"You Are Not Independent in Any Way": Potentiality in Biopolitics, Gig Economy Work, and the Emergence of Illegible Antagonisms

Tony Iantosca

Kingsborough Community College

1. Introduction: Potentiality in Biopolitics, Gig Economy Work, and the Emergence of Illegible Antagonisms

In what follows, I examine processes of subjectification and desubjectification and how these become possible in a contradictory way through the production of the biopolitical self in gig economy workers. To do so, I use two biopolitical techniques Lazzarato has analyzed across two books as a conceptual framework. I believe that what has endured since the financial crisis to which Lazzarato responds is not so much the specificity of a subject whose ethical, moral, and subjective disposition is shaped by the indebtedness that constitutes the focus of these two books, but two specific biopolitical techniques of governance that the author uncovers in the course of his analysis of the indebted subject: social subjection and machinic subjugation. The former operates by producing individuals as "individuated subjects" represented in terms of nationality, identity, gender, profession, etc., while machinic subjugation operates as a pre-individual abstraction, reducing subjects to "mechanical parts" defined by our function as platforms for the exchange of information and data (Lazzarato 2015: 187). The concept of machinic subjugation is analogous to what Weiskopf more recently has termed "algorithmic profiling," or the process by which "abstractions are produced that haunt the world" and that nonetheless "circulate and have material effects." (2020: 5). This process amounts to the translation of the unmeasurable human experience, rooted in subjectivity, into quantifiable, calculable and supposedly predictable formats Pressing against limits produced by social subjection and machinic subjugation and the disjunctions arising between these two attempts at biopolitical control, I assert the power of the unquantifiable, which Weiskopf also explores. I believe that what is produced by, and yet what still eludes this attempt at control, is labor power as potentiality. As we will see, these two methods have become essential to capital's biopolitical management of labor power's alternate potentialities, methods to which we are all subject in the wake of poly-crises and revolt.

I depart only slightly from Lazzarato in that I do not believe that the figure of the indebted man is nearly as enduring as the biopolitical figure to whom we are all expected to aspire; Lazzarato attempts to classify the indebted man as an iteration of this figure, but I see the disciplinary and subjectivizing forces of biopolitics as much more durable than the condition of indebtedness, and as finding new states of refinement in the emblematic interactions of gig workers with sociotechnical systems, rubrics, and forms of abstraction. The contradictions apparent in these two modes of subjection—a production of subjectivity and identity in social subjection alongside a radical desubjectification in machinic subjugation—are examples of larger mutually reinforcing contradictions within biopolitical governance, contradictions which Deleuze and Guattari (2009: 239) claim are the limits that capitalism is perpetually evading, reproducing

and evading again. Situating these limits and Lazzarato's two modes of subjection/subjugation within a biopolitical framework shows that gig work as a particular form of biopolitical management of life also reveals new strategies for rebellion in the broader social space that appears because of these contradictions. Recognizing and operationalizing these new strategies for subversion will also entail a break with the dominant mode of capitalist biopolitical governance in its digitized form as it operates within the realm of the circulation of commodities as well as the circulation of human capital throughout what Matteo Polleri (2019), following Romano Alquati, has called hyper-industrialized societies, distinguished by a "mutation in the forms of "industrialization" of production and social reproduction."

Framing contemporary techniques of subjection/subjugation requires a return to Foucault's foundational work on biopolitics as a form of governance that emerged from the disciplinary societies of the eighteenth century. An emphasis on biopower's adoption and adaptation of digital technology to its ends will follow, alongside an analysis of one of its main objects, labor power. Previous works by Paolo Virno (2009) and Kiarina Kordela (2012) will then help situate labor power as one of the main sites of biopolitical management. This framing of labor power recasts it as the vital force of the living person underlying paid labor, a force that constitutes a common ontological surplus that cannot find adequate expression in the representational systems of capitalist valorization. Contextualizing the biopolitical analyses of thinkers who ground their discussions of the topic in labor power will allow us to see that the gig economy relies not on labor classically understood but on channeling labor power into a near-constant work on the self, mediated and policed through technological means. Reconfiguring and reformatting the liberal individual, biopolitical management of gig workers produces a figure whose work on the self is constant, thereby abolishing the historical conditions in which life and work, productive and reproductive labor, were separate domains; life-as-labor becomes a resource from which capital extracts value without, however, exhausting labor power's alternate potentialities. While my analysis follows from that of scholars such as Mario Khreiche (2019: 117), who writes that for gig economy workers, "digitally mediated services *conceal* human labor," I would qualify such a framing by emphasizing the introjection of labor into life without their becoming identical; the rhythms of life and the labor of self-management do not so much conceal labor as demonstrate its new position within the fabric of individual gig workers' lives and subjectivities. As this mobilization of life takes place through simultaneous and ongoing processes of digital abstraction and materialization of the subject alongside broader cultural emphases on singular, coherent individuals, there may appear a line of flight through the mismatched imperatives of self and data. This line of flight appears out of the constitution of what some have termed the "dividual," that is, what Lazzarato (2015), following Deleuze, refers to as the "human' operators, agents, elements or pieces of the socieotechnical machine." The gig economy worker's partial constitution as a dividual will allow me to highlight the potential construction of a subject that can instrumentalize the incoherence biopolitical governance produces, mobilizing desubjectification to a threshold of illegibility. App-based employment's adoption of techniques that contribute to broader biopolitical imperatives of vitality and productivity, as well as its disjunctions and potential production of an illegible subject, show that it is quickly becoming more relevant than the management of populations by, for example, the welfare state institutions to which Lazzarato (2012) refers in The Making of Indebted Man.

I recognize, however, that this limit-point of illegibility may be precisely the type of barrier that Deleuze and Guattari claim capitalism is persistently capable of evading through reappropriation. Willy Solis, who works for a grocery delivery app called Shipt, exhibits the internal contradictions, conflicts, and incoherencies alluded to above, but his eventual disillusionment with the processes of subjugation in gig work may push us all to consider ways to move beyond these two modes of subjection and the perpetual reappropriations of subversive potential that capital invents to discipline subjects society-wide. As important as Khreiche's (2019) analysis of the political, economic, subjective, and power relations of the gig economy is, we should not overlook the revolts and forms of power that provoked this situation, the intervention and production of power within it through subjectivizing forces, and the emergent shapes of subjectivity that could facilitate further rebellion. Solis's reflections on his work reveal processes of social subjection and machinic subjugation in action, processes that have developed through gig economy labor's reliance on what Griesbach et al. has called "algorithmic management" in the years

since Lazzarato first developed these terms (Griesbach 2019: 8). Solis's experience is also unique for the historical framing he gives it, as he reflects on his and his family's engagement with gig economy work as a result of economic struggle resulting from the economic crisis of 2008. Due to the fact that, as Smith argues, apps and gig economy work emerged in the post-2008 period as technologies characteristic not of technological innovation but of capitalist exploitation of the ruins of the crisis—and, I would add, a form of discipline following closely on the heels of worldwide revolts—an examination of Lazzarato's two modes of subjection is appropriate for the contemporary moment, which, since the punctuation point of 2008, is marked not by a singular acute crisis but by what Adam Tooze (2022) has called a poly-crisis.

2. Contextualizing the Gig: Crisis, Circulation, and Algorithmic Management of Labor

Jason Smith analyzes the ways in which the service economy, as has been discussed extensively, has come to fill in the voids that opened as industries both automated certain tasks in factory production and offshored manufacturing. Technological development has not brought significant gains in productivity but instead has been accompanied by wage stagnation and the expansion of the service economy, particularly the work of circulation associated with it (2020: 41). In his discussion of digital microwork, a form of labor whose precarity would make it a close cousin to gig work, Phil Jones makes a similar point, arguing that the long flattening of productivity in the global north since the 1970s has more recently resulted in what he terms "subemployment," precarious and piecemeal work characteristic of the post-crisis economic landscape (2021: 25-26). I argue that it is through biopolitical techniques adopting an algorithmic form that this productivity crisis has been managed, partly through the domination and command of workers who labor on the production of a subjectivity governing itself. Although Smith presents a limited assessment of what counts as productive, in which he ignores the production of subjectivity, effect, desire, etc., a few insights emerge from his contention that gig economy work is a post-crisis phenomenon, insights that will be important to bear in mind as my argument unfolds. First, he reveals the technology underlying gig economy apps has automated nothing other than discipline and supervision that, taken to its extreme in gig economy work, constitutes, for Griesbach et al. (2019: 8), a form of "algorithmic despotism." The disciplinary force of gig economy apps is an aspect of this work that many gig workers and union organizers have affirmed (Perrig 2021: 75). Secondly, these apps extract value from a broader crisis of capital's own design. Finally, Smith shows that one type of work that has now incorporated this disciplinary automation is not so much the affective labor of customer interaction and service work but the labor involved in circulation, which describes well the activities of gig economy workers. As Marx (1973: 635) notes, however, it is an error to regard circulation time as time that creates surplus value. The labor involved in circulation is unique for its engagement with a process that, in Marx's conception of it, entails a deduction from the value created by the labor that produced the commodity in the first place, a deduction arising from the commodity's suspension in circulation, delaying the realization of value and the continuity of the productive process (1973:624). This has spurred capital to transform a moment that delays realization, and that had traditionally involved a deduction of value into a process from which value is extracted through interventions in network relations as well as in the cost-free disciplinary and subjectivizing work gig economy workers are made to perform. In any case, these three insights provide historical and economic context for both gig economy work and for Lazzarato's two modes of subjection, modes that I believe the gig economy has, as it were, inherited from the debt economy. The labor involved in circulating commodities, the production and extraction of value from crisis, and the digital automation of supervision and discipline shape the specific character and subjective disposition of the gig economy worker, whose labor is not exclusively concerned with circulation but also with the production of the biopolitical self as human capital, a crucial figure for any analysis of contemporary labor. This figure, as Griesbach et al. shows in an empirical study of gig work, must believe that they are making choices freely for these new systems of algorithmic management to function smoothly and to conceal freedom's actual absence (2019: 2). To this I would add that this belief in choice, and in freedom and the personal responsibility underlying its actualization, carries with it the historical discourse of liberal individuality associated with the Enlightenment, modifies and

immaterializes the discursive frameworks of property and labor, and subjectifies "workers" by compelling them to work on the self during all hours of life, a form of labor that Griesbach et al. leaves unexamined.

The production of this self on whom one is required to perpetually work is further developed and reinforced by the two modes—social subjection and machinic subjugation—that Lazzarato discusses, revealing new qualitative dimensions of labor power as well as uncovering its potential to be used otherwise. However, it is also important to understand how these two processes interweave in the everyday operation of the algorithms that gig economy apps typically use. Although detailed technical information is difficult to access, as such companies do not openly share it, scholars such as Luca Perrig (2021) and Jamie Woodcock (2021), through interviews with managers, programmers, gig workers, and organizers, provide a basic understanding of how these apps function. Platforms and apps in the food delivery business, for example, charge customers for their orders as well as the delivery of the food, and then buy the food from the restaurant or the store at a lower price than what the customer has paid (Woodcock 2021: 32), transforming an old service into one that is dispersed, digitally mediated, and yet simultaneously centralized in that all data and value accrue to the app's owners. This is typical of gig economy apps, which subject users to new networks embedded within old services—shopping, taxiing, doing laundry, dining—and insinuate themselves in these networks, profiting from "the myriad connections that form between them." They do so by persuading the users, both workers and consumers, to utilize technology that makes "access to the territory staked out by a given networked service…free, in exchange for exclusive access to the data generated by users." (Smith 2020: 51). Khreiche makes a similar point, writing that the gig economy operates "by programming gigification, gamification and taskification into the circuits of social, cultural and economic exchange," that is, into contemporary forms of circulation (2019: 117). For the food delivery worker, in concrete terms, this means that orders are distributed to them while the algorithm functions by factoring distance, price per mile or kilometer, weather conditions, and order density or frequency into pricing schemes as well as into the compensation the worker will receive. Each of these data points, which form one segment of the "inputs" for the algorithm, is then fed into a ranking system that culminates in the display of "performance measures" on the worker's digital dashboard, measures that are based on the speed of the delivery. Perrig emphasizes that managers and programmers who determine these inputs decided to explicitly hide such information as compensation, distance, and route from delivery workers. He explains their rationale: "Managers wanted the couriers to be knowledgeable enough to participate in the game, but not so much that they would be able to 'game the system.'" (Perrig 2021: 77-81). Workers, in one instance, were, in fact, shown the compensation they would receive in advance, yet once programmers and managers realized that this affected the rate of acceptance of orders, they quickly decided to hide that information from gig workers until after a gig was accepted. This forced drivers and couriers to accept gigs regardless of the amount of compensation they would receive, and the same limits to information were implemented with regard to the route on which the app would direct the gig worker. Thus, factors such as order density in a given area, how long an order takes to prepare/deliver, distance and increments by which pay increases against each mile, the weather, and the speed at which workers move all inform how the algorithm delegates gigs and compensates workers (Perrig 2021: 77-83). Workers are subjected, through algorithmic coding programmed by managers whom they will never meet, to a forced acceptance of whatever conditions an order may entail. It is these processes, in which workers must submit to the rule of information that they initially produced, with limits placed on the breadth of knowledge available to them, as well as the quantitative abstractions that rule the qualitative experiences of work, that lie behind contemporary claims that today work "is being controlled algorithmically." (Woodcock 2021: 31). Scholars and activists, as Woodcock asserts, should not lose sight of the fact that it is workers themselves who produce this data used to extract value from circulation, and that their activities effectively "encode workers knowledge into bits and consequently transform bits into numbers for economic planning" (Alquati, cited in Woodcock 2021: 37). Command is thereby "integrated into the smartphones, software, and GPS tracking of workers' day-to-day (or perhaps millisecond-to-millisecond is more accurate) activities." (Woodcock 2021: 37). As we will see, this encoding and abstraction into data of daily activities both during a gig and in the time between, as well as the subjective effect this process has on workers, are contemporary examples of

the two modes of subjection/subjugation Lazzarato first developed in the wake of the 2008 debt crisis.

3. Evolutions in the Biopolitical Programming of Labor Power and Potentiality

Tracing a theoretical lineage through Marx, Nietzsche, and Foucault, Lazzarato contends that the indebted man is shaped by the mnemotechnical systems of guilt, work on the self, and the ethical production of conducts and behaviors to show how the debt economy reconfigured previous forms of power (sovereign, disciplinary, biopolitical) that Foucault developed. Lazzarato emphasizes that historically, the welfare state has played a role in exercising biopolitical power on the population, and since its financialization has been one of the key features of neoliberalism, the welfare state has continuously learned how to operate in what Foucault (2004a: 46) has called a "society where exchange determines the true value of things." The debt crisis of 2008 and onwards, in accelerating neoliberal modes of governance, meant that sovereign debts would be repaid both financially and subjectively/ethically by the populations of indebted countries, through the production of guilt and individual responsibility in citizens, and through modes of conduct and behavior that would reshape individuals' relationships with themselves (Lazzarato 2012: 135). At the level of the individual, therefore, Nietzschean guilt would take hold and propagate itself across populations whose identification as citizen-subjects of indebted countries would perform, through Foucauldian modes of biopolitical management, the disciplinary functions necessary to ensure further dominance of finance capital. It is within this context that Lazzarato develops the two modes of social subjection and machinic subjugation, which together constitute "a joint action of 'morality' and speech on the one hand, with machines on the other," combining subjective dispositions and behaviors with machinic abstractions feeding off this subjective production (2012: 146). However, it seems to me that the contemporary social and economic landscape reveals that biopolitics encompasses more than the individual's relationship with indebted states, welfare institutions, and sovereign debt. Biopolitics, in fact, includes both populations and concern with individual workers conceived as "abilities machines" who have "a lifespan, a length of time in which [they] can be used, an obsolescence, and an ageing" that determines their utility for society's productive vitality, as Foucault shows in his lectures on the topic (2004: 225). As Woodcock (2021: 34) shows, gig work eliminates any "unproductive paid time, with workers only paid for moments of productive time," and yet during this unproductive *unpaid* time, apps and platforms are still gathering data as if the worker were on the clock. Hence, the expansion of the "length of time" in which life itself can be useful and productive to capitalist dominance and valorization, as well as the acceleration of the "abilities machines" of workers through their auto-evaluation using the above-mentioned performance measures, demonstrate the gig economy's absorption and operationalization of biopolitical modes of control. Foucault's development of the theories of human capital and biopolitics helps illuminate the present intertwining of life with labor, now subject to new forms of economic analysis which require, as Lazzarato (2012: 135) emphasizes, constant "work on the self" potentially producing value through nearly all waking hours of one's existence (Fumagalli and Morini 2020). It is the economic absorption of nearly all of one's vital time through algorithmic management, including the time when one is not working but only *potentially doing so*, that characterizes the incorporation of life itself into the political-economic, that is, its biopolitical recomposition. This recomposition is accomplished today through social subjection and machinic subjugation. As we will see below, this redefinition, expansion, and generalization of labor across all waking hours, labor's consistent punctuation of the rhythms of life, may be a more accurate characterization of gig work than the argument that gig work "is part and parcel of an economic system that sets out to eradicate its own reliance on labor" to ostensibly replace it with life (Khreiche 2019: 120). This work is especially important for gig economy workers subject to an extraction of value from living labor that requires intervention into not only labor power's discrete, sellable units of time but also its underlying potentiality and subjectivity. The latter are not subsumed into capital tout court but instead mobilized and channeled into circuits of value creation, domination, and subjectification that do not, however, exhaust other potential uses for labor power. Indeed, labor power's potentiality as situated within the life of the worker, and yet separate from its expression in

exchange value which extracts from this reserve of potential, further affirms the need to theoretically and practically maintain a separation between labor and life and to emphasize that labor-becoming-life is a never-completed tendency that capital imposes upon us.

This intertwining of life and work through algorithmic management finds important theoretical resources in Foucault's work on biopolitics, not only for hisclear elaboration of the new measures and rubrics that emerged from the encounter between biopolitics and neoliberalism but also for how the rubrics produced by this encounter became subjectivized. He emphasizes in his course summary that the problem of the rationalization of "a set of living beings forming a population" should be conceived as inseparable from "the framework of political rationality within which they appeared" (2004: 317). Life, as an object of governance and as a subjective individual relation to a set of choices requiring and producing specific behaviors and conducts, is in its turn embroiled with neoliberal capitalist governance and, as Foucault emphasizes in the ninth lecture, labor. These sets of choices must be subjectively managed, as Greisbach et al. (2019), Perrig (2012), and Woodcock (2021) demonstrate in their discussion of gig economy algorithms, and they not only produce specific behaviors and conducts through performance measures and gamification but are also shaped by the illusion that they are freely made. Life's financialization, and the equation of this financialization with biopolitical health, becomes clearer in Foucault's elaboration of the theory of human capital, the development of which required "the strategic programming of individuals' activity," a phrase which clearly resonates with the above descriptions of algorithmic management of human workers by data. This programming entailed shaping and analyzing individual behavior and conduct so that work and labor are drawn into a field of intelligibility as an "economic conduct practiced, implemented, rationalized and calculated by the person who works." Homo economicus, as the ideal biopolitical node in a larger productive population, has evidently developed such that gig workers now use digital measures to evaluate their own success and manage the speed and intensity of their own labor. This resonates with Foucault's descriptions of the ideal biopolitical subject, the individual worker, who is now expected to evaluate their own "physical and psychological factors which make [them] able to earn this or that wage…so that…labor comprises a capital, that is to say, an ability, a skill." The worker thus appears as an "enterprise for himself." (Foucault 2004: 223-224). This intervening of economic rationality and analysis in the lives of subjects both inside and outside of the work relation—through the management of physical, psychological, and behavioral elements—indicates the specific function that biopolitical governance has had for capitalism's management of new forms of labor. Esposito (2013: 326) has demonstrated the overlapping metaphorical, epistemological, and concrete knowledges and practices of the modern state's equation of biopoliticized populations with a living organism whose health must be guaranteed. The health of this social body, I argue, is partly ensured through the production and maintenance of a population's productive vitality in economic terms, even as today, this takes on an equally important imperative of command. It thus becomes the responsibility of individuals to manage their lives as human capital as this management becomes part of the arsenal of techniques for working on the self, an effort meant to manage labor-power's alternate potentialities.

A. Kiarina Kordela (2013) identifies labor power with its historically contingent appearance as exchange value—"the dematerialization of material bodies"—which, she asserts, does not fully negate its character as surplus to that value, and thus as potentially mobilized for ends other than capitalist work. I believe it is this latter dimension of labor power that the biopolitical techniques outlined by Foucault and developed by Lazzarato seek to manage and control precisely because these dimensions are the site of labor power's unpredictable potentiality. In this regard, Kordela writes that "labor power, as the potential or dynamis of the living body, may be channeled into all possible activities one may want to perform for the enjoyment of oneself or others, but it may also be the labor one is forced to sell." (Kordela 2013: 156). Bruno Gulli makes this point precisely when he writes that labor-power/living labor is contingently caused within capitalist production yet retains "the freedom of the could," that is, the "ever germinating seeds of an alternative." (2005: 13). For both thinkers, labor power, as potential in those who are forced to sell it, may be reasonably identified with a surplus insofar as the potential labor and all of its desires and directions are present but never exhausted in the actual, which here we may identify as surplus value, exchange value, and profit, a point Kordela also emphasizes. These connections and continuities

between labor power's potential, biopolitical control, and capitalist dominance become even clearer when we remember, as Virno emphasizes, that it is the "living person of the seller," that is, the seller of labor power, who is the locus of potentiality (Virno 2004: 82). For all its attempts at management and control of this surplus, extending now to an interweaving of life and labor, constant work on the self, and digitized biopolitical management of that self, there always remains labor power's potential which exceeds the work of self-evaluation and the behavioral dispositions imposed upon subjects. Nonetheless, from capital's perspective, this programming and management ensure the predictable productivity and vitality of the population as a whole. This intervention takes place through the individual's management of the self-as-enterprise, while this self is abstracted through machinic subjugation and channeled into the evaluative data that facilitates ever more efficient extraction of exchange value, identified by Kordela (2013: 149) as "partaking of the realm of infinity," of endless profit and thus endless work.

This requires the integration of disciplinary and biopolitical techniques of power, with the latter "embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques" (Foucault 2020: 242). Subjectivizing procedures inherited from disciplinary power can, in turn, become generalized at the level of the population to ensure a smooth production and reproduction of a specific "state of life," to ensure against the unpredictable potentiality (for rebellion, antagonism, revolt, etc.) that labor power always contains. The connection between this adaptation and the management of the potentialities of labor power can be found in biopolitics' assurance against the aleatory and random, as the emergence of this form of power is accompanied by early uses of predictions and estimates about populations meant to "optimize a state of life." (Foucault 2020: 246). This optimization of life is programmed into gig economy algorithms, as we saw above, so that the potential for the rejection of a gig, and therefore the potential for an unpredictable and undisciplined use of labor power's potentiality that is not in service to these companies, is mitigated by a technological accumulation of predictable information about weather, traffic, routes, and the compensation the worker will receive. Such data ensures the predictability that any order that is placed will be fulfilled and, therefore, that the biopolitical programming of labor power will carry on apace in the deterritorialized networks of circulation. Gig worker Willy Solis, as we will see, is a clear example of the two modes of subjectivation that Lazzarato identifies. These modes of control can then be increasingly identified in the lives of the population as a whole, not only in the life and work of gig workers, who, in any event, constitute nearly 36 percent of the total U.S. working population (McCue 2018).

The channeling of labor back onto the self has also become a perpetual and ongoing condition of life for whole populations, whether they hold waged work or not. Indeed, in the context of what Negri has called "the real subsumption of society by capital," we can fully expect these strategies of subjection/subjugation to become further generalized. Yet, as Negri shows, the real subsumption we are witnessing, in contrast to Marx's connection of this phase of capitalism with relative surplus value, does not neatly coincide with a historical Marxist progression from formal subsumption, represented by absolute surplus value (lengthening of the working day), to real subsumption (acceleration, technologization and optimization of the labor process) (2013: 71-73). As Patrick Murray contends, Marx himself does not find clear evidence that formal subsumption occupies "a distinct historical stage"; instead, Murray argues that for real subsumption to continue developing, formal subsumption must accompany it (2016: 303). For both Negri and Murray, capital's function of command (formal subsumption) under real subsumption is just as important as its technological attempts at extraction of value, a claim that coheres with mine in that I see the role of gig work as serving a disciplinary as much as a profit seeking function, especially when we consider that most food delivery and ridesharing apps have yet to show that they can make a profit (Woodcock 2021: 30). As Andrew Ross points out, the precarity of many workers, including app-based workers, is itself both "an exercise of capitalist control" and an *attempt* to profit from "vulnerability, instability and desperation," conditions that are deepened and intensified during the era of the polycrisis (Ross 2008: 44). As a technology of dispersed and individualized self-management, the near-constant Foucauldian-biopolitical work on the self may reasonably be classified as a form of relative surplus value extraction making management easier, intensifying speed, and mitigating any potential militancy that may otherwise emerge in unjust working conditions. Yet, it would also be reasonable to note that the interlacing of life and work better corresponds to absolute surplus value's extension of the working

day and, hence, to a historical period of accumulation that is anything but new. Within this blurring of classic Marxist historical periods, I argue that these modes of extraction/production of value are better conceived as tools of domination rather than historically discrete moments in capitalist development. As Negri argues, absolute surplus value "comes *after* relative surplus value…as it is the absolute category of command over the *mass* of social exploitation…after the dynamic of relative surplus value has pushed capital towards real subsumption" (2013:75). What is new in the present era of accumulation is the digitization of the intertwined processes of subjectivized Command and extraction of value, the simultaneity of relative and absolute surplus value extraction in circulatory processes taming labor power's potentiality. This requires mobilization of subjective dispositions and behaviors as foundations for numerical and digital abstraction, which return to the subject as the dominance of machinic code and the consequent molding of new forms of pliable subjectivities whose boundaries between life and work are eroding.

4. Social Subjection and Machinic Subjugation: Antagonisms and Contradictions in Gig Economy Work

Social subjection and machinic subjugation are historically specific examples of the methods that biopolitical capitalist governance uses to mold labor power as potentiality into manageable, evaluable, and ultimately productive uses in the present context of the circulatory labor of gig economy work. Lazzarato writes that "by producing us as individuated subjects, social subjection assigns us an identity, a gender, a profession, a nationality, and so on," while machinic subjugation's role is to "function by exploiting partial, modular, subindividual subjectivities." Through the latter method, capitalism abstracts us as data, and we become, therefore, akin to platforms or molecular nodes rather than subjects with identities within the larger circuits of valorization and profit (Lazzarato 2015: 183). Together, they are the actualization of the above-discussed overlapping of relative and absolute surplus value. Recall that Marx classifies circulation time as inherently causing a deduction in the value of the commodity. Given this, it would appear that tech companies have found digital methods by which they can extract value from this deduction by distributing the work of circulation more broadly throughout the social body, revealing a further development of the tendency towards real subsumption of society through the enticement of more and more workers in already-existing networks to engage in such labor. Capital thereby multiplies circulation's emissaries, formats and subjectivizes gig workers with biopolitical techniques of subjectivation, and accelerates the realization of value through the multiplication of its nodes, which in turn accelerates production and cements command. A perpetually productive process accrues to the moment of suspended value that circulation previously involved as gig workers continuously *produce themselves as human capital*; they train, manage, and discipline themselves, adopting the appropriate conducts, behaviors, and work routines without the need for any paid supervision. This does not indicate merely digitization of already existing networks, as Smith (2020) contends, as such networks' smooth functioning both presupposes and perpetually reproduces new subjective relations between self and data, life and work; old power relations between boss and worker become internalized and productive of new forms of life and of newly valorizable data for biopolitical control.

For Uber, in particular, this entails the company capturing data from drivers through their phones "even when they are not 'at work.'" (Smith 2020: 110). The information thus gathered by gig economy companies such as Uber, which is valuable well beyond the individual tasks or hours workers log, and which clearly relates not to labor-time traditionally understood but life-time as it weaves itself into digital abstraction, is fed back into systems of valorization and control and used to evaluate workers, creating new standards for their life/labor and new evaluative rubrics, such as dashboards and performance measures that Perrig (2021) discusses, against which workers can both become intelligible and discipline these intelligible selves. Another technique that Uber uses is to encourage workers to continue driving by prompting them to remain available through the appearance of animated graphics on their phone screens. Such graphics are meant to encourage drivers to maximize their hours and earnings, and they

only appear when drivers indicate a desire to stop working for the day (Khreiche 2019: 118). These two examples represent precisely the process of machinic subjugation to which Lazzarato refers: workers are subject to preestablished options that they inform without being knowledgeable of this process, which, through the worker's predetermined set of responses, in turn, produces the subject as a platform for valorization through the capture of life-data both inside and outside the "work" relation. Indeed, this information is refined for the workers in order to produce faster and more effective work regimes, which in the case of Solis, will take the form of a measurement of how many individual gigs he accepts and how frequently (Alvarez 2021). What happens when the worker cannot make a living based on the standards and inputs to which she is subjugated, as is the case with food delivery workers in New York City who can earn as little as thirty-two dollars over the course of a seven-hour shift? (Freytas-Tamura 2020) This is where social subjection becomes important, as a mode of subjectivation in which "the 'enemy' becomes indistinguishable from a part of the self. Complaints are turned against oneself instead of relations of power." (Lazzarato 2015: 187). When, due to machinic subjugation, management and authority reside not in a definable antagonist but in cryptic algorithmic processes, which subject workers to pre-established sets of choices determined by market logic, the class antagonist is depersonalized, faceless, unknowable, and therefore internalized. (Berti, Fleming, and Walker, 2021). The enterprise of the self, which Foucault identifies as a signal figure of neoliberal biopolitical governance, is compelled to evaluate their own actions and measure their own output in such a way as to produce the very rubrics that will, in turn, come back to dominate the labor they perform on themselves, as at once boss and worker within continuous processes of circulation of goods, affects, behaviors, conducts and evaluative subjectivities. Conversely or simultaneously, social subjection produces a self, as machinic subjugation depends upon the production of this "self" as the raw material to be abstracted in the first place. While other thinkers have made similar points to those elaborated here, noting "the incorporation of humans into the itineraries and virtual projections of gigified mobility," altering the psychological and behavioral dispositions of gig workers, I argue that this process needs to be understood as one that has the unpredictable potentiality of labor-power as its object and its target (Khreiche 2019: 118). Framing the issue in such terms allows us to focus simultaneously on the economic and subjective while emphasizing relations of power and force that contend with each other in this context and, significantly, the coordinates of power's disjunctions that we can recuperate for liberatory ends.

The worker's constitution as a social subject emerges from and echoes dominant ideas of the individual, which find root in Enlightenment thinking, as Esposito shows referring to Locke, a type of thinking which "unites individuals to sovereignty by separating them" and joins the individual's life and their possession of property "in a singular effect of sense." (2004: 64). This subject is then made to be responsible for such property, requiring regularity and predictability. The historical specificity to the subject produced by neoliberal biopolitical management is that the property with which the individual is conjoined moves from material capital to an immaterial set of aptitudes, abilities, and skills that *precede any potential application* and must be managed whether the worker is productive or not. As noted above, drivers who work for ride-hailing apps and who have finished working for the day can be nudged when they are at home if there happens to be a rise in demand for drivers. Rejecting such nudges results in lost wages, but it does not result in a loss of valorizable data for the gig economy app. As Berti, Fleming, and Walker document, driver complaints about these systems are often met with the response from Uber that the system is "designed to make you more successful," a response which bears a clear resemblance to the subjectivizing and productivity-inducing rhetoric and discourse characteristic of neoliberal biopolitical governance as well as social subjection, which are productive of immaterial skills and behavioral dispositions that coincide with abstractions of the liberal individual. (2021: 30, 38).

It is here that we can connect Kordela's claim that biopolitics is concerned with the "materialization of immaterial bodies" through social subjection as well as the "dematerialization of material bodies," through machinic subjugation, as these bodies are precisely the *living bodies* in which Virno claims the living potential of labor power resides; the co-operation of materialization-dematerialization produces the subjective and "autonomous" manager of these processes, the "unity-in-motion" appearing as human capital (Marx 1973: 640). The algorithmic processes we saw above abstract the pre-individual

into evaluative data while subjectivizing the gig economy worker through the individualizing rhetoric Berti, Fleming, et al. document. We may understand this joint process as one that must intervene on the interiority (social subjection) as well as the evaluative exteriority—the grid of intelligibility Foucault discusses—in order to preempt unmanageable expressions of labor power's potential to be used for political, subversive, or non-commodifiable aims. Deleuze and Guattari hint at a similarly preemptive intervention in their discussion of schizophrenia as one of capitalism and psychoanalysis's inherent limits, writing that the close subjective surveillance the analyzed subjects are impelled to initiate shows that it is "as though they risked unleashing flows that would be dangerous for capitalist production and charged with revolutionary potential." (2009: 239). We can only speculate on the ways that this process was accelerated not only by the debt crisis Lazzarato analyzes but also by the rebellions at the level of whole societies, rather than workplaces, that resulted on nearly every continent in the years 2010-2012.

Indeed, as Deleuze recognizes, each development of power entails a field of conflictual forces within the population. Even as, for contemporary subjects, power "sets itself up in each of them, dividing each within himself," the potential for subversion never disappears. Each move power makes puts into play a field of conflictual forces amongst what Deleuze calls "dividuals" that opens the possibility for "bending force, making it impinge on itself rather than on other forms." He continues: "It is a question of doubling the play of forces, of a self-relation that allows us to resist, to elude power, to turn life or death against power." (Deleuze 1998: 98, 179). It should, therefore, be possible for those who work in the gig economy to turn the contradictory modes of subjection/subjugation against the very power of which they have been constituted as nodes or platforms. There is an apparent oscillation between social subjection and machinic subjugation, with one side actively working against the other, even as they complement each other's methods of control and intertwine to produce the enterprise of the self in a biopolitical matrix concerned with the profitability and productivity of individuals and populations. Here, it is not so much that one side of this tension is overcome or negated by the other, and certainly not that the two reach a point of reconciliation, but that from the oscillations and tensions between them, a line of flight appears, liberating a field of forces that escapes even as it has been produced by the situation of subjection. As specific and particularly contemporary examples of the broad processes of biopolitical governance, a rebellion or subversion emerging from social subjection and machinic subjugation would necessarily also entail a rebellion against and subversion of those broader techniques of power and, hopefully, an undermining of the construction of the (neo-)liberal individual.

Our framing thus far of gig economy work in the context of the post-2008 crisis period, and the rebellions that followed, may need a slight but important modification in light of Deleuze and Guattari's (2009: 235) theorizations of capitalism's simultaneous production and antiproduction "the presence of antiproduction within production itself." Similarly, capitalism's production of its own limit and the evasion of the limit are not to be understood as successive moments in a longer productive process but as one and the same process. Deleuze and Guattari (2009: 246) show that an analogous process happens in the deterritorializing and decoding of flows (for example, in financialized and globalized capital), which releases a new flux that could become unpredictable were it not for the simultaneous process that axiomatizes these same flows, which, for them, is often the role of the state. Seen this way, the crisis of 2008 that Lazzarato analyzes, and especially the poly-crisis that has ensued, are at once anti-productive and productive, a limit: destructive in clearing new spaces for the production of surplus value and profit, taking advantage of already existing networks of circulation that had been ravaged by unemployment and debt, and axiomatizing them through the production of new algorithmic codes, *valorizing the circulation of human capital*. Marx's (1973: 621) claim about circulation and production, in which he states that capital can be understood as "the unity of circulation and production [and] the division between them," can be modified slightly here, as these two processes do not necessarily take place in separate spatiotemporal dimensions, as the production of subjectivity and human capital are codependent processes with that of the circulation and delivery of material commodities, as well as the perpetual extraction from life and labor. The apparatuses of algorithmic valorization produce at the same time as they profit. As the French collective Tiqqun stated, foreseeing already in 2009 the possibility for networks to become ever-more important sites of extraction of profit, "circulation provides

the best vector for universal traceability *and the order of flows*." (2009: 155-156). In a more immediately material sense, the many crises of the past fifteen years also cleared new space for the extension of two codependent flows of debt-money and income money, as seen in the gig economy, insofar as the gig economy worker must take on costs as an individual contractor, costs which must then be covered with the wage-money earned through gig work. The gig economy worker, in fact, represents the subjective core of this process, as the dual processes of social subjection and machinic subjugation are particularly useful techniques for biopolitical governance to use in formatting a disjunctive but unified individualized worker, caught between and within two flows, decoded through machinic subjugation and axiomatized as an accumulating individual by social subjection. These dual processes can be described, as Deleuze and Guattari (2009: 244) noted before Lazzarato first developed these terms, as "the privatization brought to bear on property, goods and the means of production, but also on *the organs of 'private man' himself*." The effect is that the "person has become 'private' in reality insofar as he derives from abstract quantities and becomes concrete in the becoming-concrete of these same quantities." (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 257). The private person, responsible for costs that previously employers would incur, possesses an identity, a conscience, a work ethic, and its attendant guilt, and is materialized on that basis through abstraction insofar as she is produced with the data of human capital through machinic subjugation. The limit to these dual techniques, however, is what Stiegler (2010: 49) has called the transindividual potential of the retentional apparatuses, that is, the potential for these apparatuses to store and circulate information in a way that traverses and transindividuates any given individual. Here, these are abstracted as flows of data, which emerge from and point towards a common in excess of any expression as human capital, as the classically understood individual derived from Enlightenment thinking, or as exchange value. But capital's evasion of this limit is precisely the reconstitution of an individual out of the transindividual common (the circulatory network) as someone whose experiences with machinic subjugation are simply quantitative signifiers meant to make workers "more successful" (not to mention more disciplined and more easily commanded in the context of the tendency towards real subsumption of society). This evasion thus could be understood as a metastable process that mirrors the simultaneity of production and antiproduction, whereby every time a culprit for the subject's struggles is identified, the focus changes, evoking market valorization via an alternation between the faceless, unidentifiable algorithms and a failed work on the self, processes of simultaneous deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The worker is still, as Deleuze claims and as Morini and Fumagalli (2020) affirm, divided against himself; yet, the processes traversing this division can either prevent the worker from identifying lines of flight that may immobilize the whole process or allow gig workers to take advantage of the inchoate transindividuating terrain towards which the algorithm's dividual—leaving behind the static, stable and definable subject—gestures.

5. The Case of Willy Solis: Towards a Horizon of Illegibility

Throughout Alvarez's interview with gig economy worker Willy Solis, we see the subjective core of the experiences with social subjection and machinic subjugation as post-crisis methods for managing the potentialities of labor power in such a way as to obscure its underlying common, which is in excess of its individual representations in either digital abstraction, exchange value, or the data of command. Solis worked throughout the period between the 2008 crisis and the start of the 2020 coronavirus pandemic for various gig economy apps, such as Instacart, GrubHub, and Shipt. Throughout the discussion with Alvarez (2021: 69), we see ample evidence of the biopolitical construction of human capital as the ideal figure for these gig economy apps; indeed, Solis says early in the discussion that according to his understanding as well, "the way it was sold to me, was that this is your own little independent business," indicating the subjectivizing force of gig economy rhetoric as well as its adoption by workers. This is a predictable outcome of a long history of precarious labor, especially since 2008, in which workers have been placed in a condition of "self-exploitation in response to the gift of autonomy, and dispensability in exchange for flexibility" (Ross 2008: 34). Through the analysis of this interview, we

will see first a concrete example of how human capital is constituted by Lazzarato's two modes of subjection/subjugation through a bifurcating operation that nonetheless remains a historically-specific mode of a broader, singular process of biopolitical governance. As Kordela says in a critique of Hardt and Negri's distinction between biopower and biopolitics, such a dualism departs significantly from Foucault's "interlacing of bios and political power" as a process that includes simultaneous management and production of life alongside the elimination and/or discarding of the parts of that life that cannot be mobilized for profit. (2013: 104).

Shipt is an app that allows customers to contact shoppers to go grocery shopping. Solis notes that after having several experiences that revealed to him the impossibility of being a successful shopper on Shipt, he began to investigate the contracts to which he was subject. He quickly realizes that there are contradictions between the way that gig economy workers are classified—as independent contractors rather than employees—and the policies that this app imposes on the gig shoppers. Solis reflects that the policy manual "has all these policies and rules specifying what you can and can't do, but it's all written very carefully in a language that *implies* very heavily that you *shouldn't* do X or Y, not that you legally *can't* do them." He continues: "What happens is these policies become like the norm, which is exactly what they want…Through policy, they control us. If we go to court, the contract is written in such a way that it would allow Shipt to say, 'No, these people are independent. We don't control them in any way.'" (Alvarez 2021: 76). Here, we see not only that there is a potential contradiction *between* social subjection and machinic subjugation but that there is also a contradiction *within* social subjection itself. Constituted as a worker and as a legal subject through the concretizing language of representation that we find in policy manuals as well as legal classifications such as independent contracting (Lazzarato 2015), we see that the old contradiction between the formally free laborer and the coerced and exploited worker that Marx (1977: 271) initially identified persists as a characteristic of social subjection. Nonetheless, these policies and rules function in order to abstract and channel the individual gig economy worker into measurable bits of data, such as the "acceptance rate" that measures the frequency and quantity of orders an individual worker accepts, which Solis states are "really important to us, because they dictate our earning potential." (Alvarez 2021: 81). Here, it should be noted that biopolitics' concern with the *potential* labor a worker can offer the productive population, and this potential's encoding in algorithmic predictions that manage the aleatory, appear to have been internalized and adopted as part of the gig worker's self-evaluation. Should a worker's acceptance rate decrease due to technical difficulties, such as the Shipt-provided credit card not functioning properly, which for Lazzarato (2015: 183) is an instance of machinic subjugation "[asking] only that he function correctly according to the received instructions," then this, in turn, lowers the number of customer orders offered to the individual gig shopper. As Griesbach et al. have also shown, grocery delivery apps similar to Shipt will also consistently offer orders only to those workers whose acceptance rates are sufficiently high. For Solis, the app may also tell him to drive a route to a customer's house that will make him late when he can rely on his own knowledge to arrive there more quickly; traffic can harm his customer rating, yet another data point into which the socially-subjected person is abstracted (Lazzarato 2015: 183). In either case, Solis states it directly: "The algorithm determines our pay." (Alvarez 2021: 81). As Lazzarato (2015:183) acknowledges, without, however, interrogating the specific relations of this figure to the new forms of what Jones (2021) calls subemployment, these two "processes and techniques are fully embodied in 'human capital,'" which produces behaviors and actions dictated by the combined operations of contracts, policies, manuals, and dividualizing abstractions into data and ratings. Hence, the person, the customer, is rated as the fully realized appearance of human capital, biopolitically managed and divided against himself through a joint operation of power that is nonetheless hidden by the measurable service performed by the worker in the circulation of goods. Measure encroaches upon terrains hitherto unknown to it, such as the efficiency of the subject's adherence to benchmarks produced through constant interaction between "subjects," individuals, and algorithmic code, but what the customer rates is the overall effect of these processes on the formation of human capital, a figure whose formation and standards increasingly affect us all.

Solis's ongoing construction as human capital, a process achieved through the biopolitical

management of potential, is evidenced by his reflections on his mindset throughout this period in his life. As a result of his assertion that, at the time, he still saw himself as an "individual business" or, in Foucault's words, an entrepreneur of the self, he became fiercely protective of the above-mentioned ratings. He, therefore, *motivated himself* to work harder and more quickly, claiming that Shipt creates "self-policing environments," but his account on the app was nonetheless deactivated as a result of being late for deliveries for reasons that were out of his control. (Alvarez 2021: 75, 79). This has clear effects on how gig workers such as Solis are subjectivized, however; as the mechanisms ensuring guilt, responsibility, and self-discipline further reveal themselves to be external and largely arbitrary, the process of the construction of the ideal biopolitical subject, requiring an internalization of command, breaks down. As a result, he was forced to take a training course without being able to make any deliveries or earn any income while completing its requirements. His subjectivation as a self-governing biopolitical subject is so thorough, and his economic circumstances so precarious, that we can see here the extent to which this governance extends to both paid and unpaid work on the self during the time not of work strictly speaking but during the time of life itself. I am not blaming Solis for his own subjection/ subjugation, as I do not subscribe to liberal notions of individual responsibility in the first place. My aim instead is to demonstrate the apparent effectiveness and thoroughgoing production of biopoliticized human capital whose circulation in the network, both within and beyond "work" time, is guaranteed no longer through economic coercion alone but through the self-management of each individual's living potentiality *by each individual*. Such coercion was a defining characteristic of the pre-gig economy precariat, but what Solis's experiences evidence is a generalization of conditions to which low-wage and immigrant workers have long been accustomed, and a combination of these conditions with those of digital management that precarious knowledge workers endured throughout the first decade of the 2000s (Ross 2008: 40). Still, Solis's discussion with Alvarez reveals that contradictions emerge that become apparent to the worker himself, contradictions that it will be worthwhile to explore in some detail.

Indeed, Solis clearly sees the contradictions both within the processes of social subjection and between social subjection and machinic subjugation: "With gig work…you are not independent in any way, shape or form. You *believe* that you are, at first, but as soon as something unexpected happens, you have to rely entirely on what the app tells you to do." (Alvarez 2021: 71). Important to note here is that Solis sees this lack of independence arising not from interaction with coworkers, managers, or bosses but from his close involvement and interaction with the functions of a depersonalized app controlled by algorithmic code, which, as Woodcock (2021) emphasizes, the mass of gig workers themselves produced. Here, the independence to which he refers above, and to which he initially aspired, could only become real to him on the condition that the proper behavior is instilled in him, realizing a fully-formed "abilities machine" through the correct training instituted by biopolitical algorithmic control (Foucault 2004: 226-229). Submitting Solis to the "received instructions" to resolve any unexpected issues, machinic subjugation operates not only by constituting subjects as platforms but also by asking them to submit to pre-established sets of choices, the responses to which enhance mechanisms of command, as we saw above in the case of Solis's acceptance rate. Weiskopf's algorithmic profiling continues to be relevant here as a term that captures machinic subjugation's recent technical mutations into a process that reduces all decisions to abstractions regardless of their ethical implications (Weiskopf 2020: 5). To reiterate, it is the human subject's ongoing interaction not with other workers but with sociotechnical code that signals to Solis his total lack of independence and his lack of freedom arising from the requirement to submit to the app's mandates. We know that the concept of the independent, autonomous individual finds historical roots in the Enlightenment identification of the individual with their property and acquisitive labor, along with guilt, responsibility, and self-discipline as defining affects of this figure and that the individual undergoes an acceleration and refinement with biopolitical neoliberalism, which immaterializes labor and its properties and internalizes much of these efforts, as discussed above. Yet, algorithmic management of gig economy workers here undermines, through machinic subjugation, one of its most central discursive constructions by revealing this total lack of independence and freedom, opening a line of flight onto a subjectivizing moment rooted in an undeniable ontological truth: the

freely independent subject is a fiction, as Gulli (2021) has shown, invented by capitalism to produce situations of subjection and subjugation. In fact, the *completion* of the figure of human capital must be distinguished from the *construction* of this figure as a metastable and ongoing project that one is continuously compelled to undertake precisely to the degree that its achievement is always and forever deferred. Nonetheless, Lazzarato's (2012: 135) claim that capital is reimbursed for its investments in human capital through behaviors, dispositions, and ethical conducts conceived as free is affirmed here, as these are developed at no cost to the gig economy apps but at significant cost to the worker, even as these measures contribute simultaneously to the ongoing reinforcement of the social subject and the production of a new skepticism about this figure. Solis's retraining exercises may also be conceived as a form of "care" of the self—as all unremunerated reproductive labor involves care—and the emotional labor it evidently involves is a foundation that is monetized and abstracted into the realm of infinite value through machinic subjugation, with intervals of remuneration punctuating the long lines of these processes that synchronize subjects' lives with the rhythms of capital accumulation. Whether conceived explicitly as care or in terms of the Marxist category of reproductive labor, the work involved in Solis's enrolment in unpaid retraining programs increasingly obscures not only its character as labor, thereby producing a self-policing subject whose freedom is captured in this putative self, but it tends towards a naturalization of the above-mentioned "social" interaction and collaboration with algorithmic code as a result of such internalizations. Against such a naturalization, however, Solis's realization that for "independent" contractors, companies like Shipt start "dictating just about everything you do and how you respond to every situation, [so that] you lose any semblance of independence" allows him to see emerging contradictions between Lazzarato's two modes of subjection/subjugation (Alvarez 2021: 74). Furthermore, it allows him to shift blame, and with it the guilt that accompanies any fully disciplined subject, away from himself and onto errors or blips in the machinic production and management of his subjectivity; he states directly that "the things I got deactivated for were not my fault," indicating the emergence of a consciousness that begins to move beyond the self-blame, self-discipline, and self-bossing encouraged by the figure of human capital (Alvarez 2021: 74). As two poles on either side of the oscillation that produces human capital as a lifelong manager of one's own potentiality, social subjection and machinic subjugation depend on one another for the construction of the biopolitical subject. What becomes apparent to Solis as he begins to escape the process of the production of human capital, as one whose antagonist is always internal, is that the internal divisions of the conflict against himself hit a limit such that the subjectivizing and individualizing principles begin to break down and the culprit for his troubles is no longer internal. As a result, social subjection, as the construction of a self with personal responsibility and its attendant guilt for all shortcomings, begins to fail.

This is the first step towards exiting the economy ofaffect, which the gig economy relies upon. For if it is no longer Solis's fault, and if the basis of his entrepreneurship of the self relies on personal responsibility, which in turn ratifies his participation in a competitive milieu populated by other gig workers (Griesbach et al. 2019: 3), then his overcoming of personal responsibility is the beginning of his deprogramming as a social subject. When the abstract and infinite machinic mechanisms fail to reinforce this concrete subject, or when this subject no longer becomes concrete through a self-governing adherence to deterritorializing abstractions, it is as if an ideological support beam has been cut out from under the entire micro-assemblage of the gig economy worker as a whole biopolitical subject. As a result of this, Solis does not return to the individualized subject as a source of any kind of power but begins to see the territory to which machinic subjugation's trans-individuating processes gesture, a territory in which the Nietzschean production of guilt fails at its task. I believe that this trans-individuating potential, first emerging from the digital and algorithmic methods capital devised to extract value from labor-power's potentiality, gives us all a common horizon to strive towards in which we can embrace dividuality as a tool of resistance, creating liberatory formations that are illegible to capitalist accumulation as they reject the social subject that provides the raw material for abstraction into exchange value.

Clearly, it would be inaccurate to claim that the unleashing of the potential inherent in gig economy labor power will be the catalyst for society-wide rebellions. The claim is instead that the processes of

subjectivation to which gig economy workers are subject can point to broader methods of biopolitical governance to which we are all now subject, as well as indicate processes of desubjectification from which resistance movements and the rebellions to come can learn a great deal. For Solis, the contradictions between machinic subjugation and social subjection, as well as a recognition of this condition as essentially common and therefore potential, begin to open onto lines of flight found in that very terrain that machinic subjugation entailed all along: the transindividual, or trans-dividual, as a metastable form never settling in either concrete manifestations or ethereal and ungraspable processes. As Gulli (2020: 33) argues, the trans-individuation that Stiegler as well as Simondon discuss should be renamed trans-dividuation to signify "relations without a subject," as it is the fully formed and completed subject, signified by the prefix in- (i.e., individual, individuation, etc.), which is the basis for all subjection and subjugation, and that obscures the processual becoming of the dividual. The processual interweaving of the trans-dividual with the general intellect, what we are all learning through our interactions with algorithmic and biopolitical management, can become antagonistic to the sociotechnical code to which Solis is subjected, an antagonism that could constitute the most radical break with the figure of human capital by subverting its production. This break would also subvert its epistemological presuppositions by making the subject unidentifiable according to the biopolitical heuristics of capture, which rely on the social subject's self and self-management for smooth operation. Lazzarato's two modes of subjection/ subjugation do not end with a stable, well-managed biopolitical whole constituting a mass of compliant bodies but with a multitude marked by periodic ruptures in the polycrisis period, ruptures that expose potentiality and give us all glimpses of the type of relations that it will be necessary to harness to make the coming rebellions less and less legible to capital and the state. Indeed, the illegibility of the abstractions discussed throughout could be recuperated to infuse whatever unmanageable expressions labor-power's potentiality may take in the next waves of uprising and rebellion. Perhaps gig economy workers could find ways to increase this illegibility emerging from metastable processes of trans-dividuation, but more important is for all of us to recognize that through the two modes of subjection analyzed throughout, a new form of resistance becomes clear whose potential has yet to be fully explored either by workers or by movements more broadly. Since we are all increasingly subject to these forms of algorithmic management, we must be willing to learn from the ways they are applied to gig work and find within these applications moments when the possibility for liberation becomes most apparent. At a moment when, as Tronti already foresaw in the 1960s, the entire "social nexus, the social fabric" becomes the object of capitalist dominance, this opens a moment for a refusal of capitalist forms of socialization, such that subjects "refuse to become mediators of capitalist development." (2020: 89, 178). Refusal today must include a refusal to become a legible subject classically understood (Goldberg 2018: 153).

References

Alvarez, Maximillian. 2021. *The Work of Living: Working People Talk about their Lives and the Year the World Broke*. London: OR Books.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1995. *Negotiations*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. 2009. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. New York: Penguin Books.

Esposito, Roberto. 2008. *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Foucault, Michel. 2004. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979*. New York: Picador.

Foucault, Michel. 2020. *Society Must Be Defended*. London: Penguin Random House.

Freytas-Tamura, Kimiko. "Food Delivery Apps are Booming. Their Workers are Often Struggling." Nytimes.com.

Fumagalli, Andrea, and Cristina Morini. 2020. "Anthropomorphic Capital and Commonwealth Value." Frontiers in Sociology 5. DOI: 10.3389/fsoc.2020.00024.

Goldberg, Greg. 2018. *Anxious Labor in the Digital Economy*. New York: New York University Press.

Griesbach, Kathleen, Luke Elliot-Negri, Ruth Milkman, and Adam Reich. 2019. "Algorithmic Control in Platform Food Delivery Work." *Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World* 5: 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023119870041

Gulli, Bruno. 2020. *Singularities at the Threshold: The Ontology of Unrest*. New York: Lexington Books.

Gulli, Bruno. 2005. *Labor of Fire: The Ontology of Labor between Economy and Culture*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Jones, Phil. 2021. *Work Without the Worker: Labor in the Age of Platform Capitalism*. New York: Verso Books.

Kordela, Kiarina. 2013. *Being, Time, Bios: Capitalism and Ontology*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Khreiche, Mario. 2019. "The Twilight of Automation." *Fast Capitalism* 16:2. doi:10.32855/fcapital.201902.011

Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2012. *The Making of Indebted Man*. South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e).

Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2015. *Governing by Deb*t. South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e).

Marx, Karl. 1977. *Capital, Vol. 1*. New York: Vintage Books.

Marx, Karl. 1973. *Grundrisse*. London: Penguin Books.

McCue, TJ. "57 Million U.S. Workers Are Part Of The Gig Economy." Forbes.com.

Murrapy, Patrick. 2016. *The Mismeasure of Wealth: Essays on Marx and Social Form*. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.

Negri, Antonio. 2013. *Time for Revolution*. Translated by Matteo Mandarini. London: Bloomsbury.

Perrig, Luca. 2021. "Manufacturing Consent in the Gig Economy" pp. 75-86 in *Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and Work*, Jamie Woodcock and Phoebe Moore, eds. London: Pluto Press.

Polleri, Matteo. 2019. Editor's note to "Co-research and Worker's Inquiry" by Romano Alquati. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 118(2): 470-477. DOI 10.1215/00382876-7381382.

Ross, Andrew. 2008. "The New Geography of Work: Power to the Precarious?" *Theory, Culture and Society* 25 (7/8), 31-49. DOI: 10.1177/0263276408097795.

Smith, Jason. 2020. *Smart Machines and Service Work: Automation in an Age of Stagnation*. London: Reaktion Books.

Stiegler, Bernard. 2010. *Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Tiqqun. 2011. *This is Not a Program*. South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e).

Tooze, Adam. 2022. "Welcome to the world of the polycrisis." *Financial Times*, October 8.

Tronti, Mario. 2020. *The Weapon of Organization*. Brooklyn, NY: Common Notions.

Virno, Paolo. 2004. *The Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life*. South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e).

Walker, Michael, Peter Fleming, and Marco Berti. 2021. "You Can't Pick Up a Phone and Talk to Someone': How Algorithms Function as Biopower in the Gig Economy." *Organization* 28(1): 30. DOI: 10.1177/1350508420978831.

Weiskopf, Richard. "Algorithmic Decision-Making, Spectrogenic Profiling, and Hyper-Facticity in the Age of Post-Truth." *Le foucaldien 6, no. 1* (2020): 3, 1–37. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16995/ lefou.62

Woodcock, Jamie. 2021. *The Fight Against Platform Capitalism: An Inquiry into the Global Struggles of the Gig Economy*. London: University of Westminster Press.