creations but, to an extent, over future uses.

Publishers also contended with cultural, economic and legal norms that were at odds with their material interests. Technological innovations including the invention of movable type presses in the late fifteenth century facilitated the larger market for books and new forms of piracy (Eisenstein 1983). Piracy was also encouraged through mercantilist state policies and a public who enjoyed more affordable reading material and benefited from increased public education and literacy (Woodmansee 1994: 46, 49). While during the eighteenth century some German publishers enjoyed monopoly "privileges" mandated by political rulers, they sought increased legal protections for the works that they published (Woodmansee 1994: 45). The conception of the author put forth by German philosophers and poets helped to bring the legal apparatus into line with the interests of the publishers, and even as authors were extended exclusive rights to their works, publishers garnered the most substantial economic benefits from the new protections.

In the Anglo-American context, John Locke's Two Treatises on Government provides a philosophical justification for intellectual property provisions. Locke argues that "every man has a 'property' in his own 'person'" and extends this to the products of his labor. Whatever one "removes out of the state of nature" and "mixes" with their labor becomes their property and "excludes the common right of other men" (Locke 1823: 116). Locke contends that property should be determined by labor, but he also argues for the alienability of the products of labor through contracts between, for instance, workers and employers. Women, children, slaves and workers cede the rights to the products of their labor to their master or employer (Locke 1823: 116, 140). Locke does not indicate that his argument can be directly applied to intellectual property. However, the Statute of Anne (1709) brought English copyright law in line with Locke's idea of natural rights and became the foundation for subsequent copyright regimes.

European copyright laws were spread, unevenly, through imperialist conquests. Napoleon's imperial expansion extended French copyright laws to a large swath of Europe. Spain extended its copyright laws to its colonies which covered the works of Spanish writers while special consent was required for the importation of works written in Spanish by colonial subjects (Foster and Shook 1989: 13). Locke's conception of property also travelled to the New World. In fact, Locke's schema served to justify colonial expropriation of seemingly unworked land through the labor of European settlers. British copyright legislation had jurisdiction over their North American colonies until the war of independence, when states began to produce their own laws around intellectual property. The writers of the US constitution enshrined the power of Congress "to promote the process of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writing and discoveries" (US Constitution in Gillespie 2007: 22). On paper, at least, US property laws promote the national interest or common good by means of securing the right to remuneration for authors and inventors. However, until the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, copyright in the US was granted to the first party to publish a text which often placed power in the hands of publishers rather than authors. While Frank Foster and Robert Shook argue that the contemporary law "strengthens the rights of authors and deemphasizes the rights of publishers," this law also extends copyright to 50-75 years after the death of the authors (1989: 18). The extension of copyright ultimately increases the profit margins for publishers by delaying the entry of works into the public domain.

Intellectual property regimes and the ideologies that support them serve to enrich capital often at the expense of writers and the public. The ideology of the author has been used to alienate the product of intellectual property from its producers. It emphasizes a particular type of labor while downplaying the collective and ongoing process of intellectual production. At the same time, it obscures this process from the public and the authors by providing a veneer of empowerment. Historically, the major interests involved in establishing an intellectual property regime in England were competing publishers rather than the authors and artists who served as an ideological foil (Kleiner 2008: 29). Mark Rose goes as far as to suggest "that the London booksellers invented the proprietary author, constructing him as a weapon in their struggle with the booksellers of the provinces" (1993: 41). More recent developments in intellectual property law in the US have extended the longevity of copyright well beyond the life of authors in order to keep works out of the public domain and to reap profits for publishers and media companies. The next section turns from a general ideology critique of authorship and the history of intellectual property, to a particular focus on the labor involved in producing Marx's oeuvre and the works that have been published in the MECW.

Marx and the Author Function

The production and collection of Marx and Engels' works is a continuing process that has involved writers, scholars, translators and editors, publishers, political organizations and even states. Before discussing the labor time involved in writing, translating and publishing Marx and Engels' works, I will consider the often controversial intellectual work of determining what counts as Marx's work and what does not. There are a number of ongoing conflicts over what should be included in Marx's oeuvre. These include debates over whether Marx should be given exclusive credit for the authorship of The Communist Manifesto, Louis Althusser's (1970) argument that there is an "epistemological break" between the young and the mature Marx, and Kevin Anderson's recent inclusion of Marx's late unpublished notebooks in Marx on the Margins. The role of determining which of these texts are worthy of inclusion as Marx's work has been made the task of scholars, editors and publishers.

One factor that has contributed to these debates is that Marx, like many writers, wrote in a number of different genres and coauthored works. Julius Smulkstys divides Marx's writings "into eight major categories: poetry and other attempts at writing literature during his youth; philosophical essays; polemical tracts; political pamphlets; correspondence; speeches; newspaper articles; and scientific or economic studies" (1974: 101). Marx penned large manuscripts, such as Capital Volume 1, only some of which were completed and published during his lifetime. In fact, the second two volumes of Capital were completed and published posthumously, largely thanks to Engels. Marx wrote pamphlets and manifestos: The Communist Manifesto, for instance, was written for the Communist League, of which Marx and Engels were active members. It was published in German before being translated into other languages, beginning with the first English edition translated by Helen Macfarlane (Draper 1994). Marx edited the Neue Rheinische Zeitung and was a frequent contributor to German and English language newspapers. The Manifesto was serialized and published in the Deutsche Londoner Zeitung and Marx held a position as a European correspondent for the New York Daily Tribune for which Engels occasionally wrote articles under Marx's moniker (Anderson 2010: 5). Finally, Marx's letters, including his correspondence with Engels, chronicle his political organizing, exchanges with other intellectuals, his family life, poor financial situation and repeated requests for money and commissions. Through his prolific writing, Marx produced an unprecedented critique of the capitalist system of private property while eking out a meager living from royalties, commissions and subscriptions.

While Marx received few royalties during his lifetime, almost all of his writing has since been collected, translated, edited and distributed. This process has involved the labor of writing as well as translating, editing, and publishing processes like typesetting. Christian Fuchs has attempted to calculate the labor involved in producing the MECW by looking specifically at Capital Volume 1, which is reprinted in volume 35 of the MECW. Capital draws on previous works by Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Jean-Baptiste Say as well as taking, as a point of departure, previous work by socialist thinkers such as Robert Owen and Charles Fourier. It also incorporates much of Marx's earlier work, especially The Critique of Political Economy, and is the culmination of myriad drafts and aborted attempts. Putting aside these influences and aborted attempts, Fuchs contends that the text "has primarily been enabled by estimated 20,000 hours of Marx's work, 10,000 hours of [Samuel] Moore and [Edward] Aveling's work and 5,000 hours of Engels' work" (Fuchs 2014). Marx helped to edit and translate a French edition, while the English edition, upon which the MECW version is based, was translated by Moore and Aveling and edited by Engels. It is difficult to determine whether Fuchs' estimations are correct, but he directs attention to the considerable collaborative labor and resources expended in the ongoing creation of Marx and Engels' oeuvre.

The process of publishing a definitive collection of Marx and Engels' work was begun in the 1920s by the Marx scholar David Riazanov with considerable financial support from the Soviet state. The largest collection of Marx's manuscripts and letters was held by the Second International, and Riazanov employed the help of Carl Gruenberg who was the director of the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University (and likely the labor of a cadre of students) to make copies of the collection which would become the Marx-Engels Gesamtausabe. Plans for more limited selections that would become the German-language Marx-Engels Werke, and the English-language Marx and Engels Collected Works (to which L&W now claims ownership) were also devised by Riazanov (Anderson 2010: 248). All of this work took place before L&W became involved in the process.

The labor involved in translating, copy editing, typesetting and distribution conducted and commissioned by L&W employees also serves to reproduce and disseminate Marx and Engels' works. Anderson notes: "The most extensive of [Marx's] journalistic writings, those for the Tribune, only became widely available in their entirety in their original English at the end of the 1980s, when they appeared in the Collected Works of Marx and Engels"

(Anderson 2010: 5). In an official statement the publisher notes: "The work that went into producing [the MECW] involved years of documentary research, collating and organizing, the commissioning of hundreds of translations, and academic work on references and context" (http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/collected_works_statement.html 2014). While much of Marx and Engels' work had already been collated and translated, the continuation of this process by L&W allows the publisher to assert its ownership of the MECW.

L&W's claim to the ownership of particular versions of Marx and Engels' work is not based on original authorship and it exemplifies the ways in which copyright alienates the ownership of intellectual property from its creators. L&W's copyright is based on the status of MECW as a "derivative work." The status of a derivative works can be conferred on translations as well as compilations (http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/resources/glossary.html#19 2012). In cases where the original work is in the public domain, as is the case with Marx and Engels' writing, the translator gains the sole right to distribute or sell the version that they create. Such a legal claim is also helped if the translator brings together fragments and adds annotations to constitute a reasonably original work, because The World Trade Organization's (1994) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and the (1996) WIPO Copyright Treaty have extended the label of "derivative work" to compilations and collections. However, translators and workers involved in producing compilations, like authors, generally sell their labor to publishers that have the capacity to profit from the sale of the work.

Existing copyright regimes do not acknowledge the history of collaborative production, maintenance and funding of Marx and Engels' texts when attributing the right to distribute and profit from MECW. In some instances, L&W claims ownership of texts under contract with translators while in others their claim can only be based on the book's status as compilation with added notations. Ultimately, this means that L&W can claim legal rights to the MECW and reap the profits of labor contributed by Marx, Engels, Moore, Aveling, Riavanov and many others who have contributed to the production of Marx's oeuvre. At the same time, they do not recognize the work required to produce and archive these texts in the MIA. L&W's claim is highly selective in terms of which aspects of the production and reproduction of MECW are recognized as the basis for ownership.

Digital Production and Intellectual Property

Despite the long history of collaboration that produced the collection, L&W is deploying its copyright claim to impede new avenues for digital reproduction at the expense of public access. With the advent of digital media, Tarleton Gillespie contends that copyright now faces "a technology that dramatically reimagined how and by whom culture is produced, sold, distributed and consumed" (Gillespie 2007: 4). As we have seen, intellectual property regimes emerged at the end of the eighteenth century when the primary technology for the reproduction and distribution of manuscripts was the printing press, authors and publishers were attempting to secure monopoly rights over particular texts, and European states were attempting to foster domestic markets while engaging in imperialist expansion. L&W's claim to the ownership of Marx and Engels' work is situated within new technological, economic, cultural and political constellations. The internet has lowered the cost of entry for prospective media producers, enabling forms of networked and online collaboration, and reduced the cost of copying, archiving and distributing information.

Scholars such as Clay Shirky celebrate the productivity of new collaborative and voluntary online projects while downplaying the labor involved in their reproduction. In his (2010) Cognitive Surplus, Shirky identifies the productive powers made available through increased leisure time, networked technologies and intrinsic motivations. He argues that since the end of the Second World War in developed countries there has been an increasing "amount of unstructured time cumulatively available to educated populations" (Shirky 2010: 5). The internet opens the way for these billions of collective leisure hours to be put toward creative and scientific endeavors. However, Shirky does not see these endeavors as involving labor. He asks, "what if the contributors aren't workers? What if they really are contributors, quite specifically intending their contributions to be acts of sharing rather than production?" (Shirky 2010: 58). People, like those involved in curating MIA, are willing to contribute their time and effort to causes and projects without remuneration. But, positing productive activities as solely "acts of sharing" avoids questions about what happens when these projects run afoul of strategies of accumulation. The rhetoric of MIA's volunteer page explicitly acknowledges that the contributions are both voluntary and a type of labor:

> Volunteers come into the project to do work on what they like — there is no top down or centralized planning structure... We are all involved with activities other than building this archive, from our day-jobs (and we hold a diverse array of them!) to being with our families and friends. The MIA has been built simply by workers who give a few minutes of labor at the end of the day (http://www.marxists.org/admin/volunteers/index.htm 2014).

In opposition to Shirky's approach, a focus on the labor involved in these projects can provide collaborative projects like the MIA with a legal and moral claim to collective ownership of their products.

Autonomist Marxists point to the prominence of "immaterial labor" in digital production. While this approach attempts to address the collaborative character of this work, it eclipses the specific types of labor that are required for the reproduction of projects like MIA. Scholars such as Maurizio Lazzarato argue that immaterial labor evades classical economic strategies of measurement, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest that the "temporal unity of labor as the basic measure of value today makes no sense" (Lazzarato 1996: 113; Hardt and Negri 2004: 145). While MIA relies on the contributions of volunteers from around the world who collaborate remotely and in their own time via the internet, it is possible to identify the particular types of work and the labor time required to produce and archive specific texts. In addition to the technical work that goes into maintaining MIA's website and archives, volunteers engage in transcribing/publishing, translating, proofreading and researching. Before the version of Capital Volume 1 based on the MECW was removed from MIA's website, the site listed Bert Schultz as the transcriber, Brian Baggins and Andy Blunden as responsible for the html markup, and Andy Blunden as a proof reader. In response to a question about the time necessary to archiving a text, Blunden noted that "No way have we ever worked out the hours etc." (2014). He further suggested: "Why don't you just do a test run yourself. Pick a book. Scan it. OCR it. Proofread and correct it, then convert it to HTML" (Blunden 2014). The concept of immaterial labor fails to account for the labor time contributed by volunteers who perform these specific tasks for MIA. Labor is always material because it consists of human cognition, communication and bodily activity that "changes the state of real world systems" (Fuchs 2008: 103).

In contradistinction to the autonomist approach to "immaterial labor," the extension of Marx's labor theory of value provides an understanding of the concrete labor involved in intellectual production. In Marx's formulation, the value of a commodity is made up of its raw materials (constant capital), necessary labor (variable capital), and the surplus value created by labor (Fuchs 2008: 175):

$$V = c + v + s$$

The cost of each paper copy of a volume of the MECW sold by L&W for £50 or the whole series sold for £1,000 includes the cost of raw materials, the labor of printers and other workers, and a margin for profit (though, importantly not the cost of Marx, Engels, Moore or Aveling's labor) (http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/books/archive/marx_offer.html 2014). Once the first edition of MECW had been produced, the organic composition of capital increases for subsequent print runs. Once the work of writing, collecting, translating, editing and annotating the texts in the MECW is completed, the only costs involved in reproducing their works are those involved in making and distributing copies. Digital publishing has changed the economic equation for the reproduction of texts.

The process of reproduction is made considerably cheaper by digital technologies whereby, after the initial labor involved in formatting a text and posting it online, the cost of making copies is reduced to almost nothing. Unlike the printed volumes of the MECW, the cost of each digital copy of Marx's texts is infinitesimally small. MIA is able to provide free and unfettered content because of the reduced cost of online hosting, volunteer labor, and collaborative forms of editing, translating and curating enabled through the internet. That is not to say that labor, infrastructure and energy costs are not involved in making these texts available online, but that digital distribution considerably decreases costs for MIA.

Faced with this competition, L&W has invoked copyright to create an artificial scarcity and maintain the commodity status of Marx and Engels' work. The scarcity and cost imposed by L&W has the effect of limiting access to those people who either have the considerable sum to spend on the books for their private collection or who have access to academic libraries. Volunteer organizations like MIA lack economic resources compared to publishing companies, which likely contributes to their policy of removing contested material without recourse to the courts. However, a number of petitions and mirror sites emerged in response to L&W's actions. One petition calling for free online access to MECW received more than 2500 signatures from around the world (http://www.change.org/en-GB/petitions/lawrence-and-wishart-allow-marx-s-and-engels-s-writings-to-remain-in-the-public-domain 2014). MIA also encourages others to copy and distribute their material. The organization suggests that volunteers

and users make eBook versions of texts from their archives, make "mirror" sites, distribute DVD's, or print out texts (http://www.marxists.org/admin/volunteers/index.htm 2014). As a result, it is almost impossible to remove the material originally hosted by MIA from the internet. At the current juncture, struggles over copyright and digital media could result in a further retrenchment of copyright through legal and technological mechanisms or they could be leveraged to address the concerns of knowledge workers and to support increased public access to information.

Alternatives to the Current Intellectual Property Regime

Marx and Engels' works have been dragged into contemporary struggles over copyright. While Fuchs stresses the importance of looking at the labor of Marx, Engels and others involved in producing these works, he argues that "claiming the MIA is stealing information from L&W is just as absurd and misplaced as claiming that L&W is stealing information from Marx and Engels because the whole idea of a copyright on Marx and Engels' works is absurd" (Fuchs 2014). At the very least, L&W's role in publishing books for library shelves and private collections should not impinge upon the availability of Marx and Engels' work online. In the meantime, the controversy over MECW allows us to pose questions about alternative ways to produce, archive and distribute knowledge.

There are a number of innovative institutional models for reconceptualizing and reorganizing knowledge production and archives. Mario Biagioli contends that large-scale multi-authorship in the natural sciences renders untenable the idea of the "scientist as the person who had the idea, did the work, wrote the paper, and took credit and responsibility for it" (2003: 261). In response to this crisis of scientific authorship, some journals, particularly in the field of biomedicine, have attempted to narrowly define authorship in terms of "intellectual contributions" to the exclusion of other forms of labor involved in scientific production. Hugh Gusterson explains that, in such an approach to knowledge production, "intellectual value, or capital, tends to behave in the same way as material value in large capitalist institutions: it is extracted from those on the bottom, who create it through labor, accruing as wealth to those on the top…" (2003: 284). Biagioli identifies an alternative approach at the Collider Detector at Fermilab physics laboratory which is characterized by a "labor mentality" (2003: 207). In this model all employees who contribute labor in a research community, including technical staff, are listed as authors, even for publication on which they do not directly work. This particular model relies on the shared physical space of the laboratory, multimillion-dollar equipment and government grants. Nonetheless, it shows how communities can allocate rights and responsibilities for knowledge production without discriminating between different types of labor. Such a model would recognize the labor which goes into reproducing and archiving texts online.

In some respects, the labor mentality model parallels strategies for Community Intellectual Rights (CIR) in so-called "traditional communities." Peter Jaszi and Woodmansee suggest that CIR, which does not rely on the fiction of a single author or inventor, is gaining traction in Latin America and parts of Africa as ways to claim rights over the production and maintenance of community knowledge (2003: 215). CIR seeks to protect the ongoing process of knowledge creation rather than assigning rights to finished products and individual creators. It attributes knowledge production to dynamic and changing communities of producers that should have a collective claim to how knowledge is produced, stored, distributed and used. The very different types of collaborative intellectual production involved in large-scale scientific laboratories and traditional cultures are responses to the crisis of the author and the limits of current copyright regimes for addressing collective intellectual production. The labor mentality model and CIR recognize the social character of knowledge production, but they also provide means through which particular communities of producers are able claim rights to the processes and the products of their labor.

Another example is provided by the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media (CHNM) at George Mason University. The center "uses digital media and technology to preserve and present history online, transform scholarship across the humanities, and advance historical education and understanding" (http://chnm.gmu.edu/about/ 2014). It is a collaborative center that produces free software for historians and educators under Creative Commons licensing as well as allowing members to pursue their own research interests. CHNM provides a model for digital archiving, but it is able to draw on resources that are unavailable to many archiving projects; it relies on its institutional affinity for access to necessary infrastructure and the scholarly reputation of its members in order to attract grants.

Both CHNM and MIA use Creative Commons licensing, but Creative Commons has important limitations. Supporters of Creative Commons such as James Boyle, Lawrence Lessig and Yokai Benkler argue for reforms to

copyright law while maintaining the necessity of private property. Boyle warns that "bad policy may lock up our cultural heritage unnecessarily, leave it to molder in libraries, forbid citizens to digitize it, even though the vast majority of it will never be available publicly and no copyright owner can be found (2008: 246). Lessig suggests that society faces a number of choices about how its values can be maintained through their inscription into both law and digital technologies. He advocates "free culture" which allocates intellectual property rights while allowing others access in order to create and innovate, as opposed to "permission culture" wherein "creators only get to create with the permission of the powerful" (Lessig 2004: xvi). For Lessig, such a model is presented by Creative Commons (Lessig 2006: 199). Benkler and Lessig limit the idea of peer production to digital products which they categorize as "nonrival" goods. Further, while Creative Commons licensing makes intellectual property rights more flexible, it reinforces the regime of individual copyright from which those who own property are able to continue to draw rent. Creative Commons licenses can account for collaborative projects, but, in order to operate within current intellectual property regimes, they continue to perpetuate the metaphors of authorship and originality.

Even approaches that stipulate the end of private property as an ultimate goal must address the need to remunerate a growing number of knowledge workers and provide public access to informational goods in the short-term. Dmytri Kleiner (2011) focuses on the collaborative nature of production and the goal of building collective resources. He suggests "venture communism" as a way for information workers to accrue resources and make their work available to a community of users in order to undermine corporate forms of control and exploitation. Kleiner advocates having two sets of rules: one set for "venture communes" who collectively own the rights to content and infrastructure and can accumulate wealth by adding their labor to this pool; and, another set of rules that prevents the exploitation of the commons by companies that wish to extract rent. Further, he points to the materiality of digital and "nonrival" goods: "Computers and networks, as well as developers and their places of work and residence, are all very much material and all require material upkeep" (Kleiner 2011: 21). As such, Kleiner, who is part of such a community, hopes this strategy will allow communally organized knowledge workers to accumulate the resources and build the infrastructure needed to challenge the existing mode of production.

Conclusion

These contemporary examples of models for collective knowledge production and archiving respond to an ongoing crisis of the concept of authorship and the limits of intellectual property regimes. By sketching the historical production of Marx and Engels' oeuvre, I hope to have shown that when we read their words today, they are mediated by the labor of translators, editors, interpreters and technical workers. Ownership of their work can no longer be justified by original authorship. L&W's claim to own these works does not recognize the majority of the labor time that has gone into reproducing these texts and contradicts the justifications for copyright, including the supposed incentives for producing or distributing knowledge. Ultimately, L&W's recourse to copyright law in the case of the works collated in MECW comes at the cost of public access. For now, MIA may be able to draw on its nonprofit status and the affordances of networked technologies in order to produce versions of Marx and Engels' work that will not raise the ire of other publishers. However, sustainable alternatives to current intellectual property regimes will need to provide for the material needs of knowledge workers by collectivizing the infrastructure of knowledge production and archiving, while continuing to increase public access to informational products.

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Inflicting the Structural Violence of the Market: Workfare and Underemployment to Discipline the Reserve Army of Labor

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> "Taking them as a whole, the general movements of wages are exclusively regulated by the expansion and contraction of the industrial reserve army, and these again correspond to the periodic changes of the industrial cycle. They are, therefore, not determined by the variations of the absolute number of the working population, but by the varying proportions in which the working-class is divided into active and reserve army, by the increase or diminution in the relative amount of the surplus-population, by the extent to which it is now absorbed, now set free."[2]
>
> — Marx, K. (1867)

Inflicting the Structural Violence of the Market

As the ongoing crisis of capitalism continues beyond its sixth year, the effects have been felt with different degrees of severity in different countries. In the UK it has manifested in chronic levels of underemployment which veil the already very high unemployment total that is currently hovering not far off the early 1980s levels of around three million. This data takes into consideration the official unemployment total and combines it with the number of Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) claimants now 'self-employed' who work in various odd jobs such as catalogue selling or holding an eBay account now claim Tax Credits to supplement their meager earnings. As such, "record falls in unemployment" and "record numbers in employment" are really not what they seem. This paper will critically outline some of the key features of underemployment and workfare in 'dispossessing the dispossessed' and in inflicting upon them the structural violence of the market, the legally sanctified market violence of capitalism, and the various forms this can be said to take. The underlying argument is that there remains the structural violence inherent in the capital-labor relation itself.

The financial crisis, continuous and showing no sign of abating, is in the UK context at least, following the end of the recession, now apparently 'over.' However, the economic and social paroxysms that began more than six years ago, as a crisis unlike anything previously experienced since the early Twentieth Century, stubbornly refuse to subside, regardless of how much austerity is applied politically.

Indeed, capital's necessity for further accumulation and its own valorization at any cost means that crisis remains always present. By this, is not meant merely any 'crisis of capitalism,' 'boom and bust' or 'disequilibrium in the economy,' but instead the fact that for capital to exist systemically it must reproduce value and extract profit, and in doing so, accumulates crisis, the crisis of the very basis for this accumulation being labor. Capital is dead labor, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labor[3] and dead labor (that is abstract labor stored up as accumulation) finds living labor increasingly unnecessary for self-valorization. In other words, the capacity for work or wage labor to feasibly exist can be discerned in the crisis of the capital-labor relation itself which finds material expression in wage labor that is increasingly elusive, insecure, and is a precarious privilege for a growing and substantial number

of people.

Indeed, as has been said, in outlining the terms of dispossession it is possible to speak of a legally sanctified market violence, and the various forms this can be said to take. By this is meant the structural violence inherent in the capital-labor relation itself, one which is always not only unequal and one sided, but determined utterly by one side, capital. Capital being an abstract social relation formed by living labor, once rendered dead, accumulated abstract labor reverses this dependency and in so doing determines the very terms of material existence in a world in which wage labor is the means through which 'labor' materially reproduces itself. This structural violence of the market is shored up by the cruder and only sometimes immediately apparent violence of the state, there are the measures taken to alter the co-ordinates of capitalist society to the of capital and the capitalist class: 'creating an attractive environment for investors,' being the frequently preferred euphemism especially. Employed labor, as for its unemployed reserve army, is also disciplined by the threat of 'workfare,' the umbrella term used for programmed targeting the unemployed, us material compulsion, that is, the direct or indirect threat of benefit withdrawal for non-compliance: actual destitution being the threat underlying it. As such, the necessity for flexibility in the capital-labor relation flexibility meaning the flexibility of labor to adapt to its situation capital renders the precarious and insecure existence of a substantial section of the majority, an apparent privilege: for that section in temporary and indeterminate possession of it, and of course that fluid section cast adrift.

Dispossessing the dispossessed then, refers to the class location of that section of the majority most immediately affected by the state's efforts to attempt to restructure and reform the existing terms of existence for the side of labor to better serve the imperatives of accumulation and the production of value. In such a relation, the privilege of wage labor only ever relative to the reproduction of that labor becomes scarcer and more precarious at the exact same time as it is rendered disconnected utterly from any notion of necessity.

Underemployment refers to the precarious situation of those unable to secure full-time wage labor, who must settle for part-time hours while trying to meet full-time costs, something fully realized in zero hours contracts. In the crisis of the capitalist economy, myriad forms are found for shifting this back onto populations, the contemporary notion of austerity the most notorious and keenly felt.

Precarious or contingent employment, underemployment and the disjuncture of these with spiraling living costs, mark out a material terrain of dispossession for a growing number. To be sure, in the UK of 2015, economic recovery can be seen in the widespread existence of food banks and payday lenders, throwing stark light on the harsh social reality of austerity and unconvincing governmental attempts to veil the actual nature of such efforts to shore up the capitalist economy: arguably the most reprehensible of these being the removal from official figures of all those forced onto some version of workfare, or under 'sanction' (having their subsistence benefit withdrawn) thus making the total appear lower than it actually is.

The crude violence of rendering people destitute by depriving them of the very minimal means the state defines as subsistence can be seen in the number of suicides following the sanctioning of claimants. The fact that welfare reform in this case the exponential increase in the use of sanctions for perceived infractions of the rules should be directly linked with many dozens of suicides is unique to the formerly incumbent DWP regime.

> 'Figures released under the Freedom of Information Act show that 3,097,630 Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) claims were made in 2013-14 and 568,430 individuals were subject to a sanction, a total of 18%. In 2012-13, 16% of claims were subjected to sanctions and 15% in 2010-11. They are imposed on people who fail to keep appointments, reject jobs or walk out of jobs without good reason.[4]

In 2008-09, only 286,694 sanctions were applied on the 2,935,930 JSA claims, representing 10%[5]. Indeed, the DWP is currently in the midst of its own inquiry into 60 suicides directly related to its benefits sanctions regime.[6] Although the results of that have yet to be made public it is safe to say that 'no evidence' will be found, in the true terms of the state investigating itself. It should be emphasized however, that simply because 'no evidence is found' for something, it does not mean that the evidence doesn't exist. David Webster, honorary senior research fellow at the University of Glasgow has noted, 'The DWP is still regularly claiming that it is only a 'tiny minority' of claimants who are sanctioned - most recently by Esther McVey last week - but this suggests it is not a tiny minority.[7]

'Look for More or Better Paid Work': Workfare Targeting the Underemployed

The formerly incumbent coalition and now wholly Conservative DWP regime has over the past 5 years, gone

out of its way to make life as difficult as possible for unemployed claimants, no less than all those in receipt of Employment Support Allowance (ESA). ESA claimants are the sick, disabled, and those with incurable conditions such as MS and Parkinson's who are deemed fit for work en masse following the humiliation of the so-called 'Work Capability Assessment' carried out by Atos Healthcare, something which has led to the deaths or suicides of at least 10,000 people.[8] Protests against Atos in fact led to the company ending its £500 million contract with the DWP a year early, and being replaced by the workfare multinational Maximus.[9]

While the mass application of sanctions and workfare has indeed been beyond anything even resolute critics of 'welfare reform' could have expected, there is also the indeterminate roll out of 'Universal Credit' which will place all those claimants who are also underemployed under the same performative demands of the Job Centre. The same performative demands, which should they still wish to supplement their meager earnings with benefits of some kind will mean them facing the same punitive measures of workfare and sanctions JSA claimants already face. A further additional and comparatively new government habit is to reclassify those who were formerly unemployed by mass signing off and registration as self-employed,[10] thus achieving 'record falls in unemployment' and 'record numbers in employment.' What is not mentioned is the fact that the overwhelming majority of newly self-employed former claimants are doing some sort of piece work such as selling catalogues door-to-door, or running an account on eBay, struggling to make their former income of JSA with Tax Credits.

This unwelcome tightening of the screw made by both state and capital, is also the pacification of employed labor, since the most basic rudiments of capitalism are to cut costs none being costlier than wages and to increase profits, the employer can do no better than eliminate the cost of wages altogether by using unpaid labor mandated to do the same work. This pacification of labor of course, also undercuts those employed and paid wages for their trouble, since it lowers the relative value of their own labor, which it should be restated is never more than relative to the cost of its reproduction.

When it is considered that in the UK, the underemployed including in that definition all subsections of the category combined with the much higher number who are unemployed, comprise roughly one third of the total workforce, the full reality of 'recovery' becomes clearer. It is worth repeating also, what is meant by recovery: the recovery of capitalism, its return to profitability, which demands at every turn, the minimization of costs, foremost among those being wages, assuming wage labor is required at all, for so far as it may sometime be, 'there is at the same time a widening of the social chasm that divides the worker from the capitalist, an increase in the power of capital over labor, a greater dependence of labor upon capital'.[11]

Underemployment, understood as the terminal disjunction between labors having the at least relative means for its social reproduction, that 'full time' wage labor gave it is possible to discern a definite market discipline in operation. Capital, seeking always to drive down the cost of labor, aims to reduce it as far as possible. The two sides always existing as diametric opposites:

> 'They stand in inverse proportion to each other. The share of (profit) increases in the same proportion in which the share of labor (wages) falls, and vice versa. Profit rises in the same degree in which wages fall; it falls in the same degree in which wages rise.'[12]

The market discipline of a chronic shortage of wage labor yielding enough in wages that is in a limited amount of part-time, casualized, and flexible employment, as capital reaches the point 'as an independent social power i.e., as the power of a part of society it preserves itself and multiplies by exchange with direct, living labor" that being the obsolescence of a greater or lesser section 'of a class which possesses nothing but the ability to work', is the fragmented and diffuse abstract that 'is a necessary presupposition of capital.'[13]

Illustrating the point, according to the DWP project known as 'Universal Credit,' to replace all existing benefits en bloc, the tyranny of underemployment will meet the tyranny of workfare and sanctions. The tyranny of workfare and sanctions speaks for itself: conscription of claimants to work unpaid or be made to 'volunteer', or risk losing their only income of JSA. Anyone needing to supplement meager wages with benefits of some kind will be obligated to 'look for more or better paid work,' or be under the same workfare and sanctions.[14]An explanatory memorandum accompanying the legislation:

- '216. Claimants will be subject to work related requirements intended to help them move into work, progress in work or prepare for work in the future.
- 217. Claimants will fall into one of the following conditionality groups [...]. "All work related requirements: claimants we expect to move into work, more work or better paid work. All Work-Related Requirements Group

- 233. This will be the default group for all claimants unless they fall in the work focused interview or work preparation groups.
- 234. Claimants in this group will be required to look for and be available for work. This will usually be full time (i.e. for their expected hours of work) and of any type'[15].

The various programs, termed workfare, have historically been the state's efforts to 'put the unemployed to work' and 'make the unproductive productive' without them actually being employed. However, workfare has faced serious and concerted opposition and contestation in the last few years both politically and legally. Legal opposition to workfare began in 2012, when two claimants, Cait Reilly and Jamison Wilson,[16] who had been sent to work unpaid as a condition of being able to claim Job Seeker's Allowance (JSA), launched a court case against the DWP,[17] arguing that this amounted to forced labor, and was therefore unlawful.[18] The Appeal Court ruled that such schemes were legally flawed; quashing the regulations underpinning them the DWP subsequently rushed through replacement legislation as a response.[19] Reilly had been compelled to give up her volunteering role at a museum something closely related to her chosen field and been made to 'accept the help that is offered'[20] in the form of another of the punitive schemes: a 'Sector-Based Work Academy.'[21]

It could be concluded here that the essence of what cover the now seven variants of what are grouped under the umbrella term, 'workfare' are distilled in the case of Cait Reilly and Jamison Wilson: material compulsion to discipline the reserve army of labor, and much ideological baggage of the starry-eyed positive thinking kind to veil the punitive nature of what claimants are faced with.

Franchising the Workhouse: The contemporary UK context

It can be contended that there is something of an absurd irony in the fact that private companies tasked with imposing workfare on the unemployed, sick and disabled, now make up what is a growth industry. In a society based on precarious and 'flexible' wage labor, which demands that the overwhelming majority of the population work at all costs, even if there is not in fact enough actual wage labor available, work assumes once again, a virtuous ethic of self-discipline, pious resolve, and thrift, comprising an ideological narrative of 'self-help' and 'individual responsibility.'[22] This narrative of the inherent virtue of work aims at shifting the burden for unemployment back onto the shoulders of the individual: societal problems become individual failings, and a matter of 'not trying hard enough', just as 'there is work out there, but some people don't want to work.' The workfare industry applies the existing state model of material compulsion and elements of the same ideology of work as being a good in and of itself,[23] regardless of whether the person engaged in it is paid enough to reproduce their labor power which, it is worth remembering, is only ever the relative value of wage labor.

It may be contended, that workfare is also a composite part of the project of 'security' that is, securing the terrain of exploitation for capital at any and every cost. The fact that capital and state work together to achieve such an outcome is well crystallized in workfare: the state seeks to pacify the reserve army of labor while cutting its limited benefits once seen as a minimal guarantor of relative social peace while an entire industry springs up comprised of capitalist enterprises specialize in drilling individuals, thrown into the labor surplus, with 'work discipline' as they undertake imposing the state's outsourced punitive measures and ideology of workfare. Indeed in the contemporary UK, the Conservative-led coalition, now regrettably a Conservative majority in its own following this year's General Election right albeit a very slim one, made itself with 'welfare reform,' the decades long project a key element of neoliberalism to lessen the so-called 'welfare state,' and restructure it to better serve the needs of capital, a task governments of all shades since the 1980s. This restructuring of the welfare state, can be seen as part of a wider and even longer term restructuring of the labor market, and its alignment with 'flexibility'- insecure, expendable, and atomized labor being instantly replaceable with equally insecure, expendable, and atomized labor. The 'rigidities' are observable in unionized workforces taking collective action to resist wage stagnations and reductions, redundancies, and the ever-present demands of capital on labor to speed up. Workfare, (and also 'welfare-to-work') is the imposition of market discipline in order to further limit the contradiction of capital and labor through the latter's pacification.[24]

The pacification and compliance of a reserve army of labor under constant threat of sanction for not embracing its own servitude with the requisite enthusiasm, provides capital with a pliable and expendable workforce as and when required.[25] Workfare is also supported by the Victorian workhouse ideology of the deserving and undeserving poor, and self-help which individualizes unemployment making social and societal problems into individual moral failings,[26] albeit having received a twenty-first century gloss of 'empowerment' aimed at 'fulfilling potential'.

Indeed, the lucrative workfare industry specializes in such positive thinking to explain its own role in claimants being 'helped into work,' or somewhat tellingly, 'nearer to the labor market' workfare has very little effect in securing actual employment:

> 'There is little evidence that workfare increases the likelihood of finding work. It can even reduce employment chances by limiting the time available for job search and by failing to provide the skills and experience valued by employers. [...] Workfare is least effective in getting people into jobs in weak labor markets where unemployment is high.'[27]

It is thus insightful that the state sees fit to make its minimal contribution to keeping the unwanted surplus at supposedly subsistence level conditional, as this same reserve army is expected to assume full responsibility for its own superfluity while meeting performative demands, or face sanctions.

As Marx' capitalism is a system predicated on the exploitation of labor for profit, that is, the appropriation of the wealth of a society that is itself produced by labor, for capital.

> 'We thus see that, even if we keep ourselves within the relation of capital and wage-labor, the interests of capital and the interests of wage-labor are diametrically opposed to each other. To say that "the most favorable condition for wage labor is the fastest possible growth of productive capital", is the same as to say: the quicker the working class multiplies and augments the power inimical to the wealth of another which lords over that class the more favorable will be the conditions under which it will be permitted to toil anew at the multiplication of bourgeois wealth, at the enlargement of the power of capital, content thus to forge for itself the golden chains by which the bourgeoisie drags it in its train.'[28]

Capital is itself a social relation, and one that is based on the imperative of always needing to drive down the cost of labor, in fact as far as possible, to do away with it, even though capital needs labor simply to exist. As such, the reduction in wages, will try to be as far as possible symmetrical with the increase in the volume of work. Labor must be made to work harder, longer, and for less, the better that capital can reproduce surplus value, and extract profit, for 'profit and wages remain as before, in inverse proportion.'[29] Capitalist enterprises, and the institutions serving capitalist society, benefit greatly from labor's docility, and for those in employment, there is the actual sometimes implied threat of unemployment. However inherently exploitative wage labor may be, it does at least allow the wage laborer to reproduce their material existence; to have this privilege withdrawn, is to be effectively erased from material existence itself.

As capital accumulation reaches a certain level, it throws off far more labor than can be reasonably exploited, and so a continuous surplus becomes ever-more apparent, and is felt by the side of labor all the time by its own superfluity, its social extraneousness.

'Offered the House and Nothing Else…'[30] The Genesis and History of Workfare

Additionally, and in support of the efforts of government policy, largely irrespective of incumbent administration though more crudely apparent in the present UK context, there is the media propaganda war making use of a narrative of imaginary 'lazy-feckless-workshy-scroungers', who have 'chosen' the 'lifestyle' of unemployment.[31] The rhetoric of welfare reform, now nakedly revealed for what it always was as workfare truly came into its own in 2012 with Iain Duncan-Smith's workhouse ideology underlying his emphasis on conditionality as the basis for Universal Credit, itself the centerpiece of the 2012 Welfare Reform Act.[32] Besides this, the different versions of workfare all seek to impose this burdensome ideological weight on the shoulders of claimants, making them believe that they are responsible for unemployment, and are to blame for being workless. The grim rectitude of this unsparing validation of the inherent good of work is especially insightful for contemporary Critical Theory, since besides the ideology it espouses, there is the very real material compulsion of severely limited benefits being sanctioned, sometimes for up to three years.

The society of which workfare is a composite part, can be seen as the state of exception become the rule, of the structural violence of capitalism having become that much cruder and more brutish, workhouse ideology albeit a twenty-first century incarnation and the material compulsion of market discipline, replacing a modicum of social security as the price for capital and the state tolerating unwanted surplus labor. This ideological figment of the deserving and undeserving poor is always at work in the punitive policy of workfare, as much as the media narrative promulgating it. Such a division of the proletariat against itself, by an arbitrary separation of those who 'deserve'

the help of society and those who 'choose' the 'lifestyle' this affords, has a long history which pre-dates even the idea of a so-called welfare state, going back in modern form in Britain arguably to the Act for the Relief of the Poor 1597 and Poor Relief Act 1601, followed by the Relief of the Poor Act 1782 and 1824 Vagrancy Act, finding its most notorious expression at the dawn of industrialization in the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834. The violent displacement of industrialization and capital accumulation of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries saw the bringing into being of a working class made dependent on wage labor. Without anything but its labor to sell, surplus labor was as unwanted and problematic requiring discipline to maintain its docility—a punitive process always on the very edge of its.

As far as labor could be usefully exploited by capital, it would at least survive, but having nothing besides itself to sell, material compulsion was the constant driving force, and as soon as wage labor became unavailable, labor, the proletariat, experienced the other freedom it had been granted by the market, the freedom to starve. As such, the newly created urban poor became a problem to be dealt with, being, as they were, formally free and under no feudal obligation, but without the means to survive. Earlier Poor Laws unsurprisingly, made the task of social welfare provision such as it was, the task of the Church, until the Tudor dissolution of the monasteries, belatedly made it the concern of the state in the form of rate contributions via counties and the parish.

The consolidated and synthesized earlier legislative programs to divide the poor into deserving and undeserving, and as such, was also the first properly modern structuring of social space to make the whole of life in accord with the demands of capital accumulation. The working class went to the factory and mill to labor to be paid wages relative to subsistence: those members of this class cast off by capital and thus removed from the wage relation became the urban poor, a dangerous group that has haunted capitalist society for as long as it has existed. To be sure however, this dangerous group is not and never has been a separate class from the proletariat, merely a section of it, but one that (re)appears as the visible prelude to the real reckoning of history, which haunts capitalism.[33] The essence of the 1834 Act, and its role in the modern structuring of social space was distilled in the so-called 'workhouse test' and the administering of 'indoor' and 'outdoor' relief, the latter being the granting of 'relief' to those otherwise still granted their freedom, and as such something to be discouraged and limited in practice. 'Indoor relief' was of course the degradation and brutalization of the workhouse, virtually indistinguishable from prison. The urban poor were thus considered undesirable, and to be at best tolerated and pacified through a punitive and limited system of 'assistance', but one in which little presence was made to disguise its function: containment. One hundred and eighty or so years later and in updated and postmodern or liquid modern form, there is workfare, just as via the global restructuring and class re-composition of global capital, there is chronic underemployment to inflict the structural violence of the market and dispossess the dispossessed.

Conclusion

It has been argued here is best understood as the disciplinary bulwark used against unwanted surplus labor to forcibly mobilize it in a continuous struggle for material justification of its existence. What is especially invidious about workfare is that compulsion is as far as possible left to the dull compulsion of material forces, and individualized accordingly.[34] The fact that, to quote Tesco's own PR response to queries about its participation in offering unpaid traineeships as part of 'Help to Work,' 'most young people refer themselves'[35] is very much in keeping with self-managed or self-service servitude, in that at every turn, this is individualized so the individual becomes the one who locks themselves in their cell.

To be sure, the franchises of workfare are the private partners of the state, that model of the market delivering what remain state functions, and with the legal blessing to act accordingly. This model of contracting out state functions and services was especially beloved by New Labour, who could claim, quite truthfully, that it was 'not privatization'. From virtually all public services, to the repressive machinery of policing and prisons, private third, fourth and fifth parties bid for the tender, the successful bidder gaining very lucrative revenue streams lasting several years at a time. Third, fourth and fifth party private workfare contractors deliver punitive workfare measures for the state which means of course, enforcing measures become ever more punitive. With this in mind, the progressive withdrawal of very basic state provision of social security and its replacement with a punitive workfare regime, what Zygmunt Bauman might call a shift in governmental priorities[36] has created a new market all of its own for companies to profit from unemployment. Indeed, the likes of A4E, Avanta, and Serco, are not, and never have been

concerned with finding what are in fact non-existent jobs for those mandated to their 'services' by the Job Centre, but in the telling language of the DWP itself, tackling 'worklessness'. 'Worklessness' is itself a term uniquely derived from workfare rhetoric, itself underlined by the 'dull compulsion of economic relations'[37] infused by the same material compulsion and sanctimonious shopkeeper moralism of 'individual responsibility' to break the 'dependency' of being unemployed or in receipt of benefits, something to which the poor must 'adapt themselves'[38] in essence, blaming the unemployed for being unemployed, and the poor for being poor.

This example is useful for illustrating the concept of 'self-exploitation' already outlined: the surplus labor of capital, cast off as surplus to requirements, that being to be usefully exploited in the production of value and the extraction of profit, is made so indirectly through material compulsion: the individualized responsibility for servitude. Tesco along with many other companies and charities gets indentured labor for free, and as for the scheme being 'over-subscribed,'[39] that can easily be traced back to Job Centre advisers and/or workfare brokers offering unemployed youth (and other claimants) the choice of agreeing to it, but considering the alternatives involve being moved onto a different workfare scheme, or very likely facing sanction, the voluntary nature of workfare is cast in its own harsh light. Such a roundabout way of putting the unemployed to work' even when it is not for the usual basic remuneration of wages,[40] can certainly be understood as a state measure aimed at guaranteeing social peace, of course subcontracted in delivery by the market and like underemployment an at once opaque and complex, but ultimately very simple institutional and commercial operation of the structural violence inherent in the capital-labor relation.[41]

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Meanwhile, after lodging a third appeal with the High Court against having to publicly disclose the full lists of organizations involved in workfare, the DWP lost again, being ordered to make them publicly available, forthwith. 'The Upper Tribunal has dismissed DWP's appeal re "workfare" job seeker programmes.' https://twitter.com/hopkinsrobin/status/491600471426355200 [Last accessed: 28th May 2015] , 'The list of shame: Court tells DWP to reveal workfare users', http://www.boycottworkfare.org/?p=3680 [Last accessed: 9 March 2015] A very notable defeat for this most punitive variant of workfare yet, was inflicted in late July 2014, when Byteback IT Solutions Ltd, a Bristol-based IT reconditioning firm, touted a photo of chancellor George Osborne - an enthusiast for workfare - visiting them. The DWP had done likewise, since the 'flagship small business' 'subcontractor' had unemployed JSA claimants working for it unpaid, on 'Community Work Placements'. Within a couple of days, the company had withdrawn due to the response on social media. 'IT Firm Pulls Out Of Workfare Scheme After George Osborne Visit' The Huffington Post UK, Bennett, Asa. 24 July 2014 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/07/24/george-osborne-it-firm-workfare_n_5616281.html [Last accessed: 28th May 2015]. Earlier in April 2014, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) ordered the DWP to reveal the names of the organizations that provided placements on the 'Day One Support for Young People Trailblazer' pilot workfare scheme. http://ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/decisionnotices/2014/fs_50520380.ashx [Last accessed: 28th May 2015]

41. The campaign against all forms of workfare has had some very notable successes - particularly via social media - in dozens of 'big name' companies and charities ending their involvement. So far, at least 40 have withdrawn, and another 400 voluntary organizations have helped make 'Help to Work', in which claimants can be mandated with indefinite 'full time' unpaid workfare or be made to sign on every day, an unmitigated disaster. Another 25 'big name' national charities have stated that they will not take part., whilst another 5 smaller organizations previously enthusiastic supporters of CWPs withdrew in a matter of hours following the response on social media. From its failed and fitful launch on, 'Help to Work' was meant to be up and running in May, and only in "very exceptional circumstances" could it be delayed to 2nd June, however Caroline Lucas MP found that this was delayed to 9th June across the board. Work and Pensions Access to Work Programme http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140611/text/140611w0002.htm#14061165001750 [Last accessed: 28th May 2015].

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